
How China is filling a weapons supply gap in Africa's Sahel left by France and Russia
weapons supply breach in parts of Africa's Sahel as authorities in the region cut ties with former colonial power France and Russia struggles to replace its depleted stocks.
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The buyers include
Burkina Faso 's military junta which took delivery of 116 infantry carriers and six assault vehicles from China in 2024 alone, according to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
By contrast, France's last delivery – six Bastion armoured vehicles – arrived in 2019-2020, while the US supplied only engines in 2021.
Observers say Burkina Faso's growing interest in Chinese weaponry is driven by the need to diversify security partners, following the deterioration of relations with France and the United States. In 2022,
Ibrahim Traore mounted a coup, which saw French troops expelled from the West African nation as part of the broader collapse of
Operation Barkhane, Paris' counterterrorism mission in the Sahel.
At the same time, Russia, which has been a top supplier of arms to many West African countries such as Mali, has been slowed down by the war in Ukraine.
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