‘Father of Shue Yan' dedicated his life to benevolent education in Hong Kong
Henry Hu Hung-lick forking out his savings to establish Shue Yan College, Hong Kong's first private higher education institution, more than half a century ago, with a name that resonates with that spirit – cultivating virtues of benevolence. The revered educator, who died at the age of 105 this week, will be remembered for his lifelong endeavour in transforming generations of students and reshaping the city's education landscape.
Hu and his late wife, Dr Chung Chi-yung, broke new ground with Shue Yan College in the 1970s, when the city was not known for private universities or a culture of philanthropic support for centres of learning. With publicly funded degree places still confined to the crème de la crème in those days, the couple's admirable but lofty goal of liberalising higher education might have raised some eyebrows.
But their pioneering venture and selfless contribution have offered life-changing opportunities for countless students over the decades. Among the prominent Shue Yan alumni is Chief Secretary Eric Chan Kwok-ki.
Hu is a role model for learning. The Zhejiang-born graduate of the National University of Political Science also spoke Russian and French. He served as a diplomat in Tashkent in present-day Uzbekistan, studied law and international politics in France and took the Bar exams in Britain in 1954. A member of the Legislative Council and the now-defunct Urban Council, Hu was also known for his work as the defence counsel in a high-profile murder case in 1975.
He was an example of not giving up easily. His commitment to providing four-year courses, with an emphasis on Chinese culture and the liberal arts, instead of the usual three-year course, was an
obstacle to obtaining government funding. While Shue Yan gained recognition as a private post-secondary institution in 1976, it was not until 2006 that it became Hong Kong's first private university.
Hu was awarded the highest honour of the Grand Bauhinia Medal in 2008 for his lifelong contributions to society; his wife received the Gold Bauhinia Star in 2000. Chief Executive John Lee Ka-chiu praised Hu for devoting 'substantial financial resources and personal effort to the development of Hong Kong's post-secondary education, nurturing generations of virtuous talent for Hong Kong'.
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