Can Europe Re-Arm In Time To Stop Russia?

Forbes

06-04-2025

TOPSHOT - A Russian battle tank T-72 drives outside the town of Sudzha on August 8, 2024. Ukraine's ... More incursion into Russia, which entered a third day on August 8, 2024, appears to be an unprecedented assault which experts say could aim to draw Russian resources away from other areas or to undermine morale. Russia has given only scarce updates as it seeks to strike a balance between denouncing the escalation and avoiding panic. (Photo by ANATOLIY ZHDANOV / Kommersant Photo / AFP) / Russia OUT (Photo by ANATOLIY ZHDANOV/Kommersant Photo/AFP via Getty Images)
Last month the EU launched its Defence WhitePaper, which sets out how the bloc will defend itself, primarily in the face of Russian aggression and a possible withdrawal of the US from Europe.
The report was launched by the relatively new EU defence and space commissioner Andrius Kubilius, who was twice prime minister of Lithuania – a country very much in the cross-hairs of Russia. The report coincided with the approval by the Bundestag of a waiver of the German debt brake for defence spending, above 1% of GDP) and follows the announcement of potentially Eur 800bn in funding for European defence infrastructure.
Politically the report is careful to state that NATO remains the organisation to provide defence coordination across Europe, but practically the report focuses on building out common EU defence capabilities (heavy transport aircraft, radar and signals) and in particular seven capabilities 'gaps' are flagged – such as air defence and space infrastructure as it relates to satellites, intelligence gathering and communications.
Oddly for an EU document, the onus for implementation is delegated back to national defence chiefs – and the EU defence industry (in terms of equipment led solutions), and in proposing collective arms purchases across EU countries. The report is not perhaps sufficiently detailed on the potential relaxation of merger/anti-trust rules to help build scale, labour market issues, talent recruitment and innovation – though these topics are perhaps slightly beyond its scope.
The report flags a range of defence threats – from the Arctic to the Middle East and is vocal on the threats posed by China to the world order. Behind the scenes there were some efforts to name and shame counties like Spain that are perceived not to invest sufficiently in their defence (Spain and Italy had objected to the 'Re-arm' titling of the initiative).
A few sources have flagged to us how individual states are now re-examining procurement and training relations with the DoD and American weapons suppliers US given the new approach by the Trump administration to Europe. Also, one focus of negative feedback was the apparent prohibition on arms purchases from the UK (with EU funding), a messaging error some thought harsh in the light of UK/EU defence cooperation.
The EU defence White Paper stands out in comparison to policy papers in other fields in the sense that – it has strong political backing, capital and is pragmatic in implementation. In that sense it is an echo with some of the financial remedies applied to the euro-zone economy in 2012.
My understanding is that much of the report (begun last November) was written before the Munich Security Conference, and as such the language does not reflect the EU view on recent pronouncements from the White House. However, while the assessment is a complete one it also highlights the near-term vulnerability of the EU.