Pentagon Golden Dome to have 4-layer defense system, slides show
The slides, tagged 'Go Fast, Think Big!' were presented to 3,000 defense contractors in Huntsville, Alabama, last week and reveal the unprecedented complexity of the system, which faces an ambitious 2028 deadline set by US President Donald Trump.
The system is estimated to cost $175 billion, but the slides show uncertainties still loom over the basic architecture of the project because the number of launchers, interceptors, ground stations, and missile sites needed for the system has yet to be determined.
"They have a lot of money, but they don't have a target of what it costs yet," said one US official. So far Congress has appropriated $25 billion for Golden Dome in Trump's tax-and-spend bill passed in July. Another $45.3 billion is earmarked for Golden Dome in his 2026 presidential budget request.
Intended as a multi-layered missile defense shield for the US, Golden Dome draws inspiration from Israel's Iron Dome, but is significantly bigger due to the geography it will need to protect and the complexity due to the varied threats it will face.
According to the slides, the system architecture consists of four integrated layers: a space-based sensing and targeting layer for missile warning and tracking as well as "missile defense" and three land-based layers consisting of missile interceptors, radar arrays, and potentially lasers.
One surprise was a new large missile field -- seemingly in the Midwest according to a map contained in the presentation -- for Next Generation Interceptors which are made by Lockheed Martin and would be a part of the "upper layer" alongside Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Aegis systems which are also made by Lockheed.
NGI is the modernized missile for the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense network of radars, interceptors and other equipment -- currently the primary missile defense shield to protect the US from intercontinental ballistic missiles from rogue states.
The US operates GMD launch sites in southern California and Alaska. This plan would add a third site in the Midwest to counter additional threats.
Other technical hurdles the slides identified included communication latency across the "kill chain" of systems.
Contractors such as Lockheed, Northrop Grumman, RTX, and Boeing have a variety of missile defense systems.
Notably, the slides did not mention Elon Musk's SpaceX, which was part of a bid for Golden Dome contracts alongside software maker Palantir and defense systems manufacturer Anduril.
The Pentagon said it is gathering information "from industry, academia, national labs, and other government agencies for support to Golden Dome" but it would be "imprudent" to release more information on a program in these early stages.
One key goal for Golden Dome is to shoot targets down during their 'boost phase,' the slow and predictable climb through the Earth's atmosphere of a missile. Rather, it seeks to field space-based interceptors that can more quickly intercept incoming missiles.
The presentation highlighted that the United States "has built both interceptors and re-entry vehicles" but has never built a vehicle that can handle the heat of reentry while targeting an enemy missile.
The last lines of defense dubbed the "under layer" and "Limited Area Defense" will include new radars and current systems like the Patriot missile defense system and a new "common" launcher that will launch current and future interceptors against all threat types.
These modular and relocatable systems would be designed to minimize reliance on prepared sites, allowing for rapid deployment across multiple theaters.
Space Force General Michael Guetlein, confirmed last month to lead the Golden Dome project, has 30 days from his July 17 confirmation to build a team, another 60 days to deliver an initial system design, and 120 days to present a full implementation plan, including satellite and ground station details, people briefed on a memo signed by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth have told Reuters. (Reuters)
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
![[Lee Byung-jong] Is Lee-Trump bromance possible?](/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwimg.heraldcorp.com%2Fnews%2Fcms%2F2025%2F08%2F14%2Fnews-p.v1.20250814.de9b5effcd2440afb6c47437e0126b08_T1.jpg&w=3840&q=100)
![[Lee Byung-jong] Is Lee-Trump bromance possible?](/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fall-logos-bucket.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fkoreaherald.com.png&w=48&q=75){kind=small}
Korea Herald
10 minutes ago
- Korea Herald
[Lee Byung-jong] Is Lee-Trump bromance possible?
Former President Yoon Suk Yeol, now disgraced and awaiting trial for his ill-fated martial law declaration and other charges, may still be remembered in the United States for one surprisingly warm gesture. During his 2023 state visit to the White House, Yoon famously broke into a rendition of "American Pie," the beloved US pop classic. He was no great vocalist, but the effortless way he delivered the English lyrics showed clear preparation. The performance went viral in the US, and for many Americans, it became a quirky but genuine symbol of Yoon's effort to connect. Now, with just days to go before his own crucial meeting with US President Donald Trump, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung appears to be preparing in his own way -- by practicing his golf swing. Given Trump's well-documented love of the game, Lee seems to be betting that time on the fairway could help establish rapport. The strategy is hardly unprecedented: Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe famously used golf to develop a strong personal relationship with Trump during his first term, a dynamic that many believe smoothed Tokyo-Washington relations. Lee may well be hoping to replicate that playbook. But for Lee, good chemistry with Trump would mean more than just pleasant rounds of golf. The upcoming summit will be a defining moment for his presidency and for South Korea's place in the world. On the economic front, the stakes could not be higher. Washington recently announced a 15 percent tariff on Korean exports to the US, tied to conditions that Seoul invest $350 billion in the American economy and purchase $100 billion worth of US energy. The details remain fluid. Trump has also signaled plans to impose a 100 percent tariff on semiconductor imports — a measure that could devastate Korea's flagship industry — though it is not yet clear whether Korean firms might win exemptions. Much of this will be settled in person, and the results will directly affect how much Korean companies can sell in their largest overseas market. Security concerns are equally pressing. The Seoul-Washington alliance, now 72 years old, faces a transformed geopolitical landscape. China's rise, North Korea's growing hostility and deepening Pyongyang-Moscow military ties all demand a strategic rethink. The alliance must expand its scope from deterring North Korean aggression to countering China's military presence in the wider region — an adjustment that would reshape the roles and capacities of both US and Korean forces. Another contentious topic will be defense cost-sharing: Trump has repeatedly demanded steep increases to the roughly 1.5 trillion won ($1.08 billion) South Korea currently pays to host 28,000 American troops. While these decisions will ultimately be driven by national interests and cold calculations, Trump's track record makes clear that personal rapport plays an outsized role in his foreign policy. Leaders he likes — Abe, and even Kim Jong-un — often find negotiations more fruitful. Those who lose his favor, such as former Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, can face protracted and bruising disputes. In that regard, Lee begins at a disadvantage. His earlier political career included sharp critiques of US foreign policy. He once described the US as an 'occupying force' responsible for Korea's post-liberation division, and during a meeting with a visiting US senator, he pointedly cited the 1905 Taft-Katsura Agreement as a Washington-endorsed prelude to Japanese colonization of Korea. The remark drew accusations of diplomatic impropriety. Since taking office, however, Lee has worked to shed his perceived anti-American image. He has repeatedly emphasized the centrality of the Seoul-Washington alliance to South Korea's security and, compared with some liberal predecessors — especially former President Moon Jae-in — he has sought closer ties with the US while maintaining greater distance from China. Relations with Japan, which had improved under Yoon after plunging to historic lows under Moon, have also been a priority for Lee to sustain. This shift might reflect his embrace of alliances and internationalism, but some of Lee's closest political allies carry their own history of anti-American activism. His first prime minister, Kim Min-seok, was once convicted for orchestrating a 1985 sit-in at the US cultural center in Seoul, wrongly believing the US had condoned the 1980 Gwangju crackdown. Ruling Democratic Party Chair Jung Chung-rae, a trusted Lee confidant, served four years in prison for his role in a 1989 raid on the US ambassador's residence in Seoul. Today, both men, like Lee, publicly affirm their commitment to the alliance, recognizing the decisive role the US plays in South Korea's trade and security. But their pasts may still color perceptions in Washington, particularly with a president like Trump, who often relies on instinctive judgments of personal loyalty. For Lee, then, the meeting will be about more than policy; it will be about optics, trust and chemistry. Trump is transactional, but also intensely personal. If he feels camaraderie with Lee, negotiations on tariffs, defense spending and military strategy could move more smoothly. If not, Korea may find itself facing tougher demands and fewer concessions.
Korea Herald
14 hours ago
- Korea Herald
Nowhere to turn but toward future: Seoul and Tokyo 80 years after liberation
Calls grow for fresh Korea-Japan declaration to tackle shared challenges absent from 1998 agreement Eighty years after the end of Japan's 35-year colonial rule, South Korea and Japan remain locked in an uneasy duet — pulled together by the inescapable demands of geopolitics, yet held apart by the deep, unhealed wounds left by Japan's occupation of the Korean Peninsula. As Korea marks its 80th National Liberation Day on Friday, the question has never felt more urgent. Can Seoul and Tokyo — tethered by geography and facing many shared challenges — forge a genuinely future-oriented partnership despite historical disputes so deeply ingrained that they have outlived generations? The stakes are raised by the rapidly shifting global order under US President Donald Trump's 'America First' foreign policy. Washington is recalibrating its alliances with both South Korea and Japan, pivoting toward the China threat in the Indo-Pacific region. As the region's strategic map is redrawn, Seoul and Tokyo are left with fewer and fewer exits from each other's orbit. 'Future-oriented relations are not about people-to-people exchanges or building mutual trust. Rather, they require a fundamental discussion of how Korea and Japan must inevitably cooperate to survive in a profoundly transformed global environment,' Yang Kee-ho, professor of Japanese studies at Sungkonghoe University, told The Korea Herald. 'This is the moment when Korea and Japan must envision a new phase of cooperation.' The list of pressures is long: the intensifying US-China strategic competition, Trump's go-it-alone diplomacy, and for Seoul, the challenge of navigating Washington's push to 'modernize' the alliance and grant greater strategic flexibility to US Forces Korea. Add to that North Korea's advancing nuclear and missile programs, and Beijing's ambitions — from dominating global high-tech manufacturing through its 'Made in China 2025' initiative to becoming a 'fully developed, rich, and powerful' nation by 2049. 'Such developments carry a considerable risk of disrupting the status quo in Northeast Asia, which is why it is necessary to build sufficient, shared deterrence through joint discussions,' said Yang, highlighting the need for coordination between Seoul and Tokyo. South Korea and Japan have cogent reasons to work in tandem for better outcomes for both countries in the face of parallel challenges, including 'mounting Trump-origin risks' such as tariff negotiations with the US, said Choi Eun-mi, a research fellow at the Center for Regional Studies at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies. 'The merits of Korea-Japan cooperation, in my view, are very significant in that regard,' Choi said. 'At present, cooperation between Korea and Japan has become nothing short of indispensable, both domestically and internationally.' Symbolically, President Lee Jae Myung is set to visit Tokyo from Aug. 23 to 24 for a summit with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba before heading to Washington for his first in-person meeting with Trump. Foreign Minister Cho Hyun also opted for Tokyo for his first overseas trip before flying to Washington. Korea-Japan cooperation is also imperative, given the breadth of shared future-oriented challenges. 'Between Korea and Japan, there are numerous common challenges,' Lim Eun-jung, professor in the Division of International Studies at Kongju National University, told The Korea Herald. 'Population decline, a super-aged society, labor shortages, regional extinction, industrial transformation, cybersecurity, the utilization of AI and the proliferation of humanoid robots, and energy security are all areas that show the structural similarities of the two countries.' Closer, yet still divided Even as pressing shared challenges bring Seoul and Tokyo closer, major obstacles, including potential discrepancies in their foreign policy approaches to China and North Korea, still stand. 'In dealing with North Korea, South Korea favors dialogue, while Japan has traditionally prioritized sanctions over engagement,' said Lee Ki-tae, director of the Center for Diplomatic Strategy at the Sejong Institute, discussing the Lee Jae Myung administration's inter-Korean policy. 'That said, the Ishiba administration appears to place somewhat greater weight on dialogue, aligning its stance more closely with ours and reducing the potential for friction.' Lee, however, noted, 'On China policy, Japan remains firmly in step with the US, whereas South Korea prefers not to be drawn into (the US-China competition) — a subtle divergence in perception.' Historical disputes, which are ingrained in the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations that formally normalized diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan, remain intact as a major obstacle. Despite the general positive assessment of the Lee administration's Japan policy in its early stages, experts point out that the current tendency of both the Lee and Ishiba administrations to leave historical disputes off the agenda also poses a significant hurdle. 'The overall start has been good. Given how difficult things are right now for both Korea and Japan, avoiding conflict is important, so the direction itself has been well set,' Yang said. 'However, the current situation is a disguised peace or a postponed conflict.' Yang pointed out that the Lee administration's 'pragmatic diplomacy' cannot replace a guiding principle for historical disputes, urging Seoul to go beyond pragmatism by establishing clear rules for dealing with and managing these issues with Japan. Without such principles in place, Yang warned, Seoul and Tokyo risk letting conflicts accumulate. In that scenario, the ruling Democratic Party of Korea could be tempted to bash Japan to boost support for the party or President Lee, repeating a familiar vicious cycle. History still under the surface Echoing those concerns, Choi underscored that Seoul and Tokyo 'need to discuss how they will live with and manage historical issues, given that they are difficult to resolve, impossible to simply erase, and, in truth, extremely hard to settle completely.' 'Yet that discussion is entirely absent, which is regrettable. It's not that we've solved this issue and therefore no longer talk about it — it clearly remains beneath the surface, but it's just not showing right now,' Choi explained. 'Japan doesn't want to bring it up, and Korea isn't talking about it either, which means the issue could resurface at any time. I'm not sure if I should call it a 'risk,' but I would describe it as one factor that makes cooperation more difficult.' Lee Ki-tae pointed out that sustainable ties require political will. 'It is most important for the leadership in both countries to demonstrate the will not to exploit negative public sentiment toward each other for domestic political purposes,' he said. Lee also underlined the significance of Seoul and Tokyo in forging public discourse on the indispensability of bilateral cooperation. 'Beyond that, the leadership must recognize that Korea-Japan cooperation is, in a sense, essential for the survival of both countries, and they should communicate this effectively to their citizens,' Lee added. 'It is also important to explain clearly to the public that cooperation between Korea and Japan contributes to addressing issues on the Korean Peninsula, as well as to peace and stability in the broader Northeast Asian region.' In particular, Seoul and Tokyo should avoid repeating the past mistake of allowing historical disputes to spill over and hamper economic and security cooperation, as happened during the overlapping period of the Moon Jae-in administration and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's second term. 'I'd like to single out the Moon-Abe period as an important turning point because, no matter how much Korea-Japan relations were tied up in historical issues, there had always been certain lines neither side would cross,' Lim said, when asked about the most important turning point in bilateral relations over the 80 years since liberation and its significance. 'During the Moon and Abe administrations, however, those lines collapsed, sending the relationship into a downward spiral.' Tensions peaked in 2019 when South Korea's Supreme Court ordered Japanese companies to compensate the Korean victims of wartime forced labor. In response, the Abe administration restricted exports of three key semiconductor materials in July and removed South Korea from its list of preferred trading partners the following month. These actions led to a nationwide boycott in South Korea of Japanese goods and travel to Japan. That November, the Moon administration conditionally delayed its decision to end the GSOMIA military intelligence-sharing pact with Japan, effectively suspending its operation, while a radar lock-on dispute the following month further strained defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries. This period also saw growing economic security concerns, driven by the first Trump administration's 'America First' policies and supply chain disruptions caused by the pandemic. 'Yet, paradoxically, this period also made us realize anew that Korea and Japan are bound together — economically, socially and culturally — in ways that are profoundly close,' Lim said. 'Never again should historical issues be allowed to damage cooperation not only in the economic sphere, but also in the realm of security.' Time for a new joint declaration For many in Seoul, the benchmark for a diplomatic reset remains the 1998 Kim Dae-jung-Obuchi Declaration, formally titled the Korea-Japan Joint Declaration: A New Partnership Toward the Twenty-first Century. In the declaration, Seoul and Tokyo set out a roadmap for future-oriented cooperation, including principles for collaboration across sectors such as security, the economy, policy, people-to-people and cultural exchanges and global issues. It also included Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi's expression of 'deep remorse and heartfelt apology' for Korea's colonization. The time has come to forge a new joint declaration. 'The international situation in 1998, when it was created, is completely different from what it is now, so we need a vision for Korea-Japan cooperation that reflects the current circumstances,' she said. 'Among the action plans for 43 items included (in the declaration), there are some that were relevant then and still are today, but there are also topics that are no longer timely. So, we need an updated version that addresses how to deal with those aspects.' Choi cites the 'Trump risk' as a clear example. 'It's not just because of the Trump administration, but because the international environment has become very unstable,' Choi said. 'For instance, if US involvement is reduced, how will regional security be maintained? We need to discuss how Korea and Japan can cooperate in that context.' Choi noted that a forward-looking approach should extend beyond economic and historical matters that were absent or only lightly addressed in the 1998 declaration. For instance, the 1998 declaration did not mention supply chains, AI or 5G, which are now central to both bilateral and global agendas. The joint declaration also left out specific historical topics, like the memorial service at the Sado gold mine, where Koreans were subjected to forced labor during World War II. Choi underscored that these issues should be included in a new framework, along with plans for handling future challenges. Lee concurred on the need to forge a new joint declaration in light of the shift in the balance between Seoul and Tokyo since then. 'At that time, in 1998, we were still — I wouldn't say far behind Japan, but in a somewhat lower position — and that perspective was reflected in much of the content,' Lee said. 'If that declaration was made in the context of Japan helping Korea, today the two countries are truly on an equal footing. In this context, we need a new version of the Korea-Japan Partnership Declaration that considers how the two countries, as equals, should cooperate.' Seizing the Ishiba opportunity Nam Ki-jeong, professor at the Institute for Japanese Studies at Seoul National University, views the current Ishiba administration in Tokyo as part of a rare alignment of circumstances that could offer the Lee administration a valuable opening. 'The Ishiba Cabinet has the potential to last a bit longer,' he said. 'While it's possible that it could end in a very short period, if we carefully devise and execute a strategy in coordination with the Ishiba Cabinet and those around it, we can advance Korea-Japan relations during the time that the Cabinet is in place.' Even if the political situation changes, Nam argues, the groundwork laid now could bring long-term benefits. If the ruling Liberal Democratic Party were to shift further to the right after the Ishiba Cabinet, for example, under figures like former economic security minister Sanae Takaichi, the existing groundwork could help keep a more hardline government in check. On the other hand, if the LDP were to hold longer to the relatively liberal approach established by Ishiba, Seoul and Tokyo could have a better chance of improving their relationship beyond its current state. 'Right now, Korea-Japan relations enjoy an exceptionally favorable combination of administrations. When such a combination emerges, we must think on our side about how to make the most of the opportunity,' Nam said. 'Producing tangible results while Ishiba is in office is crucial at this moment.'
Korea Herald
15 hours ago
- Korea Herald
Korean tycoons to join Lee for Trump summit
South Korea's top conglomerate leaders will join President Lee Jae Myung on a US visit next week for his summit with US President Donald Trump, aiming to promote major investments in strategic sectors including semiconductors, batteries, automobiles and shipbuilding, according to industry sources Thursday. The Aug. 24-26 trip will feature four chaebol heads — Samsung Electronics Chairman Lee Jae-yong, SK Group Chairman Chey Tae-won, Hyundai Motor Group Executive Chair Chung Euisun and LG Group Chairman Koo Kwang-mo — along with executives from leading shipbuilding, aviation and defense firms. The delegation will be tightly focused on the Aug. 25 White House summit, with the government assembling a compact, high-impact team capable of announcing significant US investments. Samsung is operating and building foundry plants worth $37 billion in Austin and Taylor, Texas, while SK hynix is investing $3.87 billion in an advanced packaging plant for its cutting-edge high bandwidth memory chips in Indiana. Hyundai's Chung met Trump in March, pledging $21 billion in new US projects, including a steel plant. LG Energy Solution is also investing about 30 trillion won ($21.7 billion) across the US, including a 7-trillion-won facility in Arizona. The four chaebol groups are expected to discuss semiconductor expansion and AI chip partnerships, as well as electric vehicle and battery production growth, and Inflation Reduction Act subsidies, during the visit. Hanwha Group Vice Chairman Kim Dong-kwan and HD Hyundai Senior Vice Chairman Chung Ki-sun, who are part of the delegation, are also expected to announce new deals as their companies are both central to the Korea-US shipbuilding cooperation initiative known as the MASGA project. Hanwha acquired Philly Shipyard last year, while HD Hyundai secured a US Navy maintenance contract. Korean Air Chairman Cho Won-tae, traveling with the delegation, recently signed $32.7 billion in supply agreements with Boeing and GE Aerospace. Ahead of the departure, the president will meet the delegation to review each company's investment pledges, tailoring the 'Korea Sales' campaign to appeal to Trump's preference for favorable reciprocal deals, sources say. "The summit agenda is expected to cover economic cooperation in manufacturing, advanced technology and key minerals, with an aim to further strengthen the bilateral economic security partnership," Presidential spokesperson Kang Yu-jung said.
