The Kurdish scheme - World - Al-Ahram Weekly
The outbreak of sectarian violence in the Sweida Governorate, south of Damascus, in July, together with earlier attacks on the Alawite community in western Syria in March, has given Kurdish political forces grounds to reject demands from the central government in Damascus and Turkey to disarm. But are they leveraging the situation to press for the preservation of their de facto autonomy as a distinctively Kurdish political and cultural entity?
The military arm of AANES, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), has declared that 'disarmament is a red line.' The interim authorities in Damascus responded that 'the refusal to disarm and the insistence on maintaining an armed formation is categorically unacceptable.' They also accused the Kurds of 'using the events in Sweida and [Latakia] to justify refusing to merge under the authority of the government and to cast aspersions on government's intentions.' Such actions were 'flagrant attempts to manipulate public opinion and distort the facts.'
AANES fears that the recent surge in sectarian incidents could drive Syria to a dangerous precipice. It has warned of the existential crisis for the Syrian state and its diverse society should these incidents trigger larger eruptions across regional or sectarian divides. In a statement, AANES described the attacks on the predominantly Druze towns and villages in Sweida as 'a setback to the hopes and aspirations of the Syrian people.' It lamented the numerous deaths of civilians and condemned the looting and burning of dozens of homes and farms.
Echoing this view, the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), on 22 July, warned that the events in Sweida were not isolated incidents but rather a vivid manifestation of the general collapse of political and institutional structures in Syria. This deterioration was the product of decades of exclusion, tyranny, marginalisation of elements of the nation, and failure on the part of the central government to sustain diversity and maintain civil peace.
The foregoing statement may hint at reasons why AANES and its military and political bodies would use recent events to justify dragging their feet on the implementation of the March 2025 Agreement to integrate into centralised state institutions. From the perspective of the Kurdish national movement, any centralised state might marginalise minorities or ignore their identity-related political and cultural demands. At the same time, the Kurds are wary of Turkey's strategic aim of preventing any autonomous Kurdish entity from developing along its southern flank.
From a practical standpoint, the SDF might therefore see the government's preoccupation with events in the south combined with the Israeli military escalation as a window to achieve at least two ends: to impose de facto realities that would throw a spanner into the process of integrating Kurdish forces into the army and to neutralise Turkish pressures on the Kurdish-controlled regions.
Turkey, too, is concerned by the highly volatile situation in Syria and its implications for the Turkish project there. On 19 July, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan cautioned Kurdish forces against taking advantage of the situation in Sweida to achieve territorial gains
. Claiming that Ankara had received intelligence on possible Kurdish manoeuvres, Fidan said the Kurds 'must refrain from exploiting the chaos in Syria or engaging in reckless adventures that will further complicate the situation. Opportunism at this stage could have grave consequences.'
Ankara also views reports of ties between the SDF and Druze militia factions through a similar lens: it is wary of any development that might undermine its efforts to shape the situation in Syria to align with Turkey's strategic interests.
Some commentators have suggested that SDF support for Druze factions in Sweida may be motivated by a desire to align with Israel's stated policy of protecting the Druze minority. According to this view, the Kurds calculate that, in developing ties with the Druze, Israel would be induced to assist SDF militarily and politically to counter pressures from the central government or from Turkey. In addition, Israel would persuade Washington not to withdraw its support for the SDF. Meanwhile, by exploiting unrest in Sweida, the SDF could derail or at least delay the indirect negotiations currently in progress between Damascus and Tel Aviv, thereby increasing the prospects of Israeli support for Kurdish aspirations of autonomy.
In light of the foregoing, the Kurdish forces may shift to a strategy of deliberately fuelling sectarian tensions in order to build up pressure on the central government in Damascus, thereby enhancing the prospects of Kurdish autonomy within a federal system.
This helps explain the Kurdish forces' state of high alert in northeastern Syria . Against the backdrop of clashes in Sweida between the Druze, Bedouins and regime forces, the Kurds fear they will be the next target on the regime's list after the Druze and Alawites.
On the other hand, the type of speculation that ticks certain boxes against the politically charged climate in Syria may serve to deflect the blame for the current deterioration. But could it also be intended to create a Kurdish scapegoat? Perhaps this may explain the Kurdish forces' state of high alert in northeastern Syria.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 6 August, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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He is currently director of the Middle East Programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC. * A version of this article appears in print in the 6 August, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly Follow us on: Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Short link:
