Bangladesh government workers protest tax authority reform
Bangladesh government workers protest tax authority reform
DHAKA: Bangladesh security forces surrounded the national tax authority headquarters on Sunday as its employees extended a two-week-long strike over the interim government's reforms, reportedly leaving millions of dollars in taxes uncollected.
Government orders to overhaul the powerful tax authority, the National Board of Revenue (NBR), have sparked fury from ordinary employees to top management.
"Tax, customs, and VAT -- all three wings will observe a complete work abstention from Monday," Joint Tax Commissioner Monalisa Saha Sushmita told reporters at the main NBR building in Dhaka, where police and armed security gathered.
Bangladesh has been in turmoil since a student-led revolt ousted former prime minister
Sheikh Hasina
in August 2024, ending her 15-year iron-fisted rule.
The interim government -- led by Nobel Peace Prize microfinance pioneer Muhammad Yunus -- is trying to instil sweeping government reforms.
The tax board protest reflects the divisions, rival loyalties and confusion between government branches and the caretaker administration.
The government order issued on May 12 proposed splitting the powerful money-raising NRB into two.
Crucially, it would also hand control of the new sections to government-chosen civil servants from outside the NRB.
Sushmita claimed that the strike will mean, in effect, that "imports and exports will also be halted" and that tax revenues totalling between $122-163 million per day had not been collected since the strike began.
It was not possible to verify those figures.
Bangladesh is the world's second-largest garment manufacturer, while textile and garment production accounts for about 80 percent of the country's exports.
The industry has been rebuilding after it was hit hard by last year's unrest.
In separate protests on Sunday, hundreds of civil servants demonstrated in Dhaka against a government order giving it greater power to sack employees for disciplinary breaches.
"If the government proceeds with the amended ordinance, the interim government will face severe criticism," said Mohammad Nazrul Islam from the Inter-Ministerial Employees Association.
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Indian Express
6 hours ago
- Indian Express
To truly break with the past, Bangladesh needs robust institutions, not vendetta
Until a few months ago, it seemed as if the goodwill commanded by the interim government of Bangladesh headed by Muhammad Yunus — the product of an agreement between the major political parties, the army, and student leaders — would be enough for it to carry out its ambitious reform agenda. But while the reform efforts are still on, the banning of the Awami League and the onset of the absentee trial of the ousted leader, Sheikh Hasina, have produced an unsettling sense that we are witnessing what commentator Taqbir Huda calls 'the perverse circularity of revenge politics in Bangladesh'. This is not the best of circumstances for external players to actively support the accountability and reform objectives of the interim government. In February 2025, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights released a fact-finding report on the purported abuses and violations of human rights that took place during the massive protests in Bangladesh from July 1 to August 15, 2024. In the team's assessment, up to 1,400 people could have died during the protests, with military rifles and shotguns loaded with deadly metal pellets — common weapons used by Bangladesh's security forces — killing the majority of them. The UN human rights office, says the report, 'has reasonable grounds to believe that these violations were carried out with the knowledge, coordination and direction of the political leadership and senior security sector officials, in pursuance of a strategy to suppress the protests and related expressions of dissent'. Despite its name, the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), which is holding Hasina's absentee trial, is a domestic court. It will be an understatement to say that the conduct of a legal proceeding in absentia is controversial under most circumstances (including in the case of India's foreigners' tribunals). Article 63 of the Rome Statute that set up the International Criminal Court — of which Bangladesh is a state party — states quite unambiguously that 'the accused shall be present during the trial'. But the fact that Hasina's trial would be in her absence doesn't seem to greatly concern its backers. In response to a reporter's queries, as far back as December 2024, the special adviser to the tribunal's chief prosecutor said, rather nonchalantly, 'I don't know what India will do about Sheikh Hasina's return to Bangladesh. But if India does not have her return here, her trial will continue in her absence.' The UN fact-finding report notes that the interim government is committed to holding those responsible for the serious violations accountable, and that it has concentrated its resources on bringing criminal cases before the ICT as quickly as possible. But it says that several interlocutors, including some human rights defenders and public interest attorneys, have voiced concerns about the ICT's contentious history and its legal structure, and are sceptical of its ability to conduct truly independent, fair, and effective proceedings. The interim government has since approved amendments to the ICT Act to address several issues regarding due process and fair trials raised by the UN human rights office and others. However, the revisions, says the UN report, addressed some but not all those issues. It specifically notes the continued absence of the fair trial protections required for proceedings in absentia. The banning of the Awami League, which happened after the UN report was released, raises additional issues about Sheikh Hasina's right to due process and a fair trial. In view of the speed with which the interim government is proceeding to try Bangladesh's ousted leader, it may be worth reflecting on the question of time and the pursuit of justice. While there is a lot to be said for the adage that justice delayed is justice denied, there are situations when new opportunities for justice become available with the passage of time. For instance, it is not unusual for familiar barriers to justice, such as the power and influence of people committing breaches, to weaken and disappear over time. There are good reasons for why war crimes, and crimes against humanity — whether committed in time of war or in time of peace — are not subject to any statutory limitation. The Nazi war criminal John Demjanjuk, who worked as a Nazi camp-guard and immigrated to the United States in 1952, was finally convicted and sentenced to five years in prison by a Munich court in 2011 — nearly eight decades after the Holocaust. The UN fact-finding report includes an important observation about Bangladeshi politics, that its 'political parties have been historically dominated by individual leaders who pursued politics of patronage and sought to weaponise the political system against their opponents'. The adverse effects of such practices, however, were tempered so long as people were able to regularly vote the ruling party out of power. This was possible because of 'a constitutional system of temporary caretaker governments that would seek to level the playing field before a new round of elections'. Unfortunately, following its victory in the 2008 election, the Awami League eliminated this institution. Many observers of Bangladeshi politics recognise the caretaker arrangement as an important institutional innovation in the country's constitutional history. Thankfully, the report of the constitution reform commission appointed by the interim government includes the recommendation of 'the appointment of an election-time interim government after the end of the term of the Parliament or, if the Parliament is dissolved, until the next elected government is sworn in'. There is no denying that many of Bangladesh's institutions require reforms. But there are valid concerns about whether an unelected interim government has the authority to carry out all the reforms that Yunus and his colleagues would like to make. Reinstating the institution of the caretaker government, and establishing robust constitutional safeguards for it, could serve as a significant legacy for Yunus and the government he heads. The writer is professor emeritus of Political Studies at Bard College, New York
The Hindu
10 hours ago
- The Hindu
If Sheikh Hasina is Extradited to Bangladesh, Justice Will Not Be Served: Badrul Ahsan
Published : Jun 04, 2025 15:49 IST - 17 MINS READ On June 1, 2025, Bangladesh's International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) formally charged former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina with crimes against humanity for ordering police action against student protesters, leading to her ouster on August 5, 2024. The court issued arrest warrants for Hasina, her Home Minister, and the former police chief. The 77-year-old leader currently lives in exile in India. Syed Badrul Ahsan, senior Bangladeshi journalist and commentator, spoke to Frontline about Hasina's indictment. Ahsan, who lives in London, discussed the Awami League's reaction to the indictment, the prospect of Hasina's extradition from India to Bangladesh, the possibility of free and fair elections in the near future, Muhammad Yunus' tenure as Chief Adviser, and the state of India-Bangladesh bilateral relations with both Pakistan and China hovering in the immediate backdrop. Edited excerpts: How is the Awami League reacting to this indictment for ordering police to fire on protesters, resulting in several hundred deaths? Well, first of all, this is a state of irony in Bangladesh. The ICT was set up by the erstwhile Awami League to try collaborators of the 1971 Pakistani military regime. A good number were sentenced to death and executed. Now the tables have been turned, and this tribunal is trying Sheikh Hasina and members of the former government. The Awami League is in a very desperate situation. It's not organised at all, and there's no particular leadership that can give the people or the international community a public statement. This is in contrast to 1971, when Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was arrested, but there was a second tier of leadership which organised the liberation war with India's assistance. Post-1975, after Sheikh Mujib's assassination, the Awami League was divided into three factions, but Sheikh Hasina came back from exile in Delhi in 1981 and took charge. That kind of situation doesn't exist now because of the repression against Awami League leaders, activists, and supporters over the last 10 months. Although there have been some sporadic protests by young Awami League activists—the Chhatra League, the Jubo League—they're all scattered. The media exercises self-censorship because of mob violence. What we have in Bangladesh today is a situation where everything has been hollowed out except the name People's Republic of Bangladesh. There is a deliberate program of eliminating everything that had to do with the 1971 war of liberation. No one argues that there was corruption during the 15-year rule of the Awami League. But the process is what matters. People in the ICT today were never disposed in a friendly way toward the Awami League or democratic secular politics. Is there concern that India might ask Sheikh Hasina to leave and return to Bangladesh for the sake of good relations? That kind of concern is not there because under the Awami League government, good relations existed with India. The feeling is that Modi will not take steps to have Sheikh Hasina extradited. If Sheikh Hasina is extradited to Bangladesh, justice will not be served. The feeling in Bangladesh is that judgment has already been delivered—student supporters of the interim government have made it clear that Sheikh Hasina will be brought back to Dhaka and hanged. When people look to a judicial killing of a former Prime Minister before a trial, I don't think the Indian government will agree to that. The Awami League, which liberated the country, has been placed under a ban—a huge irony. On the other hand, the Jamaat-e-Islami, which violently opposed Bangladesh's liberation in 1971 and supported the Pakistani army, has come to the forefront. With the Awami League banned, anywhere between 35 to 40 per cent, perhaps more, of voters have been disenfranchised. For the foreseeable future, until things change in Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina will be in India. Is Sheikh Hasina not responsible for the leadership vacuum because she surrounded herself with a tight-knit clique? Should she step back and allow new leadership to rebuild the party? That would be very appreciable—for Sheikh Hasina to step back in view of the indictment, letting the country know she's ready to face justice. If the Awami League doesn't exist or simply withers away, that will be terrible for the country. With the Awami League, Bangladesh's history gets washed away. Over the last 15 years, her leadership style changed. The difference between Sheikh Hasina and her father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, is that Sheikh Mujib had around him a group of leaders who argued with him, debated issues with him, and collectively reached party decisions. With Sheikh Hasina, they tended to be more sycophantic than being able to debate policy matters with her. She created a clique around her where nobody could argue against her policies. Every time a minister made a statement, he or she began with 'On the advice of the Honourable Prime Minister, the government has decided'. Sheikh Hasina is aged now—she was born in September 1947, so she's almost 78. It's high time for her to hand over leadership to a new generation. If the Awami League simply withers away, it's an entire nation that will suffer, an entire history of Bangladesh that is already under threat might be wiped out altogether. Also Read | India and Bangladesh are destined to work together: Sreeradha Datta Can a case be made that once prosecution begins, the ban on the Awami League becomes legally shaky? The prosecution itself may help a second rung emerge. The ban on the Awami League was not a wise step. That should have been kept separate from cases of corruption and orders to police to fire on protesters. The interim government could have prosecuted individuals but leave the Awami League aside because it is a major party. Historically, every time the Awami League has been under pressure, it always bounced back because it had that set of leaders. As far as the present Awami League is concerned, the party is there but in scattered form. Many Awami League activists and leaders revere Sheikh Hasina largely because she happens to be the daughter of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. But with the indictment, Sheikh Hasina could consult her party leaders and take steps to get in touch with other leaders and give them directives on how to reorganise the party and step away from it until this entire course of investigations comes to an end. People in Bangladesh—30 to 40 per cent—since the banning of the Awami League, citizens who never supported the Awami League are becoming sympathetic to it. If the Awami League is unbanned hypothetically and an election is held today, there's a good chance it will go back to power—maybe not with a vast majority, but in a coalition. The Chief Adviser, Muhammad Yunus, told his advisors last week that the Awami League is destabilising the country. Despite the ban, the interim government feels there is a threat from the Awami League. Is the army going to permit an election without the Awami League? Army chief General Wakar-Uz-Zaman has been saying there has to be an inclusive election before December. Some kind of subtle pressure is there from the army. When General Wakar-Uz-Zaman made it clear about two weeks ago that elections have to be held by December this year, Professor Yunus said he was thinking of resigning. The Yunus government came forth with the idea that elections will be held anywhere between December this year and June next year. The army has been playing a very subtle, very positive game. The army chief has gone on record saying that the values of the liberation war will not be sacrificed, and the rule of law will be maintained. Just the other day in Rangpur, when the former military leader General Hussain Muhammad Ershad's family home was being vandalised, the army moved in. The regional army commander summoned these student leaders in the middle of the night and warned them that this kind of vandalism will not be tolerated. If elections are held without the Awami League, they will not be credible at all—in the same way that elections under the Awami League government, when the BNP [Bangladesh Nationalist Party] did not take part, were never regarded as credible. The army is the only disciplined force in the country now. The army must insist that inclusivity means bringing the Awami League into the election. So the Awami League is looking to the army to bring it back into political life. The three chiefs were appointed by Sheikh Hasina—is there a feeling they owe this to her? I won't say they owe this to her. They owe this to the proper rules of governance under which they were appointed. But they're also loyal to the principles and values of the 1971 war of liberation. That sense of values is still working in them. Now if they see the trajectory the country is taking—the Jamaat-e-Islami has come back, militant Islamist organisations like Hizb ut-Tahrir are there, and there are reports of Pakistani military officials and ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan's external intelligence agency] officials coming to Bangladesh and trying to establish links with the Bangladesh government—these are very concerning things. The armed forces, I don't think they will take all these things lying down. You mentioned if elections were held today, the Awami League might return to power. But we hear the BNP believes it will sweep the elections—that's why they are eager for December elections. When I talked about the Awami League's prospects, there's a sympathy factor working, although not for its doings in the last government—the corruption is roundly condemned even by supporters. If elections are held, we do not feel the Awami League will win a straight majority, but it just might squeak through. The BNP is very confident it will win, but worried that the Jamaat-e-Islami is getting ahead of it. Since August last year, Jamaat has gone ahead. Jamaat has worked very quietly and softly, asking for local government elections first rather than general elections. The BNP is massively popular because it's been out of power for so many years and because of the repression exercised on it by the Awami League government. All political power in the party rests with Tarique Rahman [party chief Khaleda Zia's son], who has been in exile in the UK since 2007. The question many people ask is why Tarique Rahman has not been going back to Bangladesh. The interim government does not want him to return. An unwritten instruction is there because if he goes back today, that will create a huge wave of support for the BNP that the interim government will not be able to stem. Recently, Jamaat-e-Islami member A.T.M. Azharul Islam was released from prison. The head of Jamaat held a press conference saying the party apologised to the nation, but did not mention 1971 or collaboration with Pakistan Army. How is this being received? The people are not happy with this sort of statement from Jamaat. It is very ambiguous. When a party chief says, 'if we have made any mistake,' the question is not if mistakes were made. The historical record is there. All the old newspapers are there. I was there in 1971. I belong to a generation that was there. We saw what Jamaat did. If Jamaat is actually apologetic about 1971, it should come out with a clear statement saying: 'We made mistakes in 1971, we should not have supported the Pakistani military regime, and we respect the three million people of Bangladesh who died because of the Pakistani military regime and their local collaborators.' Young people who were born 15 or 20 years ago know the history of the country. You have to tell these people you're sorry. Condemning the Awami League for corruption is one thing. But history is something else, and Jamaat has to own up to it clearly and without ambiguity. There was talk of an army takeover. What are you hearing about the differences between the army and interim administration? The army is not happy. The army and the Yunus administration are not happy with each other because Yunus feels pressure from the army. The army feels nationwide pressure for elections and knows that unless there's an elected government, a constitutional government, things cannot go back to normal. I don't think the army is ready to take over. The Bangladesh Army remembers the periods when the army took charge and would not like to go back into that situation. What the army can do is ensure elections are held in good time, are inclusive, and ensure they are free, fair, and credible. This return to constitutional government is absolutely important because the people of Bangladesh have become tired of the kind of politics in the last 25-30 years. No political leader—either Begum Khalida Zia or Sheikh Hasina—has graduated to being a national leader. Not since Sheikh Mujibur Rahman have we had a national leader who could unite all people. 'If Sheikh Hasina is extradited to Bangladesh, justice will not be served. Student supporters of the interim government have made it clear that she will be brought back to Dhaka and hanged.' That is also the fear now: that if the BNP sweeps, there would not be a centrist opposition. It might be Jamaat or other extremist Islamist parties. The ideal situation would be first for the Awami League to be unbanned and permitted to take part. If the BNP sweeps the election, it will be back to square one. If Jamaat becomes the opposition in parliament, that will not be happy for the country. But if the Awami League is there and the BNP is there, and if people vote for either of these parties with the margin of difference very small, that is the kind of election we need. Since 1970, every time we've had an election, it's always been one party claiming the entire parliament for itself. If an election produces a result with no party gaining a majority, that will be extremely good for the country. That will force political parties to get into talks about forming a coalition. About the humanitarian corridor proposal from Bangladesh into Myanmar that reportedly caused army-administration differences: Given over a million Rohingya refugees and Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) activity in camps, why has this become such a big issue? This humanitarian corridor idea was sponsored by the interim government, especially by the National Security Advisor, Khalil-ur-Rahman. We have never had a National Security Advisor in Bangladesh. It was done without consultation with the Army. There's no guarantee, given Bangladesh's weak state politically, that elements of ARSA and the Arakan rebels will not take advantage to operate from within Bangladesh. If the humanitarian corridor is allowed, it might become a point where these Myanmar rebels might take advantage and Bangladesh might become a source of supply of arms—not just food and other items for Rohingya, but ammunition and weapons for rebels. When the army chief made it clear that the military will not allow any humanitarian corridor, he felt the pulse of the nation. On the pretext of this humanitarian corridor, it will be a point where militants, Islamic militants, will become even more active in trying to dislodge the administration within Bangladesh. Is there fear that Western foreign troops might use that corridor—for instance, the US military stationing itself there? That's a very valid concern. We are worried about American attention to islands like Saint Martin. American policy will clearly be aimed at helping Myanmar rebels with arms and ammunition routed through Bangladesh—that will impinge on Bangladesh's sovereignty. Secondly, to keep a check on India and China will place Bangladesh in a very difficult geopolitical situation. Also Read | India comments on treatment of Hindus in Bangladesh but must know its treatment of Muslims has repercussions: Debapriya Bhattacharya One theory after Sheikh Hasina's ouster was that the United States had a hand in it. When Sheikh Hasina mentioned that 'a white man' asked her about Saint Martin's Island, this theory got wings. Would India have allowed the US to burn down the house next door where India had so many stakes? It's obvious that elements in the United States, especially in the Democratic Party government, were never truly well disposed toward Sheikh Hasina. Under the Biden administration, there were indications they were not happy with Sheikh Hasina. She came up with the statement about 'a white man's proposal' regarding Saint Martin. We were surprised when she made that statement because she didn't go further. When Professor Yunus went to the UN last year, he met Bill Clinton and talked about the meticulous plan for the removal of Sheikh Hasina's government. That has led to questions—what was that meticulous plan? Whether India would have agreed to that, I don't think so. If the American government intends to intrude into Bangladesh territory on the excuse of helping Myanmar rebels, the Indian government will put its foot down. India will not accept this kind of intrusion by American interests in Bangladesh. The Chief Adviser went to China and made that controversial remark about inviting the Chinese to set up a trading zone with India's north-eastern states. There's now a high-powered Chinese delegation in Dhaka. What's the difference between Sheikh Hasina and Yunus regarding China? Hardly any difference. What the Yunus government has been doing is carrying forward Sheikh Hasina's policies vis-à-vis China. But we should be mindful that no matter how much closer we get to China, our focal point is India. We have traditionally maintained good relations with India in all spheres. As far as India is concerned, the Modi government should have done more in dealing with the crisis that erupted in Bangladesh in August 2024. What we certainly did not expect was the anarchy that would replace the fall of the Awami League government. For now, the Modi government should be able to interact with the Yunus government till the election. Certain measures such as closing land borders should be relaxed. If they are not relaxed, it's the people of Bangladesh who suffer and, to a certain extent, the people of India. At the end of the day, everything depends on how soon we can return Bangladesh to an elected government. If we have a strong government, a national government that reaches out to all people, it will give us an opportunity to forge a foreign policy which would benefit Bangladesh's people and the region. Why has the Yunus administration not been able to take control of the mob violence, the vandalism of Mujib's house, even with the army's support? The expectation was that after taking over from Sheikh Hasina's government, he would clear the accumulated debris and lead the country to elections. But it soon became very clear that the interim administration was anti-Awami League. When the torching of Sheikh Mujib's residence was done, shortly after Yunus went to the United States where he addressed the General Assembly. The anchor asked him why on his watch Sheikh Mujib's house was torched and he had done nothing about it. His answer didn't satisfy anybody. He said it was a meticulous plan, but then he said there was a reset button at work. The question is, what reset button? You don't reset history. Over the last 10 months, it has become very clear that the Yunus government, through all its activities, is against the Awami League—through not allowing Awami League supporters to gather, through letting mobs demolish structures, and attacks on the Hindu minority community. There are still Awami League supporters who can't stay at home for fear they will be targeted by mobs. Everything depends on when we have the election. To have it in good time, we need army pressure to be kept up. We also need a timetable, which the interim government has not yet brought forward. We keep fingers crossed. Nirupama Subramanian is an independent journalist who has worked earlier at The Hindu and at The Indian Express.
News18
11 hours ago
- News18
Yunus, Army, Pakistan, And China: A New Axis Threatens India's Security
Last Updated: China's role as the linchpin of this emerging axis cannot be overstated, as it leverages its economic and military influence to counter India's rise India faces an emerging geopolitical storm as Bangladesh's interim government, led by Muhammad Yunus, aligns with Pakistan and China, forming a troubling axis that threatens New Delhi's regional dominance. The convergence of Yunus's administration, Bangladesh's military, Pakistan's strategic provocations, and China's growing influence in South Asia presents a multifaceted challenge that India cannot afford to underestimate. Tensions escalated following provocative remarks by a retired Bangladesh army officer, closely tied to Yunus's government, advocating for a joint military arrangement with China to seize India's northeastern states in the event of an India-Pakistan conflict. This inflammatory rhetoric, coupled with Bangladesh's warming ties with Pakistan and China, signals a deliberate shift in Dhaka's foreign policy under Yunus, moving away from the India-friendly stance of the ousted Sheikh Hasina regime. Since August 2024, when Hasina's government fell, attacks on minorities, particularly Hindus, have surged in Bangladesh, straining bilateral relations. India's revocation of transshipment facilities for Bangladeshi exports in April 2025 further highlighted this rift. Meanwhile, Pakistan's military, emboldened by Chinese weaponry like the J-10C jets and PL-15 missiles, has intensified its aggression, as seen in the May 2025 India-Pakistan clashes. China, leveraging its economic and military largesse, is deepening its footprint in both nations, positioning itself as a counterweight to India. This alignment, fueled by Yunus's outreach to Beijing and Pakistan's reliance on Chinese arms, creates a volatile dynamic that could destabilise South Asia. The combination of Yunus's interim regime, Bangladesh's military ambitions, Pakistan's hostility, and China's strategic manoeuvring forms a potent threat that demands India's urgent attention as it navigates this complex regional chessboard. Muhammad Yunus, as Bangladesh's interim leader since August 2024, has steered Dhaka towards a confrontational stance against India, undermining decades of cooperative ties fostered under Sheikh Hasina. His administration's failure to curb rising attacks on Hindus—over 1,000 incidents reported since August—has inflamed tensions, with India viewing these as a deliberate signal of hostility. Yunus's visit to China in early 2025, where he positioned Bangladesh as a gateway for Chinese economic expansion, particularly highlighting the landlocked nature of India's northeastern states, raised alarm in New Delhi. By pitching Bangladesh as the 'only guardian of the ocean" for the region, Yunus invited Beijing to deepen its strategic presence, potentially encircling India's vulnerable northeast. His government's appointment of Major General (Retd) ALM Fazlur Rahman, who called for occupying India's seven northeastern states in coordination with China if India attacks Pakistan, as chairman of the National Independent Commission, underscores this shift. Though Dhaka distanced itself from Rahman's remarks, the lack of disciplinary action suggests tacit approval. This rhetoric aligns with Yunus's broader strategy to balance against India by leveraging China's economic and military support, including agreements signed during his China visit to enhance infrastructure and trade. The revocation of India's transshipment facility, which crippled Bangladesh's export routes, was a direct response to this pivot. Yunus's alignment with anti-India forces, particularly in the context of rising communal violence, risks alienating India's goodwill and strengthening a Bangladesh-China axis that could destabilise the region. As India prepares for potential escalations, Yunus's provocative leadership signals a new front in India's security challenges, especially given Bangladesh's proximity and historical ties with Pakistan. Bangladesh's Military Ambitions and Regional Instability Bangladesh's military, under Yunus's interim government, is emerging as a destabilising force, emboldened by its growing alignment with China and Pakistan. The provocative statement by Major General (Retd) ALM Fazlur Rahman, a key figure appointed by Yunus to investigate the 2009 Bangladesh Rifles mutiny, reflects a broader militaristic undercurrent. Rahman's call for a 'joint military arrangement" with China to target India's northeast, though officially disavowed, highlights a dangerous mindset within Bangladesh's military circles. The Bangladesh army's top general, Qamarul Hasan, visited Pakistan in early 2025, meeting with army chief Asim Munir to discuss enhanced military cooperation. This visit, coupled with Yunus's outreach to China, suggests a coordinated effort to challenge India's regional influence. Bangladesh's military modernisation, supported by Chinese arms, including Type 59 tanks and anti-ship missiles, is modest but strategically significant given its proximity to India's sensitive northeastern border. The region's landlocked geography makes it vulnerable to disruptions, and Bangladesh's control over key maritime routes amplifies this threat. Reports indicate China is funding port upgrades in Chittagong, potentially for dual-use military purposes, which could facilitate Chinese naval presence in the Bay of Bengal. The interim government's failure to address minority violence, coupled with its military's flirtation with anti-India rhetoric, risks escalating tensions into a broader conflict. India's military, already stretched by border disputes with China and Pakistan, must now contend with a potentially hostile Bangladesh, complicating its strategic calculus. This military posturing, backed by Chinese support, positions Bangladesh as a wildcard in South Asia's security landscape, directly threatening India's northeastern stability. Pakistan's Aggression and Chinese Military Backing Pakistan's military escalation against India, particularly evident in the May 2025 clashes, is deeply intertwined with its reliance on Chinese weaponry, amplifying the threat to New Delhi. Following a terrorist attack in Kashmir that killed 26 tourists, India launched missile strikes on alleged terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Pakistan retaliated with Chinese-made J-10C fighter jets and PL-15 missiles, claiming to have downed Indian aircraft, including French-made Rafales. The conflict, which saw drones and missiles targeting airbases, highlighted Pakistan's dependence on Chinese arms, with 63% of China's arms exports from 2020-2024 going to Pakistan. The J-10C's reported success against Western technology has boosted China's defence industry, with stocks of AVIC Chengdu Aircraft rising 40% during the conflict. Pakistan's military, led by General Asim Munir, views India as an existential threat, a stance reinforced by its nuclear modernisation and battlefield nuclear weapons development, as noted in a 2025 US Defense Intelligence Agency report. China's support, including the HQ-9 air defence system and joint military exercises, strengthens Pakistan's confidence in confronting India. This dynamic not only escalates the India-Pakistan rivalry but also serves China's interest in keeping India preoccupied with regional conflicts, draining its resources. The Pakistani military's ideological commitment to Kashmir, coupled with Chinese backing, ensures that tensions will persist, with the potential for rapid escalation given both nations' nuclear capabilities. India's successful strikes on Pakistani airbases, despite losses, demonstrate its resolve, but the China-Pakistan nexus complicates its strategic response, making this a critical threat for 2026 and beyond. China's Strategic Manoeuvring: Exploiting Regional Tensions China's role as the linchpin of this emerging axis cannot be overstated, as it leverages its economic and military influence to counter India's rise. Beijing's deepening ties with Bangladesh and Pakistan create a pincer effect, encircling India from the east and west. In Bangladesh, China is investing heavily in infrastructure, including the Chittagong port, which could serve as a strategic foothold in the Indian Ocean. Yunus's invitation for Chinese expansion, emphasising Bangladesh's maritime dominance, aligns with Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative, aiming to secure access to Nepal and Bhutan's markets while pressuring India's northeast. In Pakistan, China's military support, including advanced J-10C jets and PL-15 missiles, has transformed the India-Pakistan conflict into a proxy battleground for Chinese and Western technologies. The May 2025 clashes provided China with a real-time intelligence harvest, allowing it to assess Indian military capabilities through Pakistan's use of its weapons. China's fishing fleets, doubling as intelligence-gathering units, have been spotted near Indian naval drills, further enhancing Beijing's surveillance capabilities. top videos View all Despite strained China-Pakistan ties due to attacks on Chinese workers in 2024, Beijing continues to back Pakistan to keep India engaged in regional conflicts, diverting its focus from the Sino-Indian border dispute. China's neutral public stance during the India-Pakistan conflict, with its foreign ministry claiming ignorance of J-10C involvement, masks its strategic interest in prolonging tensions. By fostering instability through Bangladesh and Pakistan, China undermines India's global aspirations, positioning itself as the dominant regional power. This calculated manoeuvring, exploiting Yunus's ambitions and Pakistan's hostility, creates a formidable challenge for India's security and diplomatic strategy. The author teaches journalism at St Xavier's College (autonomous), Kolkata. His handle on X is @sayantan_gh. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect News18's views. tags : bangladesh China Muhammad Yunus Operation Sindoor pakistan Location : Kolkata, India, India First Published: June 05, 2025, 03:17 IST News opinion Opinion | Yunus, Army, Pakistan, And China: A New Axis Threatens India's Security
