Same relief cannot be sought on two different forums: LHC
LAHORE: The Lahore High Court (LHC) held that proceedings for the same relief cannot be conducted on two different forums.
The court passed this order in a petition filed by a citizen, Munir Ahmed, who prayed to nullify the SOPs of Pakistan National Identity List (PNIL).
Chief Justice Aalia Neelum expressing strong displeasure over the filing of a frivolous petition stated that this petition had already been filed and dismissed by the Islamabad High Court (IHC).
A law officer stated that petitioner had already filed a similar petition in the IHC, which had dismissed it. The petitioner allegedly concealed this fact from the court.
The petitioner's counsel, Azhar Siddique, argued that the petition in the IHC was not filed by the same petitioner. He claimed to be unaware of any judicial order in the Islamabad case. But he was shown the court order from the IHC where his appearance was officially recorded.
The court after reviewing the entire record found the petition non-maintainable due to the same matter having been previously filed in the IHC.
Chief Justice observed that court time was extremely valuable and should be reserved for serious matters.
Copyright Business Recorder, 2025
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