US higher education cuts ‘opportune moment' for Hong Kong to attract talent, says head of city's top university
US President Donald Trump's slashing of grants to some of the country's elite universities, including Harvard and Columbia, has caused 'damage' to the American higher education sector, said Zhang Xiang, president and vice-chancellor of HKU, in interviews published by two local newspapers on Monday.
However, it gives 'an opportune moment and a good window for Hong Kong to absorb overseas talent,' he told Ming Pao and Sing Tao Daily.
His remarks come days after the Trump administration announced fresh funding cuts to Harvard, claiming 'discrimination' at one of the world's top universities.
US federal agencies have terminated a total of US$2.65 billion in grants to Harvard, a move that the university has called 'unlawful.' Harvard is challenging the decision in court.
Another Ivy League school, Columbia University, complied with some of the Trump administration's demands but still faced grant cuts, forcing it to lay off nearly 180 staff members.
Science journal Nature found that 75 per cent of US scientists who answered its poll said they were considering leaving the United States following 'disruptions prompted by Trump,' with Europe and Canada being top choices for relocation.
'World-class university'
Zhang, who studied and worked at US universities, said in the interview that Trump's move had affected the morale of academics in the country.
HKU recently admitted mainland Chinese students who had enrolled at Princeton University, another Ivy League school in Trump's crosshairs, he said, adding that some scholars had decided not to go the US due to the president's policy.
However, Hong Kong also faces competition from other universities in the region in attracting talent, he said, citing the case of ex-Harvard chemist Charles Lieber.
Lieber, who in 2021 was convicted of lying to the US federal government about his research ties to China, joined Tsinghua Shenzhen International Graduate School, a university in Shenzhen, as a professor in late April.
Zhang told the newspapers that Lieber intended to come to HKU, but the Chinese university made a better offer. The vice-chancellor added that housing and education for children in Hong Kong posed an additional challenge in the city's bid to bring in talent.
The Nanjing-born academic shrugged off concerns that the share of local staff at HKU had been declining, whereas that of mainland Chinese staff had been on the rise.
Ming Pao reported that local staff accounted for 25.5 per cent of HKU's faculty in the 2024-25 academic year, down from 38.7 per cent in 2017-18, while mainland Chinese faculty rose from 21.6 to 38.8 per cent over the same period.
Zhang said a 'world-class' university must comprise scholars from around the world, describing the trend as 'a natural process.'
'That chapter has passed'
Zhang also said HKU had been 'on the right track' after a year of management infighting that prompted the Hong Kong government to intervene.
In June last year, the government set up a task force to investigate a prolonged conflict between the HKU governing council, then led by barrister Priscilla Wong, and Zhang himself.
Veteran HSBC banker Peter Wong was later appointed chairperson of the council, succeeding Priscilla Wong as she completed her three-year term at the end of last year. Peter Wong took up the role in January this year.
'That chapter has passed,' Zhang said, adding that the university had arranged for the successor to interim deputy vice-chancellor Richard Wong, who is expected to step down at the end of June.
Zhang took up the post in 2018, succeeding Peter Mathieson, who stepped down after four years in office. Last year, he was cleared of misconduct and mismanagement allegations arising from whistle-blower emails that prompted an internal six-month-long investigation.
HKU, the city's oldest university, was ranked sixth in Asia in the latest ranking published by Times Higher Education – the highest among tertiary institutions in Hong Kong.
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