'#Ishiba don't quit': Unlikely support grows for embattled PM
The life raft has emerged since Upper House elections on Sunday deprived Ishiba's coalition of a majority, months after it suffered a similar disaster in the lower chamber.
Despite Ishiba, 68, insisting that he has not discussed his resignation with members of his Liberal Democratic Party, multiple reports say that it is just a matter of time.
Some conservative members of the LDP are collecting signatures to hold a special meeting to discuss a leadership election to oust Ishiba, Fuji TV reported on Friday.
One reported signee is Sanae Takaichi, a hardline nationalist and onetime heavy metal drummer who lost a leadership contest to Ishiba in September.
Takaichi, 64, would likely run again to lead the party — and become Japan's first female prime minister if she wins — if Ishiba does depart.
The prospect of someone as premier with hawkish views on Japanese history and China has fueled online calls for the moderate Ishiba to remain in power under the hashtag "#Ishiba Don't quit."
Some of the calls came from opposition politicians to the left of the LDP, including from a Japanese Communist Party member of a local ward assembly.
Ishiba "is the most reasonable LDP leader in recent memory," LaSalle Ishii, a newly elected lawmaker for the Social Democratic Party, said on X.
"If he resigns, a far-right government will be born," the well-known comedian and voice actor said.
Taro Yamamoto, the leader of small opposition party Reiwa Shinsengumi, was among the first to voice concern about Ishiba's replacement.
"The question is, if he were not to continue, who is going to replace him instead?" he told reporters during a Monday news conference.
"His economic policies are no good, but for Ishiba-san to continue, I think it's a safe choice."
A few hundred people participated in a rally outside Ishiba's office Friday evening, with some holding up signs urging him to "never give up" and "persevere."
Among them was 70-year-old Shigeru Koga, an opposition supporter who until Sunday had been calling on Ishiba's government to be brought down.
But five days later, he said Ishiba is "still far better" than alternatives like Takaichi and Shinjiro Koizumi, the popular agriculture minister who Koga called "easily manipulable."
"If the Takaichi government materializes, it would further give rise to forces like far-right Sanseito," Koga said, referring to the upstart "Japanese first" party.
"To prevent that, and keep Japan safe, Ishiba must be brave and stand firm."
Shortly after Sunday's election, a Kyodo News survey put the approval rating for the Ishiba government at just 22.9%.
But in that same poll, 45.8% of the public believed there was no need for him to resign.
The LDP has governed almost nonstop since 1955, but voters have been deserting the party, including toward fringe groups like Sanseito.
Factors include rising prices, notably for rice, falling living standards, and anger at corruption scandals within the LDP.
The opposition is seen as too fragmented to form an alternative government.
But being in a minority in both houses of parliament means Ishiba's coalition needs support from other parties to pass legislation.
This comes just as Japan faces multiple challenges, including a ballooning social security budget to pay pensions for its rapidly aging and shrinking population.
A new trade deal announced this week with U.S. President Donald Trump will see Japanese imports face a painful 15% tariff, although this was lower than a threatened 25%.
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Japan Times
5 hours ago
- Japan Times
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But that plan failed miserably — both bombs were dropped, the USSR entered the war and demanded full involvement in postwar plans for the Asian nation as a reward for its brief six-day fight before Japan announced its surrender. Every Aug. 6 and 9, Hiroshima and Nagasaki update and announce the number of deaths caused by the atomic bombings. Radioactive fallout continued to cause cancers for decades after the attacks. As of Aug. 6, 2025, Hiroshima has recorded 349,246 names; Nagasaki will also add more names to last year's total of 198,785. Edo Naito is a commentator on Japanese politics, law and history. He is a retired international business attorney and has held board of director and executive positions at several U.S. and Japanese multinational companies.
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Hibakusha Groups Call on Japan to Attend Nuke Ban Treaty Meetings
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Japan Times
8 hours ago
- Japan Times
The Japan-Australia frigate sale is a big deal. Here's why.
This week, the Australian government announced that Japan has won the hard-fought competition to provide the Royal Australian Navy's next surface warfare vessel and that it will purchase up to 11 Mogami-class frigates. The amount of money in the deal is a whopping 10 billion Australian dollars (¥950 billion) to be committed over about 20 years. While the price tag and length of the deal are substantial, they are only partly why this agreement is so significant. For Japan, it signals a key step in the evolution of its defense industry. For Australia, it offers a viable near-term solution to modernizing its navy while also supporting its own domestic shipbuilding industries. Equally important is what it means for the deepening relationship between the two countries based on the long-term commitment they are embarking upon together. 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A decade ago, the Australian military was in the market for a new diesel-powered submarine to replace its aging Collins-class vessels. The deal came down to two options: the Japanese Soryu-class or the French Suffren-class. The Australian government opted for the French deal, in part because of guarantees on the amount that local Australian shipbuilding industries would be incorporated into the procurement process. The Japanese government felt slighted by the decision for two reasons: first, it believed the Soryu was the superior submarine; and second, it saw the deal as emblematic of deepening security ties. For the Australians, the submarine deal with France ended up collapsing anyway. Amid delays and cost increases, the government decided in 2021 that it would abandon diesel submarines altogether and move to acquire nuclear-powered vessels under the new AUKUS pact. The result is that Australia still has no new submarines almost 10 years after eschewing the Japanese option. 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Australia's Department of Defence must now engage Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and the Japanese government in negotiating and entering binding commercial contracts. Their aim is to complete this process next year, with the delivery of the first Mogami-class frigate to Australia by 2029. For the Japanese government, this will make for the largest defense export to date. It is a huge milestone that entices Japanese companies to invest more heavily into their defense-related industries. Up to this point, export controls and the Japanese government's inability to facilitate the conclusion of deals have hampered progress in achieving these kinds of deals even when Japan has had top-of-the-line products. While the Soryu-class submarine offers one salient example, another is the ShinMaywa US-2 rescue seaplane — a one-of-a-kind search and rescue craft that still has not been exported overseas despite foreign interest. The fact that the Japanese government has finally netted something of this magnitude may be the kind of signal to Japan's big conglomerates that this sector can promise a worthwhile return on investment. For Australia, this deal is significant because it accelerates the procurement of its next-generation frigates. The administration of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese is touting that this new design will enable the delivery of the new frigate five years ahead of the previous government's designs. The successful integration of this new vessel will help modernize the Australian Navy as it continues its important efforts to preserve the rules-based international order in the maritime domain. Further, the deal allows for investment in local Australian manufacturers. While the final contours of the deal will be worked out next year, a key parameter for this recent agreement-in-principle is that the shipbuilding will eventually transition from Japan to Australian soil in cooperation with domestic shipbuilders. Thus, this is not just a deal that satisfies government interests but creates important and enduring links to private sector interests as well. As the Australian government announced, this deal will underpin a 20-year program of record, and that is not even including the longer-term sustainment initiatives. Considering that vessels operate for decades, this agreement signals long-term investment from both countries. As for interoperability between defense forces, the deal promises both information-sharing and like systems. Licensed assembly in Australia means that there will be a necessary transfer of information on defense technology and operational designs. Further, interoperability becomes easier when the systems being used are alike. And, if all goes well, there is potential for similar procurement options in the future. It also offers additional synergy with the U.S. ally. As the Japanese touted to the Australian government, the Mogami-class frigate is designed to operate principally with Japanese and American technologies (e.g., weapons targeting systems, radars, datalink systems, etc.), meaning that Australia can leverage its existing relationships with U.S. defense companies for long-term sustainment and potential future upgrades. Understanding all this, it is easier to recognize why this frigate agreement is such a big deal. With it, the growing Japan-Australia Special Strategic Partnership just added another foundational pillar. [bio]Michael MacArthur Bosack is the special adviser for government relations at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies. He previously served in the Japanese government as a Mansfield fellow.[bio]
