
Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh: An Army Officer who earned a place at Central Sikh Museum for saving Amritsar during 1965 war
In November 2017, the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC) had installed portraits of war heroes at the Central Sikh Museum, including Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh, Lt Gen Jagjit Singh Arora, and Marshal of Indian Air Force Arjan Singh.
Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh found a place in the museum as the Sikh community believes that he saved the Golden Temple during the 1965 India-Pakistan war.
Born on October 1, 1913, in Badrukhan village near Sangrur in the princely state of Jind, Harbaksh Singh hailed from a rich farming family. His father, Harnam Singh, was the first doctor in their village and had served with valour in the Tirah Campaign (1897-98) and the East African campaign during World War I.
Harbaksh Singh was commissioned into the Indian Army on July 15, 1935. Over time, he rose through the ranks to become the general officer commanding-in-chief of Western Command, playing a pivotal role during the 1965 war.
During the conflict, Pakistan launched a massive surprise offensive on the Amritsar and Dera Baba Nanak sectors.
The story passed down through generations in Punjab is that, alarmed by the scale of the attack by Pakistan, the Army leadership in Delhi ordered a retreat behind the Beas River — a move that would have left Amritsar and the Darbar Sahib at risk of being overrun. Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh defied the order.
His leadership proved decisive. The Indian forces held their position, repelled the Pakistani assault, and safeguarded Punjab from deeper incursion. Though some attempted to question his insubordination after the war, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri firmly stood by Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh, recognising his judgment and valour.
In 1966, the government honoured him with the Padma Vibhushan, India's second-highest civilian award.
In 2016, then SGPC president Kirpal Singh Badungar, while announcing that his portrait would be installed at the Central Sikh Museum, said, 'Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh, who was commandant of the Army unit, showed exemplary confidence during the war and played a key role in defeating Pakistani troops. It was due to him that Pakistan could not touch Amritsar. Otherwise, his seniors from Delhi had ordered him to step back to the Beas river — but he did not take these orders and stood his ground to fight Pakistan. Because he knew that stepping back would mean giving Amritsar to Pakistan. His bravery is a source of inspiration for youth. This is why we have decided to install his portrait at the Central Sikh Museum (Golden Temple) to pay tribute to him.'
On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the 1965 war on September 9, 2015, the Punjab government had invited and honoured Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh's daughter, Harmala Kaur, at Asal Uttar in Tarn Taran district.
Speaking to The Indian Express after the event, she had said, 'My father has written an autobiography; his contribution cannot be ignored. It is true that sometimes politics gets in the way…but he was always sure that he was in the right position to take the right decision at that time.'
Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh's story has become folklore in the border districts, and he was the inspiration behind the Nishan-e-Sikhi Institute of Science and Training (NSIST) at Khadur Sahib in Tarn Taran district, where youth are trained to join the Army.
Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh passed away on November 14, 1999, but his legacy lives on in the Darbar Sahib premises.
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