Duterte trial loaded with heavy geopolitical implications
After decades of political impunity over allegations of overseeing tens of thousands of extrajudicial killings under his scorched-earth drug war, the ex-leader walked straight into a trap laid by the Ferdinand Marcos Jr administration, which quickly whisked away Duterte to The Hague despite its longstanding refusal to acknowledge the ICC's jurisdiction.
Just hours after returning from Hong Kong, where Duterte was reportedly exploring potential political exile, the former president was taken to the country's main military base and, from there, flown to The Hague via Dubai on a private jet.
His allies hopelessly sought to block the arrest by applying for temporary restraining orders from local courts, but the sheer speed of the operation overwhelmed the Philippines' judicial institutions.
Filipino legal luminaries such as former ICC judge Raul Pangalangan, however, have argued that the arrest was fundamentally legal, even if controversial, citing legal precedents from various high-profile international cases, including the arrest of Ugandan warlord Dominic Ongwen.
Duterte has been accused of overseeing the deaths of tens of thousands of Filipinos, including more than a hundred minors, during anti-drug operations. Although he unilaterally withdrew the Philippines from the ICC to avoid scrutiny, the Philippine Supreme Court determined that the ICC retained jurisdiction over crimes committed during the country's membership between 2011 and 2018.
In September, Duterte will officially become the first Asian leader to stand trial for crimes against humanity and, arguably, the most high-profile fugitive under the ICC's custody. This represents a major landmark for the embattled international body, which has faced criticism over its inefficacy and supposed selectiveness in meting out justice.
Duterte's arrest has also raised major geopolitical questions, including China's alleged abandonment of a key ally as well as the Trump administration's selective silence on the issue.
It's hard to overstate the relevance of Duterte's arrest on multiple fronts. At home, it has sparked a massive political backlash from the former president's supporters, raising concerns over civil unrest, especially in Duterte's home island of Mindanao, where he enjoys wide popularity.
Last week, several Duterte allies in the Senate, led by no less than presidential sister Imee Marcos, conducted a hearing, where they questioned and even berated officials involved in Duterte's arrest.
A local Social Weather Stations poll shows that a majority of Filipinos favor the ICC trial. According to one authoritative survey last month, 51% of respondents wanted Duterte to face justice as the alleged architect of the extrajudicial killings of thousands of suspected drug dealers. Only 25% disagreed, while a smaller number (14%) were still undecided.
Duterte supporters sought to rally public sympathy by highlighting Duterte's age (soon to be 80 years old) and supposed frailty, but the former president seemed hale and energetic just days earlier during a rally among supporters in Hong Kong.
There, he admitted that he had caught wind of a possible arrest warrant, but, in an expletive-laced speech, mocked the ICC and remained defiant about his legacy: 'If this is my fate in life, it's OK, I'll accept it. I can't do anything if I get arrested and jailed.'
Last year, Duterte also defiantly challenged the ICC to arrest him and, with characteristic machismo and chutzpah, threatened to physically strike at the courts' representatives in the event of any arrest attempt. While in power, he once threatened to feed ICC investigators to 'crocodiles' if they entered the country.
The Marcos Jr administration has struggled to provide a clear legal justification for its action, given its earlier opposition to ICC's investigation and even raising questions over its jurisdiction.
It simply insisted that it was in no position to defy an international legal body, especially given the Philippines' reliance on international law to preserve its sovereign rights on thorny issues such as the South China Sea disputes with China.
Back in 2016, the Philippines won a landmark arbitration case at The Hague, where an international court, under the aegis of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), reaffirmed the Southeast Asian nation's exclusive economic rights in contested portions of the South China Sea. The Marcos Jr administration has repeatedly invoked that ruling to reject China's claims in the Philippines' exclusive economic zone.
To critics, however, the Marcos Jr administration's decision to cooperate with the ICC seemed politically self-serving rather than principled. After all, the former president's arrest came on the heels of escalating tensions between the Marcos and Duterte dynasties and shortly after government allies impeached Vice President Sara Duterte, the ex-president's daughter, for alleged corruption and misconduct in office.
There are broader geopolitical implications of the saga. Earlier arrest warrants against Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have been challenged by even members of the ICC, while the bulk of ICC trials in the past predominantly focused on alleged criminals from the African continent.
Others have accused the body of 'Eurocentrism' and questioned the variable speed of the ICC's response to alleged atrocities in various portions of the world.
The Duterte trial, therefore, provides the ICC and, more broadly, the European Union (EU) a historic opportunity to assert its relevance as an anchor of a rules-based international order at a time it's being challenged, if not scrapped, by Donald Trump.
The incident also raised questions over Beijing's alleged abandonment of its Filipino ally. Duterte famously met with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in mid-2023, sparking controversy at a time Marcos Jr had crossed swords with Beijing over their South China Sea disputes and was pivoting hard back toward the US.
Some recent local reports suggest that China refused to provide Duterte sanctuary, deeming the former president more of a liability than an asset.
Other keen observers, however, have denied this, arguing that China is known for its reliability as a strategic patron and that Duterte's decision to return home from Hong Kong was driven more by hubris and concern for his embattled daughter, who could face removal from office after midterm elections this year.
China indirectly expressed support for its former Filipino ally by publicly urging the ICC against 'politicizing' the trial, although it refused to comment on whether it had offered asylum to Duterte.
'This is an important sudden incident. China has noted the news and is closely following how this might develop,' Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said in a regular press conference shortly after the ICC's shock arrest.
'I would like to reiterate China's consistent view that the International Criminal Court should strictly follow the principle of complementarity, exercise its functions and powers prudently in accordance with the law and prevent politicization or double standards,' Mao added, underscoring the possibility that Beijing had lacked prior knowledge of the closely-coordinated arrest between the ICC and Manila.
Even more curious, however, is the Trump administration's strategic silence on the issue. Throughout the years, Washington has sanctioned and repeatedly threatened ICC judges with punitive measures.
But it has remained eerily silent on Duterte's case, likely due to the former Filipino president's pro-China policies as well as the Philippines' crucial role as a frontline ally in Asia. That position was jeopardized under Duterte but has been reaffirmed under Marcos Jr.
US Defense Secretary Pete Hagseth is visiting Manila this week, underscoring the depth and enduring significance of the two sides' strategic partnership. Duterte has seemingly been largely abandoned by former allies both at home and abroad, while the Marcos Jr administration has deftly leveraged the country's growing geopolitical importance to maintain support of certain key Western allies on the ICC issue.
When it comes to a rules-based order these days, it all seemingly comes down to the geopolitical interests of individual superpowers.
Follow Richard Javad Heydarian on X at @RichHeydarian
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