Corrections: June 10, 2025
An article on Monday about Representative Don Bacon, a Nebraska Republican, and his break with President Trump misstated the number of terms an incumbent mayor of Omaha had served before his recent election loss. It was three terms, not four.
A picture caption with an article on Friday about a new show by the photographer Elle Pérez misstated the title of an artwork, using information from the Cultural Counsel. It is 'Untitled (wet and tired flowers),' from 'La Despedida,' 2025, not 'Untitled (cut path and yellow flowers),' from 'La Despedida,' 2025.
An article on Monday about the television producer Jesse Collins misidentified the documentary in which Beyoncé requests a 30-foot camera track. It is 'Renaissance: A Film by Beyoncé,' not 'Homecoming.'
Errors are corrected during the press run whenever possible, so some errors noted here may not have appeared in all editions.
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Fox News
2 hours ago
- Fox News
Putin appears to be visibly annoyed as reporters barrage him and Trump with questions
Russian President Vladimir Putin was not shy about showing apparent disdain for members of the press who clamored to ask him questions at the high-stakes summit in Alaska. For President Donald Trump, such media scrutiny was nothing out of the ordinary, but Putin appeared to make it clear he was unhappy with the display. As reporters tried to grab the leaders' attention, Putin — a former Soviet KGB intelligence officer — seemed to be visibly annoyed. Heading into the summit, Trump faced pressure from leaders at home and abroad to secure a deal with Putin and end the hostilities. Even former Trump rival Hillary Clinton acknowledged the gravity of the moment, saying she would nominate Trump for a Nobel Peace Prize if he secured a ceasefire in Ukraine. Despite a rocky relationship with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Trump has managed to coordinate with both him and Putin. Before Friday's U.S.-Russia summit, Zelenskyy met with European leaders and took part in a session of the "Coalition of the Willing," which Vice President JD Vance also attended. Additionally, on Wednesday, Trump met virtually with European leaders to prepare for the pivotal talks. Although Putin and Trump failed to reach a deal Friday, the meeting was widely viewed as a successful step forward. Trump told Fox News' Sean Hannity in an exclusive interview that the meeting was "very good" and that Putin "wants to see it done." However, the president declined to share what sticking point stopped them from reaching a deal. European leaders praised Trump in a joint statement signed by French President Emmanuel Macron, U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and others. "Leaders welcomed President Trump's efforts to stop the killing in Ukraine, end Russia's war of aggression, and achieve just and lasting peace," the statement read. The leaders also reiterated their stance that "Ukraine must have ironclad security guarantees to effectively defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity." Zelenskyy is scheduled to meet with Trump in Washington, D.C., on Monday. He said in a post on X that he and Trump will "discuss all of the details regarding ending the killing and the war." Trump and Zelenskyy — who was not invited to the Alaska summit — have signaled willingness for a trilateral meeting with Putin. But Putin has shown no movement toward such talks. On Saturday, Zelenskyy said he urged Trump to strengthen sanctions if Putin refuses to join a trilateral meeting, echoing Trump's earlier warning that Russia would face "very severe" economic consequences if it derailed the peace process.
Yahoo
2 hours ago
- Yahoo
Trump's unprecedented, potentially unconstitutional deal with Nvidia and AMD, explained: Alexander Hamilton would approve
'We negotiated a little deal,' President Donald Trump told reporters on August 11, about the developing situation with leading chip makers Nvidia and AMD continuing to do business in China. He explained that he originally wanted a 20% cut of Nvidia's sales in exchange for the company obtaining export licenses to sell H20 chip to China, but he was persuaded to settle at 15%. The H20 chip is 'obsolete,' Trump added … 'he's selling a essentially old chip.' The chips do appear to be quite significant to China, considering that the Cyberspace Administration of China held discussions with Nvidia over security concerns that the H20 chips may be tracked and turned off remotely, according to a disclosure on its website. The deal, which lifted an export ban on Nvidia's H20 AI chips and AMD's MI308, and followed heated negotiations, was widely described as unusual and also still theoretical at this point, with the legal details still being ironed out by the Department of Commerce. Legal experts have questioned whether the eventual deal would constitute an unconstitutional export tax, as the U.S. Constitution prohibits duties on exports. This has come to be known as the 'export clause' of the constitution. Indeed, it's hard to find much precedent for it anywhere in the history of the U.S. government's dealings with the corporate sector. Erik Jensen, a law professor at Case Western Reserve University who has studied the history of the export clause, told Fortune he was not aware of anything like this in history. In the 1990s, he added, the Supreme Court struck down two attempted taxes on export clause grounds (cases known as IBM and U.S. Shoe). Jensen said tax practitioners were surprised that the court took up the cases: 'if only because most pay no attention to constitutional limitations, and the Court hadn't heard any export clause cases in about 70 years.' The takeaway was clear, Jensen said: 'The export clause matters.' Columbia University professor Eric Talley agreed with Jensen, telling Fortune that while the federal government has previously applied subsidies to exports, he's not aware of other historical cases imposing taxes on selected exporters. Talley also cited the export clause as the usual grounds for finding such arrangements unconstitutional. Rather than downplaying the uniqueness of the arrangement, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has been leaning into it. In a Bloomberg television interview, he said: 'I think you know, right now, this is unique. But now that we have the model and the beta test, why not expand it? I think we could see it in other industries over time.' Bessent and the White House insist there are 'no national security concerns,' since only less-advanced chips are being sold to China. Instead, officials have touted the deal as a creative solution to balance trade, technology, and national policy. How rare is this? The arrangement has drawn sharp reaction from business leaders, legal experts, and trade analysts. Julia Powles, director of UCLA's Institute for Technology, Law & Policy, told the Los Angeles Times: 'It ties the fate of this chip manufacturer in a very particular way to this administration, which is quite rare.' Experts warned that if replicated, this template could pressure other firms—not just tech giants—into similar arrangements with the government. Already, several unprecedented arrangements have been struck between the Trump administration and the corporate sector, ranging from the 'golden share' in U.S. Steel negotiated as part of its takeover by Japan's Nippon Steel to the federal government reportedly discussing buying a stake in chipmaker Intel. Nvidia and AMD have declined to comment on specifics. When contacted by Fortune for comment, Nvidia reiterated its statement that it follows rules the U.S. government sets for its participation in worldwide markets. 'While we haven't shipped H20 to China for months, we hope export control rules will let America compete in China and worldwide. America cannot repeat 5G and lose telecommunication leadership. America's AI tech stack can be the world's standard if we race.' The White House declined to comment about the potential deal. AMD did not respond to a request for comment. While Washington has often intervened in business—especially in times of crisis—the mechanism and magnitude of the Nvidia/AMD deal are virtually unprecedented in recent history. The federal government appears to have never previously claimed a percentage of corporate revenue from export sales as a precondition for market access. Instead, previous actions took the form of temporary nationalization, regulatory control, subsidies, or bailouts—often during war or economic emergency. Examples of this include the seizure of coal mines (1946) and steel mills (1952) during labor strikes, as well as the 2008 financial crisis bailouts, where the government took equity stakes in large corporations including two of Detroit's Big three and most of Wall Street's key banks. During World War I, the War Industries Board regulated prices, production, and business conduct for the war effort. Congress has previously created export incentives and tax-deferral strategies (such as the Domestic International Sales Corporation and Foreign Sales Corporation Acts), but these measures incentivized sales rather than directly diverting a fixed share of export revenue to the government. Legal scholars stress that such arrangements were subjected to global trade rules and later modified after international complaints. Global lack of precedent The U.S. prohibition on export taxes dates back to the birth of the nation. Case Western's Jensen has written that some delegates of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, such as New York's Alexander Hamilton, were in favor of the government being able to tax revenue sources such as imports and exports, but the 'staple states' in the southern U.S. were fiercely opposed, given their agricultural bent, especially the importance of cotton at that point. Still, many other countries currently have export taxes on the books, though they are generally imposed across all exporters, rather than as one-off arrangements that remove barriers to a specific market. And many of the nations with export taxes are developing countries who tax agricultural or resource commodities. In several cases (Uganda, Malaya, Sudan, Nigeria, Haiti, Thailand), export taxes made up 10% to 40% of total government tax revenue in the 1960s and 1970s, according to an IMF staff paper. Globally, most countries tax profits generated within their borders ('source-based corporate taxes'), but rarely as a direct percentage of export sales as a market access precondition. The standard model is taxation of locally earned profits, regardless of export destination; licensing fees and tariffs may be applied, but not usually as a fixed percent of export revenue as a pre-negotiated entry fee. Although the Nvidia/AMD deal doesn't take the usual form of a tax, Case Western's Jensen added. 'I don't see what else it could be characterized as.' It's clearly not a 'user fee,' which he said is the usual triable issue of law in export clause cases. For instance, if goods or services are being provided by the government in exchange for the charge, such as docking fees at a governmentally operated port, then that charge isn't a tax or duty and the Export Clause is irrelevant. 'I just don't see how the charges that will be levied in the chip cases could possibly be characterized in that way.' Players have been known to 'game' the different legal treatments of subsidies and taxes, Columbia's Talley added. He cited the example of a government imposing a uniform, across-the-board tax on all producers, but then providing a subsidy to sellers who sell to domestic markets. 'The net effect would be the same as a tax on exports, but indirectly.' He was unaware of this happening in the U.S. but cited several international examples including Argentina, India, and even the EU. One famous example of a canny international tax strategy was Apple's domicile in Ireland, along with so many other multinationals keeping their international profits offshore in affiliates in order to avoid paying U.S. tax, which at the time applied to all worldwide income upon repatriation. Talley said much of this went away after the 2018 tax reforms, which moved the U.S. away from a worldwide corporate tax, with some exceptions. The protection racket comparison If Trump's chip export tax is an anomaly in the annals of U.S. international trade, the deal structure has some parallels in another corner of the business world: organized crime, where 'protection rackets' have a long history. Businesses bound by such deals must pay a cut of their revenues to a criminal organization (or parallel government), effectively as the cost for being allowed to operate or to avoid harm. The China chip export tax and the protection rackets extract revenue as a condition for market access, use the threat of exclusion or punishment for non-payment, and both may be justified as 'protection' or 'guaranteed access,' but are not freely negotiated by the business. 'It certainly has the smell of a governmental shakedown in certain respects,' Columbia's Talley told Fortune, considering that the 'underlying threat was an outright export ban, which makes a 15% surcharge seem palatable by comparison.' Talley noted some nuances, such as the generally established broad statutory and constitutional support for national-security-based export bans on various goods and services sold to enumerated countries, which have been imposed with legal authority on China, North Korea, Iraq, Russia, Cuba, and others. 'From an economic perspective, a ban on an exported good is tantamount to a tax of 'infinity percent' on the good,' Talley said, meaning it effectively shuts down the export market for that good. 'Viewed in that light, a 15% levy is less (and not more) extreme than a ban.' Still, there's the matter, similar to Trump's tariff regime, of making a legal challenge to an ostensibly blatantly illegal policy actually hold up in court. 'A serious question with the chips tax,' Case Western's Jensen told Fortune, 'is who, if anyone, would have standing to challenge the tax?' In other words, it may be unconstitutional, but who's actually going to compel the federal government to obey the constitution? This story was originally featured on Error in retrieving data Sign in to access your portfolio Error in retrieving data Error in retrieving data Error in retrieving data Error in retrieving data
Yahoo
2 hours ago
- Yahoo
Nvidia and AMD's ‘special treatment' from Trump is shaking up an already tangled global chip supply chain
Donald Trump's decision to let Nvidia and AMD export AI processors to China in exchange for a cut of their sales will have repercussions far beyond the semiconductor supply chain is global, involving a wide array of non-U.S. companies, often based in countries that are U.S. allies. Nvidia's chips may be designed and sold by a U.S. company, but they're manufactured by Taiwan's TSMC, using chipmaking tools from companies like ASML, which is based in the Netherlands, and Japan's Tokyo Election, and using components from suppliers like South Korea's SK Hynix. The U.S. leaned on these global companies for years to try to limit their engagement with China; these efforts picked up after the passage of the CHIPS Act and the expansion of U.S. chip-export controls in 2022. Washington has also pressured major transshipment hubs, like Singapore and the United Arab Emirates, to more closely monitor chip shipments to ensure that controlled chips don't make their way to China in violation of U.S. law. Within the U.S., discussion of Trump's Nvidia deal has focused on what it means for China's government's and Chinese companies' ability to get their hands on cutting-edge U.S. technology. But several other countries and companies are likely studying the deal closely to see if they might get an opening to sell to China as well. Trump's Nvidia deal 'tells you that [U.S.] national security is not really the issue, or has never been the issue' with export controls, says Mario Morales, who leads market research firm IDC's work on semiconductors. Companies and countries will 'probably have to revisit what their strategy has been, and in some cases, they're going to break away from the U.S. administration's policies.' 'If Nvidia and AMD are given special treatment because they've 'paid to play', why shouldn't other companies be doing the same?' he adds. Getting allies on their side The Biden administration spent a lot of diplomatic energy to get its allies to agree to limit their semiconductor exports to China. First, Washington said that manufacturers like TSMC and Intel that wanted to tap billions in subsidies could not expand advanced chip production in China. Then, the U.S. pushed for its allies to impose their own sanctions on exports to China. 'Export controls and other sanctions efforts are necessarily multilateral, yet are fraught with collective action problems,' says Jennifer Lind, an associate professor at Dartmouth College and international relations expert. 'Other countries are often deeply unenthusiastic about telling their firms—which are positioned to bring in a lot of revenue, which they use for future innovation—that they cannot export to Country X or Country Y.' This translates to 'refusing to participate in export controls or to devoting little or no effort to ensuring that their firms are adhering to the controls,' she says. Paul Triolo, a partner at the DGA-Albright Stonebridge Group, points out that 'Japanese and Dutch officials during the Biden administration resisted any serious alignment with U.S. controls,' and suggests that U.S allies 'will be glad to see a major stepping back from controls.' Ongoing trade negotiations between the U.S. and its trading partners could weaken export controls further. Chinese officials may demand a rollback of chip sanctions as part of a grand bargain between Washington and Beijing, similar to how the U.S. agreed to grant export licenses to Nvidia and AMD in exchange for China loosening its controls on rare earth magnets. Japan and South Korea may also bring up the chip controls as part of their own trade negotiations with Trump. 'Expect continuing diversions' A separate issue are controls over the transfer of Nvidia GPUs. The U.S. has leaned on governments like Singapore, Malaysia and the United Arab Emirates to prevent advanced Nvidia processors from making their way to China. Scrutiny picked up in the wake of DeepSeek's surprise AI release earlier this year, amid allegations that the Hangzhou-based startup had trained its powerful models on Nvidia processors that were subject to export controls. (The startup claims that it acquired its processors before export controls came into effect). As of now, the two chips allowed to be sold in China–Nvidia's H20 and AMD's MI308–are not the most powerful AI chips on the market. The leading-edge processors, like Nvidia's Blackwell chip, cannot be sold to China. That means chip smuggling will continue to be a concern for the U.S. government. Yet 'enforcement will be spotty,' Triolo says. 'The Commerce Department lacks resources to track GPUs globally, hence expect continuing diversions of limited amounts of GPUs to China via Thailand, Malaysia, and other jurisdictions.' Triolo is, instead, focused on another loophole in the export control regime: Chinese firms accessing AI chips based in overseas data centers. 'There is no sign that the Trump Commerce Department is gearing up to try and close this gaping loophole in U.S. efforts to limit Chinese access to advanced compute,' he says. How much will the global supply chain change? Not all analysts think we'll see a complete unraveling of the export control regime. 'The controls involve a complex multinational coalition that all parties will be hesitant to disrupt, given how uncertain the results will be,' says Chris Miller, author of Chip War: The Fight for the World's Most Critical Technology. He adds that many of these chipmakers and suppliers don't have the same political heft as Nvidia, the world's most valuable company. Yet while these companies may not be as politically savvy as Nvidia, they're just as important. TSMC, for example, is the only company that can manufacture the newest generation of advanced chips; ASML is the only supplier of the extreme ultraviolet lithography machines used to make the smallest semiconductors. 'I don't believe it's leverage that the Trump administration will easily give away,' says Ray Wang, a semiconductor researcher at the Futurum Group. This story was originally featured on Error in retrieving data Sign in to access your portfolio Error in retrieving data Error in retrieving data Error in retrieving data Error in retrieving data
