NYC to remove Bain Center jail barge in South Bronx, replace it with marine freight terminal
The removal of the massive 800-bed barge will make away for a new Hunts Point Marine Terminal, said Adams, who announced the move with Andrew Kimball, president of the city Economic Development Corp. The terminal will act as a transfer point to other transportation modes for deliveries across the city.
The Bain Center, which was brought to the city in 1992 to help alleviate jail overcrowding, was decommissioned and ceased being used as a jail in 2023. As part of the current plan, EDC will ask for proposals from companies which can undertake the project of moving the barge. The future use of the barge, if any, remained unclear Monday.
'Today, we are adding yet another stop to that harbor by clearing away the old jail barge in the Bronx and building a new Hunts Point Marine Terminal in its place,' Adams said. 'We'll unload cargo from all across the world for delivery throughout New York City, put even more New Yorkers to work in vibrant industries, and continue to show that cities can do bold, ambitious things.'
City Hall estimated the new terminal would create 400 construction jobs, 100 permanent jobs, and generate $3.9 billion in economic impact over the next 30 years. It would also removed an estimate 9,000 monthly truck trips from the city streets thus reducing congestion, the officials said. The site is adjacent to the massive Fulton Fish Market Cooperative, a crossroads for the city's food distribution.
The city is also investing more than $28 million to extent bike paths along the area's waterfront, officials said.
Added Kimball, 'The Hunts Point Marine Terminal will advance a robust and sustainable food distribution supply chain and deliver on critical commitments, including in our 'Hunts Point Forward' plan and as part of our Harbor of the Future.'
Officials said the city has been trying to increase the use of its waterways to transport goods. The measures also include $18 million to upgrade port operations at the 122-acre Brooklyn Marine Terminal and a federal grant of $164 million to modernize that terminal.
The intended removal of the Bain Center also earned plaudits from jail advocacy groups. Stanley Richards, president and CEO of the Fortune Society, called it a landmark moment.
'Dismantling the jail barge is not only about reducing jail capacity — it's about healing a painful legacy and advancing environmental justice for neighborhoods that have long borne the brunt of carceral infrastructure,' Richards said.
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