Masood Azhar seen in POK, 1,000 km away from Bahawalpur bastion, shows intel
The latest intel inputs accessed by India Today suggest Masood Azhar has moved over a thousand km from his stronghold, Bahawalpur
The revelation comes after Pakistan's former foreign minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari recently claimed that Azhar might be in Afghanistan. He even suggested that Islamabad would hand him over to India if he was found on Pakistani soil."If and when the Indian government shares information with us that he is on Pakistani soil, we would be more than happy to arrest him," Bhutto told Al Jazeera in a recent interview.Azhar has been the mastermind of several terror activities in India, including the 2016 Pathankot airbase attack and the 2019 Pulwama attack, which left over 40 soldiers dead. Indian intelligence agencies are closely tracking Azhar's movements even as Jaish's online platforms push deliberate misinformation, recycling old audio clips of his speeches to suggest he remained at his long-time Bahawalpur base.Azhar has two known establishments there - Jamia Subhan Allah, Jaish's headquarters targeted by India during Operation Sindoor, and Jamia Usman O Ali, a mosque located in a densely populated part of the city where his old residence also stands in proximity to a hospital.Reports have said that India's strikes on Jamia Subhan Allah killed 10 members of Azhar's family.
Satellite overview of two old hideouts of Masood Azhar in Bahawalpur. Jamia Subhan Allah (on left seen visibly damaged during Operation Sindoor). Satellite Image: Google Earth/ Airbus
Satellite image of Masood Azhar's old house and mosque, Jamia Usman O Ali in Bahawalpur. Satellite Image: Google Earth/Airbus
Sanctioned by India, the US and the United Nations, Azhar is believed to be responsible for several terror attacks in India, including the attack on Parliament in 2001.He was once in Indian custody before his associates hijacked an aircraft and exchanged Azhar for the release of passengers. Soon after his release, Azhar founded Jaish e Mohammad.
Masood Azhar's most recent sightings in Skardu
This isn't the first time that Azhar has been shifted out of Bahawalpur. After the 2019 Balakot air strikes, he was moved from Bahawalpur to a discreet safe house in Peshawar.Azhar is not the only terrorist leader who has found safe sanctuary in Pakistan. Another designated terrorist and chief of terror outfit Hizbul Mujahideen, Syed Salahuddin, is believed to be operating from a posh locality in Islamabad.
Syed Salahuddin's hideout in Islamabad. Satellite Image: Google Earth/Airbus
He also has a working office in another densely populated suburban locality in Burma Town, where he is often seen accompanied by gunmen.- Ends
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