Akash System, AI Drones, And Why India Can't 'Outsource' Security
Learning From The Past
History presents stark reminders. In 1965, India's military endeavours were significantly hindered by a US arms embargo. In 1991, amidst the Gulf War, Saudi Arabia, despite possessing an abundance of Western armaments, depended wholly on the United States for the protection of its oil fields. In stark contrast, Israel has not only endured but flourished, and through strategic alliances and a steadfast commitment has developed its own capabilities. Therefore, countries that delegate their defence industrial capabilities relinquish control over their strategic destiny. Atmanirbharta, or self-reliance, in defence transcends mere rhetoric.
This strategic realisation is beginning to pay dividends for India. Despite still being the world's second-largest arms importer, accounting for 8.3% of global imports, just behind Ukraine's 8.4% according to SIPRI, India has shifted course since 2014. The focus has moved beyond mere procurement towards co-development, co-production, and indigenous innovation. The aim is no longer just to acquire weapons but to build the capacity to design and produce them domestically. Initiatives such as the Defence Industrial Corridors in Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh, the corporatisation of the Ordnance Factory Board, and the launch of Innovations for Defence Excellence (iDEX) signal a structural push towards developing in-house defence R&D. Successes like the Tejas fighter jet, the DRDO-developed anti-satellite missile (ASAT), and the Agni-V intercontinental ballistic missile are no longer isolated achievements, they reflect the emergence of a broader, self-sustaining military-industrial ecosystem. Simultaneously, technology transfer agreements and licensed production under the Strategic Partnership Model are enabling Indian firms to move up the value chain. India is no longer content being a passive buyer, it is steadily becoming a sovereign producer. Atmanirbharta in defence is not a distant goal. It is fast becoming the country's strategic posture.
All That Was Used In Op Sindoor
Operation Sindoor has given us the clearest evidence of how far India has come as far as innovation in defence tech is concerned. The mission, launched in retaliation to the April 2025 Pahalgam terror attack, was conducted entirely without crossing the Line of Control, relying on high-precision, domestically engineered strike and surveillance systems. Among the most crucial was the Akash Surface-to-Air Missile System, which provided short-range protection against incoming aerial threats. Backed by the Akashteer Air Defence Control and Reporting System, Indian forces intercepted all hostile drones and missiles with 100% success, demonstrating real-time net-centric warfare capabilities powered by domestic radar, telemetry, and sensor integration. The Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) served as the backbone of coordination, linking airbases, radar units, and weapon platforms across the services under a single digital command structure.
For offensive capabilities, SkyStriker loitering munitions, manufactured domestically under technology transfer from Israel's Elbit Systems, enabled deep penetration and destruction of enemy radar and missile installations. These AI-enabled kamikaze drones hovered over target zones, identified high-value assets, and struck with zero collateral damage. The Indian Air Force also deployed long-range drones for real-time ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), while DRDO-developed electronic warfare systems successfully jammed Pakistan's Chinese-supplied radar and missile infrastructure, completing the mission in under 23 minutes, without any loss of Indian assets. Ground forces remained on high alert using a layered defensive posture comprising legacy systems like Pechora and OSA-AK, and new-generation assets like Akash-NG and LLQRM (Low-Level Quick Reaction Missiles). The Indian Army's Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS) grid and shoulder-fired missiles formed the first layer of protection, reinforced by low-level air defence (LLAD) guns and electro-optical tracking systems.
Notably, India's indigenous satellite assets, including those from ISRO, provided 24x7 strategic situational awareness. More than 10 satellites were operational in monitoring India's 7,000-km coastline and the northern theatre during the mission, highlighting the seamless integration of space-based sensors into real-time tactical decision-making. The operation also exposed and neutralised advanced foreign-origin platforms deployed by Pakistan, including PL-15 air-to-air missiles, Turkish-origin UAVs, and Chinese-made quadcopters, all of which were rendered ineffective by India's domestic air defence ecosystem.
A Decade Of Work
Behind the success of Operation Sindoor lies a decade of focused investment in building indigenous capacity. The iDEX platform, Strategic Partnership Model, Defence Industrial Corridors in Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh, and the ban on imported drones in 2021 catalysed the rise of Indian firms in the UAV and defence electronics space. Firms like Alpha Design Technologies, Paras Defence, and Tata Advanced Systems are now core contributors to India's tactical autonomy. India's drone market, projected to reach $11 billion by 2030, is rapidly emerging as a key pillar of national security.
Let The Momentum Remain
To consolidate Operation Sindoor's gains and realise full-spectrum strategic autonomy, India must urgently address key gaps across its defence ecosystem. The most pressing is the development of indigenous jet engines. Despite progress in airframe design, India remains reliant on foreign propulsion systems, which is a critical vulnerability. We still rely on GE engines for Tejas, and deliveries are behind schedule. Reviving the Kaveri engine programme, backed by a National Aero-Engine Mission with global partnerships and IP retention, is imperative.
Equally important is scaling the indigenous drone ecosystem. India must accelerate the development of HALE/MALE drones, autonomous loitering munitions, and AI-powered drone swarms. The CATS Warrior and TAPAS-BH platforms must be supported with robust R&D funding, domestic payload production, and regulatory clarity.
In parallel, India must localise avionics, AESA radars, mission computers, and electronic warfare (EW) suites. Modern warfare is increasingly software-defined, and foreign dependence for these components creates the risk of supply chain disruption or strategic denial. DRDO's Uttam radar and integrated EW systems must be expanded across all military platforms.
On the missile front, India must invest in hypersonic glide vehicles, scramjet propulsion, and advanced seekers. While systems like Agni-V and BrahMos have established deterrence, the next phase requires indigenising guidance, propulsion, and warhead technologies to reduce exposure to sanctions.
Don't Forget Navy
Naval self-reliance is equally essential. India must develop indigenous nuclear propulsion, air-independent systems for submarines, and sonar suites for warships. The strategic shipbuilding base, strengthened by projects like INS Vikrant, needs technological depth and private-sector integration to meet future maritime threats.
Space-based defence infrastructure must be hardened and expanded, especially satellite surveillance, communication, and navigation systems. ISRO's constellation of military satellites proved effective in Operation Sindoor, but micro-satellite swarms, missile early-warning sensors, and secure relay networks are the next frontier.
India must also invest in cyber and AI warfare. A dedicated Defence Cyber Command is needed to build offensive and defensive capabilities, alongside AI tools for battlefield management, autonomous weapons, and predictive logistics.
Finally, defence-grade electronics, semiconductors, embedded systems, and secure microcontrollers must be domestically produced. India's semiconductor mission must explicitly include military applications to secure its electronic backbone.
The next decade will determine whether India merely reduces dependence or truly rewires its defence ecosystem for self-sufficiency. The challenge now is not one of intent but of scale, speed, and strategic discipline. As defence technology becomes increasingly complex, interdisciplinary, and software-defined, India must foster deep integration between research labs, private industry, and operational commands. This will require not just funding or policy reform, but a cultural shift, one that values iterative innovation, tolerates risk, and treats defence R&D as a national strategic asset rather than a budget line.
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