Audit finds US$21 million financial irregularities in Pakistan Cricket Board
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The Auditor General of Pakistan's report for the 2023-24 financial year was published in The News and highlighted the non-recovery of outstanding sponsorship worth 5.3 billion rupees as the major discrepancy identified.
PCB chairman Mohsin Naqvi is the third person in four years to lead the sport's national administration, following Ramiz Raja and Zaka Ashraf. He is also a government minister.
The report also questioned the 63.39 million rupees (US$220,000) the PCB spent on meals for police and law enforcement personnel assigned for the security of foreign teams during international matches in Pakistan.
Auditors said providing security was the responsibility of governments, and disagreed with the PCB's explanation that visiting international teams were given extra safety guarantees that required heavy police deployment.
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The report also flagged the hiring of three junior regional coaches who did not meet the eligibility criteria and the appointment of a media director outside the proper procedure.
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