With charges against Sheikh Hasina, ICT in Bangladesh has come full circle
Written by Sreeradha Datta
It is an ironic twist of fate to see the International Criminal Tribunal (ICT), formed in 1973 and revived by Sheikh Hasina herself to try those who had committed crimes during the Liberation War of 1971, now poised to indict her. Hasina, the longest-serving prime minister of Bangladesh, is being held accountable for the alleged crimes committed during her last tenure, specifically during the students' anti-quota uprising that led to her overthrow. Earlier this May, investigators submitted their report on the July–August 2024 killings, naming her as the one who issued the orders for the security forces to open fire on the protesters.
To recall briefly, Sheikh Hasina took office in January 2009 with a huge mandate. To consolidate power, she ushered in amendments, including the abolition of the caretaker government (CTG) system in 2011 — a system unique to Bangladesh, which had served well in assisting the Election Commission to hold free and fair elections. Ironically, it was Hasina who had insisted on legally introducing the CTG in 1996.
While she believed Bangladesh was ready to hold elections without a CTG, the opposition disagreed. Hasina then went on to use the Digital Security Act to silence any dissenting voices. The government's impunity was exemplified by elections marred by allegations of rigging, and the use of state apparatus to undermine the autonomy and independence of institutions, enabling a coterie that wielded disproportionate influence over policymaking.
During the July–August uprising, security forces initiated a brutal crackdown on protesters. In the face of growing public anger and the Army's inability to guarantee her safety, she fled to India, where she continues to reside, reassuring her supporters of her return in glory to her homeland. Within days of Hasina's escape, the Interim Government headed by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus took over, promising to bring the accused to justice.
The ICT, which has previously executed four Jamaat leaders and a Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) leader, will now hear the five charges filed against Hasina. A three-judge tribunal — comprising Golam Mortuza Mozumder, Md Shofiul Alam Mahmood, and Mohammad Mohitul Haque Anam Chawdhury — will be hearing the charges. Two others charged are former Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan and the then IGP Chowdhury Abdullah Al-Mamun. The latter is in police custody, while Hasina and Khan remain outside the country.
This is the first time Hasina has been formally charged by the ICT in connection with the crackdown that took place during the July-August protests. She has also been accused of running secret detention centres. The Interim Government has further alleged that she orchestrated the disappearance of more than 3,500 people. A report by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights highlighted the excesses that occurred under her watch. The report also reiterated that up to 13 per cent of those killed during the uprising were children.
Hasina will be tried on five specific charges, including the killing of unarmed protester Abu Sayed at close range, shot in the chest without provocation. The next hearing is scheduled for June 16. Whether physically in Bangladesh or tried in absentia, Hasina will be prosecuted under the ICT Act of 1973.
Bangladesh has already requested India to extradite Sheikh Hasina. There will now be a renewed attempt at a higher diplomatic level. However, the likelihood of India agreeing to extradite Hasina is low. Although a bilateral extradition treaty exists, the caveats are significant. From the Indian perspective, Hasina's trial, given the prevailing political atmosphere in Bangladesh, is unlikely to be free and fair. Apart from the ICT, requesting the involvement of the International Criminal Court is also an option for Dhaka.
The writer is Professor at the Jindal School of International Affairs, O P Jindal Global University, and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore
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The Hindu
4 hours ago
- The Hindu
If Sheikh Hasina is Extradited to Bangladesh, Justice Will Not Be Served: Badrul Ahsan
Published : Jun 04, 2025 15:49 IST - 17 MINS READ On June 1, 2025, Bangladesh's International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) formally charged former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina with crimes against humanity for ordering police action against student protesters, leading to her ouster on August 5, 2024. The court issued arrest warrants for Hasina, her Home Minister, and the former police chief. The 77-year-old leader currently lives in exile in India. Syed Badrul Ahsan, senior Bangladeshi journalist and commentator, spoke to Frontline about Hasina's indictment. Ahsan, who lives in London, discussed the Awami League's reaction to the indictment, the prospect of Hasina's extradition from India to Bangladesh, the possibility of free and fair elections in the near future, Muhammad Yunus' tenure as Chief Adviser, and the state of India-Bangladesh bilateral relations with both Pakistan and China hovering in the immediate backdrop. Edited excerpts: How is the Awami League reacting to this indictment for ordering police to fire on protesters, resulting in several hundred deaths? Well, first of all, this is a state of irony in Bangladesh. The ICT was set up by the erstwhile Awami League to try collaborators of the 1971 Pakistani military regime. A good number were sentenced to death and executed. Now the tables have been turned, and this tribunal is trying Sheikh Hasina and members of the former government. The Awami League is in a very desperate situation. It's not organised at all, and there's no particular leadership that can give the people or the international community a public statement. This is in contrast to 1971, when Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was arrested, but there was a second tier of leadership which organised the liberation war with India's assistance. Post-1975, after Sheikh Mujib's assassination, the Awami League was divided into three factions, but Sheikh Hasina came back from exile in Delhi in 1981 and took charge. That kind of situation doesn't exist now because of the repression against Awami League leaders, activists, and supporters over the last 10 months. Although there have been some sporadic protests by young Awami League activists—the Chhatra League, the Jubo League—they're all scattered. The media exercises self-censorship because of mob violence. What we have in Bangladesh today is a situation where everything has been hollowed out except the name People's Republic of Bangladesh. There is a deliberate program of eliminating everything that had to do with the 1971 war of liberation. No one argues that there was corruption during the 15-year rule of the Awami League. But the process is what matters. People in the ICT today were never disposed in a friendly way toward the Awami League or democratic secular politics. Is there concern that India might ask Sheikh Hasina to leave and return to Bangladesh for the sake of good relations? That kind of concern is not there because under the Awami League government, good relations existed with India. The feeling is that Modi will not take steps to have Sheikh Hasina extradited. If Sheikh Hasina is extradited to Bangladesh, justice will not be served. The feeling in Bangladesh is that judgment has already been delivered—student supporters of the interim government have made it clear that Sheikh Hasina will be brought back to Dhaka and hanged. When people look to a judicial killing of a former Prime Minister before a trial, I don't think the Indian government will agree to that. The Awami League, which liberated the country, has been placed under a ban—a huge irony. On the other hand, the Jamaat-e-Islami, which violently opposed Bangladesh's liberation in 1971 and supported the Pakistani army, has come to the forefront. With the Awami League banned, anywhere between 35 to 40 per cent, perhaps more, of voters have been disenfranchised. For the foreseeable future, until things change in Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina will be in India. Is Sheikh Hasina not responsible for the leadership vacuum because she surrounded herself with a tight-knit clique? Should she step back and allow new leadership to rebuild the party? That would be very appreciable—for Sheikh Hasina to step back in view of the indictment, letting the country know she's ready to face justice. If the Awami League doesn't exist or simply withers away, that will be terrible for the country. With the Awami League, Bangladesh's history gets washed away. Over the last 15 years, her leadership style changed. The difference between Sheikh Hasina and her father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, is that Sheikh Mujib had around him a group of leaders who argued with him, debated issues with him, and collectively reached party decisions. With Sheikh Hasina, they tended to be more sycophantic than being able to debate policy matters with her. She created a clique around her where nobody could argue against her policies. Every time a minister made a statement, he or she began with 'On the advice of the Honourable Prime Minister, the government has decided'. Sheikh Hasina is aged now—she was born in September 1947, so she's almost 78. It's high time for her to hand over leadership to a new generation. If the Awami League simply withers away, it's an entire nation that will suffer, an entire history of Bangladesh that is already under threat might be wiped out altogether. Also Read | India and Bangladesh are destined to work together: Sreeradha Datta Can a case be made that once prosecution begins, the ban on the Awami League becomes legally shaky? The prosecution itself may help a second rung emerge. The ban on the Awami League was not a wise step. That should have been kept separate from cases of corruption and orders to police to fire on protesters. The interim government could have prosecuted individuals but leave the Awami League aside because it is a major party. Historically, every time the Awami League has been under pressure, it always bounced back because it had that set of leaders. As far as the present Awami League is concerned, the party is there but in scattered form. Many Awami League activists and leaders revere Sheikh Hasina largely because she happens to be the daughter of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. But with the indictment, Sheikh Hasina could consult her party leaders and take steps to get in touch with other leaders and give them directives on how to reorganise the party and step away from it until this entire course of investigations comes to an end. People in Bangladesh—30 to 40 per cent—since the banning of the Awami League, citizens who never supported the Awami League are becoming sympathetic to it. If the Awami League is unbanned hypothetically and an election is held today, there's a good chance it will go back to power—maybe not with a vast majority, but in a coalition. The Chief Adviser, Muhammad Yunus, told his advisors last week that the Awami League is destabilising the country. Despite the ban, the interim government feels there is a threat from the Awami League. Is the army going to permit an election without the Awami League? Army chief General Wakar-Uz-Zaman has been saying there has to be an inclusive election before December. Some kind of subtle pressure is there from the army. When General Wakar-Uz-Zaman made it clear about two weeks ago that elections have to be held by December this year, Professor Yunus said he was thinking of resigning. The Yunus government came forth with the idea that elections will be held anywhere between December this year and June next year. The army has been playing a very subtle, very positive game. The army chief has gone on record saying that the values of the liberation war will not be sacrificed, and the rule of law will be maintained. Just the other day in Rangpur, when the former military leader General Hussain Muhammad Ershad's family home was being vandalised, the army moved in. The regional army commander summoned these student leaders in the middle of the night and warned them that this kind of vandalism will not be tolerated. If elections are held without the Awami League, they will not be credible at all—in the same way that elections under the Awami League government, when the BNP [Bangladesh Nationalist Party] did not take part, were never regarded as credible. The army is the only disciplined force in the country now. The army must insist that inclusivity means bringing the Awami League into the election. So the Awami League is looking to the army to bring it back into political life. The three chiefs were appointed by Sheikh Hasina—is there a feeling they owe this to her? I won't say they owe this to her. They owe this to the proper rules of governance under which they were appointed. But they're also loyal to the principles and values of the 1971 war of liberation. That sense of values is still working in them. Now if they see the trajectory the country is taking—the Jamaat-e-Islami has come back, militant Islamist organisations like Hizb ut-Tahrir are there, and there are reports of Pakistani military officials and ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan's external intelligence agency] officials coming to Bangladesh and trying to establish links with the Bangladesh government—these are very concerning things. The armed forces, I don't think they will take all these things lying down. You mentioned if elections were held today, the Awami League might return to power. But we hear the BNP believes it will sweep the elections—that's why they are eager for December elections. When I talked about the Awami League's prospects, there's a sympathy factor working, although not for its doings in the last government—the corruption is roundly condemned even by supporters. If elections are held, we do not feel the Awami League will win a straight majority, but it just might squeak through. The BNP is very confident it will win, but worried that the Jamaat-e-Islami is getting ahead of it. Since August last year, Jamaat has gone ahead. Jamaat has worked very quietly and softly, asking for local government elections first rather than general elections. The BNP is massively popular because it's been out of power for so many years and because of the repression exercised on it by the Awami League government. All political power in the party rests with Tarique Rahman [party chief Khaleda Zia's son], who has been in exile in the UK since 2007. The question many people ask is why Tarique Rahman has not been going back to Bangladesh. The interim government does not want him to return. An unwritten instruction is there because if he goes back today, that will create a huge wave of support for the BNP that the interim government will not be able to stem. Recently, Jamaat-e-Islami member A.T.M. Azharul Islam was released from prison. The head of Jamaat held a press conference saying the party apologised to the nation, but did not mention 1971 or collaboration with Pakistan Army. How is this being received? The people are not happy with this sort of statement from Jamaat. It is very ambiguous. When a party chief says, 'if we have made any mistake,' the question is not if mistakes were made. The historical record is there. All the old newspapers are there. I was there in 1971. I belong to a generation that was there. We saw what Jamaat did. If Jamaat is actually apologetic about 1971, it should come out with a clear statement saying: 'We made mistakes in 1971, we should not have supported the Pakistani military regime, and we respect the three million people of Bangladesh who died because of the Pakistani military regime and their local collaborators.' Young people who were born 15 or 20 years ago know the history of the country. You have to tell these people you're sorry. Condemning the Awami League for corruption is one thing. But history is something else, and Jamaat has to own up to it clearly and without ambiguity. There was talk of an army takeover. What are you hearing about the differences between the army and interim administration? The army is not happy. The army and the Yunus administration are not happy with each other because Yunus feels pressure from the army. The army feels nationwide pressure for elections and knows that unless there's an elected government, a constitutional government, things cannot go back to normal. I don't think the army is ready to take over. The Bangladesh Army remembers the periods when the army took charge and would not like to go back into that situation. What the army can do is ensure elections are held in good time, are inclusive, and ensure they are free, fair, and credible. This return to constitutional government is absolutely important because the people of Bangladesh have become tired of the kind of politics in the last 25-30 years. No political leader—either Begum Khalida Zia or Sheikh Hasina—has graduated to being a national leader. Not since Sheikh Mujibur Rahman have we had a national leader who could unite all people. 'If Sheikh Hasina is extradited to Bangladesh, justice will not be served. Student supporters of the interim government have made it clear that she will be brought back to Dhaka and hanged.' That is also the fear now: that if the BNP sweeps, there would not be a centrist opposition. It might be Jamaat or other extremist Islamist parties. The ideal situation would be first for the Awami League to be unbanned and permitted to take part. If the BNP sweeps the election, it will be back to square one. If Jamaat becomes the opposition in parliament, that will not be happy for the country. But if the Awami League is there and the BNP is there, and if people vote for either of these parties with the margin of difference very small, that is the kind of election we need. Since 1970, every time we've had an election, it's always been one party claiming the entire parliament for itself. If an election produces a result with no party gaining a majority, that will be extremely good for the country. That will force political parties to get into talks about forming a coalition. About the humanitarian corridor proposal from Bangladesh into Myanmar that reportedly caused army-administration differences: Given over a million Rohingya refugees and Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) activity in camps, why has this become such a big issue? This humanitarian corridor idea was sponsored by the interim government, especially by the National Security Advisor, Khalil-ur-Rahman. We have never had a National Security Advisor in Bangladesh. It was done without consultation with the Army. There's no guarantee, given Bangladesh's weak state politically, that elements of ARSA and the Arakan rebels will not take advantage to operate from within Bangladesh. If the humanitarian corridor is allowed, it might become a point where these Myanmar rebels might take advantage and Bangladesh might become a source of supply of arms—not just food and other items for Rohingya, but ammunition and weapons for rebels. When the army chief made it clear that the military will not allow any humanitarian corridor, he felt the pulse of the nation. On the pretext of this humanitarian corridor, it will be a point where militants, Islamic militants, will become even more active in trying to dislodge the administration within Bangladesh. Is there fear that Western foreign troops might use that corridor—for instance, the US military stationing itself there? That's a very valid concern. We are worried about American attention to islands like Saint Martin. American policy will clearly be aimed at helping Myanmar rebels with arms and ammunition routed through Bangladesh—that will impinge on Bangladesh's sovereignty. Secondly, to keep a check on India and China will place Bangladesh in a very difficult geopolitical situation. Also Read | India comments on treatment of Hindus in Bangladesh but must know its treatment of Muslims has repercussions: Debapriya Bhattacharya One theory after Sheikh Hasina's ouster was that the United States had a hand in it. When Sheikh Hasina mentioned that 'a white man' asked her about Saint Martin's Island, this theory got wings. Would India have allowed the US to burn down the house next door where India had so many stakes? It's obvious that elements in the United States, especially in the Democratic Party government, were never truly well disposed toward Sheikh Hasina. Under the Biden administration, there were indications they were not happy with Sheikh Hasina. She came up with the statement about 'a white man's proposal' regarding Saint Martin. We were surprised when she made that statement because she didn't go further. When Professor Yunus went to the UN last year, he met Bill Clinton and talked about the meticulous plan for the removal of Sheikh Hasina's government. That has led to questions—what was that meticulous plan? Whether India would have agreed to that, I don't think so. If the American government intends to intrude into Bangladesh territory on the excuse of helping Myanmar rebels, the Indian government will put its foot down. India will not accept this kind of intrusion by American interests in Bangladesh. The Chief Adviser went to China and made that controversial remark about inviting the Chinese to set up a trading zone with India's north-eastern states. There's now a high-powered Chinese delegation in Dhaka. What's the difference between Sheikh Hasina and Yunus regarding China? Hardly any difference. What the Yunus government has been doing is carrying forward Sheikh Hasina's policies vis-à-vis China. But we should be mindful that no matter how much closer we get to China, our focal point is India. We have traditionally maintained good relations with India in all spheres. As far as India is concerned, the Modi government should have done more in dealing with the crisis that erupted in Bangladesh in August 2024. What we certainly did not expect was the anarchy that would replace the fall of the Awami League government. For now, the Modi government should be able to interact with the Yunus government till the election. Certain measures such as closing land borders should be relaxed. If they are not relaxed, it's the people of Bangladesh who suffer and, to a certain extent, the people of India. At the end of the day, everything depends on how soon we can return Bangladesh to an elected government. If we have a strong government, a national government that reaches out to all people, it will give us an opportunity to forge a foreign policy which would benefit Bangladesh's people and the region. Why has the Yunus administration not been able to take control of the mob violence, the vandalism of Mujib's house, even with the army's support? The expectation was that after taking over from Sheikh Hasina's government, he would clear the accumulated debris and lead the country to elections. But it soon became very clear that the interim administration was anti-Awami League. When the torching of Sheikh Mujib's residence was done, shortly after Yunus went to the United States where he addressed the General Assembly. The anchor asked him why on his watch Sheikh Mujib's house was torched and he had done nothing about it. His answer didn't satisfy anybody. He said it was a meticulous plan, but then he said there was a reset button at work. The question is, what reset button? You don't reset history. Over the last 10 months, it has become very clear that the Yunus government, through all its activities, is against the Awami League—through not allowing Awami League supporters to gather, through letting mobs demolish structures, and attacks on the Hindu minority community. There are still Awami League supporters who can't stay at home for fear they will be targeted by mobs. Everything depends on when we have the election. To have it in good time, we need army pressure to be kept up. We also need a timetable, which the interim government has not yet brought forward. We keep fingers crossed. Nirupama Subramanian is an independent journalist who has worked earlier at The Hindu and at The Indian Express.
News18
4 hours ago
- News18
Yunus, Army, Pakistan, And China: A New Axis Threatens India's Security
Last Updated: China's role as the linchpin of this emerging axis cannot be overstated, as it leverages its economic and military influence to counter India's rise India faces an emerging geopolitical storm as Bangladesh's interim government, led by Muhammad Yunus, aligns with Pakistan and China, forming a troubling axis that threatens New Delhi's regional dominance. The convergence of Yunus's administration, Bangladesh's military, Pakistan's strategic provocations, and China's growing influence in South Asia presents a multifaceted challenge that India cannot afford to underestimate. Tensions escalated following provocative remarks by a retired Bangladesh army officer, closely tied to Yunus's government, advocating for a joint military arrangement with China to seize India's northeastern states in the event of an India-Pakistan conflict. This inflammatory rhetoric, coupled with Bangladesh's warming ties with Pakistan and China, signals a deliberate shift in Dhaka's foreign policy under Yunus, moving away from the India-friendly stance of the ousted Sheikh Hasina regime. Since August 2024, when Hasina's government fell, attacks on minorities, particularly Hindus, have surged in Bangladesh, straining bilateral relations. India's revocation of transshipment facilities for Bangladeshi exports in April 2025 further highlighted this rift. Meanwhile, Pakistan's military, emboldened by Chinese weaponry like the J-10C jets and PL-15 missiles, has intensified its aggression, as seen in the May 2025 India-Pakistan clashes. China, leveraging its economic and military largesse, is deepening its footprint in both nations, positioning itself as a counterweight to India. This alignment, fueled by Yunus's outreach to Beijing and Pakistan's reliance on Chinese arms, creates a volatile dynamic that could destabilise South Asia. The combination of Yunus's interim regime, Bangladesh's military ambitions, Pakistan's hostility, and China's strategic manoeuvring forms a potent threat that demands India's urgent attention as it navigates this complex regional chessboard. Muhammad Yunus, as Bangladesh's interim leader since August 2024, has steered Dhaka towards a confrontational stance against India, undermining decades of cooperative ties fostered under Sheikh Hasina. His administration's failure to curb rising attacks on Hindus—over 1,000 incidents reported since August—has inflamed tensions, with India viewing these as a deliberate signal of hostility. Yunus's visit to China in early 2025, where he positioned Bangladesh as a gateway for Chinese economic expansion, particularly highlighting the landlocked nature of India's northeastern states, raised alarm in New Delhi. By pitching Bangladesh as the 'only guardian of the ocean" for the region, Yunus invited Beijing to deepen its strategic presence, potentially encircling India's vulnerable northeast. His government's appointment of Major General (Retd) ALM Fazlur Rahman, who called for occupying India's seven northeastern states in coordination with China if India attacks Pakistan, as chairman of the National Independent Commission, underscores this shift. Though Dhaka distanced itself from Rahman's remarks, the lack of disciplinary action suggests tacit approval. This rhetoric aligns with Yunus's broader strategy to balance against India by leveraging China's economic and military support, including agreements signed during his China visit to enhance infrastructure and trade. The revocation of India's transshipment facility, which crippled Bangladesh's export routes, was a direct response to this pivot. Yunus's alignment with anti-India forces, particularly in the context of rising communal violence, risks alienating India's goodwill and strengthening a Bangladesh-China axis that could destabilise the region. As India prepares for potential escalations, Yunus's provocative leadership signals a new front in India's security challenges, especially given Bangladesh's proximity and historical ties with Pakistan. Bangladesh's Military Ambitions and Regional Instability Bangladesh's military, under Yunus's interim government, is emerging as a destabilising force, emboldened by its growing alignment with China and Pakistan. The provocative statement by Major General (Retd) ALM Fazlur Rahman, a key figure appointed by Yunus to investigate the 2009 Bangladesh Rifles mutiny, reflects a broader militaristic undercurrent. Rahman's call for a 'joint military arrangement" with China to target India's northeast, though officially disavowed, highlights a dangerous mindset within Bangladesh's military circles. The Bangladesh army's top general, Qamarul Hasan, visited Pakistan in early 2025, meeting with army chief Asim Munir to discuss enhanced military cooperation. This visit, coupled with Yunus's outreach to China, suggests a coordinated effort to challenge India's regional influence. Bangladesh's military modernisation, supported by Chinese arms, including Type 59 tanks and anti-ship missiles, is modest but strategically significant given its proximity to India's sensitive northeastern border. The region's landlocked geography makes it vulnerable to disruptions, and Bangladesh's control over key maritime routes amplifies this threat. Reports indicate China is funding port upgrades in Chittagong, potentially for dual-use military purposes, which could facilitate Chinese naval presence in the Bay of Bengal. The interim government's failure to address minority violence, coupled with its military's flirtation with anti-India rhetoric, risks escalating tensions into a broader conflict. India's military, already stretched by border disputes with China and Pakistan, must now contend with a potentially hostile Bangladesh, complicating its strategic calculus. This military posturing, backed by Chinese support, positions Bangladesh as a wildcard in South Asia's security landscape, directly threatening India's northeastern stability. Pakistan's Aggression and Chinese Military Backing Pakistan's military escalation against India, particularly evident in the May 2025 clashes, is deeply intertwined with its reliance on Chinese weaponry, amplifying the threat to New Delhi. Following a terrorist attack in Kashmir that killed 26 tourists, India launched missile strikes on alleged terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Pakistan retaliated with Chinese-made J-10C fighter jets and PL-15 missiles, claiming to have downed Indian aircraft, including French-made Rafales. The conflict, which saw drones and missiles targeting airbases, highlighted Pakistan's dependence on Chinese arms, with 63% of China's arms exports from 2020-2024 going to Pakistan. The J-10C's reported success against Western technology has boosted China's defence industry, with stocks of AVIC Chengdu Aircraft rising 40% during the conflict. Pakistan's military, led by General Asim Munir, views India as an existential threat, a stance reinforced by its nuclear modernisation and battlefield nuclear weapons development, as noted in a 2025 US Defense Intelligence Agency report. China's support, including the HQ-9 air defence system and joint military exercises, strengthens Pakistan's confidence in confronting India. This dynamic not only escalates the India-Pakistan rivalry but also serves China's interest in keeping India preoccupied with regional conflicts, draining its resources. The Pakistani military's ideological commitment to Kashmir, coupled with Chinese backing, ensures that tensions will persist, with the potential for rapid escalation given both nations' nuclear capabilities. India's successful strikes on Pakistani airbases, despite losses, demonstrate its resolve, but the China-Pakistan nexus complicates its strategic response, making this a critical threat for 2026 and beyond. China's Strategic Manoeuvring: Exploiting Regional Tensions China's role as the linchpin of this emerging axis cannot be overstated, as it leverages its economic and military influence to counter India's rise. Beijing's deepening ties with Bangladesh and Pakistan create a pincer effect, encircling India from the east and west. In Bangladesh, China is investing heavily in infrastructure, including the Chittagong port, which could serve as a strategic foothold in the Indian Ocean. Yunus's invitation for Chinese expansion, emphasising Bangladesh's maritime dominance, aligns with Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative, aiming to secure access to Nepal and Bhutan's markets while pressuring India's northeast. In Pakistan, China's military support, including advanced J-10C jets and PL-15 missiles, has transformed the India-Pakistan conflict into a proxy battleground for Chinese and Western technologies. The May 2025 clashes provided China with a real-time intelligence harvest, allowing it to assess Indian military capabilities through Pakistan's use of its weapons. China's fishing fleets, doubling as intelligence-gathering units, have been spotted near Indian naval drills, further enhancing Beijing's surveillance capabilities. top videos View all Despite strained China-Pakistan ties due to attacks on Chinese workers in 2024, Beijing continues to back Pakistan to keep India engaged in regional conflicts, diverting its focus from the Sino-Indian border dispute. China's neutral public stance during the India-Pakistan conflict, with its foreign ministry claiming ignorance of J-10C involvement, masks its strategic interest in prolonging tensions. By fostering instability through Bangladesh and Pakistan, China undermines India's global aspirations, positioning itself as the dominant regional power. This calculated manoeuvring, exploiting Yunus's ambitions and Pakistan's hostility, creates a formidable challenge for India's security and diplomatic strategy. The author teaches journalism at St Xavier's College (autonomous), Kolkata. His handle on X is @sayantan_gh. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect News18's views. tags : bangladesh China Muhammad Yunus Operation Sindoor pakistan Location : Kolkata, India, India First Published: June 05, 2025, 03:17 IST News opinion Opinion | Yunus, Army, Pakistan, And China: A New Axis Threatens India's Security
Time of India
11 hours ago
- Time of India
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman cancelled: Bangladesh seeks new 'father' in Pakistan
Bangladesh's retreat from its founding ethos began when in August last year, after the ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, the statue of her father and national founder Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was toppled by an unruly crowd. Now the erasure of his image from the country's currency a few days ago signals efforts to undo Bangladesh by sliding towards East Pakistan, as the country was known before it broke away from Pakistan. There are reports that the caretaker government under Muhammad Yunus has also revoked Mujib's status as a freedom-fighter, though the government has denied that. These developments not only carry profound domestic implications but also pose serious strategic and national security challenges for India. Disowning the 'Father of the Nation' Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, revered as the Father of the Nation, symbolized Bangladesh's historic break from Pakistan and its embrace of a secular, Bengali nationalism. His leadership in the 1971 liberation war, in collaboration with Indian forces, laid the moral and political bedrock of the republic. His most prominent statue that once stood in Dhaka's Mrityunjayee Prangan was not merely a monument; it was a manifestation of the state's ideological origin story. by Taboola by Taboola Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like Bayan Lepas: Unsold Furniture Liquidation 2024 (Prices May Surprise You) Unsold Furniture | Search Ads Learn More Undo The toppling of the statue and destruction following Hasina's fall by Islamist crowds was an unmistakable political and symbolic repudiation of Mujib's legacy. That repudiation was institutionalized a few days ago, when the Bangladesh Bank issued new Taka 1,000, 50, and 20 notes, pointedly omitting Mujib's image and replacing it with symbols associated with the protest movement. Even more controversially, reports emerged that the interim government had quietly revoked Mujib's status as a freedom-fighter -- a move officially denied, but widely believed to be accurate. These acts are not isolated decisions. They represent a conscious attempt by the emergent political class to move Bangladesh's ideological compass from secularism and regional solidarity with India toward Islamist radicalism and a flirtation with the ideological memory of Pakistan. Live Events A new East Pakistan? Historical revisionism is now visibly underway. The new regime has embarked on a process of educational reform, repositioning Ziaur Rahman, the founder of the opposition BNP and a figure with more ambiguous ties to Pakistan, as the true architect of independence. National holidays commemorating Mujib's birth and death have been removed, and his portrait has been taken down from key state institutions. This erasure of historical memory is accompanied by a resurgence of Islamist narratives. Extremist elements, long marginal in Bangladeshi mainstream politics, have found new political space in the post-Hasina vacuum. Minority Hindu community, historically protected under Awami League governments, has faced large-scale violence and intimidation even as the interim government under Yunus has largely remained silent or tried to negate anti-Hindu violence. What is emerging is a Bangladesh that increasingly resembles the ideological contours of the very state it fought to separate from in 1971, a state defined less by cultural identity and more by Islamist jihadi politics. What Bangladesh's slide into past means for India These internal realignments in Bangladesh have immediate and long-term implications for India, arguably its most consequential regional partner. India's relationship with Bangladesh has historically been defined by shared narratives of liberation, linguistic nationalism and secular values. A Bangladesh that questions its break from Pakistan also implicitly questions the legitimacy of India's role in its birth, thereby altering the moral basis of bilateral cooperation. During Hasina's rule, India did not have to face Islamist radicalism in the east. The resurgence of extremist networks in Bangladesh, particularly those with pan-Islamist sympathies, risks turning the country into a breeding ground for cross-border militancy. Bangladesh's transition has seen the quiet rehabilitation of Islamist clerics and organizations once deemed threats to regional security. If these groups gain deeper political footholds, India's vulnerable northeastern states may face renewed infiltration, radicalization and communal unrest, which India had experienced during the rule of Khaleda Zia who had friendly ties with Pakistan. India and Bangladesh share one of the world's longest porous borders. Political instability, combined with the growing persecution of minorities, could precipitate a renewed wave of migration into Indian territory, particularly into Assam, Tripura, and West Bengal. Such an influx would not only strain local resources but also reignite longstanding ethnic and communal tensions within India. With the retreat of pro-India leadership in Bangladesh as it has recently banned ousted PM Hasina's party Awami League, there are growing indications that Bangladesh may deepen its engagements with Pakistan and China. This includes signs of increased economic and military consultations. A trilateral alignment among these states, however informal, would create a new axis of friction in South Asia, complicating India's efforts to maintain regional equilibrium. Reportedly, Bangladesh has invited China to develop an old airport near Chicken's Neck area, India's sensitive border zone. India must now approach Bangladesh not as a post-liberation ally, but as a fluid and potentially adversarial neighbor. India needs a recalibrated strategy grounded in realism rather than sentiment. This includes enhanced border surveillance, renewed investment in counter-radicalization initiatives in eastern India, and robust diplomatic engagement with minority groups and civil society actors within Bangladesh, in addition increased military vigilance. At stake is not merely the future of bilateral relations, but the strategic architecture of South Asia. Another Pakistan on India's eastern border will plunge the subcontinent into permanent unrest.
