India, Pakistan — redefining deterrence

Express Tribune

21-05-2025

The writer is a retired major general and has an interest in International Relations and Political Sociology. He can be reached at [e-mail] and tweets @20_Inam
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'Deterrence' in military parlance is, simply put, to 'deter' a potential adversary of the outsized consequences and disproportionate response to any (military) adventurism. Deterrence is established when two sides possess the means to inflict losses on each other in case of hostilities and hence decide not to initiate hostilities. Deterrence can be 'conventional'— through capabilities of conventional air, land, sea, cyber and space forces or 'non-conventional' through possession of nuclear weapons and capabilities.
Before Pulwama/Balakot in 2019, conventional and non-conventional deterrence averted military escalation between India and Pakistan, especially military incursion in mainland Pakistan by India. Kargil war (May-June 1999) before that was fought across an undefined border termed as Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir, where there is a tacit understanding and practice of occasional flare-up on and from both sides.
Pahalgam/Operation Sindoor in 2025 ratcheted up hostilities and India, 'undeterred' by Pakistan's conventional and non-conventional military capabilities, launched brazen attacks on some 6 cities in Pakistan proper and AJK. So, the deterrence broke down. A broken deterrence needs to be re-established, hence Pakistan following its strategy of 'quid-pro-quo plus' equalised its losses and re-stablished deterrence through Operation Bunyan Marsoos. Deterrence is said to be established when both sides are standing on the equal rungs of the imaginary two-sided 'Escalation Ladder (EL)', militarily and perceptually. This equal status 'may' control further escalation.
This cycle of deterrence breakdown and re-establishment can go on, if the escalation continues which may result into a 'limited' (uni/bi-service war or conflict limited in aim, scope and space) or a full-scale/all-out war. In India Pakistan's military construct, traditionally deterrence breakdown 'would' escalate into a conventional military conflict, that may inch towards a 'possible' nuclear exchange, when continued fighting degrades a weaker Pakistan's forces and infrastructure, results into spatial losses, causes population casualty or threatens Pakistan's existential economic well-being – all understood to be Pakistan's traditional redlines or 'thresholds'. In a nutshell, a conventional war is generally thought to precede a nuclear war.
However, Pulwama and Pahalgam have overturned this traditional construct. In today's super-charged bilateral environs, a jingoistic Indian media, in particular, creates frenzy and ratchets up war hysteria, where not only politicians but all walks of an otherwise saner population are driven towards violence, sanctioned and eulogised by nationalistic fervour.
Therefore, escalation is fast and higher than usual. Social and even mainstream media whips up sentiments and emotions to unacceptable levels, and perceptual and psychological escalation occurs faster than military escalation. And when such socio-psycho-perceptual escalation is combined with military acts, the situation becomes irretrievably difficult and dangerous. As this faster psycho-perceptual escalation puts pressure on leaders from both sides to respond with more force and alacrity.
So, the traditional construct of a conventional war leading to nuclear-specific escalation is never the case anymore. New implements of war like drones and missile strikes, although less deadly than actual combat by comparison, raise the ante unacceptably high. There is then an inadvertent slide towards miscalculation because of a communication breakdown. The US cited this communication breakdown as a reason for their involvement in the current crisis.
There seems to be less realisation of this new 'escalation normal' between the belligerents. One has repeatedly alluded to a dangerous belief among serving and retired Indian military leaders, who (erroneously) think there is space for war between India and Pakistan under the nuclear overhang. And who consider Pakistan's resolve to go nuclear, if push comes to shove, as a bluff and mere nuclear brinkmanship and blackmail.
In reality, escalation would quickly and uncontrollably slide towards a nuclear conflict for the reasons cited. And, as Pulwama and Pahalgam prove, Indian political leaders in cahoots with the cited military lobby, would continue to corner Pakistan in embarrassing situations for short-term gains, while driven by hate, blighted by irrationality and encouraged by a super-charged war mongering media.
Hence situation akin to Pulwama and Pahalgam, which may recur every now and then due to indigenous grievances within the India Union, and its security failure, would scapegoat and direct Indian wrath against Pakistan, without any proof, rationale or reason. This necessitates Pakistan to take steps 'now' to forestall such false-flag, injurious operations and India's 'retaliatory strikes like the Indian-sponsored school bus attack in Lorelai on Wednesday. And the only way this is possible is through re-establishing deterrence more robustly and more effectively. Declaration of Pakistan's nuclear policy from its ambiguous status of 'No First Use' is the need of the hour.
Pakistan can study the French example. France maintains a nuclear policy based on "strict sufficiency", by keeping its arsenal at the lowest levels as dictated by its strategic compulsions; emphasises deterrence through credible nuclear forces; and ensures and prioritises protection of France's vital interests. It envisages the use of nuclear weapons in legitimate self-defence through a 'Nuclear Triad' of air, land and seas-based nuclear weapons. It now relies upon submarine-launched ballistic missiles and air-launched cruise missiles, having scrapped land-based systems.
Selection of target and choice of munitions can also be escalatory. Indian attack on population centres and its use of long-range Brahmos (1500 km) missiles were escalatory. Pakistan exercised unprecedented restraint and limited its damage to the Indian air and ground assets, once Indian AD system was compromised consequent to the integrated, full spectrum Pakistani riposte involving air-land-cyber and space components.
Indian allegation of Pakistan using Shaheen missile (range 2,700 km) compared to the short-range Fatah Series, is at best a cover-up, coming after Delhi having realised its own mistake of using strategic Brahmos.
Both countries need to go to the drawing board and use the lessons learnt from the recent standoff to recalibrate their restraint, deterrence and escalation regimes. India in particular needs to get out of the 'perceptual trap' of blaming Pakistan for non-functional toilets in Pune and resorting to blatant escalation in case of any militant activity, trampling all norms and tenets of statehood and neighbourliness.
There may be no Trump to facilitate the next ceasefire, or the world reaction might be too late than Pakistan's response to the Indian provocations, that may be even deadlier, given the pressures and imperatives of its own demography, and India's perpetual brinkmanship.
Only nukes will restrain a bellicose India! Period.
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