New minister pushes land for the poor
Speaking at the Royal Irrigation Department after meeting ministry executives, Mr Atthakorn -- who was promoted from deputy minister during the previous cabinet of Srettha Thavisin to full minister this week -- said he would prioritise short- and medium-term results, given the government's limited time in office.
"We have only 18 months remaining, so the focus will be on practical outcomes. Immediate actions include reducing farming costs and increasing yields, alongside implementing existing policies," he told the gathering.
A key policy is the transformation of Sor Por Kor 4-01 land documents into full agricultural titles, which would give farmers the legal right to sell their land. Mr Atthakorn urged the Agricultural Land Reform Office to expedite the process, saying that delays must be addressed promptly to ensure landholders benefit.
"I will monitor the progress closely and expect to see improvement," he said.
He cited data from the Office of Agricultural Economics indicating that farmers' income increased following the Covid-19 pandemic but began to decline again last year due to water shortages. The ministry aims to develop new water sources in line with the government's economic stimulus package to support farming activity and sustain livelihoods.
However, the policy of converting Sor Por Kor documents into saleable land titles has drawn concern. Critics argue that it risks enabling wealthy investors to acquire forest land, which is meant to be preserved for small-scale farmers. Under existing regulations, Sor Por Kor land cannot be sold or transferred.
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