US reporter goes inside the House of Huawei
With this quote from Admiral William A. Owens, former vice-chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and former CEO of Nortel, Eva Dou introduces her detailed account of Chinese entrepreneur Ren Zhengfei and Huawei, the company that he founded and has led to global prominence.
A technology reporter for the Washington Post, Dou provides the background to questions such as: How did Huawei get so big so quickly?
What relationship does Ren have with the Chinese military?
Is Huawei spying for the Chinese Communist Party?
House of Huawei: The Secret History of China's Most Powerful Company (Portfolio / Penguin, 2025, 406 pages) takes the reader through Ren's early life, his years in the military, Huawei's origins in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone established under the rule of Deng Xiaoping, Ren's political education and how he has used it to advance the company's interests, Huawei's rise to the top of the global telecommunications equipment market, the US government's attempt to shut it down and the start of its recovery.
The story begins with the arrest of Ren's daughter and Huawei CFO Meng Wangzhou (Sabrina Meng) by Canadian authorities at Vancouver International Airport in December 2018 and concludes with her release in September 2021 and the company's subsequent development under sanctions. The timeline of events at the end of the book stops with the launch of Huawei's Mate 60 Pro 5G smartphone in September 2023.
Focused on corporate structure, management and the question of just what sort of company Huawei is (and needing to stop somewhere), Dou does not address the evolution of Huawei into a diversified technology company that is far more sophisticated and influential than it was when the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the U.S. Department of Commerce put sanctions on it in May 2019.
Born in 1944, Ren grew up in poverty in the early years of the People's Republic of China, during the struggle to establish a communist society, on the edge of starvation during the Great Leap Forward, in the dangerous political chaos of the Cultural Revolution. The son of an educator who was attacked and humiliated by students during the rampage of the Red Guards, and of a mother who supported his love of learning, he was the only one of seven children to attend university.
In 1968, after graduating from the Chongqing Institute of Architecture and Engineering with a degree in heating, gas supply and ventilation engineering, Ren went to work at Base 011, a military factory hidden in the caves of Guizhou Province, not far from Vietnam. He worked as a cook, a plumber and a technician, studying electronics in his spare time.
After that, he was dispatched to train at the Xi'an Instruments Factory, which made pressure gauges, thermometers and other devices, and then to Liaoyang in the far northeast with the PLA Engineering Corps to build a nylon and polyester factory. Ren was not a soldier, but he adopted military attitudes and a strong sense of patriotism.
'He would inculcate Huawei with a military-esque culture,' writes Dou, 'running new hires through army-inspired boot camps and emphasizing discipline and personal sacrifice. He peppered his speeches with military analogies and references to famous battles. Years later, he still carried himself with a soldier's bearing.'
In Liaoyang, Ren's unit was assigned to test and calibrate instruments brought by French technical advisors. These included differential pressure transmitters, which measure the rate of flow through a pipe. Frustrated by the old and inaccurate Soviet gauges on hand and inspired after learning about a new type of precision gauge made in the US, he decided to build his own. In 1979, after a great deal of work, he published a small book about his invention entitled A Floating Ball-Precision Pressure Generator – Air Pressure Balance.
By then, Ren had been sent to Jinan, where he was made deputy director of a research institute. And he had attended China's first National Science Conference, where Deng Xiaoping declared that scientists were part of the working class. This made it possible for him to join the Communist Party, which would greatly facilitate his career in China but raise the incurable suspicion of the Americans.
And so it was that after the PLA Engineering Corps was disbanded in 1982, Ren was able to move to Shenzhen with the experience, drive and connections that would first land him a job at a subsidiary of the South Sea Oil Corporation and then, when Shenzhen legalized privately owned technology companies, strike out on his own. In September 1987, at the age of 42, Ren founded Huawei Technologies Co.
Huawei started off as a contract assembler and distributor of telephone switches, but Ren wanted to build his own. To do this, he recruited engineering talent and began to copy a Chinese-made switch, a simple PBX (Private Branch Exchange), that was already on the market.
The engineers he hired included Guo Ping, who is now chairman of Huawei's supervisory board, who joined Huawei in 1988; and Hu Houkun (Ken Hu), who is now one of the four rotating chairs of the company's board of directors, who joined in 1990. Two other current rotating chairs, Xu Zhijun (Eric Xu) and Liang Hua (Howard Liang), joined in 1993 and 1995. The fourth is Ren's daughter, Meng Wanzhou.
In 1993, Ren bet the company on the development of an advanced digital PBX that could handle 10,000 telephone calls at once. The following year, having obtained the support of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications and formed a joint venture with provincial telecommunications bureaus, Huawei had both a functioning prototype and recognition as a company that could help China eliminate its dependence on foreign suppliers of telecom equipment.
When national leader Jiang Zemin, himself an engineer, visited Shenzhen, Ren told him:'A country without its own program-controlled switches is like one without an army.' Ren added that such switches are 'related to national security' and that their 'software must be held in the hands of the Chinese government.'
After that, Huawei's domestic business took off as it and Chinese rivals, led by ZTE, displaced foreign suppliers such as Northern Telecom (Nortel), Ericsson and Fujitsu with a combination of low prices, aggressive marketing, government favoritism and steady technological advance. Foreign equipment was ripped out and replaced, something that Huawei itself would experience in the US and other countries many years later.
Huawei also began to expand outside China, starting in California in 1993 and moving on to Hong Kong, Russia, Europe, Latin America and the rest of the world. Faced with entrenched competition in advanced countries, it sought an advantage in less attractive markets including Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran. That earned it the attention of the US military (which bombed an optical fiber network Huawei was building in Iraq in 2001) and the National Security Agency (NSA).
In February 2003, Cisco sued Huawei for patent infringement, dropping its suit in July 2004. Neither side revealed the details of the settlement, merely indicating that they were satisfied, but suspicion of Huawei only increased. The FBI interviewed Ren during his visit to New York in 2007, Motorola sued Huawei in 2010 and the House Select Committee on Intelligence looked into the activities of both Huawei and ZTE in 2012.
In 2014, the New York Times and Der Spiegel, citing documents made public by Edward Snowden, reported that the NSA had hacked Huawei's email system in 2009, had also gained access to its source code and was even using Huawei telecom infrastructure to conduct its own spying operations.
Also in 2014, Meng Wanzhou was detained for questioning at JFK Airport in New York. In 2016, the U.S. Department of Commerce put sanctions on ZTE, and in August 2018, President Trump prohibited US government agencies from using ZTE and Huawei equipment. When Meng Wanzhou was arrested in Vancouver in December of that year, the immediate pretext was Huawei's business in Iran, which contravened US sanctions.
But there was a lot more to it than that. Huawei had become the world's top supplier of leading edge 5G mobile telecom equipment, with the highest market share, the most advanced technology and by far the lowest prices. Western vendors, who had invented and until recently dominated the telecom equipment market, were going the way of the Dodo bird.
On top of that, the US, Australia and others were worried that China would do to them what the US had been doing to China, with serious consequences for national security. As former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull wrote about banning Huawei's 5G equipment, 'That didn't mean we thought Huawei was currently being used to interfere with our telecommunication networks. Our approach was a hedge against a future threat, not the identification of a smoking gun but a loaded one.'
As things stand now, the use of Huawei and ZTE 5G equipment has been banned or greatly restricted in the US and Canada, western Europe, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. But because countries not allied with the US have not cooperated, and because the Chinese market is so big, Huawei remains the world's top supplier.
Near the end of her narrative, Dou writes:
But make no mistake: The US government has succeeded in halting Huawei's rise. Huawei is no longer setting new sales records each year but is instead working to regain its 2020 levels…[and] it remains to be seen if Huawei can maintain its place as an R&D leader in the next generation, and the one after that.
However, Huawei's financial results for 2024 show sales up 35% since 2021, when sanctions hit hardest, reaching 96% of their 2020 peak with a higher operating margin. And, in addition to returning to the 5G cell phone market in defiance of US sanctions on the Chinese semiconductor industry, Huawei has taken the lead in 5G-Advanced (5.5G) mobile telecom technology, replaced Oracle's ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning) software with its own, become a significant supplier of autonomous driving solutions, and impressed both Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang and industry analysts with its AI processing technology.
Speaking in Beijing last Wednesday, Huang said, 'Anyone who discounts Huawei and anyone who discounts China's manufacturing capability is deeply naïve.' But that doesn't mean that Dou's conclusion is necessarily wrong, only that a book cannot keep up with the news, particularly in the case of fast-moving technologies.
What the news can't match is Dou's thorough exploration of the evolution of Huawei's management, its legal and political battles in China and the US, and the character of Ren Zhengfei and its other key personnel. House of Huawei is an excellent source for scholars, journalists and anyone else interested in the rise of China.
Follow this writer on X: @ScottFo83517667
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
AllAfrica
2 hours ago
- AllAfrica
China's AI leap elevating stealth fighter ambitions
The South China Morning Post (SCMP) has reported that Chinese scientists have developed advanced aircraft-design software they claim breaks the 'curse of dimensionality,' a computational barrier that contributed to the US Navy's cancellation of its X-47B stealth drone program in 2015. Led by Huang Jiangtao at the China Aerodynamics Research and Development Center, the team introduced a geometric sensitivity computation method that enables optimization of hundreds of variables—such as stealth, aerodynamics and propulsion—without increasing computational load. Unlike traditional methods that grow exponentially more complex, their approach decouples gradient computation costs from design intricacy and integrates radar-absorbent materials directly into aerodynamic sensitivity equations. Their paper, published in Acta Aeronautica et Astronautica Sinica, demonstrated dramatic improvements using the X-47B as a case study. The researchers say this breakthrough could provide critical technical support for next-generation low-observable aircraft, including China's J-36 and J-50 fighters and stealth drones. As sixth-generation fighter programs worldwide face delays or cancellations, China's approach—emphasizing algorithmic efficiency over raw computing power—may save time and resources in stealth warplane development. The SCMP has also previously reported that China's Shenyang Aircraft Design Institute is using the DeepSeek AI platform to tackle complex engineering challenges and reduce time spent on technical reviews, freeing researchers to focus on core innovation tasks. Lead designer Wang Yongqing has stated that the technology is already generating new ideas and approaches for aerospace development, and confirmed steady progress on new variants of the multi-role J-35 stealth fighter. This progress may be underpinned by China's development of increasingly capable AI models. Nature reported this month that Moonshot AI's Kimi K2, an open-weight agentic large language model, matches or surpasses Western and DeepSeek models. The report indicates that Kimi K2 appears to excel in coding, scoring high in tests such as LiveCodeBench. According to Nature, unlike traditional 'reasoner' models, Kimi K2 is designed to execute complex multi-step actions using external tools autonomously, and its accessibility via API at low cost has spurred rapid adoption on platforms like Hugging Face. However, in an April 2025 ChinaTalk article, Lennart Heim noted that while Chinese AI models are likely to match US counterparts in performance, the latter retains a decisive edge in computing capacity, driven by more advanced AI chips and superior system integration at scale. Moreover, Gregory Allen, in a March 2025 report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank, stated that DeepSeek trained its V3 model using 2.8 million graphics processing unit (GPU) hours on Nvidia H800 chips—export-compliant processors specifically designed to comply with the US's October 2022 chip controls. Allen noted that although DeepSeek's publications claimed exclusive use of H800s, reporting from SemiAnalysis and Chinese media—cited in the report—alleged that DeepSeek's R1 model may have been trained using banned Nvidia H100 chips. He reported that SemiAnalysis estimated DeepSeek's parent company, High-Flyer Capital, had acquired 50,000 Hopper-generation GPUs, including 10,000 H100s, 10,000 H800s, and 30,000 H20s. Allen further observed that Nvidia's A800 and H800 chips initially skirted US export controls until regulatory updates in October 2023 closed those loopholes. In addition to relying on US AI chips, China depends on US Electronic Design Automation (EDA) software for chip development. Reuters reported that the US has lifted export controls on EDA software, coinciding with China's relaxation of rare-earth export restrictions. Despite efforts toward indigenous advanced AI chip production—particularly Extreme Ultraviolet (EUV) lithography machines—the Hunan Printed Circuit Association noted this month that China remains at an early developmental stage, encountering significant issues with throughput, durability, and integration into existing ecosystems. These chip-related limitations may have sharp implications for the development of strategic Chinese platforms, notably the H-20 stealth bomber. According to the 2024 US Department of Defense (DoD) China Military Power Report (CMPR), the H-20 is a critical next-generation long-range bomber designed to bolster China's nuclear triad and extend military reach beyond the Second Island Chain. The report states that the H-20, based on a flying-wing design similar to the US B-2, is expected to surpass an 8,500-kilometer range and carry conventional and nuclear payloads, giving China its first true strategic bomber and global strike capability. It notes that the H-20 has yet to be revealed or flight-tested and may only enter service by the 2030s. In contrast to the H-20, General Thomas Bussiere, head of US Air Force Global Strike Command, stated in an interview this month with Air & Space Forces Magazine, that a second developmental B-21 bomber 'should fly shortly,' following the first unit's initial November 2023 flight. The magazine reports that production acceleration was enabled by Congressional approval of a $4.5 billion increase through a reconciliation bill, which Bussiere described as expected and based on over a year of analysis regarding capability, cost, and ramp-rate potential. Bussiere told the publication that this expansion reflects a growing recognition of the strategic value of long-range strike, particularly amid the challenge of sustaining aging Cold War-era bombers and an increasingly volatile global environment. While the official production goal remains 'more than 100' B-21 bombers, the article notes that Bussiere informed the Senate Armed Services Committee he supports assessing an increase to 145 aircraft, citing strategic shifts such as Russia's invasion of Ukraine and China's expanding strategic forces. Air & Space Forces Magazine adds that General Anthony Cotton, head of US Strategic Command, also advocates for raising the total to 145 aircraft. Highlighting the role of AI in accelerating B-21 development, Newsweek reported in December 2023 that AI optimized digital design and engineering processes, including simulation-based testing before physical construction. According to the report, AI-driven tools have enabled Northrop Grumman to maintain tight schedules, enhance sustainability, and optimize supply chains. It also notes that the B-21 incorporates open-architecture software, facilitating rapid upgrades and AI-driven mission flexibility, transforming it into a stealthy sensor and data fusion node beyond its bomber role. Despite these advantages, the US faces significant challenges scaling B-21 production. In a June 2025 report for the Heritage Foundation, Shawn Barnes and Robert Peters noted that the US relies solely on a single B-21 production facility in Palmdale, California, which limits output to about ten bombers per year—insufficient to reach the US Air Force's 100-aircraft goal before the late 2030s. They highlighted the high up-front development costs of the program, the fragility of the defense industrial base and the single-point-of-failure risk associated with relying on one site. Barnes and Peters argued that establishing a second production line is essential to scale capacity, reduce risk, and potentially support future sales to close allies, as was done with the F-35. AI-driven breakthroughs are clearly reshaping stealth aircraft development, but progress for both China and the US hinges critically on overcoming chip dependencies and scaling production capacities. The outcome of this high-stakes technological competition will shape the future balance of strategic airpower.
AllAfrica
4 hours ago
- AllAfrica
Microsoft used China-based support for multiple US agencies
This article was first published by ProPublica, a Pulitzer Prize-winning investigative newsroom. Sign up for The Big Story newsletter to receive stories like this one in your inbox . Last week, Microsoft announced that it would no longer use China-based engineering teams to support the Defense Department's cloud computing systems, following ProPublica's investigation of the practice, which cybersecurity experts said could expose the government to hacking and espionage. But it turns out the Pentagon was not the only part of the government facing such a threat. For years, Microsoft has also used its global workforce, including China-based personnel, to maintain the cloud systems of other federal departments, including parts of Justice, Treasury and Commerce, ProPublica has found. This work has taken place in what's known as the Government Community Cloud, which is intended for information that is not classified but is nonetheless sensitive. The Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program, the US government's cloud accreditation organization, has approved GCC to handle 'moderate' impact information 'where the loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability would result in serious adverse effect on an agency's operations, assets, or individuals.' The Justice Department's Antitrust Division has used GCC to support its criminal and civil investigation and litigation functions, according to a 2022 report. Parts of the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Education have also used GCC. Microsoft says its foreign engineers working in GCC have been overseen by U.S.-based personnel known as 'digital escorts,' similar to the system it had in place at the Defense Department. Nevertheless, cybersecurity experts told ProPublica that foreign support for GCC presents an opportunity for spying and sabotage. 'There's a misconception that, if government data isn't classified, no harm can come of its distribution,' said Rex Booth, a former federal cybersecurity official who now is chief information security officer of the tech company SailPoint. 'With so much data stored in cloud services — and the power of AI to analyze it quickly — even unclassified data can reveal insights that could harm US interests,' he said. Harry Coker, who was a senior executive at the CIA and the National Security Agency, said foreign intelligence agencies could leverage information gleaned from GCC systems to 'swim upstream' to more sensitive or even classified ones. 'It is an opportunity that I can't imagine an intelligence service not pursuing,' he said. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence has deemed China the 'most active and persistent cyber threat to U.S. Government, private-sector, and critical infrastructure networks.' Laws there grant the country's officials broad authority to collect data, and experts say it is difficult for any Chinese citizen or company to meaningfully resist a direct request from security forces or law enforcement. Microsoft declined interview requests for this story. In response to questions, the tech giant issued a statement that suggested it would be discontinuing its use of China-based support for GCC, as it recently did for the Defense Department's cloud systems. 'Microsoft took steps last week to enhance the security of our DoD Government cloud offerings. Going forward, we are taking similar steps for all our government customers who use Government Community Cloud to further ensure the security of their data,' the statement said. A spokesperson declined to elaborate on what those steps are. The company also said that over the next month it 'will conduct a review to assess whether additional measures are needed.' The federal departments and agencies that ProPublica found to be using GCC did not respond to requests for comment. The latest revelations about Microsoft's use of its Chinese workforce to service the U.S. government — and the company's swift response — are likely to fuel a rapidly developing firestorm in Washington, where federal lawmakers and the Trump administration are questioning the tech giant's cybersecurity practices and trying to contain any potential national security fallout. 'Foreign engineers — from any country, including of course China — should NEVER be allowed to maintain or access DoD systems,' Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth wrote in a post on X last Friday. Last week, ProPublica revealed that Microsoft has for a decade relied on foreign workers — including those based in China — to maintain the Defense Department's computer systems, with oversight coming from US-based digital escorts. But those escorts, we found, often don't have the advanced technical expertise to police foreign counterparts with far more advanced skills, leaving highly sensitive information vulnerable. In response to the reporting, Hegseth launched a review of the practice. ProPublica found that Microsoft developed the escort arrangement to satisfy Defense Department officials who were concerned about the company's foreign employees, given the department's citizenship requirements for people handling sensitive data. Microsoft went on to win federal cloud computing business and has said in earnings reports that it receives 'substantial revenue from government contracts.' While Microsoft has said it will stop using China-based tech support for the Defense Department, it declined to answer questions about what would replace it, including whether cloud support would come from engineers based outside the U.S. The company also declined to say whether it would continue to use digital escorts. Microsoft confirmed to ProPublica this week that a similar escorting arrangement had been used in GCC — a dynamic that surprised some former government officials and cybersecurity experts. 'In an increasingly complex digital world, consumers of cloud products deserve to know how their data is handled and by whom,' Booth said. 'The cybersecurity industry depends on clarity.' Microsoft said it disclosed details of the GCC escort arrangement in documentation submitted to the federal government as part of the FedRAMP cloud accreditation process. The company declined to provide the documents to ProPublica, citing the potential security risk of publicly disclosing them, and also declined to say whether the China-based location of its support personnel was specifically mentioned in them. ProPublica contacted other major cloud services providers to the federal government to ask whether they use China-based support. A spokesperson for Amazon Web Services said in a statement that 'AWS does not use personnel in China to support federal contracts.' A Google spokesperson said in a statement that 'Google Public Sector does not have a Digital Escort program. Instead, its sensitive systems are supported by fully trained personnel who meet the U.S. government's location, citizenship and security clearance requirements.' Oracle said it 'does not use any Chinese support for US federal customers.' Renee Dudley is a ProPublica reporter focused on technology, cybersecurity and business. Doris Burke, who covers corporate wrongdoing, contributed reporting.
AllAfrica
4 hours ago
- AllAfrica
Trump's weaker export controls risk security to please China
Recent US export control decisions imperil national security and threaten not only US artificial intelligence 'dominance' but potentially many other emerging technologies critical to military programs. While legal US exports of AI-related semiconductors were blocked, China got at least US$1 billion worth of Nvidia-made chips illegally, mostly in 'packages' of data-center-ready racks. The packages being sold in China are labeled as Supermicro, Dell and Asus. The chip packages, which include software, were sold at a 50% markup over US prices. Meanwhile, the Financial Times reports that the Trump administration has decided to lift 'aggressive' strategic export controls and has directed the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security to implement the new directive. Under the US export control system, commercial exports, also known as dual-use exports, are controlled by the Department of Commerce. However, the Commerce Department is supposed to coordinate with the Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security and US intelligence. By law, US export controls support national security, lim supply and US foreign policy. These are broad categories. The US is also supposed to coordinate its export controls multilaterally, but since the dissolution of COCOM in 1994 and the weak substitute Wassenaar arrangement, very often the US resorts to unilateral export controls. It is not clear what 'aggressive' strategic export controls are, nor is it clear how they impact the interagency deliberative process. One presumes that the Commerce Department's Bureau of Export Controls will try to come up with some sort of export licensing guidelines to cover the White House directive. Neither the Commerce Department nor the other involved agencies apparently played any role in the White House directive. Prior to the White House decision, Trump previously told Nvidia it could restart chip exports to China, an apparent quid pro quo in which China released rare earth exports to the United States. Twenty former US officials say allowing Nvidia to export chips to China was a strategic misstep. The latest White House move, lifting 'aggressive' strategic export controls, is designed to facilitate trade negotiations between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Looked at objectively, Chinese export restrictions trumped Trump (pun intended). Some expected that Trump would go to China in September when Russian President Vladimir Putin is also expected. However, it appears that the idea has been nixed, and Trump won't meet with Xi and Putin together and will go to China later in the Fall, probably after the APEC meeting in South Korea. News reports say that China and the US are working on an agenda and a date for a high-level meeting. The immediate impact of removing 'aggressive' export controls will be on AI-relevant technology. The Trump administration has released an AI Action Plan. The plan calls for removing 'red tape' that delays AI investments and initiatives, investing more in AI and boosting government investment, especially by the Defense Department. It also describes the US effort in AI as a 'race' like the 'space race' in the past and seeks 'American dominance' in AI. The latest decisions on export controls, and specifically on Nvidia, compromise the AI Action Plan. They are totally incompatible. The lifting of export controls on Nvidia, which is the premier component in AI data centers, and the subsequent order to lift 'aggressive' export controls, not only subverts the billions of investment already made in AI but also leaves uncertain what other critical US technologies will be sold off to China. There is little doubt China is aggressively pursuing AI and is investing billions in the effort. According to investment bank Morgan Stanley, China is a sleeping giant that is now awakened and seeking global AI dominance by 2030. It is important to note that US companies like Nvidia will now directly assist China by sharing know-how and technology. There are many sensitive emerging technologies that are quite important and in many cases sensitive to US national security. The chart below illustrates some of them: The immediate question is whether the latest policy guidance from the White House includes any or all of the emerging technologies? The above chart was published to highlight what the Trump administration originally wanted to curtail using export controls. It is normal whenever new US export controls or guidance is proposed for the Commerce Department to publish the policy for comment before it is approved. In the comment period, the public (most often industry) comments on the proposed rule. It is far from clear if the Commerce Department will publish guidance for the latest policy change, but it should do so. Moreover, it should explain the national security implications as it understands them. There is also the question of interagency coordination, a non-trivial part of the US export control process. Will the Defense Department and other agencies (especially the intelligence community) be consulted, or will the Commerce Department ignore the other agencies? Typically, the Defense Department concerns itself with the impact of approving export licenses that might undermine national security and the military mission. Beyond that, many of the emerging technologies are critical to US defense systems and represent areas where the Defense Department has invested billions of dollars. The latest decisions contradict the AI Action Plan and potentially compromise export control protection of critical emerging technologies. In turn, the decisions damage US national security as defined, in part, by the administration itself. Stephen Bryen is a special correspondent to Asia Times and former US deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. This article, which originally appeared on his Substack newsletter Weapons and Strategy, is republished with permission.
