Trump's Asia policy should prioritize security over revenue

AllAfrica

a day ago

Although People's Republic of China (PRC) officials say they do not seek hegemony, US regional pre-eminence is standing in the way of achieving their objectives, which include satisfying Beijing's vast irredentist claims, holding veto power over the foreign policies of neighboring countries and keeping out unwanted foreign military influence.
China enjoys important advantages in this competition with the US for regional leadership: geography, ability to focus its forces close to home and superior manufacturing capability. China is also narrowing the technological gap.
Washington recently tried to slow China's technological progress by restricting sales of US semiconductors and limiting visas for Chinese students, but soon relented because of American dependence on rare earth elements, of which China controls 90% of global production.
Despite questions about possible US retrenchment, senior Trump administration officials say they are committed to maintaining US leadership in the Asia-Pacific region. One of their primary stated US foreign policy goals is to rally friendly governments to block Chinese expansionism.
Perhaps the clearest advantage the US enjoys in pursuit of that goal is a robust network of allies and security partners. As the competition with China reaches a critical stage, America needs the full strategic value of these partnerships—to help prevent Chinese domination of vital supply chains, to unitedly oppose Chinese coercion and aggression against individual countries, to offer bases for US forces, to be prepared to provide additional combat capability if needed and even to build ships for the US Navy.
The administration's efforts to raise revenue and cut government expenditures, however, are at odds with the geostrategic task of facing up to the China challenge. After half a year in office, the new US government still lacks a coherent Asia strategy.
The most prominent issue here is the tariffs. Trying to maximize revenue from security partners both antagonizes them and makes it harder for them to fulfill US demands that they increase their defense spending.
Washington announced a deal in July that would set Japan's tariff to 15%, which while lower than a previously threatened 35% rate, is still 10 times what the average US tariff on Japanese imports was in 2024.
Simultaneously, the US has demanded that Japan further raise its defense spending target from an already difficult 2% to 3.5%, then 5%. Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba spoke of Japan becoming 'less dependent on America' for its security.
South Korean tariffs on US imports already dropped to 1% under the 2012 US-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS). Then the first Trump administration renegotiated KORUS in 2019, resulting in a deal that Trump called 'fantastic' and 'a model for fair trade.'
Nevertheless, on July 7, Trump imposed a 25% tariff on South Korea imports. A statement from Korea's ruling Democratic Party said, 'Trump is betraying the trust of allies.'
Later, Washington lowered the figure to 15%, but South Korean trade negotiator Yeo Han-koo said, 'We cannot be relieved, because we do not know when we will face pressure from tariffs or non-tariff measures again.' Such US pressure could give Seoul's new liberal government additional reason to seek a more equidistant position between the US and China.
Australia has a trade deficit with the US, but still drew a 10% tariff, plus higher rates for steel and aluminum products and auto parts. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said the tariffs 'have no basis in logic' and are 'not the act of a friend.'
Although Taiwan is not a US ally, a similar incoherence is in play. Taiwan got a 20% tariff despite committing $100 billion to build factories for its economic crown jewel, advanced semiconductors, in the US.
Although the US has strong political and strategic interests in helping Taiwan avoid forcible annexation by the PRC, Trump has spoken far more about the US-Taiwan relationship as an economic issue than a strategic issue, suggesting he thinks Taiwan has no value to the US beyond its ability to pay for US military protection.
There are other examples of US policy being economically penny-wise and strategically pound-foolish, including reducing US diplomatic impact by large staff cuts at the Department of State and cutting funding for organizations such as USAID, which promotes international goodwill toward the US, and Radio Free Asia, which counters the anti-American narratives of the Authoritarian Bloc.
Cuts to developmental aid and capacity-building programs are especially damaging in a region such as the Pacific Islands, where Beijing is attempting to increase its influence at the expense of traditional benefactors the US, Australia and New Zealand.
In that case, an amount of aid that is relatively modest in monetary terms goes a long way because the small populations in the island states have sovereignty over huge and strategically important expanses of ocean.
According to a recent report, US Under Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby asked British defense officials if they could recall a UK aircraft carrier that was en route to a patrol in Asian waters. This bizarre episode seems to represent another instance of elevating economic concerns to the point of strategic counterproductivity.
The Trump government wants NATO countries to spend 5% of their GDP on defense. This has led US officials to discourage European allies from maintaining a military presence in Asia that could help deter China, based on the logic that the Europeans should concentrate on their own neighborhood to free up American resources for Asia.
But if the primary US objective is countering China, Washington should be welcoming rather than rebuffing such direct European assistance. Already outnumbered by the Chinese Navy, America is in no position to turn away additional friendly platforms.
Showing the flags of European countries in maritime Asia complicates Chinese planning for possible aggressive actions and signals that the international costs to Beijing of such actions would be high. Moreover, sending ships to visit Asian waters has minimal negative impact on Europe's capacity to defeat a Russian invasion, which would primarily require ground and air forces.
Trump government officials have said they will stop helping China wrest global technological leadership from the US, a goal clearly in line with US strategic and security interests. There is a danger, however, that this goal will conflict with Trump's pursuit of a bilateral trade agreement with China.
During the first Trump Administration, US sanctions came close to killing Chinese telecommunications company ZTE, which would have reduced the danger of China stealing sensitive data from US trade and security partners. Trump, however, decided to let ZTE off the hook, apparently to grease US-China trade talks.
In May 2025, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced that out of national security concerns, the US would revoke the visas of Chinese students who have ties to the Chinese Communist Party or study in sensitive technological fields.
In June, however, Trump said in a social media post that 'our deal with China is done,' and 'we will provide to China what was agreed to, including Chinese students using our colleges and universities.'
In the recent past, the implied American pitch to friendly governments was 'help us support a global order that we overpay for and that benefits you.' Now it's 'you must pay more, and our relationship must clearly benefit us.'
It was not always like this. After World War II, the US offered its former bitter enemy Japan generous economic assistance, including $25 billion (in today's dollars) in grants and loans from 1945 to 1952.
Washington opened the US market to Japanese exports, becoming Japan's largest trade partner. The Americans also facilitated Japan's entry into international financial institutions and helped Japan re-integrate into the Asian regional economy.
The assistance was significant enough that Tokyo felt obligated to offer at least symbolic concessions when US President George H. W. Bush visited in 1992 to ask for a redress of the US trade deficit with Japan (a request punctuated by Bush becoming sick during dinner and vomiting on Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa).
Under the cloud of a compelling geostrategic threat (in that case the Cold War), Washington viewed bilateral trade and investment not as decontextualized transactionalism, but as part of a larger strategic vision. Such an approach is necessary again.
In setting tariffs, the US government should consider both the strategic value of its relationships with friendly governments and efforts these countries are making to increase their potential contributions to a counter-China coalition. These considerations should at least partially, if not fully, offset the assessment that a security partner is underpaying for its access to US markets.
Washington should go back to encouraging Western European governments to send military vessels and aircraft to visit the region to demonstrate support for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The non-military tools that increase US influence in the Asia-Pacific tend to be highly cost-effective.
Yanking funding from them is not wise policy. In trade, investment and research cooperation with China, the US government should carefully identify critically important areas in which to implement de-risking and should stick to the policy even if the Chinese complain it is preventing a trade agreement.
It is far from certain that the geostrategic component of US policy toward the Asia-Pacific—specifically, winning the competition with China—can succeed without subordinating revenue generation to the goals of helping security partners maximize their strategic value to the US.
Denny Roy is senior fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu.