Katy Perry to perform in China eight years after visa denial
The singer, who this month made a brief trip into space on a Blue Origin rocket owned by Jeff Bezos, is due to hold two concerts in an 18,000-seat stadium in Hangzhou, eastern China, on November 21 and 22, according to a notice from Zhejiang province's culture and tourism bureau.
In 2017 Perry, 40, was denied entry into China for a Victoria's Secret fashion show in Shanghai. Beijing never confirmed the visa rejection.
The New York Post's Page Six gossip column reported at the time that Perry was banned
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EVN Report
3 days ago
- EVN Report
Iran's Strategic Uncertainty and Armenia's Security Challenges
Following the Second Karabakh War, and particularly after Azerbaijan's assault on Armenia's sovereign territory in September 2022, many observers began describing Iran's regional policy as increasingly pro-Armenian. While Tehran continues to pursue a broadly balanced approach in the South Caucasus , this perception has been reinforced by frequent high-level visits with Armenian officials, regular statements affirming Armenia's territorial integrity, and a sustained ' war of words ' with Baku. Tensions deepened amid reports of Azerbaijani involvement in Israel's strike on Iran. Both the recent 12-day Israeli-American-Iranian war and shifting Iran-Azerbaijan dynamics carry direct implications for Armenia's security. As the risk of renewed escalation lingers, this article assesses those risks from the perspective of Armenia's security. Iran-U.S.-Israeli War and Its Outcome After Donald Trump returned to the White House and declared his strategic goal of becoming a ' peacemaker president ', mediated talks resumed between Washington and Tehran on Iran's nuclear program. Following five Oman-mediated meetings described as ' successful ', the parties appeared close to reaching an agreement. However, shortly before the sixth round of negotiations, Israel attacked Iran, killing key nuclear scientists and senior military officials. Israel subsequently convinced the U.S. to join in the military action against Iran, using ' bunker buster' bombs to strike Iran's Fordow nuclear facility. Though a ceasefire was established after 12 days of conflict, uncertainties about Iran's nuclear program and the future of negotiations persist. All sides declared ' victory ,' yet paradoxically, each fell short of its strategic objectives. This phase of the conflict left relations between the parties no clearer than before. Uncertainty over Iran's nuclear program persists, as U.S. military strikes provided no conclusive evidence that it has been fully disrupted. Iran has acknowledged significant damage to its nuclear infrastructure, likely delaying any potential nuclear weapon development by months or years (whether Iran intends to create such a weapon is a separate discussion). Reports suggest Iran preemptively safeguarded some of its enriched uranium, suggesting Tehran may have had advance knowledge of the U.S. strikes. Meanwhile, according to American sources , informal U.S.-Iran negotiations continued even during the strikes. The war also exposed the vulnerability of Iran's military and strategic infrastructure, which can be attributed to several objective realities: The once-united ' Axis of Resistance '—the main pillar of Iran's regional policy and security—is now fragmented. Syria no longer operates under pro-Iranian rule, Hezbollah has suffered significant losses, and Houthis forces face more direct threats and targeted U.S. strikes. Meanwhile, Iran's strategic allies, Russia and China , offered nothing beyond condemnatory statements during the war. Not all of Israel's strategic goals materialized. Its expectation of regime change in Iran proved overly ambitious. While some Iranian ethnic minority movements receive external backing, foreign actors have used separatist rhetoric more as leverage than as a genuine push for Iran's partition. Turkey and Azerbaijan, for example, have encouraged Turkic separatism among Iran's Azeris, yet both understand that Iran's fragmentation could also embolden Kurdish separatism—an outcome Turkey opposes. Likewise, Pakistan condemned the Israeli strikes, likely wary of unrest among its own Baluchi population. Despite public discontent with the regime, Iranian society carries the traumatic memory of the Iran-Iraq War and the painful experience of a foreign-backed coup (the overthrow of Mossadegh ). These historical wounds make expectations of a mass internal uprising against the backdrop of missile strikes unrealistic. While some social media voices portrayed the conflict as a war against the regime rather than the people of Iran, these perspectives were largely perceived as disconnected from actual Iranian sentiment. Nevertheless, despite the regime maintaining its formal integrity, recent developments suggest the possibility of internal change. President Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Araghchi took on key decision-making roles during the war, emphasizing continued diplomacy and distinguishing between U.S. and Israeli approaches. Following the war, both officials gave interviews to American media highlighting their willingness to resume negotiations on Iran's peaceful nuclear program. In an interview with Tucker Carlson, Pezeshkian stated that Iran would welcome American investors if sanctions were lifted, clarifying that 'the slogan 'Death to America,' by no means refers to the American people, or even officials .' While Iranian conservatives have severely criticized these positions, they will continue to shape Iran's foreign policy as long as distrust in the president remains incomplete. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was absent from the public sphere during the military strikes and did not attend the funerals of military and political figures. The vulnerability of Iran's airspace calls into question both the viability of holding mass public events and the regime's ideological slogans of 'Death to America' and 'Death to Israel.' These slogans are not just rhetoric but form the ideological backbone of the regime. The succession process of the Supreme Leader and the role of a weakened Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) may determine whether Iran pursues ideological reorientation or further escalation with the United States. Rather than complete regime change, Iran may undergo a transformation of its political identity, shifting from the Shiite Islamic concept of ' Velayate Faghih ' toward a more national political strategy. This trend is already visible in Khamenei's commissioning of a patriotic song during Ashura ceremonies, Pezeshkian's emphasis on the need to start dialogue with the political opposition, and even in calls from conservative actors, saying ' we need change .' Thus, Iran's policy in the near future faces strategic uncertainty due to both external conflict threats (with Israel and the U.S.) and internal leadership instability. Three possible scenarios emerge: New military escalation Diplomatic reintegration (perhaps with or without a new nuclear agreement) Or the continuation of the current status quo of strategic uncertainty Iran's Political Uncertainty and Its Impact on the South Caucasus and Armenia Developments around Iran could directly affect the security of the South Caucasus, particularly Armenia's. Recent threats to Armenia included potential breakdown of negotiations with Azerbaijan, political conditions favoring military escalation, ongoing disagreements over the Syunik transit route, and the continuing blockade of Armenia. An Israeli attack on Iran, especially with U.S. participation, could intensify these threats for several reasons: First, conducting negotiations while simultaneously planning what could be termed a ' preemptive attack ', undermines established norms in international relations and encourages other actors to consider military options even during peace talks. Engaging Iran in a protracted war would shift the balance of power in the South Caucasus. Military operations near the region could embolden Azerbaijan to attack Armenia, particularly since a conflict with Iran would jeopardize the security of connections between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan. Israel's plans for a protracted war include activating separatist forces inside Iran. This scenario would require using the Azeri-speaking population in northern Iran, with Azerbaijan playing a significant role. Such involvement would enhance Azerbaijan's political importance to the West, especially Israel, potentially creating an additional threat for Armenia. If these plans were viable, the transit route through Syunik might become less urgent since Azerbaijan would already have a land border with Nakhichevan. However, there's no guarantee that northern Iran would seek independence or unification with Azerbaijan, even during internal chaos. Consequently, in the medium term, Azerbaijan would likely still have additional political justifications for demanding a transit route through Syunik, similar to the situation described earlier. On the very first day of the war, news spread in Iranian media that one of Iran's neighbors had supported Israel's attack on Iran. Azerbaijani officials denied these rumors. Nevertheless, the issue became a topic of discussion during a later telephone conversation between the presidents of Iran and Azerbaijan. During his subsequent visit to Azerbaijan, Iranian President Pezeshkian expressed satisfaction with the ' responsible position ' taken by member states of the Economic Cooperation Organization during the war. While some Iranian circles still advocate for a cautious approach toward Azerbaijan, officials are working to ease tensions through diplomatic engagements. The declaration adopted by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Istanbul—which referenced the right of return for 'Western Azerbaijanis'—represents one such diplomatic effort. Despite the Iranian ambassador to Armenia stating , 'The use of such wording should be avoided. The name 'Western Azerbaijan' is the name of one of the provinces of the Republic of Iran. It cannot be used to name any other geographical area, especially if it implies any form of territorial claims,' Iran maintained its signature on the document. Similarly, Pezeshkian did not cancel his visit to Karabakh and engaged in cordial discussions with Aliyev regarding destruction attributed to Armenians. The U.S.-backed Syunik Transit Route and Iran's Response Following the war, developments emerged regarding the proposed transit route through Syunik and the U.S. proposal for this route. While official details of the proposal, (or possibly multiple proposals) remained undisclosed, discussions about this possibility spread through both Armenian and international media after the Carnegie Endowment published an article and the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey issued a statement . Iran remained silent for several days. Eventually, during a telephone conversation between the security council secretaries of Iran and Armenia, both parties reaffirmed their commitment to preserving national sovereignty and territorial integrity in any project implementation. In a subsequent interview with Iranian Public Television, Iran's ambassador emphasized that Tehran would accept any project that aligned with Armenia's security interests. Ali Khamenei's foreign affairs advisor, Ali Akbar Velayati, also reaffirmed Iran's opposition to the 'Zangezur corridor' though notably did not address potential American involvement in the transit road. Despite Armenian officials' announcement that Armenia would not 'lease land' to America, it seemed unlikely that American proposals would end there. Indeed, the peace declaration initialed between Armenia and Azerbaijan on August 8 at the White House—in the presence of and witnessed by the U.S. President— included an important provision about the transit road through Meghri, to be named the 'Trump Road for Peace and Prosperity' (TRIPP). Iran's reaction to this event was twofold: First, even before the signing, an article by Ali Akbar Velayati published on August 8 described in harsh terms the path 'to be given to a third party.' Second, Tehran's official response came through a press release from the Foreign Ministry which welcomed peace efforts between Armenia and Azerbaijan while expressing concerns about potential American presence in the region. In the days following the declaration, after telephone conversations between Prime Minister Pashinyan and President Pezeshkian , and between Foreign Ministers Ararat Mirzoyan and Abbas Araghchi , and particularly after Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan's visit to Tehran, Pezeshkian and Araghchi issued several statements . They affirmed that Iran's red lines were respected in the declaration, noting there was no mention of a third-party presence, especially armed forces, and that Armenia had assured them the declaration would not negatively impact the shared Iran-Armenia border. Both officials also highlighted the widespread disinformation circulating in the country about this issue. This dualism in Iran's responses should be analyzed primarily through the lens of Iran's domestic politics. President Pezeshkian's government faces criticism for emphasizing the importance of U.S. negotiations after the war. Conservative circles are characterizing recent developments in the South Caucasus as consequences of Pezeshkian's policy that work against Iran's interests. However, these circles lack decision-making authority. When analyzing Iran's response, one should rely exclusively on statements from those with foreign policy authority—namely, members of the government. I believe that President Pezeshkian's August 18 visit to Armenia will provide an important opportunity to clear up existing misconceptions. Iran's balanced response to the fundamental shift that occurred on August 8 in the South Caucasus serves as an important indicator of Iran's potential future role and the evolving Iran-U.S. relations in the broader region. While Iran continues to navigate its ties with both Armenia and Azerbaijan, its fraught relations with Israel and the U.S.—and the prospect of further clashes—pose potential security risks for Armenia. At the same time, the war exposed the vulnerability of Iran's strategic infrastructure, and the possibility of renewed U.S.-Iran engagement could trigger a broader regional realignment. Much will depend on whether the current ceasefire evolves into a lasting settlement through negotiations, rather than serving merely as a pause before renewed conflict.
EVN Report
7 days ago
- EVN Report
Thea Farhadian's 'Tattoos and Other Markings'
Farhadian's evocation of a cultural past using a mechanical, abstracted soundscape, first distances the listener who finds the sound at hand alien, before they realize that they have actually been drawn into the past the same way that a patient might under guided hypnosis. Farhadian approaches trauma through sounds that appear to be similar to the scratching of needles on old-style vinyl records. The introduction of the voice of Komitas Vartabed send chills down one's spine. The choice of Komitas, the father of Armenian liturgical and folk music who was released from captivity after being deported thanks to the intervention of the American ambassador to the Ottoman Empire Henry Morgenthau Sr., is doubly relevant today given the ongoing genocidal onslaught on the Palestinian people in Gaza. Farhadian's first solo album, 'Tectonic Shifts' (Creative Sources CS 365), featured solo violin and real-time processing that introduced listeners to an echo chamber of experimental sound. Reviewer Massimo Ricci has written: 'What separates her from the typical…tedium- transmitting specimens, is the ability to render the most absurd-sounding complications with sensible unambiguity.' Farhadian has performed in some of the world's premiere music venues, including Issue Project Room, the Downtown Music Gallery, and Alternative Museum—all in New York City—as well as the Aram Khachaturian Museum in Yerevan, Armenia. An artistic polymath, she has also curated experimental video and co-founded the New York and San Francisco Armenian Film Festivals. The composer explains that she grew up listening to Armenian music at home—both folk and sacred—which eventually led her to study Arabic music with the renowned Palestinian oud and violin master Simon Shaheen: 'I fell in love with the Arabic maqamat and began to feel more freedom using these modes to compose and play music.' Until recently it was rare to find an American-born artist who had mastered both the European and Arabic classical traditions, as well as a third tradition that is quite different, as Armenian music is based on a modal system of tetrachords that can repeat indefinitely. In an Other Minds podcast hosted by composer Joseph Bohigian, Farhadian described the process of making this four-track album more like painting than creating music, as details of her past slowly revealed themselves to her like colors on a canvas. The 44-minute long album starts off with Mokats Mirza, a piece that integrates a broader mechanistic soundscape with the voice of Komitas, which weaves in and out of the background sounds. The repetition of the sounds and sequences mimic the repetition steps across the seemingly endless Syrian desert with scant food or water. Strange unidentifiable voices appear in the background. The 18 minute-long Eulogy possesses similar elements but is presented in a more dirge-like manner. At times it resembles a slow-motion recording which offers the listener the opportunity to grieve silently as the music engulfs their senses. The third track, Inscriptions is comprised of industrial sounds that have been processed and shaped out into a soundscape that resides between silence and emptiness. These include scratchings, and sounds that recall a recording machine whose tape is run backwards, an MRI Machine, and a printing press. Here multiple technologies—both advanced and primitive—share a common function of inscribing: letters, tattoos, the inside of one's body. Finally, Farhadian's fourth and final track Gar oo Chgar, (There once was and there was not), bears the title of the traditional opening for Armenian fairytales and fables. Here, the repeated sounds perhaps stand in for needles tattooing the skin or conversely erasing them. The interstices may mirror the emptiness that the marked women experienced first during their long ordeals of captivity and later when liberated and reintegrated into Armenian communities. Farhadian also included the sound of sand falling on the floor of the Aram Khachaturian Hall; a child reciting a poem in Armenian; a recording of the double reed instrument, the duduk. To get a fuller picture of the traumatic experience of deportation, I would pair this remarkable CD. with Elyse Semerdjian's previously mentioned book. I would also add the work of fine artist Linda Ganjian whose recent exhibition 'Her Mind: a Metropolis' at Hudson, New York's Front Row Gallery mixed traditional Armenian motifs and crafts with designs reminiscent of Art Deco to approach her maternal grandmother's experience of survival. As Farhadian reminds people when discussing the personal odyssey which led to her completing 'Tattoos and Other Markings,' discovering this little-known information was chilling, and led her to questions about which cultural narratives are remembered and which are forgotten. In fact, Armenian immigrants to the United States at the turn of the 20th century were made to prove their whiteness, in order to be naturalized American, so the notion of tattooing and marking is doubly pregnant with meaning here. Farhadian's music suggests new avenues for how we hear and represent the past, by leaving the listening experience open- ended rather didactic ways of listening and interpreting. As Liverpool University's James and Constance Alsop Chair of Music Emerita Anahid Kassabian notes: 'This piece invites listeners to make their own connections among the sounds, welcoming all engagements with it. Aesthetically the layers and materials are intriguing, but making the links among them is the listener's option.' The markings left on these women of 1915 by tattoos may be both psychic and mental. And much like the musical notations that mark a page, they offer new pathways to understanding and even perhaps healing the past.
EVN Report
08-08-2025
- EVN Report
Pax Americana Comes to the South Caucasus
In early March, U.S. intelligence as well as numerous officials had substantial basis to warn the White House that Azerbaijan was planning on reinitiating hostilities against Armenia, with deep concerns that incursions into Syunik would likely materialize by mid-March. U.S. officials undertook a flurry of activities to curtail Baku's gameplan, and by mid April, a shuttle diplomacy of sorts was initiated by President Trump's Special Envoy Steve Witkoff's team between Yerevan and Baku. In early May, the American team produced a proposal to both sides which would become the foundational basis of normalization between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Washington Summit held on August 8 at the White House between Prime Minister Pashinyan, President Trump, and President Aliyev is the culmination of this normalization proposal and months of negotiations between the three sides. At the heart of the normalization process, from its inception, was the American belief that unless connectivity is established and the transit route issue addressed, Baku will weaponize the so-called 'Zangezur Corridor' precept to relaunch hostilities. Thus, for Washington, normalization began with finding a solution to the transit route conundrum. What followed was a three-month process of complex negotiations on a highly-creative and unique proposal put forth by the United States. For those of us involved in this process, three things were clear: U.S. pressure was fundamental in order to get Aliyev to agree; the secret state of negotiations limited us from sharing details with the public or civil society; and, the complex and innovative nature of the proposal was ripe for pro-Russian proxies, both in Armenia and the Diaspora, to distort and seeks its obstruction through targeted disinformation campaigns. On August 8, three documents were formalized at the Washington Summit. First, a joint declaration by Armenia and Azerbaijan, under the auspices of the United States, seeking full normalization of relations and permanent pathway to peace. Second, the foreign ministers of both countries placed their initials on a document based on the agreed contours of the draft peace agreement, signifying commitment by both sides to the terms of the deal, which, in essence, includes adherence to the 17 articles of the draft agreement. Third, both foreign ministers jointly signed a document formally withdrawing from the OSCE Minsk Group, noting the ineffective and obsolete nature of the format. At the bilateral level, numerous sets of pre-summit meetings were held on August 7, as both sides addressed the growing depth and scope of U.S.-Armenia relations. On August 8, President Trump and Prime Minister Pashinyan signed numerous memorandums of understanding to elevate the U.S.-Armenia partnership, which, in essence, is designed to not only quickly implement the agenda of the U.S.-Armenia Strategic Partnership, but also include initiatives to collaborate on artificial intelligence, energy, mining, semi-conductors, security, and Armenia's Crossroads of Peace initiative. MOUs were also signed between Azerbaijan and the US, though not at the same scope or depth as that between Armenia and US, considering that the latter are formal strategic partners, while formal bilateral relationship does not yet have such an elevated status. Both sides, however, will be given access to America's arms market, and in this context, the Trump Administration is open to offering both parties weapons sales as commensurate with commitment to bilateral agreements. There Will Be No 'Zangezur Corridor,' Only an Armenian-Controlled Transit Route With respect to the very cornerstone of this Summit lies the much-anticipated U.S.-proposed transit route. After months of intense negotiations, all sides have agreed to the Trump Route for Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a joint Armenia-U.S. venture designed as a master development plan to build a commercial route across Syunik. Conceding the fact that the term 'corridor' has been politicized and weaponized by Baku and Russia's proxies in Armenia and the Diaspora, the project will interchangeably use the terms 'road' and 'route,' thus addressing an important Armenian concern. TRIPP is envisioned as a vital and strategic trade artery that will be subjected to and administered by Armenian law, while operated under a joint Armenia-U.S. venture. Thus, TRIPP, as confirmed in discussions with numerous U.S. officials, ensures Armenia's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and jurisdictional authority. Contrary to the disinformation spread by the likes of former Kocharyan foreign minister Vartan Oskanian, Armenia's illiberal opposition, and pro-Russia organizations in the Diaspora such as the ANCA, Armenian sovereign territory will not be ceded, given, or delegated to any third party actor that constitutes extraterritoriality. Moreover, contrary to the disinformation proliferated by such circles, foreign troops will not be stationed in Armenia, no neighboring country will have a presence in sovereign Armenian territory, and Armenia's link south to Iran will not be obstructed nor have anything to do with this route. In this context, Armenia and the United States will undertake a joint venture, with both Armenian and American companies being granted contracts to build the infrastructure and undertake the development of the route. Considering the immense role the United States will be playing in securing financing for the project, the U.S., in consultation with its Armenian partners, and commensurate with Armenian law, will have the right to delegate or subcontract different parts of the construction project to pertinent companies as deemed appropriate in completing TRIPP. Thus, the United States will partner up with Armenia, with strict adherence to the principle of the inviolability of Armenia's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and jurisdictional authority, to build and operate a commercial transit route through Southern Armenia, allowing for connectivity between Azerbaijan and Nakhijevan. The route is being qualified as an economic and commercial endeavor, not simply a geopolitical or hard power move, and it is for this reason that there is not and will not be talks of its militarization to address the security of the route. Unlike the stipulations put forth in the 2020, November 9 trilateral statement that had sought, based on Russian and Azerbaijani interpretation, the presence of Russian FSB troops controlling an extraterritorial corridor, TRIPP will not have any military presence from any foreign country. Rather, the United States, in agreement with Armenia, will take on the responsibility of ensuring that the route operates and functions safely through the hiring of highly-experienced and qualified companies whose activities, under Armenian law, will ensure the set objectives. While Aliyev had demanded complete unimpeded access of all cargo and goods passing through Armenia, without any inspection of the content included in the shipments, his maximalist demand was not achieved. Rather, only commercial access will be permitted, and in this context, military equipment or non-commercial products will not be permitted. Further, since the control of the route will be under Armenian law, and thus, under Armenian control, cargo entering and passing through the Republic of Armenia will be subjected to inspection prior to entering Armenian territory. The border inspection mechanism will utilize the front-office/back-office model: a third party operator, hired by the U.S.-Armenia joint venture, will work the front office when physically dealing with incoming Azerbaijani cargo, while Armenian officials and border control personnel will be in the back office overlooking all aspects of the process. Through this model, all cargo entering and passing through Armenian territory will be ensured to be commercial, while Armenian law will dictate front-office/back-office operations. The U.S.-Armenia Paradigm and a Growing Security Architecture The Washington Summit is testimony to the highly constructive and methodical role played by the United States in making this initiative a reality. Two important factors stand out in how this came about. First, against much of his strategic self-interest, which is well-designed to maintain his power asymmetry with Armenia and thus obstruct any third-party initiative that allows Armenia agency and potential for development, Aliyev finally agreed to the U.S. proposal, after having sought every diplomatic mechanism of obstructing or prolonging the process. In my extensive engagements with the State Department, National Security Council, and the White House, it was evident that there was a clear understanding in Washington that bringing Aliyev to the table was incumbent upon the United States if Washington had any hopes of its proposed initiative having life. In essence, the Trump Administration's model of working through deadlines, and making certain that involved parties will face punitive action for failing to meet the set deadlines, produced the outcome that many of us, even having access to the process, were skeptical of: that Aliyev will agree to terms that are not commensurate to his maximalist posturing. Second, the U.S. normalization proposal, while having had several iterations since its first draft, is primarily hinged on the following logic: the United States will step in as a constructive economic and geopolitical actor to support the establishment of a transit route through Syunik, giving Azerbaijan commercial connectivity to its exclave of Nakhichevan, with the route being subjected to Armenia's laws and in full compliance with Armenia's sovereignty. In conversations with the leadership in both the State Department and the NSC during the last three months, it was directly shared with me that America's thinking was predicated on three underlying postulates. One, the Washington Summit is not a one-off engagement, but rather a foundational framework for what the United States views as a three year process, from this normalization initiative to signing a final peace treaty. Two, the White House proceeded with a 'peace first' approach, where the conflict is removed from the battlefield space and the use of force is precluded, after which the normalization process proceeds. And three, the U.S. envisions a new South Caucasus, one defined by trade, stability and interconnectivity, which also includes the opening of borders with Turkey in the very near future. In this context, the background leading up to the Summit has been defined by categorically denying Baku the option of using force, offering creative (economic, energy, infrastructure, etc.) incentives to both sides to make certain they adhere to the U.S. plan, and using these developments to formalize a normalization framework that, by 2028, will lead to the signing of a final peace agreement. For Armenia, the U.S. proposal was not only a highly-preferable outcome of its Western pivot and policy of diversification, but more specifically, it has fundamentally altered its security architecture. The joint U.S.-Armenia venture in building TRIPP, for official Yerevan, is not, in and of itself, only an economic or commercial endeavor, but just as, if not more importantly, an important layer of robust deterrence against any future acts of Azerbaijani aggression. Within the domain of security, TRIPP offers Armenia an expansive and multilayered framework of soft deterrence, which exponentially diminishes the threat propensity within its security environment. In essence, whereas the threat of Azerbaijani incursions were a continuous and high-probability threat since 2020, that threat has been exceedingly marginalized by virtue of the U.S.-led normalization initiative and the development of the TRIPP project. Furthermore, the outcome of the Washington Summit, and America's vision of undertaking a multi-year process of finalizing a peace treaty, extensively handicaps Aliyev's capacity to tap into his hybrid warfare toolkit. While Baku, for tactical and strategic reasons, will still seek to utilize certain methods of hybrid warfare, it will, nonetheless, be unable to utilize its wide-ranging toolkit the way it has for the last five years. Within the confluence of such developments, Aliyev's penchant for relying on kinetic and coercive diplomacy will also lose efficacy, since the theater of conflict has been transferred to a normalization format with immense U.S. investment. In no uncertain terms, the normalization process brings Armenia a state of de facto peace, and while a peace treaty, if achieved in the future, will produce a de jure outcome, the more important variable, in the immediate and near future, is that Aliyev's war machine, which had fed off of the power disparity with Armenia, would have go into hibernation. What the U.S. normalization initiative has done for Armenia's security architecture is quite unique: it has given Armenia a transit route that it controls, not the Zangezur Corridor of Aliyev's dreams or the FSB-controlled corridor of Moscow's desires, while at the same time strengthening Armenia's position as a regional actor. Finally, inherent in the normalization initiative is the implicit understanding that Azerbaijan will have to withdraw from the territories it has occupied within Armenia-proper as the TRIPP project comes close to conclusion and reaches the opening stage. More simply put, Azerbaijan will either have to withdraw or act as an obstructionist force against the U.S. project, for the U.S. normalization initiative envisions the operationalization of TRIPP with the de-occupation of Armenian territories. Thus, Azerbaijan's occupation of Armenian sovereign territory will soon become a liability, and what Aliyev had initially deemed an important instrument of leverage against Armenia will now become a source of diplomatic weakness in its relations with the U.S. Quite similar to what will also happen soon with the POWs: as the process develops, the issue of Armenian prisoners of war, a topic of growing importance to the White House, will become a political liability for Baku.
