Nearly 600 killed in Nigeria air strikes in eight months, air force says
The results surpassed the operational gains recorded in 2024, chief of air staff Hasan Abubakar said during a visit to Borno governor Babagana Zulum on Tuesday.
Abubakar said the air force also destroyed more than 200 technical vehicles and 166 logistics hubs in a sweeping offensive against insurgents in the northeast.
Militants from Boko Haram and its splinter group, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), have attacked security forces and civilians in Nigeria's northeast, causing widespread displacement and thousands of deaths.
Militia gangs in Borno State have killed at least 2,000 people since 2023, according to Nigeria Watch, a database that monitors lethal conflicts and security in the country.
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TimesLIVE
2 days ago
- TimesLIVE
Nearly 600 killed in Nigeria air strikes in eight months, air force says
Nigeria's military has killed 592 armed militia members in the northeastern sate of Borno in the past eight months, after stepping up air strikes in a region hit by years of violence, the air force said. The results surpassed the operational gains recorded in 2024, chief of air staff Hasan Abubakar said during a visit to Borno governor Babagana Zulum on Tuesday. Abubakar said the air force also destroyed more than 200 technical vehicles and 166 logistics hubs in a sweeping offensive against insurgents in the northeast. Militants from Boko Haram and its splinter group, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), have attacked security forces and civilians in Nigeria's northeast, causing widespread displacement and thousands of deaths. Militia gangs in Borno State have killed at least 2,000 people since 2023, according to Nigeria Watch, a database that monitors lethal conflicts and security in the country.


eNCA
5 days ago
- eNCA
Jihad or exile: Lake Chad's abandoned youth face impossible choice
Adam Issa struggled to explain why he quit his fisherman's job to join one of the many jihadist groups holed up in the hundreds of islands of Lake Chad. "Some of my friends who joined Boko Haram told me that I would make a lot of money with them," the baby-faced 20-year-old said, eyes fixed firmly downwards. At the end of another rainy season where he came home from the lake with his nets empty, Issa set off in his canoe and crossed the border on the water to join his friends at a jihadist camp in Niger, without telling his family. His story is far from unique on the shores of Lake Chad, which straddles Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria at the point where west and central Africa meet. AFP | Joris Bolomey Dire economic opportunities have made the region's struggling young people easy targets for jihadist recruiting sergeants, and pushed others onto a perilous path of exile in the hope of making money down faraway gold mines. Once arrived at the camp, Issa spent a month and a half in training, learning to fire a 12.7 mm calibre heavy machine gun, before abruptly fleeing to return to his home in the Fouli region in Chad. On what fighting he saw while a member of Boko Haram, he remained silent. - 'Turn into bandits' - Since his return from Boko Haram's embrace, Issa has made his home at the Maison des femmes (House of women) in the town of Bol, which today shelters some 40 repentant jihadists. Bol is the capital of Chad's Lac region, an underdeveloped part of an already underdeveloped nation. AFP | Joris Bolomey Its masses of out-of-work young men have proven a never-ending source of manpower for the armed groups stalking the lake's shores. Among them is Boko Haram, which has sown terror around Lake Chad for some 15 years. Founded in Nigeria at the beginning of the new millennium, the Islamist group achieved international infamy after the 2014 kidnapping of 276 schoolgirls, most of them Christians, in the north of the country. Today it faces stiff competition from the rival Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) group, which splintered off from Boko Haram in 2016. While the two are locked in infighting over ideological differences, both Boko Haram and ISWAP have mounted increasingly brazen attacks on villages and military bases in recent months. With violence mounting and the economy at a standstill, many across Lake Chad believe they have been abandoned by the state. AFP | Joris Bolomey "We have nothing to eat and as a result of this crisis our young people are turning into bandits," lamented Abba Ali Abakura, a traditional chief in the north of Chad's Lac region. Feeling "disgusted and overwhelmed", the 57-year-old also said he fears that "all the able-bodied men will leave the region" in the hope of striking gold at the mines of north Chad or elsewhere in the Sahel. "Only children and elderly people will remain." - Gold rush - That prospect of a golden ticket to a better life is exactly what pushed Mahamat Ali Abdallah to leave Chad. At less than $12 a month, his baker's wage in Baga Sola was far from enough to finance his dreams of getting married, having children and building a house. His thirst for gold led him first to Niger and then onwards north to Algeria to become a prospector, braving the hard labour and often dangerous conditions. Down the mines, he spent his days digging away at the bottom of narrow pits, which could reach a depth of up to 30 metres below the surface, in search of the precious mineral. "One day the earth collapsed on top of us," he said, showing videos of his fellow labourers. AFP | Joris Bolomey "I managed to escape unscathed but my friend had his bones broken." During his two years of tough toil, he sent half the money he made to his family and used the rest for his living expenses at the site. Having returned to Chad without a penny, he said he would leave again in search of more work. "Better to take that risk than to continue to live in poverty," he said. Sparse schooling and a lack of teachers have made the issue worse, with children forced to work in the fields as their parents cannot afford to send them to class in the cities, humanitarian organisations warn. Hassimi Djieni, project manager for the aid group Humanity & Inclusion, estimated there was a "ratio of one teacher for every 500 to 600 students" in the region. "The authorities have to understand that when you boost education, it creates a barrier against young people joining armed groups," said Djieni. By Joris Bolomey


Daily Maverick
29-07-2025
- Daily Maverick
In league with bandits — how a Boko Haram faction entrenched itself near Nigeria's capital
New evidence shows how the JAS group's Shiroro cell adopts a flexible approach that tolerates local bandits and their vices. The Shiroro cell of a Boko Haram faction in Niger State, near Nigeria's capital Abuja, is the group's furthest and most successful expansion outside the Lake Chad Basin. Until now, information about the cell of the Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS) group sketched its existence, but left many questions unanswered. New evidence from ongoing Institute for Security Studies (ISS) research includes interviews with defectors, local victims and women who escaped JAS after being married to some of its fighters. The information sheds light on the Shiroro cell's operations and alliances, and what they mean for counterterrorism in Nigeria. Audiovisual material and corroborating reports show JAS embedded deeply in Niger State's forested communities, blending jihadism with local Fulani banditry – the main source of insecurity in the area. By tolerating the bandits' non-adherence to its strict religious code, JAS benefits from their weapons, fighters and knowledge of the local terrain, enabling the group to gain a strategic foothold in Central Nigeria. The cell is led by Abubakar Saidu, alias Sadiku. A native Babur from Biu in Borno State, Sadiku was sent to Niger State in 2014 by late JAS leader Abubakar Shekau. He was part of a seven-man team directed to meet remaining members of the ultra-Salafist Darul Islam group. After being dislodged from its headquarters in Mokwa by a 2009 police raid, members had fled north into Nigeria's largely ungoverned forests. Unlike the doctrinal and tighter command discipline of rival Boko Haram faction Iswap, JAS thrives on ideological fluidity and predation. Although Darul Islam had earlier rejected Boko Haram's overture for alignment, Sadiku found fertile ground among its dispersed followers and started the Niger State cell along with his comrades from Borno. He began shuttling between Borno and Niger states, gradually embedding himself in the Alawa Forest Reserve area, and coordinating with the local Fulani. This culminated in escalating attacks by the group in 2021. From forest camps like Kugu and Dogon Fili, the group attacks security forces and civilians in villages and towns, and on roads in the Shiroro, Munya and Rafi local government areas. It has killed hundreds, displaced thousands and planted many improvised explosive devices (IEDs). A Premium Times investigation and ISS interviews reveal the abduction of boys who are forced into an indoctrination programme at Islamic schools, and forced labour. Women and girls are kidnapped and forced into marriages with fighters. Strongholds of JAS' Shiroro cell in Niger State, Nigeria Unlike the doctrinal and tighter command discipline of rival Boko Haram faction Islamic State West Africa Province's (Iswap), JAS thrives on ideological fluidity and predation. Militants raid villages, carrying out kidnapping and extortion, which they justify as 'fayhoo' (spoils taken from civilian 'unbelievers'). This flexibility appears key to its entrenchment in Niger State. The Shiroro cell is not structured under the traditional Boko Haram command system, but under kachallas (warlords or strongmen), which shows an embracing of bandit terminology. The fusion of jihadists and non-ideological armed criminals is not new. In Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, jihadists have worked with local criminals for a stake in illegal gold mines. But the Shiroro cell's local integration stands out, especially its tolerance of the bandits' use of alcohol, drugs and prostitution, which contravene the cell's strict religious doctrine. A woman formerly married to a fighter recalled Boko Haram clerics from North East Nigeria expressing disapproval, but Sadiku argued that the Fulani would 'change with time'. It is, however, doubtful whether the bandits would ever cooperate with jihadists out of religious conviction. The Shiroro cell is not structured under the traditional Boko Haram command system, but under kachallas (warlords or strongmen), which shows an embracing of bandit terminology. Notorious bandit leader Dogo Gide served under Sadiku as kachalla before their fallout – though ISS interviews suggest that Bakura Doro, the Lake Chad-based overall commander of JAS, may be mediating a reconciliation. According to defectors and women who lived in the camps, Doro supplies weapons from his base on Lake Chad's Barwa Island. One video, seen by ISS, shows weapons wrapped in grass and fish, hidden on boats bound for Shiroro. This arms flow is complemented by locally sourced weapons, seized from security forces or trafficked through Sahelian smuggling networks, using the group's bandit alliances. Money also flows from Shiroro to Doro, underscoring how territorial expansion is a tactic to also finance terrorism. The Shiroro cell is dispersed across forest communities, including Kugu, Maganda and Dogon Fili, to avoid detection by Nigeria's largely aerial military campaign. The military's ground assets were withdrawn after facing repeated deadly attacks. Further complicating the situation is the Lakurawa, a Sahelian-rooted Fulani armed group designated a terrorist organisation by Nigeria in 2025. While espousing jihadism, Lakurawa is predatory and operates in northwestern Sokoto and Kebbi states along the Niger Republic border. Geography amplifies the Shiroro threat… Arrests in July of Boko Haram-linked women heading to the Borgu axis suggest the cell is eyeing broader expansion. According to a defector and an expert on the conflict, Lakurawa's emissaries have visited Sadiku in Shiroro annually since 2023, providing the first credible evidence of Lakurawa-JAS interactions and possible alignment. Sadiku sent fighters to reinforce Lakurawa, which in turn approached another notorious Fulani bandit leader, Bello Turji, ostensibly to replicate the JAS-style alliance in the country's North West. The convergence of armed groups raises the threat of a wider coordination of violence. The 2022 Kuje prison attack in Abuja involved a rare Iswap-JAS-Ansaru collaboration. A defector who participated in the 2022 Kaduna train attack and kidnapping told ISS the assault was executed by Sadiku's fighters using IEDs from Borno, and partnering with bandits. Meanwhile, Iswap has long sought to expand beyond Lake Chad, even targeting southern states like Oyo to access coastal west Africa. ISS research shows it sent five commanders with 25 fighters each to Central Nigeria in April, maintaining a presence in Kogi's Okene axis. Yet its success has been limited compared with JAS' Shiroro stronghold. Geography amplifies the Shiroro threat. Niger State connects north and south Nigeria and borders Benin through porous forest corridors linking to the Sahel. Arrests in July of Boko Haram-linked women heading to the Borgu axis suggest the cell is eyeing broader expansion. Yet, Nigeria's strategy to prevent and counter violent extremism remains largely Lake Chad-focused. The Shiroro case shows the need for a recalibrated threat map. Responses must include forest surveillance, road security and partnerships with local vigilantes under accountability frameworks. Finance routes must be disrupted and gender-responsive reintegration programmes must be run for defectors. DM