Republicans Tillis and Bacon, Who Split with Trump, Won't Seek Reelection
Rep. Don Bacon (R-Nebraska) – who has taken issue with Trump's tariff policy, his posture toward Russia and Elon Musk's U.S. DOGE Service, among other things – announced his retirement Monday, calling himself a 'traditional conservative' caught in a 'tug of war' in his party over issues such as foreign policy and trade. A day earlier, Sen. Thom Tillis (R-North Carolina) declared that he would not seek a third term, after drawing Trump's wrath for opposing the president's priority legislative package.
The developments emboldened Democrats in their efforts to try to defeat the sweeping tax and immigration bill as well as capture both lawmakers' seats next year – and worried some Republicans on both fronts. Bacon represents one of only three GOP-held House districts nationwide that Trump lost last year, while Tillis was considered the most vulnerable Senate Republican up for reelection next year.
'When the energy's on the other side, you really don't want to have to defend an open seat,' said Tom Davis, a former chairman of the National Republican Congressional Committee.
The ranks of Republican elected officials who have differed with Trump in recent years has thinned considerably, as fealty to him has become the biggest litmus test in the party and the president has frequently vowed retribution against his critics. Some have stepped down voluntarily, while others have been ousted in Republican primaries. That dynamic is in play once again ahead of the 2026 elections, with other Republicans facing difficult decisions.
In Texas, Republican Sen. John Cornyn is already facing a tough primary challenger in a vocal Trump ally, state Attorney General Ken Paxton. Cornyn has said he is fully committed to running again. But Paxton sought to stoke doubts about that.
'You next?' Paxton asked Cornyn on X after Tillis announced his retirement.
Jeff Flake, a former Republican senator from Arizona who retired in 2019 after his own disagreements with Trump, said the decisions by Bacon and Tillis show how partisanship has only intensified since he left office. That has left independent-leaning lawmakers torn between retiring or forging forward with their every move scrutinized for loyalty to the party, he said.
'I don't blame them at all,' said Flake, specifically referring to Tillis's predicament. 'To go through the next 18 months … trying to thread that needle when the president's already come out against you – no way. That's asking for too much. You couldn't truly be independent.'
Trump lashed out at Tillis on Saturday night after he voted against moving forward with the president's bill, and promised to meet with potential primary challengers in the coming weeks.
Tillis vowed to speak more freely after announcing his retirement – and wasted little time, heading to the Senate floor hours later to give a scathing speech arguing that the bill went against Trump's insistence that he would not harm Medicaid.
'Republicans are about to make a mistake on health care and betray a promise,' Tillis said Sunday.
White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt on Monday bluntly dismissed Tillis's concerns that the bill's Medicaid provisions would prompt rural hospital closures.
'The senator was wrong,' Leavitt said during a White House press briefing. 'The president put out a Truth Social post addressing it, and then the senator announced he's no longer running for office anymore, so I think that case has been closed.'
Several moderate House Republicans privately said they were stunned by how the White House responded to Tillis's retirement announcement, according to two lawmakers familiar with the conversations, who like others spoke on the condition of anonymity to detail private conversations, fueling their concerns about how hard the president's team will work to satisfy centrist concerns' ahead of the midterms.
Speaking with reporters in Omaha on Monday, Bacon, who unlike Tillis had avoided an open back-and-forth conflict with Trump, acknowledged that some of his positions, such as his support for free trade and international alliances, put him at odds with some fellow Republicans in the Trump era.
'I'm a traditional conservative at heart, but I feel like I've been able to do what I thought was right, whether it's infrastructure, whether it was also certifying the election,' he said, referring to his support for President Joe Biden's bipartisan infrastructure law and for confirming Trump's 2020 reelection loss as the president falsely claimed it was rigged.
Bacon said he was retiring to devote more time to family after years of representing a battleground district that requires the incumbent to be 'all in.' He advised his party to be discerning about who they put forward next in Nebraska's 2nd Congressional District.
'Be careful in a primary of being drug way to the right because you can't win in the general,' he said.
Democrats said they were eager to contest the open seat.
'Even though [Bacon] always did end up voting the way that Trump wanted him to, he gave a hopeful vision, which is why he was able to win,' Jane Kleeb, head of the Nebraska Democrats, said Monday during a call with reporters. 'Now that that seat is open, there's no question that we're going to be able to send a Democratic official to Congress representing the 2nd Congressional District.'
House Republicans hold a slim majority and roughly a dozen of them have already announced runs for governor and senator, with several others mulling whether to launch their own bids, according to multiple GOP campaign strategists. Two strategists familiar with House races said that the pace of announcements is on par with past years, and that more retirements could come after the August recess, when lawmakers have time to deliberate with their families about running for reelection.
Rep. Dusty Johnson (R-South Dakota) – chair of the Main Street Caucus, which bills itself as a bloc of 'pragmatic conservatives' – announced Monday he was running for governor, and Rep. Michael Lawler (R-New York) said he would take more time to consider his own gubernatorial bid. Lawler is one of the other House Republicans who represents a district that Trump lost last year.
Several House Republicans who belong to the more moderate wing of the party have privately signaled they are considering stepping aside rather than running in tougher terrain, according to GOP officials with knowledge of the situation, but House GOP campaign strategists think those seats – if left vacant – would easily remain Republican.
In the battle for the Senate, Republicans may now be in for a messy primary in North Carolina, though operatives acknowledge an early Trump endorsement could tamp down infighting. The potential candidates include Lara Trump, the president's daughter-in-law who grew up in Wilmington; Republican National Committee Chairman Michael Whatley, the former head of the North Carolina GOP; and some of the state's House members, such as Reps. Pat Harrigan and Richard Hudson.
'This is all kind of fresh within the past 24 hours for me, really learning that this was a viable option and that Senator Tillis wouldn't be seeking re-election,' Lara Trump said Monday on Fox News Radio. 'So look, I'm considering it.'
On the Democratic side, former Rep. Wiley Nickel is already running, though many Democrats are waiting to see if former Gov. Roy Cooper joins the race.
Some Trump-aligned GOP operatives said there was upside to Tillis's decision, giving the party a fresh opportunity to find a nominee who could better unite Republicans and enter the general election with a stronger hand. But open seats can be risky, and the party has fielded some untested contenders in recent elections who ultimately fell flat.
Tillis's tensions with Trump date to his first term, when the senator initially opposed the president's declaration of a national emergency to build a border wall. He reversed the position days later amid political blowback.
At the start of Trump's second term, Tillis stood out for scrutinizing the background of Pete Hegseth as a choice for defense secretary, though he ultimately voted to confirm him. Tillis openly disagreed with Trump's decision to pardon almost all defendants in the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the Capitol and later helped sink Trump's nominee to be D.C.'s top prosecutor, Ed Martin, over his positions on Jan. 6.
While House Republicans praised Bacon on Monday, the reaction to Tillis's decision was more muted among Senate Republicans. Sen. Tim Scott (R-South Carolina), the chairman of the Senate GOP campaign arm, did not mention Tillis in a statement expressing confidence the party would keep the seat.
Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Kentucky), the former majority leader who has repeatedly split with Trump over the years, said on X that Tillis's retirement was a 'big setback' for the Senate GOP. Freshman Sen. Jim Banks (R-Indiana), who won his primary last year without opposition after Trump endorsed him, struck a different tone during an appearance on 'Fox And Friends.'
'I would retire too,' Banks said, 'if I voted against this bill.'
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