ConCourt sets date for MK party's case against Ramaphosa over Mchunu
The Constitutional Court has set down a date to hear the MK party's urgent application against President Cyril Ramaphosa to place Police Minister Senzo Mchunu on leave.
Former President Jacob Zuma and the MK party are seeking to invalidate Ramaphosa's decision to place Mchunu on a leave of absence and appoint Wits law Professor Firoz Cachalia as acting police minister.
They are also challenging Ramaphosa's establishment of a judicial commission of inquiry to investigate allegations of corruption in the police.
'Applicants must file heads of argument by Sunday, 27 July 2025, at 14h00. Respondents must file heads of argument by Monday, 28 July 2025, at 14h00,' the court directed.
The matter has been set down for Wednesday, 30 July at 11am.
ALSO READ: Zuma says Ramaphosa has no constitutional power to suspend Mchunu
Allegations
KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) Provincial Commissioner Lieutenant General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi made explosive allegations during a media briefing this month, accusing Mchunu and Deputy National Commissioner for Crime Detection, Shadrack Sibiya, of political interference in police operations.
In Ramaphosa's answering affidavit on Wednesday, the president argued that the constitution gives him 'a wide berth as to how to deal with ministers'
'It is clear that I am empowered to place a minister on special leave when there are serious allegations… so that those allegations can be properly investigated,' said Ramaphosa.
However, Zuma argues there's no express constitutional power allowing Ramaphosa to impose special leave on Mchunu.
ALSO READ: Ramaphosa motion of no confidence: MK party requests secret ballot
Zuma challenge
Zuma said there are details in Ramaphosa's affidavit that Mchunu will not return as minister of police after the commission of inquiry.
'There is nothing said in the president's affidavit which justified placing Minister Mchunu on 'special leave' and thereby causing him to retain his ministerial title, salary and other perks or privileges at the expense of the long-suffering taxpayer'.
Feroz Cacahlia
Zuma said Ramaphosa 'openly dodges' the clear distinction between the power to appoint a minister and the different power to appoint an acting minister.
'The two are plainly not the same. The obfuscatory reference to the credentials of Prof Cachalia is nothing but deflection. For the record, no issue is taken against the professor's credentials… The issue is whether he was constitutionally qualified to be appointed by the president. The answer is that he was not.'
Zuma also challenged Mchunu's version of events, portraying it as 'evasive and legally flawed', saying the minister's affidavit is a 'masterclass in evasion – it skirts the core allegations and offers no constitutional basis for the executive's conduct.'
ALSO READ: Here's why Zuma's MK party wants Ramaphosa removed in 'urgent' motion of no confidence
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IOL News
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The Dolphin Unit: A Legacy of Resistance in Apartheid South Africa
(From left) The Dolphin Unit's Iqbal Shaikh, Mohamed Ismail, Aboobaker Ismail and ANC veteran Mac Maharaj at the TRC hearings on May 7, 1998. Image: Supplied For over three decades, the remarkable story of Umkhonto we Sizwe's Special Operations Unit has remained largely untold. Formed under the direct command of ANC president Oliver Tambo and senior ANC and SACP leader Joe Slovo, this elite unit executed some of the most daring and high-profile attacks against the apartheid state in the 1980s. In this groundbreaking book by ANC and SACP activist Yunus Carrim, the history of Special Ops is brought to life through the voices of its surviving participants. This is an account of the Dolphin Unit that conducted some of MK's most successful military operations Neighbours and friends With 35 operations between 1982 and 1988 and a role in the ANC's Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK's) ordnance division from then until 1993, the Dolphin Unit was one of the longest-surviving and most successful MK units. Initially made up of Iqbal Shaikh and Mohamed Ismail, it became a one-person unit of Shaikh from 1985. Born in 1958, Shaikh was raised in Vrededorp, Johannesburg. He came from 'a typical apolitical trading family. When all the clan gathered at Granny's kitchen table, political conversations were avoided. If a topic had political undertones, the elders would shrug it off, citing how important the family business was and almost always referring to the atrocities that could befall us if the blacks took over. The Durban 1949 race riots inevitably came up, followed by the Uganda story, where Amin expelled the Indians. 'At Grandpa's two busy dress shops, where we kids came daily to meet our parents after school, we knew to greet any white customer as Goeie môre, Baas or Meisie and never to take offence at the Ja, coolie reply.' Shaikh's stepfather had a dairy delivery business. 'When I reached the gate of the houses, the incessant barking of dogs, followed by the little white kids 'Ma, die melkkoelie is hier [Mother, the milk-coolie is here]. 'We often complained to Papa about why we should address these dirty, bare-footed, little white kids with respect, whilst they called us 'coolie'. Papa would urge us to ignore them and remind us how important white customers were.' From fifteen onwards, Shaik got involved in fights, joined a gang, truanted, left school at sixteen, and found an administrative job. Vrededorp had a tradition of Congress activities. Underground ANC activist Ahmed Timol's death in detention impacted Shaikh. And when the 1976 Soweto uprising erupted, Shaikh was upset at the brutality of white policemen. He moved to Durban to live with an aunt and go back to school. At the M L Sultan Technical College, he was propelled into a student leader position. It was around the food and other conditions at the residences. Later, the sectarian and class divisions among and between Muslim, Hindi-speaking and Tamil-speaking Hindu students. His interventions helped to encourage more contact between students across the divides. When the 1980 student boycott fizzled out, Shaikh felt that the Natal Indian Congress and the parents' moderation contributed to this. Disappointed, he quit college. He returned to Johannesburg and linked up with 'Chacha' – Mohamed Ismail. Shaikh's family lived near his family. They used to play 'cowboys and crooks, hide and seek, and more'. Born in 1953, Chacha 'could see the injustice, police brutality, whites beating up black people walking in the street, and nothing happened. Mozambique became independent, and the political climate was changing. It was necessary as a Muslim and self-styled socialist to become politically active against apartheid.' Through Prema Naidoo and others, he became politically active in the Transvaal Indian Congress. Former ANC Member of Parliament Yunus Carrim narrates the untold stories of the ANC's MK Special Operations Unit. Image: Supplied Joining MK's Special Ops Shaikh threw himself into civic and political struggles in Lenasia. There was constant tension between the Black Consciousness (BC) and Congress activists. The militancy of BC activists suited Shaikh's temperament and brand of politics. But he finally opted for the 'Congressites', influenced by the politics in the Naidoo household. He increasingly felt that 'this mass politics is not for me. I want to go to the next level. It was convenient to be in mass politics and not the armed struggle because that was a harder option.' So, he approached Chacha to link him to the ANC. Chacha's brother, Aboobaker Ismail, had joined MK and would at times meet their parents in Swaziland. In September 1981, Chacha took Shaikh with them. In a hotel room, Ismail (MK: Rashid) ran a tap, switched on the television and asked them to sit away from the window. This was their first lesson in underground activity. They were trained then and on subsequent trips on urban guerrilla warfare, including the use of limpet mines and pistols. MK operatives created a hidden compartment in a Peugeot for them to transport weapons in. On their first attempt, as Shaikh and Chacha got to the border, it was 'very tense, we had sweaty palms, but you had to keep your composure. There was silence at the border, each with his thoughts. When we were barely three minutes over the border into South Africa, we erupted spontaneously into emotional yelling and handshakes. Perhaps the best high five in all my life!' They would bury the weapons in dead letter boxes (DLBs), mainly in Lenasia. 'It was backbreaking work. We weren't used to manual work. The gardeners did that. Now we had to dig up hard ground in the dark of the Highveld winter. It's work fraught with difficulties, sometimes more dangerous than hitting the target.' The Dolphin Unit Called the Dolphin Unit, they started with low-level targets in December 1982, and with experience, took on bigger targets. These included police and army offices, railway lines, electricity pylons, government buildings, the Ciskei consulate, big businesses that fired workers, a fuel depot and more*. On 10 October 1983, President PW Botha was to address a Kruger Day gathering in the Warmbaths civic centre. The unit decided to hit the civic centre and a fuel depot about a kilometre away. 'The night before the operation, on their dry run, an aggressive white man blocked a café entrance and shouted at Chacha, 'Koelie, wat doen jy hier [Coolie, what are you doing here]?' 'We passively passed by and bought our snacks for the road home. Walking back. I told Chacha you should have replied, 'Baas, ek doen niks vanaand, maar ek kom weer môre [Boss, I'm not doing anything tonight, but I'll be back tomorrow].' We laughed and returned home.' The fuel depot was damaged at about 02:20, but the limpet at the civic centre was discovered and defused. Shaikh said, 'The regime claimed that highly trained terrorists [laughter] were involved and planned to annihilate the cream of society.' In late 1986, Shaikh and Chacha went to East Germany for training. On landing, the pilot announced their names and asked them to disembark. 'What's this about? I was scared there might be [apartheid] security branch guys among the passengers.' An East German government official came onto the plane and took them away in a Mercedes, followed by a military vehicle. 'It's everything we've seen in the movies. We were very surprised …' They were trained for three months. Shaikh observed 'all the little contradictions we'd heard about in Soviet-style communism. It was demoralising.' He later said that their 'special advantage was our mobility as Indians. We were less visible as MK operatives and less detectable than our African cadres.' In crossing the South African border, 'we would weaponise our ethnicity. We used apartheid racial profiling to our advantage. By neat business attire, briefcase with brochures, bank notes, samples of a commodity, politeness at all times, and half a dozen samoosas ready on hand, nobody suspected. This was no passport to freedom, but it helped.' While helping out in the family takeaway business, it was easy for Shaikh to reconnoitre targets in the city centre. 'I often wore a toppie and kurta to disguise what I was doing. I was almost rubbing shoulders in the passageways with people linked to my targets, who would never think that I could be in MK.' He could plant limpet bombs inside buildings during work hours to go off at night, when there was nobody around. In communicating with Rashid over the phone, they would use coded words in Gujarati. Being part of a gang as a teenager and a streetfighter, as well as his instinct for challenging authority, contributed to Shaikh's success as a guerrilla. His temperament also drew him to the armed struggle. His impatience with mass struggles, the endless speech-making of leaders, the trade-offs and the failure to get more results more quickly all steered him into the armed struggle. His faith in the armed struggle drove him to be results-driven. He certainly had an adventurous, daring spirit. Shaikh's long association with Rashid and Chacha as neighbours and a shared cultural background made for a level of trust. 'Igs [Shaikh] had that X-factor,' says Farouk Farista, who worked with him in ordnance 'To have the ability to do what he did and survive takes a remarkable human being. And he did it on his own, which requires an incredible amount of tenacity. 'He thought through every single thing with incredible detail. He never took blind chances. He knew how to play it, and he was very smart about not exposing himself and not blowing his trumpet and taking credit.' Shaikh doesn't have a sense of entitlement. After 1994, he retreated from politics. He didn't seek a post in the state. I never felt owed. I didn't want anything because I did the bombings. I had no qualifications. I'm just an ordinary Fietas guy who got into the situation. * The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL, Independent Media or The African.
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A year later, a Daily Maverick article would refer to Mogotsi as a 'known Ramaphosa campaigner in North West', at the time taking court action against Ramaphosa's perceived political enemies. The Presidency had not responded to Daily Maverick's questions about the nature of Ramaphosa's relationship with Mogotsi, if any, by the time of publication. But the apparent overlap of political circles raises further uncomfortable issues for an administration that came to power on a reformist agenda – and is now being accused of being in unsettling proximity to a complex criminal web. Mogotsi alleged to be go-between for criminal and police minister In Mkhwanazi's provocative 6 July press conference, he accused Mogotsi of acting as an intermediary between Police Minister Senzo Mchunu and alleged criminal Vusimuzi 'Cat' Matlala, who Mkhwanazi claims is at 'the centre of a sophisticated criminal syndicate operating at the highest levels of the state'. The allegations would subsequently see Ramaphosa place Mchunu on suspension pending an investigation. In particular, Mkhwanazi alleged that there are phone records showing communications and financial transactions between Mchunu, Mogotsi and Matlala, with Matlala allegedly providing Mchunu and Mogotsi with financial support in exchange for having investigations into him lifted. Critical to all this is Mchunu's disbanding of the Political Killings Task Team in December 2024. One of Mkhwanazi's claims is that the task team was going after Matlala, and that it was Mogotsi who sent Matlala a message to tell him that the task team would be disbanded. Mkhwanazi has yet to provide any public evidence of his claims. But Mchunu did himself no favours in the court of public opinion by seeming to do a U-turn on the question of whether he knew Mogotsi. In Parliament in March, Mchunu claimed to have no association with Mogotsi. Yet in a statement on 9 July, in response to the Mkhwanazi press conference, Mchunu said that he 'knows and has met Mr Brown Mogotsi', but described him as 'just a comrade and not an associate of the minister'. In papers lodged on Wednesday, 23 July, in response to the MK party's legal challenge to Mchunu's suspension, Mchunu conceded that he had 'interacted with Mr Mogotsi since 2017, in the presence of other comrades'. Mchunu elaborated further: 'He is a comrade, as we are members of the same political party and have engaged on party and service delivery matters on a number of occasions'. Who is Brown Mogotsi? The man from North West who campaigned so ardently for Ramaphosa in 2017 is shrouded in mystery. Company records scrutinised by Daily Maverick show that Mogotsi was previously listed as a director of some eight companies, including one called 'North West Crimebusters'. All are registered as inactive today. Mogotsi described himself to the Sunday Times in 2017 as an 'ordinary ANC member', but City Press recorded earlier this month that he is 'close to the top echelons of the ANC, including several ministers, especially those who served in MK'. City Press also described him as owning an upmarket bar in Mafikeng from where he is known to 'summon HODs and MECs for instructions on tenders'. Exactly where this apparent political muscle stems from is unclear. Perhaps most curious has been Mogotsi's habit of trying to meddle in provincial politics through a vehicle called the Brown Mogotsi Foundation. Through this, he was instrumental in forcing then North West Premier Supra Mahumapelo out of office in 2018, at least partly because of Mahumapelo's support for Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, rather than Ramaphosa, at the ANC's 2017 Nasrec conference. Most recently, Mogotsi claimed to be an undercover police informant who played a role in the arrest of fugitive rapist Thabo Bester. This smacks of fantasy – but Mogotsi does seem to have access to police intel, if you believe Mkhwanazi. The KZN police commissioner said in his press briefing that Mogotsi had messaged him last September with a picture of a register that is only supposed to be accessible to police. Mogotsi also appears to have knowledge of the law from the other side: he reportedly has at least three previous criminal convictions, including one for assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. Mkhwanazi allegations are a political firestorm for Ramaphosa To understand why Mkhwanazi's claims amount to such a political headache for Ramaphosa, it's helpful to revisit the political context leading up to the ANC's elective conference at Nasrec in 2017. Senzo Mchunu was one of Ramaphosa's closest allies and was endorsed by Ramaphosa as his preferred candidate, on his 'slate', for secretary general. Mchunu was absolutely critical to Ramaphosa's campaigning because his constituency was in KwaZulu-Natal: the ANC's largest province by membership, and whose delegates to the elective conference were expected to fall in line with former president Jacob Zuma's endorsement and vote for Dlamini Zuma. Throughout the campaign, Mchunu leveraged his regional influence to rally ANC branches and delegates in support of Ramaphosa's message of reform. Notably, local ANC structures that aligned with Mchunu and Ramaphosa faced pushback from the Zuma-aligned KZN leadership; for instance, the ANC's KZN provincial executive committee moved to disband the Lower South Coast regional leadership, which had been campaigning for Ramaphosa, a move widely seen as an attempt to thwart that region's pro-Ramaphosa campaign. This illustrates how Mchunu actively mobilised support for Ramaphosa, triggering resistance from the opposing faction in the province. Mchunu's political role in KZN significantly influenced the dynamics of the 2017 Nasrec conference. By delivering a portion of the KZN delegates to Ramaphosa, Mchunu materially helped narrow the gap between Ramaphosa and Dlamini Zuma. And although it may have been the recently deceased David Mabuza whose Mpumalanga delegates ultimately handed victory to Ramaphosa, Mchunu's contribution cannot be discounted. Mchunu himself would narrowly (and controversially) lose the secretary-general position at that conference to Ace Magashule. But Ramaphosa went on to repay Mchunu for his support with a series of Cabinet posts in which his brand has been low-visibility and also low-controversy. 'While some of Mchunu's leading contemporaries in the ANC have been entangled in one form of scandal or another while amassing fortunes dubiously, the former teacher has largely stayed clear of adverse publicity,' veteran KwaZulu-Natal journalist Cyril Madlala wrote of him in Daily Maverick. That all changed for Mchunu on 6 July with Mkhwanazi's press conference. How much truth is there in the Mkhwanazi allegations? Ramaphosa has acted swiftly on the Mkhwanazi claims: suspending Mchunu and establishing a commission of inquiry to be helmed by Acting Deputy Chief Justice Mbuyiseli Madlanga. The President has also suddenly taken action against South Gauteng director of public prosecutions Andrew Chauke – almost two years after National Prosecuting Authority boss Shamila Batohi wrote to Ramaphosa to request his suspension, citing serious concerns about Chauke'sconduct in office – multiple questionable decisions, delays and failures to prosecute high-profile cases involving State Capture and corruption. When Daily Maverick asked the Presidency this week if Ramaphosa's sudden action on Chauke was prompted by the Mkhwanazi press conference, spokesperson Vincent Magwenya demurred, saying: 'The Chauke matter predates Mkhwanazi's allegations.' Yet it is notable that among Mkhwanazi's allegations was that the criminal syndicate he claims to have identified includes 'prosecutors in Gauteng province'. Many South Africans have expressed gratitude to Mkhwanazi for having seemingly prompted unusually decisive action from Ramaphosa – despite the fact that Mkhwanazi's claims remain wholly untested. It remains to be seen what evidence Mkhwanazi will turn over to the Madlanga Commission. But one aspect of the claims – that Mchunu ordered the shuttering of the Political Killings Task Team in December 2024 – did attract attention at the time for being a strange decision. One KwaZulu-Natal expert termed it 'bizarre' at the time, on the grounds that political assassinations tend to increase ahead of local government elections, which are scheduled for 2026. If the commission confirms Mkhwanazi's claims, it will mark a dramatic fall from grace for a political grouping heralded in 2017 as ushering in a new climate of clean governance in stark contrast to the dark days of State Capture. DM
IOL News
6 hours ago
- IOL News
Willies Mchunu defends MPLs' decision to oppose the Division of Revenue Bill
MKP convenor in KwaZulu-Natal Willies Mchunu says the party will not discipline the six MPLs who voted against the Bill. Image: supplied Umkhonto weSizwe Party (MKP) will not discipline the 'rebelling' six members of KwaZulu-Natal Legislature who voted against the Division of Revenue Bill because they did the 'right thing' This was confirmed by the party's provincial leader Willies Mchunu on Saturday. He said there was no plan to act against the six MPLs for their action which the party does not deem wrong. He stated that when you look at the national leadership position on the Bill which rejected it, the six members do not seem to be in the wrong. Mchunu further stated that there was no communication between the provincial leadership and the caucus before voting therefore the party will not act against anyone, adding that he has directed the caucus to discuss the matter and find each other. 'We will not act against anyone in this matter and we have directed our caucus to sort it out themselves in the legislature. I think there was a misunderstanding,' said Mchunu. In an unprecedented move last week, six party MPLs broke ranks with the caucus and voted against the bill while 31 other members supported during the chamber sitting, prompting calls for action against the 'rebelling' MPLs, however, the members defended their decision. The member who spoke on condition of anonymity on Thursday denied going against the party's position, saying it was him and other five members who kept the long-standing position and voted against the Bill. He stated that firstly, the new chief whip Bonginkosi Mngadi never called a caucus meeting before voting and there was no new instruction for members to vote in a particular way. He said in the absence of an instruction, the six of them followed a long-standing position that the MKP will never support anything that comes from the Government of Provincial Unity (GPU) since the party believes the elections were rigged. Furthermore, the member said to prove that they were not wrong, the party has not charged them after explaining their side to the provincial leadership under convener Willies Mchunu. The member further said that in their engagement with Mchunu it "became clear that it was an oversight from those who supported the Bill". However, the party chief whip Bonginkosi Mngadi disputed the member's version that there was no meeting or mandate to support the Bill. He stated that he called a caucus meeting where he informed the members of the position and even articulated the position when he spoke for the party before voting for the Bill. 'I am chief whip of the party in the legislature and spoke in the chamber that the party will support the Bill since it was talking about transparency and accountability so I was speaking on behalf of the party,' said Mngadi. He said he would not want to discuss the matter further since it was reported to the provincial leadership. There was also confusion when the same Bill was voted in parliament on Wednesday where the MKP chief whip Colleen Makhubekele voted yes for the bill only to change her vote later, arguing that she thought the vote was about the Ad hoc committee on allegations of Police Minister Senzo Mchunu's interference in police operations which we were reported by KwaZulu-Natal provincial Police Commissioner Lieutenant-General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi. [email protected]
