What becomes of Republicans who cross King Donald?
Since becoming president for the first time in 2017, Mr Trump has reshaped the Republican Party in his image. Loyalty comes before all else in the Trump Party: Republicans who cross him could find themselves on the receiving end of a social-media rant or, worse, facing a Trump-endorsed primary challenger. After Thom Tillis (pictured) voted against the BBB , Mr Trump took to Truth Social, his social-media platform, to condemn the senator from North Carolina, calling for a loyalist to run against him. Mr Tillis chose to withdraw from his re-election campaign altogether. His exit is a boon for Democrats who hope to win his seat next year.
After combing through 52,792 of the president's social-media posts, The Economist has identified 30 Republican members of Congress whom Mr Trump has publicly scorned or sought to displace since his first inauguration (see chart 1). Of those 30, ten went on to resign or decide not to run for re-election, including Mr Tillis. Nine faced a Trump-endorsed primary opponent. Five are standing for re-election in 2026. The data is reminiscent of the famous epigram 'divorced, beheaded, died; divorced, beheaded, survived'. Of course, the parallel to Henry VIII is unfair. Unlike the murderous English monarch, Mr Trump shows clemency. He publicly reconciled with seven of the 30 (although the feud resumed in four cases).
The president's ire has been directed at one in 20 Republicans who have served in the past eight years. That this number is not greater can be credited to the fear instilled by six occasions when a candidate endorsed by Mr Trump defeated a Republican incumbent. By this method, he dispatched four of the ten House Republicans who voted to impeach him in 2021, along with Representatives Mark Sanford, an early critic, and Bob Good, a hard-right conservative caught on tape implying that Mr Trump was not a 'true conservative'. His endorsement is so valuable that one Republican congressman from Kentucky took to airing ads in south Florida, aimed to reach Mr Trump's Mar-a-Lago resort.
The president's ability to dislodge unfriendly colleagues is not absolute. Three Republicans have survived a Trump-endorsed challenge. Nancy Mace, a congresswoman from South Carolina, survived by embracing Mr Trump, recanting her previous, mild criticisms. Two of the remaining Republicans who supported Mr Trump's second impeachment—Senator Lisa Murkowski and Representative Dan Newhouse—defeated primary opponents under voting systems which allow voters to cross party lines. Ranked-choice voting in Alaska and the two-round system in Washington state meant they could draw on support from sympathetic or tactical Democrats and independents.
Mr Trump appears to understand the limits of his powers. He has notably avoided feuding with Representative David Valadao of California, and despite calling her 'absolutely atrocious' in 2022 he has been relatively muted about Senator Susan Collins of Maine. Although both of them voted for his impeachment, they also represented constituencies that leaned towards the Democrats (Mr Valadao now represents a more Republican-leaning district). Maine uses ranked-choice voting and California uses a two-round system. Mr Trump's strategic restraint could be to preserve his record. 'I am 42-0 over the last two cycles and never even tried to run up the score,' he said of his endorsements in 2022.
For their part, Democrats are happy to enjoy the red-on-red scraps. In 2022, Nancy Pelosi, then Speaker of the House, made the controversial decision to use Democratic campaign funds to boost pro-Trump Republicans. Though arguably corrosive for democracy, in a narrow sense the gamble paid off. In three of the six races where Mr Trump unseated his critics, the Republican replacements went on to lose the general election.
Be careful what you wish for
Republicans in competitive districts have to weigh the risks of crossing Mr Trump against the risks of being too closely associated with him as voters' dissatisfaction rises. Mr Trump's loyal base, who vote in Republican primaries, are pitted against moderate general-election voters. This dynamic is a gift for the Democrats, who have a narrow path to regaining the Senate in next year's midterm elections (see chart 2). In North Carolina, Mr Tillis will probably be replaced by a less popular Republican nominee. In Texas, the state's scandal-plagued hard-right attorney-general leads primary polls by double digits, taking advantage of the president's attacks on the incumbent senator, 'hopeless' John Cornyn (to use Mr Trump's epithet). The fracas substantially improves Democrats' chances of winning the two states, which are key to their Senate prospects.
Mr Trump has made himself inextricable from the Republican Party. This gives him a lot of power. But from a tactical point of view, he can still be a liability for his party.
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Preparing for a Post-Modi Era? Why Ram Madhav's Book Matters
Bharatiya Janata Party and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh leader Ram Madhav's latest book, The New World: 21st Century Global Order and India, can be read on three levels. The first part tells the story of the world since the dawn of time in a relatively descriptive manner, so I will not refer to it much in this review. In the second part, devoted to India, Madhav presents his worldview in a very interesting way. He also expresses reservations about India's chances of becoming a great nation and, implicitly, criticises government policies, while rehabilitating an important part of the Congress's legacy – a first for a Sangh Parivar leader since 2014. Hindu nationalism, its enemies and its new friends Ram Madhav is now regarded as an organic intellectual of the Hindu nationalist movement, and this book provides insight into several facets of that movement. However, he never refers to its founding fathers (there is no mention of V.D. Savarkar) or its organisations. There is no mention of the RSS and its affiliates either. The aim here is to show that Hindutva is just one variant of a broader phenomenon that affects the whole world and which Madhav calls "national conservatism," echoing the National Conservatism Conference in which he participated in 2024. This book therefore contains key elements of this movement, starting with the idea that India is the source of many inventions that have enabled humanity to prosper: in ancient times (no date is specified), "led by the Hindus and the Greeks, a moral order began to take shape in the early centuries before the beginning of the Christian era" (p. xii). The author adds, in an equally vague and peremptory manner: "Around the same time, the Hindus also came forward with their Vedas, Upanishads and other classical literature, leading to the evolution of a superior social order in the East" (p. xiii). The result: "India was the largest economy in the world in the first millennium" (p. xiv). In fact, it was under the Mughals that India became one of the leaders of the world economy. But Ram Madhav rewrites history and, in line with Hindu nationalist dogma, claims that this golden age was followed by an era of decline due to the Mughals: "Colonization, first by the Mughals and other Central Asians, then by the British for over 800 years, had left the country pulverized and pauperized" (p. xiv). If India, according to Madhav, experienced such a Golden Age, it is because Hinduism cultivates an ethic of tolerance. In contrast, Christianity and Islam led humanity to its downfall because they promoted "a religion-centric world order in European lands. Both Christianity and Islam dominated every aspect of human existence, including science, art, and culture. Anything that went against the precepts of religion was violently rejected and suppressed. The domination of the world became the singular mission of the Semitic faiths, leading to wars and conquests that caused enormous human suffering' (p. xiv). These sentences are very interesting because of the mistrust of religion they express: for Hindu nationalists, who readily claim to be Hindus and oppose secularism, Hindus are not defined by religious beliefs but by their ethnicity, so that they form a people descended from the first humans, the Aryans. The analogy with Zionism is all the clearer here, since not only are Jews a people descended from the tribes of Israel, but they also appeared on sacred land, a notion that is equally omnipresent in Hindutva, where Bharat forms what Savarkar calls a " punyabhoomi," a sacred territory. The ancient splendour of India fuels Ram Madhav's civilisational narrative, according to which his country can now reconnect with its past glory and regain international greatness beyond even the areas it once dominated: "The extended neighbourhood offers India a great opportunity because of its millennia-long historical and civilisational ties with the subcontinent. Unlike China, India enjoys enormous goodwill in this extended region, from ASEAN to Africa to the South Pacific, due to the ancient cultural connection, which it should be able to turn into a diplomatic advantage" (p. xxxviii). In fact, the author's main objective is to restore India's status as a great power and even its "greatness" (p. 311). To achieve this, the "soft power" on which Nehru relied – described as "romantic" and "idealistic" – will not be enough: "It is time for India to make strenuous efforts to build 'Brand Bharat'—a benign global influence. The era of soft power is passé, and the time has come for 'smart power' to create a unique brand identity for nations" (p. xxxviii). This quest for power requires closer ties with "like-minded countries" and the development of industrial, military, and scientific capabilities. India's potential friends are defined in negative terms: they are primarily political forces that share the same enemies as Hindu nationalists. These adversaries form a heterogeneous group – called the "deep state" (p. 158) – ranging from "liberals" to "leftists," "cultural Marxists," "Islamists," and "woke" individuals, who are mainly found among NGOs. Of all these, Soros is the most feared. Madhav's discourse is primarily defensive: India must resist destabilisation efforts on all fronts. This has resulted in a whole repertoire of victimisation that national-populists are currently cultivating around the world: "In India, Soros is accused of supporting and sponsoring anti-Modi government campaigns such as the 2020–21 farmers' uprising and a recent attack on Indian business tycoon Gautam Adani by a lesser-known outfit called Hindenburg Research. In fact, the farmers' agitation launched against the Modi government's agricultural policies was the latest example of India's brush with global NGOs (GNGOs). The Indian government suspected the role of some GNGOs in supporting and sponsoring this agitation. 'Toolkit' as a disruptive concept became popular during this agitation with the likes of Greta Thunberg jumping in. Thunberg inadvertently put a toolkit in the public domain before hastily withdrawing it. The toolkit, allegedly created by a Canada-based organisation called the Poetic Justice Foundation (PJF) with links to separatist groups such as the Khalistanis, not only contained seditious material but also highlighted the modus operandi of some of the GNGOs' (p. 140). This conspiracy theory may raise a smile, but it lies at the heart of the nationalist-conservative phenomenon, whose proponents seek to thwart plans that would ruin the social order (and therefore the domination of the traditional elites) and destroy morality by destroying the family (hence their opposition to homosexuality, for example). What they fear is seeing their civilisation destabilised from outside. The words "chaos" and "anarchy" appear repeatedly in Madhav's writing. To resist, he wants to align himself with Donald Trump, Viktor Orban, Giorgia Meloni, Marine Le Pen, and others. Madhav's social conservatism goes beyond defending the family to encompass the caste system, which he sees as just one expression of India's diversity: "India's demographic diversity in terms of its castes, languages, and religions adds great color and celebration to it" (p. 265). How, moreover, does Madhav measure respect for religious diversity in India, when Muslims are victims of discrimination, segregation, and violence on a daily basis? He bases it on demographic growth – estimated at 7.81% in a highly controversial Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development study – because surely an oppressed community cannot have many children: "In India's context, a 7.81 percent increase in the populations of Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, and Buddhists (Parsis and Jains saw a decline) indicated that contrary to propaganda, especially in the Western media, minorities enjoy relative comfort in the country" (p. 281). Any social science student knows that the primary explanatory variable for female fertility is lack of education, hence the correlation between socio-educational development and population growth. Madhav's national conservatism involves a degree of authoritarianism that only appears in the epilogue, but which is particularly radical. For him, India must transition to "Dharmocracy," which he refers to as "democracy, the Bharat way" (p. 320). Madhav defines Dharma here as an "ethical-spiritual order" and "the only supreme authority," whose guardians are the Rajgurus (the Brahmins who guide rulers in the Hindu tradition). In Dharmocracy, as in any theocracy, those who exercise power are therefore not accountable to the people (the demos) but to the Dharma, represented by priests. For Madhav, Modi led India down this path in 2023 when he installed in the new parliament the sacred sceptre called sengol, which was used by the Rajguru of the Chola dynasty in southern India in medieval times. Why India is not necessarily on the rise If, for Madhav, India must therefore return to a type of authoritarian regime in order to be stronger, at the same time, by combining the old with the new, it must become a modern power, and it is above all to this project that the second part of his book is devoted, the tone of which is surprisingly measured, even pessimistic. Admittedly, Modi's India has broken with Nehru's "romantic globalism," but what has it achieved in ten years? In the second part, the book oscillates between pretension and thinly veiled criticism. This gives rise to recurring contradictions: on the one hand, Madhav condemns the policies implemented by the Congress Party, while on the other, he constantly cites the achievements of Nehru and his descendants, whether in the IITs or in regional diplomacy. This last example deserves closer examination. First, Madhav admits that" "Prime Minister Nehru played an important role in the transition of power in Nepal from the Ranas to a constitutional monarchy under King Tribhuvan Bir Bikram Shah Dev" (p. 288). The same is true of Sri Lanka: 'With Sri Lanka, too, India's relations began on a friendly and cordial note after the former's independence from the British in February 1948. The post-Independence Sri Lankan leadership, under S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, joined the NAM and supported India on issues ranging from domestic ones like the accession of Goa, Diu and Daman, to international ones like the Suez crisis. Nehru's death in 1964 was also declared a public holiday in Sri Lanka in his honour" (p. 288). Madhav then reviews the rest of South Asia and acknowledges the excellence of Nehru's diplomacy and that of his successors: 'India's ties with Myanmar also began on a friendly and cordial note after Independence. Prime Minister Nehru enjoyed a good personal rapport with U Nu, the Burmese prime minister. Both countries signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1951. "Bangladesh owed its birth to India when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi decided to send the Indian Army to help the Mukti Bahini rebels secure freedom from Pakistan in the final phase of the war in 1971 (p. 289). Beyond the Nehru-Gandhi family, other Congress leaders stand out, such as Narasimha Rao: 'India's romance with the Indian Ocean began in 1992 when PM Narasimha Rao enunciated what became famous as the Look East policy' (p. 299). Even Manmohan Singh, so disparaged by Narendra Modi, receives praise from Ram Madhav: "In 2008, the UPA government led by PM Dr. Manmohan Singh promoted the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), the first initiative of its kind to bring together the navies of the IOR. A decade later, IONS boasted of the participation of 35 navies from the region in its activities" (p. 301). It is on this interesting question of neighbourly relations that Ram Madhav contradicts himself most and in the most instructive way: on the one hand, he gets carried away, caught up in his desire for power for India; on the other, ceasing to believe his own lies, he opens his eyes to reality in a flash of lucidity. See for yourself. On the one hand, he writes: 'India has already emerged as a regional leader by building architectures such as SAARC and BIMSTEC with varying degrees of success. In the Indian Ocean Region, India commands enormous respect due to its longstanding cultural and civilizational ties with many countries. Once a leader in the NAM, it now champions the cause of the Global South, attracting substantial traction in Asia and Africa' (p. 113-114). On the other hand, ceasing to mistake his desires for reality, he admits: 'Both SAARC and BIMSTEC failed to promote coherent regionalism like the ones witnessed among CIS countries, ASEAN, or even the EU. SAARC became a victim of Indo-Pak rivalry, and has remained dysfunctional for a decade now. The last summit-level meeting of the SAARC countries took place in Kathmandu in November 2014. Since then, the regional body has remained dormant. On the other hand, although India attached strategic importance to the BIMSTEC arrangement, it didn't acquire the required momentum either' (p. 287). Does this mean that Modi's 'neighbourhood first' policy has failed? But regional issues are not the only area where criticism of the Modi government is evident. When he seeks to highlight Modi's achievements, he finds nothing but symbols, or even political marketing: "PM Modi understands the importance of India presenting itself [my emphasis] to global powers as a regional leader – one that enjoys the goodwill and support of its neighbours." Worse still, neutralism – which is denounced when equated with Nehru's non-alignment – becomes a paradoxical virtue, even in the case of the war in Gaza (during which India systematically abstained at the UN, even when it came to calling for a ceasefire). Incomprehensibly, Madhav describes this policy as "strategic autonomy," a term introduced into the lexicon of international relations by De Gaulle to refer to the absence of military dependence on foreign powers: "The strategic autonomy doctrine is evident in India's response to conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza. In both conflicts, the Indian leadership refused to take sides and maintained proactive neutrality, engaging with all sides of the conflict. India was among the 32 other member countries of the UN Security Council, including China, that abstained from voting when the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution in February 2023 demanding that Russia should 'immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine" (p. 258). But the most important point lies elsewhere: in Madhav's skepticism when it comes to economic, scientific, and military development, given that, as he repeatedly states, a nation's power can only be based on strong industry and cutting-edge technology. In this regard, everything remains to be done, and the author regrets that so little has been accomplished. The word "unfortunately" appears more than 10 times in the last 100 pages. When it comes to technological advances, the situation is critical because India: "...suffers from challenges such as a shortage of talent in quantum physics, limited funding, an infrastructure gap, and weak collaboration between industry and academia. India must approach this technological challenge with urgency and seriousness. It needs to revamp its education and research infrastructure completely. It needs to invest heavily in areas of innovation in frontier technologies. It should focus on building a strong culture of R&D and institutions that support innovation to ramp up its technological prowess. In the past, we achieved noteworthy progress in areas like nuclear fusion and space. Indian nuclear fusion research is making remarkable progress at an impressive pace" (p. 268). Madhav cites the achievements of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), which was created during the Congress era, and the first supercomputer, the CDC 6600, which appeared under Nehru. Even when the Modi government took initiatives, they appear insufficient to the author: '[Modi's] government took the important initiative of establishing the National Mission on Quantum Technologies & Applications (NM-QTA) in 2020 with a five-year budget outlay of about $1 billion. India became the seventh country to have a quantum mission. However, much needs to be done in terms of actual research and output. Capital investments have to increase manifold, and private equity also has to step in' (p. 270). The heart of the problem lies in the training of the elite: "India's education infrastructure remains lacklustre in terms of academic research and innovation rigor. India produces 1.5 million engineers every year, but what it needs is not just engineers but 'imagineers' – engineers with the power of imagination and innovation" (pp. 271-272). Madhav concludes: "Imitation is not innovation, and copying is not creativity" (p. 275). In terms of defence, Indian industry is so underperforming that, Madhav points out, the air force is still waiting for delivery of 40 Tejas fighter jets, whose development began in 1984. Madhav repeatedly compares India's delays with China's advances, which fuel his concerns. The Indian navy also appears to be in a poor state with its two aircraft carriers and 16 submarines. It needs to acquire 200 additional ships and 24 submarines. As Madhav states: "Achieving that capability is critical to India's future global role" (p. 310). The social consequences of India's economic weakness, and in particular the difficulties faced by its industry (once again in competition with China), do not escape the author's keen insight. He admits that "India faces the challenge of unemployment and underemployment" (p. 277), once again lamenting the mediocrity of education in a context of rapid population growth: "India's challenge is its low-skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled labor workforce. In the age of frontier technologies, a population boom without adequate skilling infrastructure will be a recipe for disaster" (p. 277). Under these conditions, India's demographic dividend is nothing more than a pipe dream. Conclusion: "India needs to tackle this demographic challenge diligently" (p. 282). At this stage, one is tempted to ask: what is the government doing about this? The question is all the more pressing given that Madhav seems to find answers by quoting another Congress leader, Lal Bahadur Shastri: "Shastri said the following in his first Independence Day speech in 1964 that stirred the conscience of the entire nation: ""We can win respect in the world only if we are strong internally and can banish poverty and unemployment from our country. Above all, we need national unity. Communal, provincial, and linguistic conflicts weaken the country""(p. 317). Should we conclude that, for Madhav, the way in which the Modi government has played the identity polarisation card needs to be revisited? Overall, while Madhav believes that 'the new Indian leadership is looking towards building a nation capable of becoming an important player on the global stage' (p. 315), for the moment, after more than ten years, the results are mixed at best. This criticism, coming from one of the most prominent Hindu nationalist leaders, is unprecedented. But given his responsibilities, it could even be seen as self-criticism. How far can this shift go? Should we expect a change of course, with the organisation of a "caste census" as the first sign, or is this initiative purely tactical? Only time will tell, but if it turns out that in Modi's India, "the more things change, the more they stay the same," Madhav's book may be paving the way for the post-Modi era – a highly anticipated milestone for the RSS. Christophe Jaffrelot is Senior Research Fellow at CERI-Sciences Po/CNRS, Paris, Professor of Indian Politics and Sociology at King's College London, Non resident Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Chair of the British Association for South Asian Studies.
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Business Standard
27 minutes ago
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