Gold Digger: Central banks want EVEN MORE GOLD as boom goes on
Gold prices are sitting near record highs
Central bank demand has been a big reason, topping 1000t in each of the past three years
And a survey of the world's central banks shows they see that trend continuing
Gold prices have absolutely sky-rocketed in the past two years, soaring from under US$2000/oz in late 2023 to more than US$3350/oz today and, at one point in April, as much as US$3500/oz.
That's great news for gold equities and their investors.
A sizeable portion of that price move could be flimsy, locked into safe haven demand based off temporary responses to signs of global economic and geopolitical instability – Trump's tariffs, the TACO trade (Trump Always Chickens Out – a gag from Wall Street that the Prez HATES), war in the Middle East and Ukraine.
But a large driver, underwriting the gold price according to many analysts, has been demand from central banks.
Sovereign buyers of bullion have hoovered up, on a net basis, around 1000t of gold in each of the past three years, well above historic levels.
The eighth annual central bank reserves survey from the World Gold Council, released this week, suggests central banks are even more bullish about the commodity now than they have been at any point since it launched.
Around 95% of central banks buyers expect central banks to increase their gold reserves this year, up from 81% last year, with 76% thinking gold will be a larger proportion of global reserve assets in five years compared to today, up from 62% last year.
43% of respondents have concrete plans to increase their gold reserves in the next 12 months, up from just 29% last year.
That comes despite the extraordinarily high cost currently of buying gold, WGC global head of central banks and head of Asia-Pacific (ex-China) Shaokai Fan said.
'After eight years of conducting this survey, we have reached an important milestone: nearly half of the central bank respondents intend to increase their own gold holdings in the coming year. This is remarkable, especially considering how many record-high prices we've hit so far in 2025," he said.
"Notably, this reflects the current global financial and geopolitical environments. Gold remains a strategic asset as the world faces uncertainty and tumult. Central banks are concerned about interest rates, inflation, and instability – all reasons to turn to gold to mitigate risk.'
Drivers
The desire to acquire more gold is even higher in emerging markets, with 48% of the 58 surveyed saying the plan to increase their gold reserves over the next 12 months, compared to just 21% of advanced economy respondents.
84% of EMDE (emerging markets and developing economies) who responded said inflation was behind their rationale for holding gold, with 81% pointing to the geopolitical situation.
Across advanced economies, those were key factors for 67% and 60% of respondents, respectively.
Those geopolitical fears are reflected also in where gold is being stored, with domestic storage of bullion up from 41% to 59% as a prepper mentality sets in. Around 73% of respondents also see moderately or significantly lower US dollar holdings in global reserves over the next five years.
That could happen in lockstep with higher Euro and Renminbi holdings, as economic turmoil, US debt levels and trade unpredictability from the new US Administration prompt foreign central bankers to diversify from the universal store of value.
Notably, no central bankers think their gold holdings will decrease this year, with 3% of respondents having indicated plans to sell gold in 2024 and 2023.
"Taken together, these findings clearly highlight that gold sentiment within the central banking community remains positive," the report authors said.
"Expectations point to continued gold buying over the next 12 months, reflecting sustained confidence in gold's strategic role amid evolving geopolitical and macroeconomic dynamics."
87% of EMDEs and 77% of advanced economy central banks pointed to gold's performance during a time of crisis as a key reason for holding gold, while 92% of advanced economy central banks say it's because of their historical position.
Winners and losers
Here's how ASX-listed precious metals stocks are performing:
CODE COMPANY PRICE WEEK % MONTH % 6 MONTH % YEAR % YTD % MARKET CAP
MRR Minrex Resources Ltd 0.009 -14% 0% 29% 0% 29% $ 10,848,675.03
NPM Newpeak Metals 0.02 82% 54% 54% 0% 82% $ 5,797,291.16
ASO Aston Minerals Ltd 0.022 0% 29% 144% 69% 144% $ 28,491,413.92
MTC Metalstech Ltd 0.13 -7% -4% -4% -45% -7% $ 27,133,811.38
GED Golden Deeps 0.021 -9% 17% -13% -48% -16% $ 3,896,765.42
G88 Golden Mile Res Ltd 0.012 0% -8% 50% 9% 33% $ 6,530,974.26
LAT Latitude 66 Limited 0.028 -24% -32% -47% 1300% -26% $ 4,015,219.74
NMR Native Mineral Res 0.2 0% 18% 441% 567% 413% $ 188,259,603.45
AQX Alice Queen Ltd 0.003 0% -40% -57% -57% -63% $ 3,748,920.20
SLZ Sultan Resources Ltd 0.005 0% -29% -17% -50% -17% $ 1,157,349.55
KSN Kingston Resources 0.13 0% 40% 76% 67% 83% $ 107,056,852.63
AMI Aurelia Metals Ltd 0.2075 -33% -30% 26% 22% 22% $ 363,903,117.60
GIB Gibb River Diamonds 0.035 9% 9% -13% -24% -13% $ 7,507,830.58
KCN Kingsgate Consolid. 2.32 4% 24% 74% 37% 81% $ 592,828,891.60
TMX Terrain Minerals 0.002 0% -20% -33% -33% -33% $ 4,497,113.20
BNR Bulletin Res Ltd 0.057 -7% -23% 46% 39% 46% $ 18,204,026.03
NXM Nexus Minerals Ltd 0.079 -5% 13% 61% 108% 76% $ 46,489,490.20
SKY SKY Metals Ltd 0.049 11% 9% -6% 53% -9% $ 32,692,345.64
LM8 Lunnonmetalslimited 0.23 10% 2% 10% 21% -8% $ 50,744,480.02
CST Castile Resources 0.062 5% -9% -17% -21% -23% $ 16,816,171.90
YRL Yandal Resources 0.1075 -10% -37% -45% -2% -39% $ 34,015,848.02
FAU First Au Ltd 0.004 14% 60% 100% 60% 100% $ 8,287,973.11
ARL Ardea Resources Ltd 0.385 -4% -8% 20% -25% 17% $ 82,061,036.85
GWR GWR Group Ltd 0.091 0% -13% 12% 5% 14% $ 29,448,205.61
IVR Investigator Res Ltd 0.032 -6% 60% 68% -36% 60% $ 49,270,766.79
GTR Gti Energy Ltd 0.004 0% 0% 0% -20% 14% $ 11,995,798.65
IPT Impact Minerals 0.0065 30% 8% -31% -57% -31% $ 25,709,644.80
BNZ Benzmining 0.44 -3% 29% 33% 226% 28% $ 70,376,347.75
MOH Moho Resources 0.004 0% -33% 0% 14% -20% $ 2,236,242.08
BCM Brazilian Critical 0.011 22% 10% 22% -35% 22% $ 14,415,865.59
PUA Peak Minerals Ltd 0.0245 17% 53% 181% 916% 216% $ 61,761,068.38
MRZ Mont Royal Resources 0.041 0% 0% -5% -33% -5% $ 3,486,221.51
SMS Starmineralslimited 0.019 -14% -27% -53% -27% -47% $ 3,530,326.41
MVL Marvel Gold Limited 0.014 -7% 0% 56% 75% 56% $ 19,504,319.84
PRX Prodigy Gold NL 0.002 0% 0% 0% -10% 0% $ 6,350,111.10
AAU Antilles Gold Ltd 0.004 0% 0% 33% 0% 33% $ 9,325,472.06
CWX Carawine Resources 0.094 0% -6% -5% -6% -6% $ 22,431,917.66
RND Rand Mining Ltd 2.12 7% 12% 36% 49% 40% $ 120,008,277.71
CAZ Cazaly Resources 0.023 21% 44% 53% 15% 64% $ 9,226,059.82
BMR Ballymore Resources 0.17 -8% 10% 31% 3% 42% $ 31,811,505.30
DRE Dreadnought Resources Ltd 0.01 -23% -23% -9% -63% -17% $ 60,954,000.00
ZNC Zenith Minerals Ltd 0.036 -8% -12% -10% -48% -10% $ 14,824,753.92
REZ Resourc & En Grp Ltd 0.019 12% 19% 6% 58% -17% $ 13,432,782.44
LEX Lefroy Exploration 0.1 -5% 28% 47% 10% 43% $ 24,842,013.80
ERM Emmerson Resources 0.13 0% 0% 76% 141% 69% $ 82,630,454.27
AM7 Arcadia Minerals 0.016 -11% -20% -16% -70% -16% $ 1,760,751.50
ADT Adriatic Metals 5.525 11% 52% 38% 39% 42% $ 1,650,437,362.24
AS1 Asara Resources Ltd 0.05 -11% 22% 127% 355% 163% $ 58,362,425.94
CYL Catalyst Metals 5.725 -15% -18% 119% 484% 122% $ 1,447,751,324.25
CHN Chalice Mining Ltd 1.5575 6% 44% 44% 17% 41% $ 632,168,530.50
KAL Kalgoorliegoldmining 0.04 -13% -5% 122% 25% 122% $ 15,258,487.08
MLS Metals Australia 0.017 -6% -6% -19% -19% -26% $ 12,388,231.91
ADN Andromeda Metals Ltd 0.012 -8% 9% 71% -29% 71% $ 45,760,116.89
MEI Meteoric Resources 0.115 -15% 10% 42% -32% 35% $ 280,423,533.84
SRN Surefire Rescs NL 0.002 100% -20% -40% -70% -32% $ 4,972,890.78
WA8 Warriedarresourltd 0.13 8% 8% 210% 160% 195% $ 135,918,297.48
HMX Hammer Metals Ltd 0.031 -3% -3% 0% -6% -6% $ 28,408,278.40
WCN White Cliff Min Ltd 0.02 -9% -31% 18% 29% 25% $ 48,267,722.92
AVM Advance Metals Ltd 0.048 0% 14% 41% 100% 41% $ 12,191,602.36
ASR Asra Minerals Ltd 0.0015 -25% -40% -50% -63% -50% $ 7,983,396.02
ARI Arika Resources 0.035 -15% 17% 35% 75% 30% $ 27,400,202.83
CTO Citigold Corp Ltd 0.003 -14% 0% -25% -25% -25% $ 9,000,000.00
SMI Santana Minerals Ltd 0.565 -7% 5% 24% 54% 16% $ 401,108,864.63
M2R Miramar 0.0035 0% 17% -13% -63% 17% $ 3,488,881.50
MHC Manhattan Corp Ltd 0.019 -14% -17% -14% -43% 0% $ 4,697,977.96
GRL Godolphin Resources 0.009 -10% 0% -33% -53% -38% $ 4,039,859.81
SVG Savannah Goldfields 0.018 -5% -22% -2% 3% -2% $ 20,548,386.70
EMC Everest Metals Corp 0.14 -7% 0% 4% 17% 4% $ 33,619,688.25
GUL Gullewa Limited 0.068 -8% -3% 21% -4% 21% $ 17,877,818.10
CY5 Cygnus Metals Ltd 0.089 -11% 25% -19% 71% -11% $ 80,006,377.07
G50 G50Corp Ltd 0.12 -14% 14% -20% -23% -23% $ 19,271,719.08
ADV Ardiden Ltd 0.15 3% 3% 15% 15% 11% $ 9,065,038.37
AAR Astral Resources NL 0.175 -3% 13% 21% 119% 30% $ 262,333,187.37
VMC Venus Metals Cor Ltd 0.115 -4% 15% 77% 51% 72% $ 21,574,155.13
NAE New Age Exploration 0.0035 -13% -13% -13% -13% 0% $ 8,117,734.22
VKA Viking Mines Ltd 0.0065 0% -7% -13% -19% -19% $ 8,735,666.87
LCL LCL Resources Ltd 0.007 0% 0% -22% -13% -30% $ 8,363,688.95
MTH Mithril Silver Gold 0.485 -8% 43% 33% 194% 21% $ 68,553,270.34
ADG Adelong Gold Limited 0.005 -17% -38% 25% -29% 11% $ 9,309,045.03
RMX Red Mount Min Ltd 0.008 -11% 0% -11% -20% -11% $ 3,719,662.37
PRS Prospech Limited 0.02 -5% -17% -33% -43% -31% $ 6,818,865.97
TTM Titan Minerals 0.35 -7% -5% 4% 0% -8% $ 96,461,111.22
AKA Aureka Limited 0.12 -4% -4% -8% -99% -11% $ 16,386,536.53
AAM Aumegametals 0.031 -9% -11% -24% -42% -26% $ 18,727,504.30
KZR Kalamazoo Resources 0.088 4% -1% 10% 4% 19% $ 19,087,235.98
BCN Beacon Minerals 0.03 7% 11% 36% 20% 36% $ 126,791,863.77
MAU Magnetic Resources 1.565 -5% -2% 39% 52% 42% $ 429,347,646.40
BC8 Black Cat Syndicate 0.85 1% 3% 49% 209% 50% $ 601,377,106.30
EM2 Eagle Mountain 0.006 20% 20% -27% -86% -33% $ 6,810,223.73
EMR Emerald Res NL 4.665 5% 10% 34% 33% 44% $ 3,024,120,122.80
BYH Bryah Resources Ltd 0.0135 -4% 238% 350% 93% 350% $ 11,309,395.79
HCH Hot Chili Ltd 0.55 -2% 15% -20% -41% -21% $ 81,861,920.46
WAF West African Res Ltd 2.175 -6% -5% 46% 51% 52% $ 2,496,359,535.81
MEU Marmota Limited 0.039 -5% -11% 5% -17% 0% $ 45,953,925.81
NVA Nova Minerals Ltd 0.35 4% 9% 25% 75% -5% $ 111,434,108.87
SVL Silver Mines Limited 0.115 -15% 29% 42% -30% 47% $ 213,573,047.04
PGD Peregrine Gold 0.16 -24% 14% 33% -27% 14% $ 13,999,877.27
ICL Iceni Gold 0.059 -31% 3% -11% -13% -17% $ 20,598,083.22
FG1 Flynngold 0.034 0% 36% 26% 26% 36% $ 12,913,443.51
WWI West Wits Mining Ltd 0.02 -26% -17% 43% 54% 43% $ 52,566,531.06
RML Resolution Minerals 0.04 18% 233% 208% 100% 233% $ 24,222,908.48
AAJ Aruma Resources Ltd 0.01 0% 0% -9% -33% -17% $ 2,775,727.14
HWK Hawk Resources. 0.015 -6% -17% -25% -58% -32% $ 4,063,941.74
GMN Gold Mountain Ltd 0.001 -50% -50% -67% -67% -67% $ 5,619,759.25
MEG Megado Minerals Ltd 0.012 0% -8% -25% 40% -29% $ 7,280,199.14
HMG Hamelingoldlimited 0.069 -17% -23% 10% -13% 8% $ 16,340,625.00
BM8 Battery Age Minerals 0.055 2% 4% -45% -61% -48% $ 6,704,050.27
TBR Tribune Res Ltd 5 2% 4% 17% 42% 17% $ 262,340,385.00
FML Focus Minerals Ltd 0.37 -6% 61% 106% 147% 118% $ 104,593,905.43
VRC Volt Resources Ltd 0.004 -11% -20% 33% -33% 33% $ 23,423,889.92
ARV Artemis Resources 0.0055 -8% -21% -39% -54% -31% $ 15,214,032.99
HRN Horizon Gold Ltd 0.57 -2% 9% 43% 104% 19% $ 79,661,957.65
CLA Celsius Resource Ltd 0.0065 -7% -7% -35% -41% -41% $ 21,948,419.16
QML Qmines Limited 0.042 5% 17% -21% -30% -22% $ 18,134,750.00
RDN Raiden Resources Ltd 0.005 -17% -29% -55% -83% -55% $ 17,254,457.21
TCG Turaco Gold Limited 0.47 -2% 21% 77% 147% 84% $ 433,911,101.28
KCC Kincora Copper 0.039 8% 22% 50% -35% 44% $ 9,419,163.52
GBZ GBM Rsources Ltd 0.006 0% -33% -14% -40% -25% $ 7,026,419.87
DTM Dart Mining NL 0.003 -14% -25% -70% -84% -67% $ 3,594,166.73
MKR Manuka Resources. 0.041 3% 21% 58% 5% 46% $ 30,842,003.75
AUC Ausgold Limited 0.725 -4% 21% 77% 96% 73% $ 253,788,176.56
ANX Anax Metals Ltd 0.007 -13% -13% -48% -77% -42% $ 6,179,652.97
EMU EMU NL 0.02 18% 0% -23% -23% -26% $ 4,224,969.36
SFM Santa Fe Minerals 0.035 -8% -5% 21% -13% 13% $ 2,912,751.56
PNR Pantoro Gold Limited 3.19 -13% -2% 111% 111% 108% $ 1,237,360,738.95
CMM Capricorn Metals 10.49 10% 20% 58% 118% 67% $ 4,431,507,241.88
VRL Verity Resources 0.021 -19% -22% -2% -57% 8% $ 6,985,586.70
HAW Hawthorn Resources 0.068 39% 24% 66% 6% 66% $ 17,755,827.49
BGD Bartongoldholdings 0.905 6% 29% 269% 223% 269% $ 200,889,359.10
SVY Stavely Minerals Ltd 0.011 -8% -8% -35% -68% -35% $ 6,528,505.12
AGC AGC Ltd 0.155 -9% 3% -3% -47% 0% $ 41,055,555.52
RGL Riversgold 0.004 -11% 0% 33% -33% 0% $ 6,734,850.37
TSO Tesoro Gold Ltd 0.025 0% -7% 19% -22% 25% $ 44,660,653.42
GUE Global Uranium 0.065 0% 8% 27% -27% 8% $ 30,013,808.42
CPM Coopermetalslimited 0.036 0% 0% -5% -49% -22% $ 2,820,803.40
MM8 Medallion Metals. 0.25 -12% -4% 158% 363% 108% $ 124,618,194.05
FFM Firefly Metals Ltd 1.075 2% 17% 18% 36% 16% $ 637,522,208.46
CBY Canterbury Resources 0.031 7% 63% 24% -33% 41% $ 6,015,785.98
SLA Solara Minerals 0.175 3% 46% 116% -30% 94% $ 10,147,344.03
SFR Sandfire Resources 11.385 0% 8% 23% 32% 23% $ 5,233,419,204.00
TAM Tanami Gold NL 0.05 9% 32% 67% 61% 67% $ 57,579,755.25
NWM Norwest Minerals 0.012 -11% 20% -30% -48% 0% $ 11,620,302.74
ALK Alkane Resources Ltd 0.72 -3% 1% 43% 38% 41% $ 439,017,871.70
BMO Bastion Minerals 0.002 27% -15% -36% -58% -36% $ 1,419,960.35
IDA Indiana Resources 0.078 3% -1% 28% 83% 28% $ 49,490,399.27
GSM Golden State Mining 0.0075 7% -17% -6% -17% -6% $ 1,955,594.41
NSM Northstaw 0.032 -5% -8% 102% 148% 102% $ 8,757,648.00
GSN Great Southern 0.024 4% 9% 71% 60% 60% $ 23,923,302.96
VAU Vault Minerals Ltd 0.4125 -4% -4% 27% -7% 25% $ 2,789,014,086.62
DEG De Grey Mining 0 -100% -100% -100% -100% -100% $ 5,915,063,112.00
THR Thor Energy PLC 0.01 -9% -9% -23% -38% -23% $ 7,107,898.35
CDR Codrus Minerals Ltd 0.037 0% -3% 95% -23% 118% $ 8,062,640.78
MDI Middle Island Res 0.021 -16% 17% 50% 62% 75% $ 6,157,913.39
WTM Waratah Minerals Ltd 0.265 -23% -13% 71% 141% 71% $ 60,713,189.16
POL Polymetals Resources 0.815 -4% 1% 1% 220% 3% $ 204,232,215.14
RDS Redstone Resources 0.0035 17% -42% 40% -30% 40% $ 3,619,935.74
NAG Nagambie Resources 0.017 -6% -6% 6% 55% -6% $ 13,656,139.85
BGL Bellevue Gold Ltd 0.935 1% 6% -20% -49% -17% $ 1,395,128,171.12
GBR Greatbould Resources 0.073 3% 20% 70% 18% 70% $ 55,536,411.26
KAI Kairos Minerals Ltd 0.0305 13% 17% 135% 190% 154% $ 76,296,453.48
KAU Kaiser Reef 0.18 0% 9% 9% 24% 13% $ 100,902,845.50
HRZ Horizon 0.049 -11% 0% 26% 36% 23% $ 123,302,133.50
CDT Castle Minerals 0.076 -14% -19% 27% -49% 27% $ 9,628,794.31
RSG Resolute Mining 0.6 5% 3% 48% 20% 52% $ 1,298,720,507.93
EVN Evolution Mining Ltd 7.855 -10% -3% 63% 116% 63% $ 15,578,504,854.48
CXU Cauldron Energy Ltd 0.01 43% 14% -7% -61% -14% $ 14,664,046.09
DLI Delta Lithium 0.175 3% -13% 6% -22% 3% $ 125,394,813.60
ALY Alchemy Resource Ltd 0.005 0% -9% -29% -38% -29% $ 5,890,381.28
NH3 Nh3Cleanenergyltd 0.03 -9% 20% 58% 173% 67% $ 16,938,143.55
OBM Ora Banda Mining Ltd 0.915 -10% -9% 42% 158% 41% $ 1,751,893,791.45
AVW Avira Resources Ltd 0.007 0% 0% -65% -65% -65% $ 1,610,000.00
LCY Legacy Iron Ore 0.009 0% 0% 0% -33% -10% $ 87,858,383.26
PDI Predictive Disc Ltd 0.3875 -7% 2% 68% 104% 68% $ 1,035,072,490.97
MAT Matsa Resources 0.061 -13% -13% 74% 110% 74% $ 44,000,871.78
ZAG Zuleika Gold Ltd 0.018 50% 50% 38% -5% 38% $ 13,353,838.69
GML Gateway Mining 0.028 -10% 0% 22% 8% 33% $ 11,855,788.56
SBM St Barbara Limited 0.325 -12% 7% 10% 51% 44% $ 341,096,597.42
SBR Sabre Resources 0.009 0% 13% -10% -47% -10% $ 3,550,157.40
STK Strickland Metals 0.14 0% 27% 63% 27% 65% $ 305,418,572.60
CEL Challenger Gold Ltd 0.086 -1% 12% 126% 51% 83% $ 177,633,790.25
GG8 Gorilla Gold Mines 0.435 -11% -17% 67% 1446% 67% $ 279,429,093.42
NST Northern Star 20.34 -5% 8% 33% 52% 32% $ 29,113,820,447.62
OZM Ozaurum Resources 0.066 -8% -14% 154% 14% 120% $ 15,120,723.62
TG1 Techgen Metals Ltd 0.024 -4% -4% -29% -14% -31% $ 3,807,977.04
XAM Xanadu Mines Ltd 0.079 1% 0% 58% 32% 61% $ 178,714,472.74
AQI Alicanto Min Ltd 0.028 -13% 0% -24% 70% -24% $ 23,748,003.33
KTA Krakatoa Resources 0.012 0% 20% 33% 9% 26% $ 6,821,474.28
ARN Aldoro Resources 0.33 10% 3% 6% 400% -13% $ 57,296,432.03
WGX Westgold Resources. 2.945 -5% 13% -1% 25% 4% $ 2,801,035,779.30
MBK Metal Bank Ltd 0.011 -15% 10% -21% -52% -27% $ 5,472,048.98
A8G Australasian Metals 0.067 -3% -3% -13% -14% -15% $ 3,878,611.58
TAR Taruga Minerals 0.008 0% -11% -20% 14% -20% $ 6,423,786.52
DTR Dateline Resources 0.079 -21% 114% 2533% 778% 2157% $ 236,251,292.67
GOR Gold Road Res Ltd 3.36 -1% 2% 64% 107% 64% $ 3,650,300,841.60
S2R S2 Resources 0.064 -14% -28% -6% -35% -4% $ 33,523,787.98
NES Nelson Resources. 0.003 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% $ 6,515,782.98
TLM Talisman Mining 0.135 -4% -10% -36% -48% -34% $ 24,481,645.37
BEZ Besragoldinc 0.056 30% 37% -16% -43% -38% $ 22,436,836.11
PRU Perseus Mining Ltd 3.555 -5% 5% 34% 51% 38% $ 4,849,508,582.72
SPQ Superior Resources 0.0035 -13% -13% -42% -50% -42% $ 9,483,930.90
PUR Pursuit Minerals 0.037 -10% -10% -66% -75% -61% $ 3,690,156.63
RMS Ramelius Resources 2.655 -6% 4% 23% 42% 28% $ 3,013,260,660.80
PKO Peako Limited 0.002 0% -20% -33% -35% -33% $ 4,463,225.88
ICG Inca Minerals Ltd 0.009 80% 80% 50% 29% 80% $ 14,187,510.56
A1G African Gold Ltd. 0.16 -3% 42% 220% 567% 191% $ 84,220,475.52
NMG New Murchison Gold 0.018 6% 20% 80% 300% 100% $ 177,315,301.93
GNM Great Northern 0.013 0% -24% -7% 8% -7% $ 2,164,807.08
KRM Kingsrose Mining Ltd 0.031 3% 0% -14% -23% -11% $ 24,112,848.61
BTR Brightstar Resources 0.5 -11% -29% 0% 33% 0% $ 241,014,510.72
RRL Regis Resources 4.705 -4% 2% 78% 170% 85% $ 3,490,307,131.08
M24 Mamba Exploration 0.012 0% -14% 0% -33% 0% $ 4,132,318.54
TRM Truscott Mining Corp 0.052 -5% -20% -33% -15% -33% $ 9,955,325.12
TNC True North Copper 0.355 13% 65% -88% -93% -88% $ 44,583,975.80
MOM Moab Minerals Ltd 0.001 0% 0% -50% -80% -50% $ 1,733,666.03
KNB Koonenberrygold 0.035 -20% -48% 192% 106% 192% $ 37,913,621.72
AWJ Auric Mining 0.175 3% -9% -51% 0% -49% $ 32,546,692.85
ENR Encounter Resources 0.26 13% 13% -13% -28% -20% $ 119,710,156.56
SNG Siren Gold 0.0505 -5% 3% -20% -42% -22% $ 10,948,530.45
STN Saturn Metals 0.385 4% 43% 97% 97% 88% $ 156,284,475.48
USL Unico Silver Limited 0.28 2% 27% 56% 93% 44% $ 122,624,251.40
PNM Pacific Nickel Mines 0.024 0% 0% 0% -17% 0% $ 10,103,834.52
AYM Australia United Min 0.003 50% 0% -25% 50% -25% $ 5,527,732.46
HAV Havilah Resources 0.18 -3% 6% -14% 0% -20% $ 62,762,414.76
SPR Spartan Resources 2.08 -6% 4% 59% 154% 48% $ 2,588,762,477.66
PNT Panthermetalsltd 0.014 0% 8% 40% -31% 27% $ 4,212,663.67
MEK Meeka Metals Limited 0.155 -11% 24% 104% 400% 101% $ 377,355,775.50
GMD Genesis Minerals 4.61 -3% 17% 81% 155% 87% $ 5,097,869,029.00
PGO Pacgold 0.067 -1% -6% -9% -36% -11% $ 9,940,386.82
FEG Far East Gold 0.16 7% 10% -11% 52% -11% $ 56,889,255.22
MI6 Minerals260Limited 0.125 -7% -14% -4% 0% -4% $ 248,079,999.96
IGO IGO Limited 3.885 -8% -6% -21% -35% -19% $ 3,066,934,642.65
GAL Galileo Mining Ltd 0.105 -19% -9% -13% -49% -16% $ 20,750,617.34
RXL Rox Resources 0.295 2% 5% 64% 111% 48% $ 216,100,888.87
PTN Patronus Resources 0.07 6% 21% 43% 25% 43% $ 114,617,846.28
CLZ Classic Min Ltd 0.001 0% 0% 0% -50% 0% $ 2,790,941.81
TGM Theta Gold Mines Ltd 0.135 -4% 13% -27% -4% -25% $ 118,722,864.51
FAL Falconmetalsltd 0.13 -7% 0% 0% -48% 13% $ 26,550,000.00
SPD Southernpalladium 0.6 0% 208% 0% 43% 0% $ 66,843,750.00
ORN Orion Minerals Ltd 0.011 0% -8% -27% -27% -27% $ 75,354,926.00
TMB Tambourahmetals 0.022 -12% -12% -4% -67% 5% $ 3,235,981.01
TMS Tennant Minerals Ltd 0.006 0% -14% -33% -70% -33% $ 6,395,342.49
AZY Antipa Minerals Ltd 0.74 -4% 35% 196% 517% 185% $ 434,657,168.25
PXX Polarx Limited 0.0075 -6% -6% 7% -32% 15% $ 17,816,257.34
TRE Toubani Res Ltd 0.29 -5% 7% 115% 57% 71% $ 74,618,436.37
AUN Aurumin 0.097 8% 45% 67% 162% 47% $ 47,448,973.82
GPR Geopacific Resources 0.0225 -6% 18% 16% 10% 13% $ 73,196,702.50
FXG Felix Gold Limited 0.145 -3% -3% 67% 174% 73% $ 59,630,786.15
ILT Iltani Resources Lim 0.225 2% -6% 25% -32% 10% $ 12,922,541.66
BRX Belararoxlimited 0.06 0% -48% -67% -69% -66% $ 9,308,947.43
TM1 Terra Metals Limited 0.048 14% 60% 118% 55% 71% $ 23,894,848.30
TOR Torque Met 0.125 -4% 26% 145% -14% 136% $ 64,854,955.88
ARD Argent Minerals 0.022 -15% 22% 29% 47% 29% $ 31,815,090.56
LM1 Leeuwin Metals Ltd 0.1325 -5% 2% 121% 128% -5% $ 12,600,798.00
SX2 Southgold Consol 7.935 5% 37% 0% 0% 0% $ 1,114,325,536.00
UVA Uvrelimited 0.09 0% -10% 6% -18% 1% $ 5,418,000.09
VTX Vertexmin 0.26 -13% 11% 41% 206% 25% $ 56,478,241.96
Zuleika Gold (ASX:ZAG)
Mark Creasy backed Zuleika Gold has a bone to pick with $1.5 billion ASX gold miner Catalyst Metals (ASX:CYL) through no smaller a forum than the WA Supreme Court ... actually it's a bone that's already been picked with Vango Mining, which Catalyst acquired a couple years back.
It's going to head there in October this year to find out the quantum of damages payable by Catalyst after the Supreme Court found in March 2022 that entities now owned by Catalyst had wrongfully repudiated a JV agreement which "prevented Zuleika from earning up to 50% of the beneficial interest" in the tenement hosting the K2, K1 and PHB-1 prospects and the K2 Area at its project in the Plutonic gold district.
'It has taken five long years to get to this stage but, on behalf of and for all Zuleika Shareholders, I am pleased we can finally present to the Supreme Court the significant opportunity lost to us when the Catalyst Entities breached Zuleika's rights under the BTS Agreement," Zuleika exec chair Annie Guo said.
'This includes denying Zuleika's immediate beneficial interest in 4.1% of the Tenement and K2 Area, and therefore 4.1% of the underlying gold resource, and denying Zuleika the opportunity to earn in up to a 50% interest in the Tenement and K2 Area in alignment with the terms of the BTS Agreement.
'We long ago identified the potential and prospectivity of the Tenement and K2 Area and are not surprised that – today – they are earmarked to underpin the future of the Plutonic Gold Project.
'The Court has already confirmed that Zuleika was denied its rights under the BTS Agreement – and dismissed the Catalyst Entities' appeal – so Zuleika's focus now is to ensure we receive fair value for what is owed to us.
'Zuleika will provide further updates as this long-running litigation finally reaches its conclusion.'
The 81,000oz K2 underground is now a planned satellite for Catalyst's Plutonic gold mine, with Zuleika claiming for losing the right to 50% of the K2 project, and unpaid entitlements under the sale agreement and royalty deed listed at $6m, legal costs and the transfer of a 4.1% beneficial interest in the tenement and K2 Area.
Catalyst meanwhile has tried to distance itself from the situation, saying the Zuleika announcement, which references incidents that happened long before it acquired Vango Mining in 2023, is just the statement of trial dates and "conveys no new or material information".
It says the dates have been known to Zuleika and Catalyst since they were set on April 11. "As to why these dates have only become material to Zuleika now is not known to Catalyst," the company said.
"The Board of Catalyst considers this to be nothing more than an attempt to generate publicity and exert leverage against the defendants in the context of the forthcoming Supreme Court hearing," CYL told the ASX.
Cazaly was up there in the past week after starting RC drilling at the Duke of York gold prospect.
The 2000m drill program will test beneath historical gold workings at the target, part of its Goongarrie gold project to the north of Kalgoorlie.
Historical drill intercepts at Duke of York included strikes of 13m at 3.5g/t and 8m at 10.7g/t on the margin of mafic and sedimentary rock under the old Duke of York workings.
'I am extremely pleased to announce that drilling has commenced at Duke of York, the first of many gold targets to be tested in this highly prospective district," MD Tara French said.
"Our team has worked extremely hard to obtain approvals which places us on the ground less than 3 months after exercising the option to earn up to 80% of the Goongarrie Gold project with Brightstar Resources (ASX:BTR).
"It's a very exciting time to be drilling beneath historical gold workings in the eastern goldfields, and we can't wait to see the results of this first drilling campaign.'
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Perth Now
38 minutes ago
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EU-Aust free trade deal: a "middle finger to Trump"
There is appetite for the European Union and Australia to signal a "middle finger to Trump" by uniting on a long-awaited free trade deal but some in Brussels are tempering expectations of a quick turnaround. Trade talks kicked off in 2018 but Canberra walked away about 18 months ago over unsatisfactory market access for beef and lamb producers, and a reluctance to give up naming rights on products for geographical origin reasons, including feta, parmesan and prosecco. Fast forward to 2025 and US President Donald Trump's tariff antics have brought both parties back to the negotiating table. There was speculation of a quick conclusion with the Australian Financial Review reporting European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen had flagged a trip to Australia for late July or early August in anticipation of signing a deal. This echoed the fact she had also been quick to flag an agreement while offering Anthony Albanese her congratulations on becoming prime minister via Twitter in 2022. But multiple EU spokespeople have declined to confirm the travel, telling AAP a Down Under trip is "not on the radar". Despite acknowledging renewed political will, various sources in Brussels are cautioning patience. "There is no rush," according to one inside the EU Commission. "I wouldn't even say the end of the year, I would say more next year." Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, a senior fellow with Brussels think-tank Bruegel, estimates it could take at least another six months to resolve outstanding issues on agricultural tariffs and quotas. "The broad contour of the deal is already negotiated," he told AAP. "They know where the skeletons are buried. It takes a political grand bargain to do it." He noted that if the EU makes concessions, it would likely encounter an angry backlash from French and Polish farmers, who also opposed the EU's deal last year with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. However tractor and manure street protests wouldn't be enough to block a deal with Canberra, he said. Amid Washington's shift to extreme trade protectionism, an EU-Australian free trade deal would send a strong message to the Trump administration, Kirkegaard said. "As two of America's traditional allies, if both the EU and Australia find themselves subject to US tariffs, what better way than to do a deal with each other," he said. "So perhaps both countries feel this political signal is kind of a middle finger to Trump as well." Back in Melbourne, Sicilian-born cheesemaker Giorgio Linguanti from That's Amore Cheese faces an anxious wait to find out whether he can continue to market his wares using generic terms like parmesan or mozzarella. Yet he is open to compromise. "We should call it Australian parmesan and Australian feta because Australian milk is the best in the world," he said. Canberra and Brussels announced on Wednesday separate negotiations on a defence pact to boost defence industry, cyber-security and counter-terrorism co-operation. But it would not have military deployment obligations.
The Advertiser
2 hours ago
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One wouldn't want to deprive Albanese of any credit he deserved, but...
Anthony Albanese is falling back into the sort of bad habits that could bring him down as Labor leader. Despite talking of national conversations about productivity, about tax, and about Australia's sense of itself, he seems to think discussions can take place behind closed doors, with selected participants working off his agenda, and with the general public unable to see, hear, or get even a smell or a taste of what it was all about until it has come to its predetermined conclusion. That's not a way to build a national consensus or a common understanding of how the nation will face the future. While backroom deals and fixes may see him through some of the economic problems, a failure to have a wide consultation could do him great damage when it comes to Australia's reorienting itself to current circumstances in our neighbourhood, and in whatever remains of the Western alliance. It may be that the AUKUS deal can survive, in one form or another, the big shifts brought on by Donald Trump. Australian ministers, from Albanese down, are pretending, or hoping, it can, even as NATO and other Western alliance defence arrangements seem headed for collapse. Some seem to think that the US can maintain a system of alliances around the western Pacific - involving Japan, Korea and Australia - even as European relationships implode. Perhaps, but, whether in the Pacific or the wider world, there cannot be any reversion to the situation before Trump arrived, or the situation after Trump imposed unilateral tariffs on all of his allies. No post-Trump president will be able to pretend that nothing happened during the Trump Reich, and that normal service can quickly be resumed. Trump has fractured the Bretton Woods system of international trade - what Richard Marles insists on calling "a rules-based international order" long after the game has changed. He has repudiated much of the web of relationships around Europe and the Middle East, particularly over the future of Ukraine. The value of American guarantees, promises and understandings (including ANZUS and AUKUS) is much diminished, as is the idea of one-in, all-in if someone breaches the peace. And who knows how Israel's adventures into Iran have changed the strategic map of the Middle East. If America is to have its druthers, future trade arrangements between nations will be based on bilateral arrangements, not multinational ones. Alternatively - and more likely - new regional and political alliances will form around multilateral agreements which do not include the United States. The trans-Pacific partnership - quite possibly including China, Canada and Europe - might well be a model. America may make an individualised deal with each nation, but even if it draws back from initial tariffs settings, most nations will see the wisdom of seeking markets anywhere but in the US. For many countries, a primary market will be China, preferred as a buyer or a seller ahead of the unreliable US. Australians can hardly help but be aware that the whole system of our international relationships is changing, and that Australia itself may have little influence on the final wash-up. We are not a big enough player to be invited into all the big-boys' clubs. When the US thinks of its alliances, Australia is not the first country that comes to its mind: we are probably 12th in the queue. To the extent that America-First recognises old obligations, the deals in squaring off the 11 higher in priority will severely pinch what is available to us. It will be worse if the US picks off its "allies" one by one in the manner of the supplicants (Australia included) seeking to negotiate individual deals for themselves. I am always reminded of what a senior American official once said to Margaret Thatcher when, in Washington, she spoke of the bonds of kinship and special relationship. The official said, "Madam, you may be right about this common history and so on, but I assure you that when the US is thinking of its national interest, it thinks of Britain about as often as when Britain, considering its own interest, thinks of the Isle of Wight". Polls show that Australian trust of the US has plummeted. Our distrust of Trump's America is higher than almost any other country, even Canada, and we haven't been threatened with an imperial takeover. A majority rate China as more trustworthy, even in spite of the freeze in relationships and trade sanctions after China was consciously baited by the Morrison government. Other polls show that Australians well understand the difference between a national leader and his policies, and the temper of the general population. But after the Trump election, there is also unease about his constituencies, the authoritarian, even fascist push, the influence in policy of racism, bigotry and anti-immigration feeling and the increasing influence of the Christian fundamentalist right. Much goodwill has evaporated. In contrast, the defence and intelligence establishment has not wavered in preferring the US even to Australia itself. But politicians on both sides of the fence are increasingly conscious that there is no automatic Australian mood to support the US if there were an attack on Taiwan. Nor is there any Australian instinct to see the world through American eyes. National unease is hardly helped by war in the Middle East, the reduction of Gaza and the massacre of its population, by events in Ukraine and by the apparent incapacity of Europe to unite militarily if the US is not an active partner. There is no shortage of information in public forums, much of which is highly critical of the US. Anyone can have a well-informed opinion. But that opinion is hardly being guided by Albanese or the Australian government. Very little is emerging officially canvassing possibilities about what could or should happen. Ministers seem to be denying that anything much is happening. Albanese seems to think that public comment or discussion by official figures should be avoided, lest it cause offence to Trump and inspire or incite some violent reaction. In Canada, Britain, Germany and France, ministers are openly discussing the brave new world. But not here. It is unlikely that Trump or the official US will judge that the comparative silence from Australia means that there is no discussion occurring here. But they may well deduce that the silence from the politicians, and from military and intelligence figures, suggests that the docile ally will not make much fuss. Or that it is unlikely to shift towards our own view of the world, rather than America's. An obvious example might be the American trade war with China, or in making it clear that Australia is not planning on getting involved in any measures to defend Taiwan. But there are also other issues - for example, over the nuclear submarine purchases, or vital US intelligence gathering and command equipment at Pine Gap and elsewhere. Albanese is mouthing polite nothings, other than insisting that he is not about to double our defence spending just because an American media figure-cum Secretary of Defence says we should. Marles, the weakest link in the Australian chain, is a dead letter in any argument, even or particularly when he seems to be parroting a position that has originated in the US. It cannot be expected that significant change to the relationship will occur only incrementally. Or that it will evolve naturally from events in the control of others. Nor can we assume that Albanese, or Marles, or for that matter Penny Wong, have the wit and the speed to shift American opinion. There has not even been any sort of softening-up process. The turning point, perhaps, will be when Albanese finally gets his meeting with Trump. Even there, more likely than not, it will be statements from Trump rather than Albanese to which even Australians will pay most attention. We are not leaving "home". It's the US throwing us out. Albanese, presumably, has rehearsed his reaction to many of the propositions that Trump can be expected to put. He has, after all, put very similar ones to other countries, and he has, additionally, made it quite clear that we are nothing special in his eyes. But Albanese has not confided his strategy or tactics to Parliament, in the media, or in open forums. He has not addressed conferences at which the government's opinions are communicated. What is on the public record, whether in relation to the strategic thinking around AUKUS or Australia's strategic situation generally, is full of waffly words and slogans that could mean anything. Is discussion to be an invitation-only jamboree, or can every parrot in every pet shop have a go? MORE JACK WATERFORD: Could it be that Albanese expects that a matter so vital is to be resolved merely in Cabinet, without any wide public discussion? Or some committee of old Labor warhorses such as Kim Beazley and Stephen Smith? Is there a soldier in the land (or for that matter a spook) to whom the political, social and military problems should be consigned without the popular will being engaged? Is there a place at the table for Paul Keating, Malcolm Turnbull, Gareth Evans or Bob Carr, or any of the third of the electorate who vote, not for Labor nor the Liberals but for parties such as the Greens, the teals, or independents such as David Pocock? Is productivity, for which a conference of insiders is planned, more important than the place of Australia among the nations of the world? One has to hope that Albanese's silence about a time and a place for public discussion and debate is not for want of a plan to engage the population. But so far, on form, one has to expect that he lacks a plan. He has no model for public discussion, and no apparent appetite for it. This could involve reverting to the style of government that he delivered in his first term. Secretive. Unwilling and seemingly unable to communicate with the general public, including those who want Labor to succeed. (Labor is always more awkward, and guilty looking, in consulting its own traditional supporters rather than hostile captains of industry.) Will there be ready but unaccountable access for some special interests, such as the arms industry and the defence establishment? There's an already established pattern of insiders given undue and improper influence, in the same manner as the gambling and liquor crowd and the old media lobbies on other issues. One thing is for sure. No one can say that Albanese has a popular mandate, arising from the landslide election, to do what he wants on such a fundamental change in our circumstances. Defence and foreign affairs scarcely figured in the election, and the two major parties had no disagreements of any substance. No citizen acquired any extra information from any defence debate. It may be true that a debate, if it occurs, will be rancorous. The big vested interests are keen on throwing about claims of being soft on national security and having ambiguous and uncertain loyalties. It could become as unpleasant as the Voice referendum. But that is not a reason for having a secret debate, or no debate at all. This matters too much. Our own sense of identity, culture, history and future are involved. Australia needs to develop an understanding of Australian nationality which has moved on, a bit at least, from when white men flew a flag containing a Union Jack at Gallipoli 110 years ago. It's a debate that embraces Australians whose ancestors were not here at the time of Gallipoli but are in every sense citizens nonetheless. A debate that involves Aboriginal Australians, whose interests were usually ignored while compiling patriotic encomia and pap. A debate involving young Australians who will have to live in a harsher, hotter and more hostile world because of pragmatic decisions made by current politicians on both sides of the fence. It's not for Albo to run Australians inside or out of the arena. Some within a smug party, having won the election more comfortably than anyone expected, have come to think that the election was won by Albanese's calm, patience and political genius. That the very landslide is a refutation of suggestions that first-term Labor was a "disappointment", with an inarticulate leader too timid to go far or fast, or to take ordinary voters into his confidence. Any prime minister who wins a second, or third, term will see it as a vindication of his or her personality, governing style and methods. They will expect that internal and external critics treat them with more respect in future. Particularly for their political skills. One wouldn't want to deprive Albanese of any credit he deserved. But it is just possible that a sizeable proportion of the increased vote for Labor came more from fear of what sort of leadership or policies a MAGA-Down-Under Peter Dutton might have delivered than from enthusiastic re-endorsement of Albanese and his team. Or embrace of Albo's vision - whatever it was - of old alliances, new alliances, and how we trade with, talk with and share with our neighbours. Anthony Albanese is falling back into the sort of bad habits that could bring him down as Labor leader. Despite talking of national conversations about productivity, about tax, and about Australia's sense of itself, he seems to think discussions can take place behind closed doors, with selected participants working off his agenda, and with the general public unable to see, hear, or get even a smell or a taste of what it was all about until it has come to its predetermined conclusion. That's not a way to build a national consensus or a common understanding of how the nation will face the future. While backroom deals and fixes may see him through some of the economic problems, a failure to have a wide consultation could do him great damage when it comes to Australia's reorienting itself to current circumstances in our neighbourhood, and in whatever remains of the Western alliance. It may be that the AUKUS deal can survive, in one form or another, the big shifts brought on by Donald Trump. Australian ministers, from Albanese down, are pretending, or hoping, it can, even as NATO and other Western alliance defence arrangements seem headed for collapse. Some seem to think that the US can maintain a system of alliances around the western Pacific - involving Japan, Korea and Australia - even as European relationships implode. Perhaps, but, whether in the Pacific or the wider world, there cannot be any reversion to the situation before Trump arrived, or the situation after Trump imposed unilateral tariffs on all of his allies. No post-Trump president will be able to pretend that nothing happened during the Trump Reich, and that normal service can quickly be resumed. Trump has fractured the Bretton Woods system of international trade - what Richard Marles insists on calling "a rules-based international order" long after the game has changed. He has repudiated much of the web of relationships around Europe and the Middle East, particularly over the future of Ukraine. The value of American guarantees, promises and understandings (including ANZUS and AUKUS) is much diminished, as is the idea of one-in, all-in if someone breaches the peace. And who knows how Israel's adventures into Iran have changed the strategic map of the Middle East. If America is to have its druthers, future trade arrangements between nations will be based on bilateral arrangements, not multinational ones. Alternatively - and more likely - new regional and political alliances will form around multilateral agreements which do not include the United States. The trans-Pacific partnership - quite possibly including China, Canada and Europe - might well be a model. America may make an individualised deal with each nation, but even if it draws back from initial tariffs settings, most nations will see the wisdom of seeking markets anywhere but in the US. For many countries, a primary market will be China, preferred as a buyer or a seller ahead of the unreliable US. Australians can hardly help but be aware that the whole system of our international relationships is changing, and that Australia itself may have little influence on the final wash-up. We are not a big enough player to be invited into all the big-boys' clubs. When the US thinks of its alliances, Australia is not the first country that comes to its mind: we are probably 12th in the queue. To the extent that America-First recognises old obligations, the deals in squaring off the 11 higher in priority will severely pinch what is available to us. It will be worse if the US picks off its "allies" one by one in the manner of the supplicants (Australia included) seeking to negotiate individual deals for themselves. I am always reminded of what a senior American official once said to Margaret Thatcher when, in Washington, she spoke of the bonds of kinship and special relationship. The official said, "Madam, you may be right about this common history and so on, but I assure you that when the US is thinking of its national interest, it thinks of Britain about as often as when Britain, considering its own interest, thinks of the Isle of Wight". Polls show that Australian trust of the US has plummeted. Our distrust of Trump's America is higher than almost any other country, even Canada, and we haven't been threatened with an imperial takeover. A majority rate China as more trustworthy, even in spite of the freeze in relationships and trade sanctions after China was consciously baited by the Morrison government. Other polls show that Australians well understand the difference between a national leader and his policies, and the temper of the general population. But after the Trump election, there is also unease about his constituencies, the authoritarian, even fascist push, the influence in policy of racism, bigotry and anti-immigration feeling and the increasing influence of the Christian fundamentalist right. Much goodwill has evaporated. In contrast, the defence and intelligence establishment has not wavered in preferring the US even to Australia itself. But politicians on both sides of the fence are increasingly conscious that there is no automatic Australian mood to support the US if there were an attack on Taiwan. Nor is there any Australian instinct to see the world through American eyes. National unease is hardly helped by war in the Middle East, the reduction of Gaza and the massacre of its population, by events in Ukraine and by the apparent incapacity of Europe to unite militarily if the US is not an active partner. There is no shortage of information in public forums, much of which is highly critical of the US. Anyone can have a well-informed opinion. But that opinion is hardly being guided by Albanese or the Australian government. Very little is emerging officially canvassing possibilities about what could or should happen. Ministers seem to be denying that anything much is happening. Albanese seems to think that public comment or discussion by official figures should be avoided, lest it cause offence to Trump and inspire or incite some violent reaction. In Canada, Britain, Germany and France, ministers are openly discussing the brave new world. But not here. It is unlikely that Trump or the official US will judge that the comparative silence from Australia means that there is no discussion occurring here. But they may well deduce that the silence from the politicians, and from military and intelligence figures, suggests that the docile ally will not make much fuss. Or that it is unlikely to shift towards our own view of the world, rather than America's. An obvious example might be the American trade war with China, or in making it clear that Australia is not planning on getting involved in any measures to defend Taiwan. But there are also other issues - for example, over the nuclear submarine purchases, or vital US intelligence gathering and command equipment at Pine Gap and elsewhere. Albanese is mouthing polite nothings, other than insisting that he is not about to double our defence spending just because an American media figure-cum Secretary of Defence says we should. Marles, the weakest link in the Australian chain, is a dead letter in any argument, even or particularly when he seems to be parroting a position that has originated in the US. It cannot be expected that significant change to the relationship will occur only incrementally. Or that it will evolve naturally from events in the control of others. Nor can we assume that Albanese, or Marles, or for that matter Penny Wong, have the wit and the speed to shift American opinion. There has not even been any sort of softening-up process. The turning point, perhaps, will be when Albanese finally gets his meeting with Trump. Even there, more likely than not, it will be statements from Trump rather than Albanese to which even Australians will pay most attention. We are not leaving "home". It's the US throwing us out. Albanese, presumably, has rehearsed his reaction to many of the propositions that Trump can be expected to put. He has, after all, put very similar ones to other countries, and he has, additionally, made it quite clear that we are nothing special in his eyes. But Albanese has not confided his strategy or tactics to Parliament, in the media, or in open forums. He has not addressed conferences at which the government's opinions are communicated. What is on the public record, whether in relation to the strategic thinking around AUKUS or Australia's strategic situation generally, is full of waffly words and slogans that could mean anything. Is discussion to be an invitation-only jamboree, or can every parrot in every pet shop have a go? MORE JACK WATERFORD: Could it be that Albanese expects that a matter so vital is to be resolved merely in Cabinet, without any wide public discussion? Or some committee of old Labor warhorses such as Kim Beazley and Stephen Smith? Is there a soldier in the land (or for that matter a spook) to whom the political, social and military problems should be consigned without the popular will being engaged? Is there a place at the table for Paul Keating, Malcolm Turnbull, Gareth Evans or Bob Carr, or any of the third of the electorate who vote, not for Labor nor the Liberals but for parties such as the Greens, the teals, or independents such as David Pocock? Is productivity, for which a conference of insiders is planned, more important than the place of Australia among the nations of the world? One has to hope that Albanese's silence about a time and a place for public discussion and debate is not for want of a plan to engage the population. But so far, on form, one has to expect that he lacks a plan. He has no model for public discussion, and no apparent appetite for it. This could involve reverting to the style of government that he delivered in his first term. Secretive. Unwilling and seemingly unable to communicate with the general public, including those who want Labor to succeed. (Labor is always more awkward, and guilty looking, in consulting its own traditional supporters rather than hostile captains of industry.) Will there be ready but unaccountable access for some special interests, such as the arms industry and the defence establishment? There's an already established pattern of insiders given undue and improper influence, in the same manner as the gambling and liquor crowd and the old media lobbies on other issues. One thing is for sure. No one can say that Albanese has a popular mandate, arising from the landslide election, to do what he wants on such a fundamental change in our circumstances. Defence and foreign affairs scarcely figured in the election, and the two major parties had no disagreements of any substance. No citizen acquired any extra information from any defence debate. It may be true that a debate, if it occurs, will be rancorous. The big vested interests are keen on throwing about claims of being soft on national security and having ambiguous and uncertain loyalties. It could become as unpleasant as the Voice referendum. But that is not a reason for having a secret debate, or no debate at all. This matters too much. Our own sense of identity, culture, history and future are involved. Australia needs to develop an understanding of Australian nationality which has moved on, a bit at least, from when white men flew a flag containing a Union Jack at Gallipoli 110 years ago. It's a debate that embraces Australians whose ancestors were not here at the time of Gallipoli but are in every sense citizens nonetheless. A debate that involves Aboriginal Australians, whose interests were usually ignored while compiling patriotic encomia and pap. A debate involving young Australians who will have to live in a harsher, hotter and more hostile world because of pragmatic decisions made by current politicians on both sides of the fence. It's not for Albo to run Australians inside or out of the arena. Some within a smug party, having won the election more comfortably than anyone expected, have come to think that the election was won by Albanese's calm, patience and political genius. That the very landslide is a refutation of suggestions that first-term Labor was a "disappointment", with an inarticulate leader too timid to go far or fast, or to take ordinary voters into his confidence. Any prime minister who wins a second, or third, term will see it as a vindication of his or her personality, governing style and methods. They will expect that internal and external critics treat them with more respect in future. Particularly for their political skills. One wouldn't want to deprive Albanese of any credit he deserved. But it is just possible that a sizeable proportion of the increased vote for Labor came more from fear of what sort of leadership or policies a MAGA-Down-Under Peter Dutton might have delivered than from enthusiastic re-endorsement of Albanese and his team. Or embrace of Albo's vision - whatever it was - of old alliances, new alliances, and how we trade with, talk with and share with our neighbours. Anthony Albanese is falling back into the sort of bad habits that could bring him down as Labor leader. Despite talking of national conversations about productivity, about tax, and about Australia's sense of itself, he seems to think discussions can take place behind closed doors, with selected participants working off his agenda, and with the general public unable to see, hear, or get even a smell or a taste of what it was all about until it has come to its predetermined conclusion. That's not a way to build a national consensus or a common understanding of how the nation will face the future. While backroom deals and fixes may see him through some of the economic problems, a failure to have a wide consultation could do him great damage when it comes to Australia's reorienting itself to current circumstances in our neighbourhood, and in whatever remains of the Western alliance. It may be that the AUKUS deal can survive, in one form or another, the big shifts brought on by Donald Trump. Australian ministers, from Albanese down, are pretending, or hoping, it can, even as NATO and other Western alliance defence arrangements seem headed for collapse. Some seem to think that the US can maintain a system of alliances around the western Pacific - involving Japan, Korea and Australia - even as European relationships implode. Perhaps, but, whether in the Pacific or the wider world, there cannot be any reversion to the situation before Trump arrived, or the situation after Trump imposed unilateral tariffs on all of his allies. No post-Trump president will be able to pretend that nothing happened during the Trump Reich, and that normal service can quickly be resumed. Trump has fractured the Bretton Woods system of international trade - what Richard Marles insists on calling "a rules-based international order" long after the game has changed. He has repudiated much of the web of relationships around Europe and the Middle East, particularly over the future of Ukraine. The value of American guarantees, promises and understandings (including ANZUS and AUKUS) is much diminished, as is the idea of one-in, all-in if someone breaches the peace. And who knows how Israel's adventures into Iran have changed the strategic map of the Middle East. If America is to have its druthers, future trade arrangements between nations will be based on bilateral arrangements, not multinational ones. Alternatively - and more likely - new regional and political alliances will form around multilateral agreements which do not include the United States. The trans-Pacific partnership - quite possibly including China, Canada and Europe - might well be a model. America may make an individualised deal with each nation, but even if it draws back from initial tariffs settings, most nations will see the wisdom of seeking markets anywhere but in the US. For many countries, a primary market will be China, preferred as a buyer or a seller ahead of the unreliable US. Australians can hardly help but be aware that the whole system of our international relationships is changing, and that Australia itself may have little influence on the final wash-up. We are not a big enough player to be invited into all the big-boys' clubs. When the US thinks of its alliances, Australia is not the first country that comes to its mind: we are probably 12th in the queue. To the extent that America-First recognises old obligations, the deals in squaring off the 11 higher in priority will severely pinch what is available to us. It will be worse if the US picks off its "allies" one by one in the manner of the supplicants (Australia included) seeking to negotiate individual deals for themselves. I am always reminded of what a senior American official once said to Margaret Thatcher when, in Washington, she spoke of the bonds of kinship and special relationship. The official said, "Madam, you may be right about this common history and so on, but I assure you that when the US is thinking of its national interest, it thinks of Britain about as often as when Britain, considering its own interest, thinks of the Isle of Wight". Polls show that Australian trust of the US has plummeted. Our distrust of Trump's America is higher than almost any other country, even Canada, and we haven't been threatened with an imperial takeover. A majority rate China as more trustworthy, even in spite of the freeze in relationships and trade sanctions after China was consciously baited by the Morrison government. Other polls show that Australians well understand the difference between a national leader and his policies, and the temper of the general population. But after the Trump election, there is also unease about his constituencies, the authoritarian, even fascist push, the influence in policy of racism, bigotry and anti-immigration feeling and the increasing influence of the Christian fundamentalist right. Much goodwill has evaporated. In contrast, the defence and intelligence establishment has not wavered in preferring the US even to Australia itself. But politicians on both sides of the fence are increasingly conscious that there is no automatic Australian mood to support the US if there were an attack on Taiwan. Nor is there any Australian instinct to see the world through American eyes. National unease is hardly helped by war in the Middle East, the reduction of Gaza and the massacre of its population, by events in Ukraine and by the apparent incapacity of Europe to unite militarily if the US is not an active partner. There is no shortage of information in public forums, much of which is highly critical of the US. Anyone can have a well-informed opinion. But that opinion is hardly being guided by Albanese or the Australian government. Very little is emerging officially canvassing possibilities about what could or should happen. Ministers seem to be denying that anything much is happening. Albanese seems to think that public comment or discussion by official figures should be avoided, lest it cause offence to Trump and inspire or incite some violent reaction. In Canada, Britain, Germany and France, ministers are openly discussing the brave new world. But not here. It is unlikely that Trump or the official US will judge that the comparative silence from Australia means that there is no discussion occurring here. But they may well deduce that the silence from the politicians, and from military and intelligence figures, suggests that the docile ally will not make much fuss. Or that it is unlikely to shift towards our own view of the world, rather than America's. An obvious example might be the American trade war with China, or in making it clear that Australia is not planning on getting involved in any measures to defend Taiwan. But there are also other issues - for example, over the nuclear submarine purchases, or vital US intelligence gathering and command equipment at Pine Gap and elsewhere. Albanese is mouthing polite nothings, other than insisting that he is not about to double our defence spending just because an American media figure-cum Secretary of Defence says we should. Marles, the weakest link in the Australian chain, is a dead letter in any argument, even or particularly when he seems to be parroting a position that has originated in the US. It cannot be expected that significant change to the relationship will occur only incrementally. Or that it will evolve naturally from events in the control of others. Nor can we assume that Albanese, or Marles, or for that matter Penny Wong, have the wit and the speed to shift American opinion. There has not even been any sort of softening-up process. The turning point, perhaps, will be when Albanese finally gets his meeting with Trump. Even there, more likely than not, it will be statements from Trump rather than Albanese to which even Australians will pay most attention. We are not leaving "home". It's the US throwing us out. Albanese, presumably, has rehearsed his reaction to many of the propositions that Trump can be expected to put. He has, after all, put very similar ones to other countries, and he has, additionally, made it quite clear that we are nothing special in his eyes. But Albanese has not confided his strategy or tactics to Parliament, in the media, or in open forums. He has not addressed conferences at which the government's opinions are communicated. What is on the public record, whether in relation to the strategic thinking around AUKUS or Australia's strategic situation generally, is full of waffly words and slogans that could mean anything. Is discussion to be an invitation-only jamboree, or can every parrot in every pet shop have a go? MORE JACK WATERFORD: Could it be that Albanese expects that a matter so vital is to be resolved merely in Cabinet, without any wide public discussion? Or some committee of old Labor warhorses such as Kim Beazley and Stephen Smith? Is there a soldier in the land (or for that matter a spook) to whom the political, social and military problems should be consigned without the popular will being engaged? Is there a place at the table for Paul Keating, Malcolm Turnbull, Gareth Evans or Bob Carr, or any of the third of the electorate who vote, not for Labor nor the Liberals but for parties such as the Greens, the teals, or independents such as David Pocock? Is productivity, for which a conference of insiders is planned, more important than the place of Australia among the nations of the world? One has to hope that Albanese's silence about a time and a place for public discussion and debate is not for want of a plan to engage the population. But so far, on form, one has to expect that he lacks a plan. He has no model for public discussion, and no apparent appetite for it. This could involve reverting to the style of government that he delivered in his first term. Secretive. Unwilling and seemingly unable to communicate with the general public, including those who want Labor to succeed. (Labor is always more awkward, and guilty looking, in consulting its own traditional supporters rather than hostile captains of industry.) Will there be ready but unaccountable access for some special interests, such as the arms industry and the defence establishment? There's an already established pattern of insiders given undue and improper influence, in the same manner as the gambling and liquor crowd and the old media lobbies on other issues. One thing is for sure. No one can say that Albanese has a popular mandate, arising from the landslide election, to do what he wants on such a fundamental change in our circumstances. Defence and foreign affairs scarcely figured in the election, and the two major parties had no disagreements of any substance. No citizen acquired any extra information from any defence debate. It may be true that a debate, if it occurs, will be rancorous. The big vested interests are keen on throwing about claims of being soft on national security and having ambiguous and uncertain loyalties. It could become as unpleasant as the Voice referendum. But that is not a reason for having a secret debate, or no debate at all. This matters too much. Our own sense of identity, culture, history and future are involved. Australia needs to develop an understanding of Australian nationality which has moved on, a bit at least, from when white men flew a flag containing a Union Jack at Gallipoli 110 years ago. It's a debate that embraces Australians whose ancestors were not here at the time of Gallipoli but are in every sense citizens nonetheless. A debate that involves Aboriginal Australians, whose interests were usually ignored while compiling patriotic encomia and pap. A debate involving young Australians who will have to live in a harsher, hotter and more hostile world because of pragmatic decisions made by current politicians on both sides of the fence. It's not for Albo to run Australians inside or out of the arena. Some within a smug party, having won the election more comfortably than anyone expected, have come to think that the election was won by Albanese's calm, patience and political genius. That the very landslide is a refutation of suggestions that first-term Labor was a "disappointment", with an inarticulate leader too timid to go far or fast, or to take ordinary voters into his confidence. Any prime minister who wins a second, or third, term will see it as a vindication of his or her personality, governing style and methods. They will expect that internal and external critics treat them with more respect in future. Particularly for their political skills. One wouldn't want to deprive Albanese of any credit he deserved. But it is just possible that a sizeable proportion of the increased vote for Labor came more from fear of what sort of leadership or policies a MAGA-Down-Under Peter Dutton might have delivered than from enthusiastic re-endorsement of Albanese and his team. Or embrace of Albo's vision - whatever it was - of old alliances, new alliances, and how we trade with, talk with and share with our neighbours. Anthony Albanese is falling back into the sort of bad habits that could bring him down as Labor leader. Despite talking of national conversations about productivity, about tax, and about Australia's sense of itself, he seems to think discussions can take place behind closed doors, with selected participants working off his agenda, and with the general public unable to see, hear, or get even a smell or a taste of what it was all about until it has come to its predetermined conclusion. That's not a way to build a national consensus or a common understanding of how the nation will face the future. While backroom deals and fixes may see him through some of the economic problems, a failure to have a wide consultation could do him great damage when it comes to Australia's reorienting itself to current circumstances in our neighbourhood, and in whatever remains of the Western alliance. It may be that the AUKUS deal can survive, in one form or another, the big shifts brought on by Donald Trump. Australian ministers, from Albanese down, are pretending, or hoping, it can, even as NATO and other Western alliance defence arrangements seem headed for collapse. Some seem to think that the US can maintain a system of alliances around the western Pacific - involving Japan, Korea and Australia - even as European relationships implode. Perhaps, but, whether in the Pacific or the wider world, there cannot be any reversion to the situation before Trump arrived, or the situation after Trump imposed unilateral tariffs on all of his allies. No post-Trump president will be able to pretend that nothing happened during the Trump Reich, and that normal service can quickly be resumed. Trump has fractured the Bretton Woods system of international trade - what Richard Marles insists on calling "a rules-based international order" long after the game has changed. He has repudiated much of the web of relationships around Europe and the Middle East, particularly over the future of Ukraine. The value of American guarantees, promises and understandings (including ANZUS and AUKUS) is much diminished, as is the idea of one-in, all-in if someone breaches the peace. And who knows how Israel's adventures into Iran have changed the strategic map of the Middle East. If America is to have its druthers, future trade arrangements between nations will be based on bilateral arrangements, not multinational ones. Alternatively - and more likely - new regional and political alliances will form around multilateral agreements which do not include the United States. The trans-Pacific partnership - quite possibly including China, Canada and Europe - might well be a model. America may make an individualised deal with each nation, but even if it draws back from initial tariffs settings, most nations will see the wisdom of seeking markets anywhere but in the US. For many countries, a primary market will be China, preferred as a buyer or a seller ahead of the unreliable US. Australians can hardly help but be aware that the whole system of our international relationships is changing, and that Australia itself may have little influence on the final wash-up. We are not a big enough player to be invited into all the big-boys' clubs. When the US thinks of its alliances, Australia is not the first country that comes to its mind: we are probably 12th in the queue. To the extent that America-First recognises old obligations, the deals in squaring off the 11 higher in priority will severely pinch what is available to us. It will be worse if the US picks off its "allies" one by one in the manner of the supplicants (Australia included) seeking to negotiate individual deals for themselves. I am always reminded of what a senior American official once said to Margaret Thatcher when, in Washington, she spoke of the bonds of kinship and special relationship. The official said, "Madam, you may be right about this common history and so on, but I assure you that when the US is thinking of its national interest, it thinks of Britain about as often as when Britain, considering its own interest, thinks of the Isle of Wight". Polls show that Australian trust of the US has plummeted. Our distrust of Trump's America is higher than almost any other country, even Canada, and we haven't been threatened with an imperial takeover. A majority rate China as more trustworthy, even in spite of the freeze in relationships and trade sanctions after China was consciously baited by the Morrison government. Other polls show that Australians well understand the difference between a national leader and his policies, and the temper of the general population. But after the Trump election, there is also unease about his constituencies, the authoritarian, even fascist push, the influence in policy of racism, bigotry and anti-immigration feeling and the increasing influence of the Christian fundamentalist right. Much goodwill has evaporated. In contrast, the defence and intelligence establishment has not wavered in preferring the US even to Australia itself. But politicians on both sides of the fence are increasingly conscious that there is no automatic Australian mood to support the US if there were an attack on Taiwan. Nor is there any Australian instinct to see the world through American eyes. National unease is hardly helped by war in the Middle East, the reduction of Gaza and the massacre of its population, by events in Ukraine and by the apparent incapacity of Europe to unite militarily if the US is not an active partner. There is no shortage of information in public forums, much of which is highly critical of the US. Anyone can have a well-informed opinion. But that opinion is hardly being guided by Albanese or the Australian government. Very little is emerging officially canvassing possibilities about what could or should happen. Ministers seem to be denying that anything much is happening. Albanese seems to think that public comment or discussion by official figures should be avoided, lest it cause offence to Trump and inspire or incite some violent reaction. In Canada, Britain, Germany and France, ministers are openly discussing the brave new world. But not here. It is unlikely that Trump or the official US will judge that the comparative silence from Australia means that there is no discussion occurring here. But they may well deduce that the silence from the politicians, and from military and intelligence figures, suggests that the docile ally will not make much fuss. Or that it is unlikely to shift towards our own view of the world, rather than America's. An obvious example might be the American trade war with China, or in making it clear that Australia is not planning on getting involved in any measures to defend Taiwan. But there are also other issues - for example, over the nuclear submarine purchases, or vital US intelligence gathering and command equipment at Pine Gap and elsewhere. Albanese is mouthing polite nothings, other than insisting that he is not about to double our defence spending just because an American media figure-cum Secretary of Defence says we should. Marles, the weakest link in the Australian chain, is a dead letter in any argument, even or particularly when he seems to be parroting a position that has originated in the US. It cannot be expected that significant change to the relationship will occur only incrementally. Or that it will evolve naturally from events in the control of others. Nor can we assume that Albanese, or Marles, or for that matter Penny Wong, have the wit and the speed to shift American opinion. There has not even been any sort of softening-up process. The turning point, perhaps, will be when Albanese finally gets his meeting with Trump. Even there, more likely than not, it will be statements from Trump rather than Albanese to which even Australians will pay most attention. We are not leaving "home". It's the US throwing us out. Albanese, presumably, has rehearsed his reaction to many of the propositions that Trump can be expected to put. He has, after all, put very similar ones to other countries, and he has, additionally, made it quite clear that we are nothing special in his eyes. But Albanese has not confided his strategy or tactics to Parliament, in the media, or in open forums. He has not addressed conferences at which the government's opinions are communicated. What is on the public record, whether in relation to the strategic thinking around AUKUS or Australia's strategic situation generally, is full of waffly words and slogans that could mean anything. Is discussion to be an invitation-only jamboree, or can every parrot in every pet shop have a go? MORE JACK WATERFORD: Could it be that Albanese expects that a matter so vital is to be resolved merely in Cabinet, without any wide public discussion? Or some committee of old Labor warhorses such as Kim Beazley and Stephen Smith? Is there a soldier in the land (or for that matter a spook) to whom the political, social and military problems should be consigned without the popular will being engaged? Is there a place at the table for Paul Keating, Malcolm Turnbull, Gareth Evans or Bob Carr, or any of the third of the electorate who vote, not for Labor nor the Liberals but for parties such as the Greens, the teals, or independents such as David Pocock? Is productivity, for which a conference of insiders is planned, more important than the place of Australia among the nations of the world? One has to hope that Albanese's silence about a time and a place for public discussion and debate is not for want of a plan to engage the population. But so far, on form, one has to expect that he lacks a plan. He has no model for public discussion, and no apparent appetite for it. This could involve reverting to the style of government that he delivered in his first term. Secretive. Unwilling and seemingly unable to communicate with the general public, including those who want Labor to succeed. (Labor is always more awkward, and guilty looking, in consulting its own traditional supporters rather than hostile captains of industry.) Will there be ready but unaccountable access for some special interests, such as the arms industry and the defence establishment? There's an already established pattern of insiders given undue and improper influence, in the same manner as the gambling and liquor crowd and the old media lobbies on other issues. One thing is for sure. No one can say that Albanese has a popular mandate, arising from the landslide election, to do what he wants on such a fundamental change in our circumstances. Defence and foreign affairs scarcely figured in the election, and the two major parties had no disagreements of any substance. No citizen acquired any extra information from any defence debate. It may be true that a debate, if it occurs, will be rancorous. The big vested interests are keen on throwing about claims of being soft on national security and having ambiguous and uncertain loyalties. It could become as unpleasant as the Voice referendum. But that is not a reason for having a secret debate, or no debate at all. This matters too much. Our own sense of identity, culture, history and future are involved. Australia needs to develop an understanding of Australian nationality which has moved on, a bit at least, from when white men flew a flag containing a Union Jack at Gallipoli 110 years ago. It's a debate that embraces Australians whose ancestors were not here at the time of Gallipoli but are in every sense citizens nonetheless. A debate that involves Aboriginal Australians, whose interests were usually ignored while compiling patriotic encomia and pap. A debate involving young Australians who will have to live in a harsher, hotter and more hostile world because of pragmatic decisions made by current politicians on both sides of the fence. It's not for Albo to run Australians inside or out of the arena. Some within a smug party, having won the election more comfortably than anyone expected, have come to think that the election was won by Albanese's calm, patience and political genius. That the very landslide is a refutation of suggestions that first-term Labor was a "disappointment", with an inarticulate leader too timid to go far or fast, or to take ordinary voters into his confidence. Any prime minister who wins a second, or third, term will see it as a vindication of his or her personality, governing style and methods. They will expect that internal and external critics treat them with more respect in future. Particularly for their political skills. One wouldn't want to deprive Albanese of any credit he deserved. But it is just possible that a sizeable proportion of the increased vote for Labor came more from fear of what sort of leadership or policies a MAGA-Down-Under Peter Dutton might have delivered than from enthusiastic re-endorsement of Albanese and his team. Or embrace of Albo's vision - whatever it was - of old alliances, new alliances, and how we trade with, talk with and share with our neighbours.
The Age
4 hours ago
- The Age
Australia an energy target as Iran-Israeli war triggers global turmoil
'In the worst-case scenario in which the Strait of Hormuz is closed, it will affect both global LNG and oil markets by up to 20 per cent of their respective annual consumption,' Citi energy analysts said this week. 'Global LNG markets will be more vulnerable than oil to further escalation of Middle East tensions.' These Middle East petro states may be underpinned by oil sales, but LNG gives them much-needed diversification. And LNG assets far away from the region give them pricing and supply upside from any energy price spikes triggered by these conflicts and any related supply shocks. Santos could not be more tempting from a strategic point of view. It would give XRG a business far from the drama of the Middle East thanks to its assets in Australia, Papua New Guinea and Alaska and close to Santos' coveted Asian customers, which have a fast-growing appetite for LNG. And what would the Santos suitors make of Australia's comical industry, where operators get a lot of their gas royalty-free from Australians and then make a fortune selling it back to them as global prices surge? Santos is not the only local energy giant making a splash among the oil giants. Loading Woodside Petroleum boss Meg O'Neill was part of the Trump entourage on his recent trip through the Middle East. She signed up Saudi Aramco, the world's largest oil and gas producer, as a partner for Woodside's US projects. She was almost the only female in a group photo with Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. She was quoted in the official White House press release. 'Woodside and Aramco will explore global opportunities, including Aramco's potential acquisition of an equity interest in an LNG offtake from the Louisiana LNG project as well as exploring opportunities for a potential collaboration in lower-carbon ammonia,' she said. 'Lower-carbon' is the other major reason why these petro states are now pouring more money into LNG developments than oil. Loading Even the petro states realise LNG will have a longer shelf life than oil as the alleged 'transition fuel' to a green energy future. China's total crude oil consumption dropped last year and developing nations are expected to follow as they adopt the flood of cheap EVs China is churning out. But the future of the Santos bid is as uncertain as the outcome of the Israel/Iran conflict. The XRG consortium is conducting due diligence, and as both sides are cautioning, there is no certainty that a formal offer will emerge. Loading More importantly, there are many regulatory hurdles, including government approval if a concrete offer does emerge for what is a critical piece of Australian infrastructure. The issue of domestic gas reservation, to prevent taxpayers and local businesses from getting screwed by companies supplying Australia its own gas, will be an interesting part of any takeover negotiations, especially since Santos already supplies gas domestically. The fact that Santos is trading at something close to a $5 billion discount to the $30 billion cash being offered for its shares tells you plenty about how cautious the market is about the potential success of this deal.
