Trump 2.0 is upending US ties. De-coupling may be hard – de-risking is necessary

Indian Express

2 days ago

Sections of the Indian foreign policy community feel 'betrayed' by the Donald Trump administration, which has found unexpected affection for Rawalpindi, raised a host of tough demands on trade, and threatened additional tariffs on India because of its BRICS membership and continued purchase of Russian oil. It is, perhaps, a small consolation that India is not alone. America's neighbours and largest trading partners (Mexico and Canada) and its longstanding allies in Europe and Asia have even more reasons to feel betrayed.
Most of these alliances date back to the end of World War II and have weathered multiple crises over the past eight decades. But as in life, so in international relations — nothing is forever. If change is the only constant, that moment of restructuring has now arrived for America's alliances and partnerships in Europe and Asia. As a non-ally, India is better prepared for change in America.
The idea of 'strategic autonomy', long central to India's foreign policy, has been viewed with scepticism by India's Western partners. They have argued that India's near obsession with autonomy limits the scope for strategic cooperation with the US and Europe. But today, 'strategic autonomy' has become the new mantra among America's allies themselves.
In his address to the British Parliament last week, French President Emmanuel Macron reflected on the implications of the unprecedented disruption unleashed by President Trump's second term. He underlined the need for deeper Franco-British cooperation to reduce what he called the 'dual dependency' on the US and China. Macron warned against Europe's excessive reliance on the two superpowers for economic, technological, and security needs, and emphasised the urgency of reclaiming European strategic autonomy. He called for stronger Franco-British collaboration on defence, climate action, migration and technological innovation, suggesting that only through unity can Europe effectively respond to global challenges and safeguard its interests.
Although America's European allies bent over backwards to placate 'daddy' Trump at the NATO summit last month, they are shocked by the Trump administration's policies. If there were any lingering doubts, Trump dispelled them over the weekend by imposing a 30 per cent tariff on imports from the European Union, shattering hopes for compromise on trade. Trump has long regarded the EU as a bigger economic threat than China but few anticipated that transatlantic ties would deteriorate so sharply in his second term.
Britain's Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, may lack the rhetorical flair of his French counterpart but he, too, is seeking to rebalance the 'special relationship' with the US against the geographic imperative of Europe. If Brexit a decade ago was about distancing from Europe and reconnecting with the Anglosphere, Starmer's Labour government is working to rebuild links with the Continent. Trump, despite his family origins in the UK, has little affection for Britain. His MAGA coalition looks down on its 'poorer cousins' in the British Isles.
The story is no different in Asia, where two of America's staunchest allies are seething over Trump's actions. The announcement of 25 per cent tariffs on Japanese imports triggered rare outrage within Japan's political class, which has placed nearly all its strategic bets on the US since World War II. It was remarkable, therefore, to hear the Japanese PM declare that Tokyo must reduce its dependence on Washington. He made it clear that Japan would not offer 'easy concessions' or compromise its national interests in the face of US pressure.
To be sure, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba is in the midst of an upper house election campaign this week. But this is not mere campaign rhetoric. He stressed that Japan, as the largest foreign investor in the US and a major creator of American jobs, deserves different treatment from countries targeted by the tariffs. Despite months of negotiations, repeated diplomatic missions to Washington, and a pledge of $1 trillion in new investment, Ishiba's government could not persuade Trump to hold back, especially as the US President remained dissatisfied with Japan's market access for American rice and automobiles.
Equally emphatic about strategic autonomy has been Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese. Few countries have been as close to Washington as Australia. Yet, in a major speech last week, Albanese insisted that being an ally does not mean being a blind follower. He described the US alliance as a 'pillar' of Australian foreign policy but argued that this partnership should not constrain Australia's sovereignty or decision-making. He called for an 'Australia first' approach — particularly relevant amid intensifying US-China rivalry in the Indo-Pacific. As it happens, Albanese is in China this week, stepping up efforts to engage Australia's Asian neighbours.
The frustration among allies does not mean they can simply walk away from Washington. All America's partners have enormous stakes in sustaining their economic and technological ties with the US. Even more important, their security challenges would become far more demanding without American guarantees. If Europe must find new ways to defend itself against Russia, Asian allies must devise strategies to cope with Chinese power. America's Eurasian partners will not simply fold their hands — they will search for creative answers. In Europe, France and Britain are discussing better coordination of their nuclear weapons policies, while the EU is accelerating collective defence efforts.
In Asia, the challenge is harder. Unlike in Europe, regional institutions remain underdeveloped, and the gap between China's power and that of its neighbours is vast. Yet, the logic of diversification is undeniable. We are already seeing Asian allies doing more with each other and engaging other actors, such as the EU. Some are beginning to reassess their engagement with China.
At the same time, the depth of the US relationship is such that preventing a slide into outright rupture remains a top priority for allies in both Asia and Europe. As Macron told the British Parliament, Europe does not want to walk away from the US — but it must 'de-risk' ties by finding new partners and rebuilding its own capacities.
India, for its part, is holding its nerve and continuing to engage Washington. As Delhi weighs the consequences of the Trump upheaval for Eurasia and the global order, it is worth recalling that India has managed many strategic surprises before: The Chinese 'betrayal' in 1962, Beijing's embrace of Pakistan, the Sino-Soviet split, the US-China entente in the 1970s, the Soviet collapse in 1991, the rise of a new economic order in the 1990s, and the Russia-China alignment in the 2000s.
If external change is inevitable, Delhi's focus must be on managing it rather than bemoaning it. For now, India remains one of the few major US trade partners not yet notified of a new tariff level. Delhi has resumed trade talks with Washington this week and is eager to conclude one of its most ambitious negotiations before the August 1 deadline. But it must be prepared for failure. As Trump might remind us, the golden rule of any negotiation is the will to walk away.
The writer is distinguished fellow at the Council for Strategic and Defence Research, Delhi, and contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express