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Road ahead is steep but not insurmountable– SA's G20 can still deliver for debt and development

Road ahead is steep but not insurmountable– SA's G20 can still deliver for debt and development

The global economy has slowed and become less supportive of developing countries. African countries may be forced to resort to international capital markets to fill the gap in their development financing needs.
It is crunch time for South Africa to begin delivering on its ambitious G20 development finance agenda. The third of the four meetings this year of G20 finance ministers and central bank governors takes place on 17 and 18 July. A communiqué is expected to be issued, focusing on the development finance issues that South Africa prioritised at the beginning of its G20 presidency.
The agenda includes politically and economically complicated topics such as sovereign debt and the cost of capital and climate finance, which are issues that are high on the global policy agenda. At the recent African Union Conference on Debt held in Togo in May, African leaders, among other matters, called for the reform of the G20 common framework and for a 'new debt doctrine'.
The Compromiso de Sevilla, the outcome document from the recently concluded UN-sponsored Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4), also acknowledged the need for a more development-oriented debt architecture.
Unfortunately, the international economic environment in which South Africa needs to deliver on this agenda has become significantly more complex and challenging. The global economy has slowed and become less supportive of developing countries.
The World Bank recently reduced its estimate of global growth from about 2.8% to 2.3% and forecast that average global growth in the first seven years of the 2020s would be the slowest of any decade since the 1960s. Its chief economist declared that ' outside of Asia, the developing world is becoming a development-free zone '.
Some G20 participating states have become less supportive of developing countries. For example, the US and the UK, among other countries, have significantly cut their official development assistance, with the US going as far as eliminating USAid, its main aid agency.
US President Donald Trump's administration also pulled out of FfD4 and has given mixed signals on his participation in the G20 summit in November. He has even opposed the theme for South Africa's G20 presidency – Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability.
These developments aggravate Africa's development challenges. Currently, Africa has an annual financing gap of around $900-billion to $1.3-trillion for Agenda 2063 and the SDGs.
While domestic resources should be the major source of each country's financing for these needs, they are unlikely to be enough in the short to medium term. Unfortunately, the amount of funding from official sources such as donor governments and the multilateral development banks (MDBs) will not be sufficient to plug this hole.
Therefore, African countries may be forced to resort to international capital markets to fill the gap in their development financing needs. The financing these markets offer is expensive, involves exchange rate risks and is pro-cyclical. In addition, evidence suggests that African countries are charged much higher interest rates than countries in other regions with comparable credit ratings.
The resulting 'African premium' costs African countries $74.5-billion per year in excess interest payments, according to a UNDP report. The reasons for this premium are still up for debate. It has been attributed to credit rating bias, lack of quality data, a lack of sound fiscal and public finance management by African governments, and to the fact that many African countries are new to international markets, having only started issuing international bonds between 2007 and 2020.
Meanwhile, as African countries continue to deal with these tough conditions on the international capital markets, efforts to address their existing debt burden remain painfully slow.
The current approach to sovereign debt restructuring uses the common framework developed by the G20 to deal with the obligations to all official and commercial creditors of low-income countries.
Unfortunately, this framework has failed to deliver adequate outcomes for African countries. South Africa's G20 presidency provides the next opportunity to address this challenge.
As South Africa commences the last half of its G20 Presidency, we suggest that it prioritise the following issues on the development finance agenda:
South Africa must champion the Borrowers' Forum
This forum, promoted in the outcome document from FfD4, would facilitate the exchange of ideas, information and peer learning among sovereign borrowers. If supported by a permanent secretariat, as proposed in the Report of the UNSG's Expert Group on Debt, the forum could become the repository of information about sovereign borrowing and the source of technical support and capacity building for debtor countries.
South Africa should advocate for the G20 to actively support the creation of the forum as soon as possible. It should also work with the African Union and African G20 guest countries to take the first actions to operationalise a regional borrowers forum in Africa.
Improving sovereign debt architecture
South Africa, as co-chair of the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable (GSDR), must use it as a tool to promote the improvement of the sovereign debt architecture.
The FfD4 Compromiso calls for the creation of a working group to propose a set of principles for responsible sovereign borrowing and lending that can make sovereign debt transactions and the international debt architecture more effective, efficient and more supportive of optimal development outcomes.
The GSDR was established as an informal G20-linked forum, chaired by the G20 presidency, the IMF and the World Bank. It brings together a diverse array of creditors, debtors and other stakeholders to discuss how to make the sovereign debt process work better for all stakeholders.
South Africa should convene a meeting of the GSDR to begin discussing the framework for promoting responsible sovereign borrowing and lending, including the planning and management of such transactions and their outcomes.
Panel of technical experts
South Africa must advocate for the G20 to appoint a panel of technical experts to study the barriers to affordable, adequate and predictable flows of development finance to African sovereigns and make recommendations on what the G20 can do to remedy this situation.
This can complement the work of the African Experts Panel, which has a broader mandate of 'exploring and defining strategies that advance Africa's collective developmental interests'.
South Africa's G20 presidency should not be the end of this year's advocacy for a new and more developmentally responsible debt architecture. These actions should also be promoted at the World Social Summit and the COP30 in Brazil. DM
Daniel D Bradlow is a part-time G20 Senior Fellow at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), where his research focuses on the finance track of the G20 and related Think20 issues.
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