Russia's Black Sea ceasefire demands are a 'fools errand' for Trump, major blow for Ukraine
But while Kyiv said it was ready to abide by it straight away, Moscow stalled, insisting the U.S. lift some of the sanctions imposed on it since the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The Kremlin has innocuously framed its request as a badly-needed boost to its global food and fertilizer trade, largely in the hands of several Russian agro-oligarchs.
But experts and officials who spoke to the Kyiv independent said lifting sanctions could in fact help line the pockets of both Russian oligarchs and Moscow's war machine, as well as putting pressure on what has so far remained a largely unified Western sanctions response to Russian aggression.
"Any easing of sanctions directly benefits the system fueling Russia's war," a Ukrainian official who works on sanctions told the Kyiv Independent under the condition of anonymity because he wasn't authorized to comment on the issue.
"It's impossible to separate Russian oligarchs from their chemical assets — especially fertilizer plants — which are deeply intertwined with the Russian military-industrial complex," they added.
When announcing the ceasefire deal, the U.S. said it would "help restore Russia's access to the world market for agricultural and fertilizer exports," but did not provide further details of how this could happen, or if it would involve the lifting of sanctions. Russia's main demand is to lift sanctions on some financial institutions including the state-owned agricultural bank Rosselkhozbank.
In addition, it wants other banks related to agriculture to be reconnected to the Brussels-headquartered SWIFT global banking payment system. Russian banks were disconnected from SWIFT after the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Despite the Kremlin insisting Russia's global agribusiness needs the boost from eased sanctions, it is in fact already on the up.
"An integral part of the Black Sea initiative is the lifting of sanctions on our banking institutions involved in settlements related to agricultural goods," Kremlin spokesperson Dmitriy Peskov told reporters on March 28, Russian state news agency TASS reported.
"If European countries refuse to take this step, it means they are not interested in following the path of peace," he added.
Russia is one of the top agricultural exporters globally and its food and fertilizer companies were not sanctioned to ensure global food security.
Despite the Kremlin insisting Russia's global agribusiness needs the boost from eased sanctions, it is in fact already on the up.
Sanctions have made it harder for the sector to secure insurance for shipping and access to finance and machinery, but this has not majorly impacted their trade.Russian agricultural exports increased by 8% in 2023 compared to 2022, and by nearly 10% in 2024. Fertilizer exports dropped by 27% in 2023 compared to 2022 but increased by 15% compared to 2021. In the last year, Russian fertilizer has become even more competitive, thanks largely to cheap gas, Lilit Gevorgyan, Associate Director, Economics at S&P Global Market Intelligence, told the Kyiv Independent.
Despite a 30% tariff on Russian fertilizer imports in the EU, they have become increasingly common in the bloc, making up 25% of the market, according to S&P Global Market Intelligence.
Read also: As Ukraine, Russia agree to ceasefire at sea, Moscow's battered Black Sea Fleet is set to get a reprieve
Moscow's demands are likely less about boosting its agriculture sector and more about overcoming wider financial sanctions, several experts told the Kyiv Independent.
Currently, due to being disconnected from SWIFT, Moscow is reliant on the Chinese banking system, although problems emerged last year when Chinese banks began curbing Russian transactions over fears of losing access to the U.S. dollar.
Regaining access to the Western financial system would be a major boon for Moscow as all of its major state-owned banks are sanctioned, so they cannot be used for trade or capital operations. The Kremlin likely picked Rosselkhozbank because of its agricultural lending, which fits its narrative around the deal being important for its agricultural sector.
However, the state-owned bank is not limited to agribusinesses. If the sanctions against it are lifted, it could lend to anyone while also being used to circumvent other sanctions, launder money, and receive oil export revenues. Russia "needs to have a large state-owned or state-controlled bank outside of the sanctions perimeter," said Alexander Kolyandr, a non-resident Senior Fellow with the Democratic Resilience Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).'That will generally help Russia to reduce risks and prices of imports, facilitate export, and make capital movements easier,' he added.
Additionally, while food and fertilizer companies have not been sanctioned, its agro-oligarch owners, such as billionaire fertilizer tycoon Andriy Melnichenko, one of the most important businessmen in Russia with close connections to the Kremlin, have been.If sanctions on Rosselkhozbank are lifted, they would be able to use the bank to move money, get loans, and make potential investments, funneling money into the pockets of businessmen that have fuelled the Kremlin's war machine.
Fertilizer companies in particular have sold chemicals to Russia's military industrial complex, such as Melnichenko's company Eurochem, Reuters has previously reported.
Russia also wants to get rid of restrictions on European ports that have prevented its vessels from docking, and wants sanctions lifted on ships flying the Russian flag. This would boost Russia's exports and allow its ships to seek maintenance at EU ports. Moscow's final demand is to allow the import of agricultural machinery, like tractors, which have been banned by the U.S. and the EU.
Western machinery could improve productivity and revenue for Russian agribusinesses, meaning more money for their oligarch owners.
U.S. President Donald Trump sees sanctions as a negotiation tool and threatened Russia with secondary oil sanctions on March 30 for heel-dragging during the peace process.
Despite this, the White House has already said it is mulling over lifting sanctions as part of the Black Sea deal, and noted that some of the sanctions Russia wants lifted belong to the EU, not the U.S. Ukraine's Foreign Ministry spokesperson Heorhii Tykhyi said on March 27 that so far, Ukraine and the U.S. haven't agreed to lift any sanctions on Russia.
If the U.S. does heed Moscow's demands, Russia will have access to hard currency and a more productive agricultural sector, Gevorgyan said.
"The loosening of sanctions will have the very real effect of immediately helping to feed the defense industrial machine within Russia."
In turn, this would benefit the oligarchs that have profited off the war, from stealing Ukrainian grain in occupied territories, to selling chemical products to Russia's military sector. "The loosening of sanctions will have the very real effect of immediately helping to feed the defense industrial machine within Russia," Steven Horrel, non-resident Senior Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at CEPA, told the Kyiv Independent.
Horrell adds there is also concern that even the lifting of limited and specific sanctions could undermine the entire sanctions regime imposed by Western nations in their support for Ukraine and fight against Russian aggression.
Giving in to Putin now would be a "fool's errand" and a "show of weakness" from the U.S., he said, adding it would also destigmatize Russian companies that have stolen from Ukraine and "reward an aggressor for invading its neighbor."
Even if the White House eases restrictions, European countries are likely to continue sticking to their guns.
"This may be intended to drive a further wedge between the U.S. and Europe", Taisa Markus, adjunct professor at the University of Illinois College of Law, and visiting professor at Kyiv Mohyla Faculty of Law, told the Kyiv Independent.
"Even if the U.S. lifts financial sanctions, so long as EU, U.K. and other sanctions remain in place, Moscow is unlikely to gain meaningful access to the global financial markets, and major American financial institutions are likely to remain hesitant to do business with Russia," she added.
Read also: Unless you act, 'it's just rhetoric' — Baltic states skeptical of Western European leadership
We've been working hard to bring you independent, locally-sourced news from Ukraine. Consider supporting the Kyiv Independent.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
Newsweek
2 minutes ago
- Newsweek
For Putin, 'Security Guarantees' on Ukraine Mean Something Different
Based on factual reporting, incorporates the expertise of the journalist and may offer interpretations and conclusions. Russia, Ukraine and European powers have all emerged from meetings with President Donald Trump in support of establishing security guarantees as part of a broader agreement to put an end to the bloody war between Moscow and Kyiv. Trump vowed to commit to Ukraine's postwar defense during his meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and European leaders on Monday, a move welcomed by his visitors. He said Russian President Vladimir Putin had also agreed to accept guarantees on Ukraine during their meeting in Alaska on Friday in what the U.S. leader described as a "very significant step." What such guarantees look like, however, remains a core sticking point among the parties to the conflict, and efforts to find a common definition may be crucial to achieving a breakthrough. "The key issue with security guarantees lies in the differing understandings of their modalities," Alexander Chekov, lecturer at Moscow State Institute of International Relations' Department of International Relations and Foreign Policy of Russia, told Newsweek. On one hand, Chekov said that "Ukraine and Western European countries view these guarantees as Western security commitments to Ukraine, supported by a range of measures such as arms sales and military assistance to the Ukrainian army, increased military-technical cooperation, and potentially even the stationing of some European troops in Ukraine." "Russia, however, interprets security guarantees differently: not as unilateral Western commitments to Ukraine, but as a multilateral system of commitments that includes not only the West but also Russia itself and probably some major non-Euro-Atlantic powers," Chekov said. As such, he argued that "one of the determining factors for the success of future negotiations will be the ability to reconcile the Western perspective on guarantees with the Russian one." Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks during a joint news conference with U.S. President Donald Trump (out of frame) after participating in a U.S.-Russia summit on Ukraine at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska, on August... Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks during a joint news conference with U.S. President Donald Trump (out of frame) after participating in a U.S.-Russia summit on Ukraine at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska, on August 15, 2025. More ANDREW CABALLERO-REYNOLDS/AFP/Getty Images The 'Root Causes' Since the beginning of the conflict, launched full-scale by Russia in February 2022 after eight years of aiding allied separatists in eastern Ukraine and occupying Crimea, Putin has argued that the "root causes" for the war would need to be addressed in any settlement. Such language is key to the Russian narrative surrounding the conflict, portrayed not as a "war of aggression" as it is often styled in the West, but as a "special military operation" dedicated to safeguarding Russian-speaking minorities and, perhaps most importantly, blocking further NATO expansion near Russia's borders. Even prior to Putin coming to power at the dawn of the 21st century, Moscow, having green-lit the newly unified Germany's admission into NATO, opposed further states within the former Soviet sphere, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, which joined the alliance in 1999. Six more rounds of expansion would follow, bringing the bloc to its current strength of 32 nations, including all of Russia's Eastern European neighbors with the exceptions of Belarus and Ukraine. Many entered for fear of a resurgent Russia looking to reassert its influence on the continent. Moscow has broadcast an opposing view—that it was NATO threatening Russian security. And Kyiv's ambitions to join the bloc, which predate the 2014 revolution that brought to power a pro-West government and set the conditions for the current crisis, have long drawn particular scorn from the Kremlin. Joshua Shifrinson, associate professor at the University of Maryland's School of Public Policy, cited a cable sent in 2008 by then-U.S. ambassador to Russia Bill Burns (later President Joe Biden's CIA chief) to then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice warning that "Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all red lines for the Russian elite (not just Putin)." "And it's not hard to understand why," Shifrinson told Newsweek. "No country wants a military alliance on its borders and that it doesn't have a handle on. We have to remember Ukraine has been historically important, and even empirically, just as a reality, important to the Russian economy, important to Russian national security." "We have to remember, too, that NATO was founded as an anti-Soviet Alliance. Large parts of it seen coming up to the Russian border is highly concerning," he added. "You don't need to believe in Russian imperial ambitions to say to one's self that, 'Look, the possibility of NATO including Ukraine could be highly detrimental to Russian security.'" After Moscow first began preparing for war in 2021 with a military buildup surrounding Ukraine on the pretext of conducting training exercises, Russia issued demands to the U.S. and NATO for "security guarantees" that would include the bloc pull back its post-Cold War presence in Eastern Europe. The conditions were dismissed after brief talks early the following year, with then-President Joe Biden's administration releasing intelligence concluding that Putin was on the precipice of ordering a large-scale invasion. Three and a half years later, Russian and Ukrainian forces remain locked in the deadliest combat the continent has seen since World War II. Meanwhile, NATO has only further expanded, counting Finland and Sweden as members in 2023 and 2024, respectively, and European states are undergoing a historic rearmament plan. A New Order for Europe While much focus has centered on the amount of territory seized by Russia—nearly a fifth of Ukraine—Chekov pointed out that the issue of land, along with economic measures, would need to be addressed as part of a broader agreement that also included security guarantees. "From the meeting in Alaska and the subsequent conference in Washington, we observed the institutionalization of several venues for negotiations on the Ukraine crisis," Chekov said. "These include security guarantees, territorial issues, and relief of Western sanctions imposed on Russia," he added. "All these topics are interdependent, and a final resolution of the Ukrainian crisis seems most promising if they are addressed together." Artem Kvartalnov, a former research fellow at the Russian Center for Policy Research now at the University of Texas at Austin, outlined what Moscow may desire in terms of reshaping the European security architecture in a way that neutralizes NATO entry into future conflicts, thus achieving Putin's long-held vision. "The key issue with a potential exchange involving security guarantees, as seen by many on both sides, is that Russia likely wants a multilateral arrangement in which Russia itself would have a say before any external guarantees could be triggered," Kvartalnov told Newsweek. "If there is a council of guarantors involving Russia itself that must authorize any use of force in response to external aggression against Ukraine, Russia will be able to block such authorizations, defeating the purpose of security guarantees," he added. Shifrinson echoed this view on Russia's aims, while noting that Europe would continue to seek a lasting U.S. role not just in this conflict but across the continent at a time when the Trump administration was increasingly pushing to shift the burden to allies. "Russia wants the ability to prevent Western intervention the future," he said. "So, if it's party part of the security guarantee, it can block a response, in some way, to a crisis in the future should a crisis occur." "I mean, look, the Europeans don't want to have to fight Russia for the future of Ukraine," he added, "but they are desperate, I think, to keep the U.S. involved in European security affairs." Moscow's position on the issue was voiced in a Telegram post Monday by Russian Permanent Representative to International Organizations in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov. "Many EU leaders emphasize that the future peace agreement should provide reliable security guarantees for Ukraine," Ulyanov wrote. "Russia agrees with this. But it has every right to expect that Moscow will also receive effective security guarantees." (Left to right) Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky speaks as French President Emmanuel Macron and U.S. President Donald Trump listen during a meeting with European leaders in the East Room of the White House in Washington,... (Left to right) Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky speaks as French President Emmanuel Macron and U.S. President Donald Trump listen during a meeting with European leaders in the East Room of the White House in Washington, D.C., on August 18, 2025. More ANDREW CABALLERO-REYNOLDS/AFP/Getty Images The Trump Factor Between Russia's calls for a greater say on European security and U.S. allies demanding strict commitments enshrining Ukraine's defense lies Trump, who has issued both praise and criticism for both sides of the conflict. Trump has repeatedly expressed his belief that Putin was sincere in engaging in talks to end the war, following a period of heated rhetoric toward the Russian leader. Trump's latest meeting with Zelensky was also far more amicable than the explosive episode that erupted in the White House during their previous meeting in February. But there are key areas where Trump, who has positioned himself as the primary power broker in the peace talks, has broken with Kyiv and European allies, namely in eschewing efforts to seek a ceasefire prior to a final settlement, reiterating the necessity of "land swaps" as part of a deal and emphasizing Ukraine would not join NATO. As such, Trump's definition of security guarantees also appears to differ from those expressed by the European leaders who recently departed Washington, D.C. "There is a kind of underlying tension that has yet to be resolved, and that is, Trump has said no to NATO enlargement, no membership for Ukraine, and this is an administration that has a history of looking with skepticism at aid to Ukraine," Charles Kupchan, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relation and professor at Georgetown University, told Newsweek. "The vice president goes around saying, 'We're done, we're not sending any more arms to Ukraine,' and the idea that, somehow, we're going to give them a security guarantee that would obligate us to defend them, it doesn't really add up," he added. "And so, there are some internal contradictions here that have to be worked out." Also significant is the backlash Trump has received for considering security guarantees for Ukraine from influential voices in his "Make America Great Again" support base, many of whom have sought to push the president toward extracting the U.S. from the conflict. Trump on Tuesday clarified his stance, offering his "assurance" during an interview with Fox & Friends that any guarantees would not include the deployment of U.S. troops to Ukraine. He also revealed, however, that European allies may be willing to send soldiers and that the U.S. is "willing to help them with things," including air support. White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt reiterated this stance during a press briefing that same day. "The president has definitively stated U.S. boots will not be on the ground in Ukraine, but we can certainly help in the coordination and perhaps provide other means of security guarantees to our European allies," Leavitt said. "The president understands security guarantees are crucially important to ensure a lasting peace," she added, "and he has directed his national security team to coordinate with our friends in Europe and also to continue to cooperate and discuss these matters with Ukraine and Russia as well." Latvian President Edgars Rinkevics (second from right) tours near the construction of a fence, concrete and armored barriers that are being erected to fortify and secure the border with Russia and Belarus in Zaborje, Latvia.... Latvian President Edgars Rinkevics (second from right) tours near the construction of a fence, concrete and armored barriers that are being erected to fortify and secure the border with Russia and Belarus in Zaborje, Latvia. More Alexander Welscher/Picture-Alliance/DPA/AP The Limits of Guarantees But some experts have cast doubt as to the extent to which even a "coalition of the willing" among European powers may truly be willing to commit to such a task. As Franz-Stefan Gady, adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, recently told Newsweek, "the hardest question that remains unanswered for Europe" boils down to "what does Ukraine really mean for Europe's security architecture, and what is Europe prepared to risk to ensure that Ukraine will remain an independent, pro-Western country?" "Are European countries prepared to go to war against Russia? If the answer is no, then any sort of European reassurance force in Ukraine, integrated with Ukrainian forces, will not be able to deter future Russian aggression," he said at the time. Kupchan also raised questions regarding the concept of a future European deployment to Ukraine, asking, "How much of a guarantee are these guarantees?" He wondered whether or not the U.S. and European allies would actually go to the lengths of ratifying defense treaties for Ukraine as they have with NATO's Article 5. "If the answer to that is no, and these agreements do not have parliamentary ratification, they may be Article 5-like, but the operative word there is 'like' in the sense that you might want to think about them more as assurances than guarantees," he said. And even if a deal were to manifest to end the war in Ukraine, he felt Europe was likely to remain "a divided continent" for some time to come, and that any progress in improving the tense security environment that exists between NATO and Russia would be incremental at best. "I could imagine, if this war comes to an end, some level of economic reintegration, some lowering of the sanctions, some progress on getting arms control, both nuclear and conventional, back up and running," Kupchan said, "but I think that the overall relationship will be highly distrustful, and you're going to see NATO on guard along its eastern flank for the foreseeable future." "Might there be a reallocation of U.S. military assets? Yes, especially if the war comes to an end, I think you'll definitely see a drawdown of the U.S. presence in Europe, not a departure, but a drawdown," he added. "But other than that, I think that if there is a sort of broader repair in the relationship between NATO and Russia, it will be glacial."
San Francisco Chronicle
4 minutes ago
- San Francisco Chronicle
NATO defense chiefs hold virtual meeting on Ukraine security guarantees
NATO defense chiefs were due to hold a virtual meeting Wednesday, a senior alliance official said, as countries pushing for an end to Russia's war on Ukraine devise possible future security guarantees for Kyiv that could help forge a peace agreement. Italian Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, chair of NATO's Military Committee, said that 32 defense chiefs from across the alliance would hold a video conference as a U.S.-led diplomatic push seeks to end the fighting. U.S. Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, NATO's supreme allied commander Europe, will take part in the talks, Dragone said on social platform X. U.S. President Donald Trump met last Friday with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska and on Monday hosted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and prominent European leaders at the White House. Neither meeting delivered concrete progress. Trump is trying to steer Putin and Zelenskyy toward a settlement more than three years after Russia invaded its neighbor, but there are major obstacles. They include Ukraine's demands for Western-backed military assurances to ensure Russia won't mount another invasion in coming years. 'We need strong security guarantees to ensure a truly secure and lasting peace,' Zelenskyy said in a Telegram post Wednesday after Russian missile and drone strikes hit six regions of Ukraine overnight. Kyiv's European allies are looking to set up a force that could backstop any peace agreement, and a coalition of 30 countries, including European nations, Japan and Australia, have signed up to support the initiative. Military chiefs are figuring out how that security force might work. The role that the U.S. might play in is unclear. Trump on Tuesday ruled out sending U.S. troops to help defend Ukraine against Russia. Attacks on civilian areas in Sumy and Odesa overnight into Wednesday injured 15 people, including a family with three small children, Ukrainian authorities said. Zelenskyy said the strikes 'only confirm the need for pressure on Moscow, the need to introduce new sanctions and tariffs until diplomacy works to its full potential.'
Newsweek
4 minutes ago
- Newsweek
Nikki Haley: Trump Needs To Rebuild U.S.-India Relationship
In July 1982, President Ronald Reagan welcomed Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to a state dinner at the White House. Toasting the friendship between our "two proud, free peoples," he said: "although our countries may travel separate paths from time to time, our destination remains the same." Four decades later, the U.S.-India relationship is at a troubling inflection point. To achieve the Trump administration's foreign policy goals—outcompeting China and achieving peace through strength—few objectives are more critical than getting U.S.-India relations back on track. The last few weeks have seen an explosive series of events. The Trump administration has threatened India with 25 percent tariffs for purchasing Russian oil, on top of the 25 percent President Donald Trump already slapped on Indian goods. These developments followed months of rising tension, including over the U.S. role in India-Pakistan ceasefire negotiations. Trump is right to target India's massive Russian oil purchases, which are helping to fund Vladimir Putin's brutal war against Ukraine. India has also traditionally been among the most protectionist economies in the world, with an average tariff rate more than five times the U.S. average in 2023. But India must be treated like the prized free and democratic partner that it is—not an adversary like China, which has thus far avoided sanctions for its Russian oil purchases, despite being one of Moscow's largest customers. If that disparity does not demand a closer look at U.S.-India relations, the realities of hard power should. Scuttling 25 years of momentum with the only country that can serve as a counterweight to Chinese dominance in Asia would be a strategic disaster. WASHINGTON, DC - MAY 22: Former U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley announced that she would vote for former President Donald Trump during an event at the Hudson Institute on May 22, 2024 in Washington, DC. WASHINGTON, DC - MAY 22: Former U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley announced that she would vote for former President Donald Trump during an event at the Hudson Institute on May 22, 2024 in Washington, the short term, India is essential in helping the United States move its critical supply chains away from China. While the Trump administration works to bring manufacturing back to our shores, India stands alone in its potential to manufacture at China-like scale for products that can't be quickly or efficiently produced here, like textiles, inexpensive phones, and solar panels. When it comes to defense, India's expanding military ties with the United States, Israel, and other American allies make it a crucial asset to the free world's security, and a rapidly growing market for U.S. defense equipment and cooperation. India's growing clout and security involvement in the Middle East could prove essential in helping to stabilize the region as America seeks to send fewer troops and dollars there. And India's location at the center of China's vital trade and energy flows could complicate Beijing's options in the case of a major conflict. In the longer term, India's significance is even more profound. Home to more than a sixth of humanity, India surpassed China as the world's most populous country in 2023, with a young workforce that contrasts with China's aging one. It is the world's fastest-growing major economy—soon to eclipse Japan as the world's fourth largest. India's rise represents the most significant geopolitical event since China's, and is among the greatest obstacles to China's goal of reshaping the global order. Simply put, China's ambitions will have to shrink as India's power grows. Yet, unlike Communist-controlled China, the rise of a democratic India does not threaten the free world. Partnership between the U.S. and India to counter China should be a no-brainer. India and China are unfriendly neighbors that have conflicting economic interests and ongoing territorial disputes, including a lethal skirmish over contested borders as recently as 2020. It would serve America's interests to help India stand up to its increasingly aggressive northern neighbor, both economically and militarily. And it would be a massive—and preventable—mistake to balloon a trade spat between the United States and India into an enduring rupture. If that were to happen, the Chinese Communist Party would be quick to play India and the United States against one another. For its part, India must take Trump's point over Russian oil seriously, and work with the White House to find a solution. As for the United States, the most urgent priority should be to reverse the downward spiral, which will require direct talks between President Trump and Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The sooner the better. The administration should focus on mending the rift with India and giving the relationship more high-level attention and resources—approaching what the U.S. devotes to China or Israel. Decades of friendship and good will between the world's two largest democracies provide a solid basis to move past the current turbulence. Navigating challenging issues like trade disagreements and Russian oil imports demand hard dialogue, but difficult conversations are often the sign of a deepening partnership. The United States should not lose sight of what matters most: our shared goals. To face China, the United States must have a friend in India. Nikki Haley, the Walter P. Stern Chair at the Hudson Institute, was US ambassador to the United Nations and governor of South Carolina. Bill Drexel is a fellow at the Hudson Institute. The views expressed in this article are the writers' own.
