Natural disasters caused $135 bn in economic losses in first half of 2025: Swiss Re
Swiss Re, which serves as an insurer of insurance companies, said first half losses were up from the $123 billion in the first half of 2024.
The Zurich-based reinsurance giant estimated that of this year's first half losses, $80 billion had been insured.
The Los Angeles blazes in January constitute the largest-ever insured wildfire loss event by far, reaching an estimated $40 billion, said Swiss Re.
It said the 'exceptional loss severity' of the fires was down to prolonged winds, a lack of rainfall and 'some of the densest concentration of high-value single-family residential property in the US'.
The March earthquake in Myanmar figured among the major natural disasters in the first six months of the year, with the tremors felt in neighbouring Thailand, India, and China.
In Thailand alone, insured losses reached $1.5 billion.
The second half of the year is usually more costly for insurers due to damage during the North Atlantic hurricane season.
'The strongest lever to increase the resilience and safety of communities is to double down on mitigation and adaptation. It's here that everyone can help reduce losses before they occur,' said Swiss Re's group chief economist Jerome Haegeli.
'While mitigation and adaptation measures come at a price, our research shows that, for example, flood protection measures such as dykes, dams and flood gates are up to 10 times more cost-effective than rebuilding.'
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Rudaw Net
3 hours ago
- Rudaw Net
Kurdistan Region eyes record gas output of over 1 billion cubic feet per day in 2025
Also in Opinions China's promise in the Kurdistan Region: A pragmatic partnership in the making Eleven years on, the Yazidi genocide continues in silence Tehran at a tipping point: The unraveling of the Iranian rial Turkish lira's rocky road: What rate cuts mean for its neighbors A+ A- It is planned that next week, the UAE-based Dana Gas and its partners will conduct the initial pre-production testing of the Khor Mor natural gas production expansion project, known as KM250. Subsequently, they will move to the production phase, increasing daily production by 250 million cubic feet of gas to 540 million cubic feet of gas for the company's operations at the Khor Mor field in Sulaimani province. This is set to bring natural gas production in the Kurdistan Region to over 1 billion cubic feet per day. According to Dana Gas's latest announcement, the KM250 project will be completed earlier than the announced timeframe, and initial work for the Chemchemal field has progressed, with the aim of producing 75 million cubic feet per day. This means that with just these two gas fields, from early next year, the Kurdistan Region will reach the production of 865 million cubic feet of natural gas per day. This will make the Khor Mor field one of the largest gas projects in the Middle East and North Africa region, comparable to the Khazzan gas project in Oman, Zohr in Egypt, and Leviathan in the Mediterranean Sea off Israel's coast. In mid-May, the Kurdistan Region's acting natural resources minister signed two major agreements in the gas and oil sectors in Washington, and indicated that the Iraqi-Kurdish oil company KAR Group produces 120-130 million cubic feet of gas from the Khurmala oil field. If the Miran and Topkhana fields also reach production levels, then the Kurdistan Region will surpass Iraq in terms of gas production. Now, the main question is whether or not reaching production of over 1 billion cubic feet of gas in this short period can place the Kurdistan Region into new energy balances in this region and save Iraq from importing Iranian gas and Turkish electricity. The Kurdistan Region's chances of meeting the target The gas fields of the Kurdistan Region, excluding the fields in Kurdish areas outside the Kurdistan Region's administration, or Article 140 areas, number five, with a total gas reserve of 26 trillion cubic feet. One of the fields is currently producing gas - the Khor Mor field. Additionally, there are five associated oil-gas fields in the Kurdistan Region with gas reserves reaching over 7 trillion cubic feet, and currently, three of these fields produce gas daily. Thus, the total natural gas reserves of the Kurdistan Region, whether in natural gas fields or those associated with oil, reach over 33 trillion cubic feet, where the level of investment is progressing daily. Five oil and gas fields in the Region are set to approach the level of gas production of the entirety of Iraq by the end of this year. The KM250 project development work has progressed toward completion and is in the final testing phase, according to Dana Gas. In the coming months, Dana Gas and its partners are set to bring gas production levels at Khor Mor and Chemchemal to approximately 865 million cubic feet of gas per day. Additionally, KAR Group produces between 120-130 million cubic feet of gas daily from the Khurmala field. WesternZagros and Gazprom produce approximately 10 to 15 million cubic feet of gas daily from the Sarqala field, and DNO's daily gas production level reaches 20 million cubic feet, but it is reinjected for use in oil production. In this way, the total gas production in the Kurdistan Region reaches approximately 1.025 billion cubic feet per day, while according to OPEC and Energy Institute (EI) data, Iraq produces approximately 1.15 billion cubic feet of gas daily. The Kurdistan Region's approach to Iraq's level in terms of natural gas production is due to the development of gas fields and the reduction of associated gas flaring from oil fields, at a time when, in July of this year, the World Bank published its annual report on associated gas flaring from oil and gas fields worldwide. According to the report, for the third consecutive year, the West Qurna-2 oil field in Basra ranks first globally among more than 15,000 fields with flaring of 1.64 billion cubic meters, and in 2024, Iraq ranked third globally for associated gas flaring, reaching 18.18 billion cubic meters. Another difference between Erbil and Baghdad regarding gas is in terms of timing. According to EI data, Iraq has been producing gas since 1970, with production of 0.07 billion cubic feet. In 2007, the production level was 0.44 billion cubic feet, and last year, the daily production level reached 1.15 billion cubic feet. In contrast, the Kurdistan Region produced zero gas before 2007, and in 2008 it reached 78 million cubic feet daily. Last year, the Region's production was approximately 0.7 billion cubic feet daily, and by the end of this year, it is set to reach over 1 billion cubic feet per day. In May, two new contracts were signed with HKN and WesternZagros in Washington for investment in the Miran and Topkhana fields. If the work of these two contracts also progresses, then in the coming years, the Kurdistan Region will surpass Iraq in terms of gas production and can emerge among gas-producing and exporting countries as a new supplier of this type of energy, which the world needs for the post-oil phase and the era of energy transition. Khor Mor compared with other Iraqi gas fields According to a report by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) last month, Iraq's total gas reserves are approximately 131 trillion cubic feet, and the production level compared to reserves can be said to be zero or a rate of 0.00087 percent. Meanwhile, the Kurdistan Region's total reserves are 33 trillion cubic feet, but the production level by the end of this year will reach 1.025 billion cubic feet, meaning that while the Region's reserves constitute one-quarter or 25.19 percent of Iraq's gas reserves, its production level has reached close to Iraq's, despite the fact that only in 2024, 48 percent of Iraq's investment budget went to the oil ministry, amounting to more than $12 trillion. This advancement in the Kurdistan Region's natural gas investment traces back to the story of Khor Mor and Crescent Petroleum company and its partners, who started in 2008 and have continuously invested in it. The development of the Kurdistan Region's gas fields, unlike Iraq, does not have a long history and go back five decades. In fact, it does not even go back two decades. It began in 2008 with daily production of 78 million cubic feet to 810 million cubic feet of natural gas, 127 million cubic feet of condensate gas, and 105 million cubic feet of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) by the end of this year, as shown below. Conclusion The test that Dana Gas and its partners reportedly plan to conduct is known as "Pressure Testing Pipe with Nitrogen" and is the final phase, after which preparations are made for production. Therefore, Dana Gas indicated in its first quarter 2025 financial report that it will commence gas production from KM250 and increase the gas production rate from Khor Mor by 50 percent for all three types of gas production. In Qamar Energy's 2021 report for the U.S. Department of Energy regarding the Kurdistan Region's natural gas, it was indicated that after meeting domestic needs, the first option for the Kurdistan Region's natural gas export is to Iraq, then Turkey, and other countries. Also, since 2019, the KM250 gas sales agreement between Dana Gas and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has been signed, and last year, Dana Gas and its partners negotiated gas sales to Iraq, but after the KRG's concerns and drone attacks, this issue was postponed. Now, the question is how the addition of 250 million cubic feet of gas will revive this issue. Will Dana Gas and its partners work directly with Baghdad as before, or will the KRG, Baghdad, and companies conduct trilateral negotiations together? According to EI data for 2024, the difference between production and demand for natural gas in Iraq is 750 million cubic feet per day, despite all signed contracts and projects of the oil ministry during this cabinet's term. Iraq can benefit from this advancement and development of the Kurdistan Region's natural gas in two ways: either buy the gas and transfer it to electricity generation stations as it attempted in the past for purchasing for electricity generation stations like Kirkuk, or buy electricity from production companies in the Kurdistan Region, because increased natural gas in the future will enable the Kurdistan Region to produce more electricity due to infrastructure that can produce up to 8,000 megawatts and double or triple the level of sales to Iraq. Another reality about the natural gas investment sector is that it is very complex and long-term, and requires significant capital. The Kurdistan Region potentially reaching close to the amount produced in Iraq over five decades in less than two decades, and becoming one of the pioneering natural gas production projects in this region and the Middle East means that federal Iraq will certainly shift from being an observer of gas-exporting countries to being a natural gas supplier in the coming years. However, it should not be overlooked that this expansion was delayed for three years due to security conditions, so this transformation requires ensuring security and safety now and in the future. Finally, the continued development of this sector in the Kurdistan Region can establish its position as a new energy source in the era of energy transition and become a factor in distancing or reducing Baghdad's dependence on Tehran's gas and Ankara's electricity. Mahmood Baban is a research fellow at the Rudaw Research Center. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
Memri
7 hours ago
- Memri
Russian Media Outlet Iran.ru: 'A Military Crisis Or Increased External Threats Against Iran' Would Have 'Profound' Consequences For China And Russia
On August 5, 2025, the Russian media outlet published an article, titled "Consequences of a Potential Military Conflict with Iran for Russia and China," by Mohammad Hossein Masumzadeh, senior research fellow at the Iran-based Governance and Policy Think Tank (GPTT). The article argues that a military crisis or increased external threats against Iran would have profound and many-sided consequences for both China and Russia. "The loss of a key strategic partner would weaken their regional influence and geopolitical leverage over the West. Key energy and transit routes would be disrupted, instability would grow in neighboring regions, and both countries would face significant threats to their economic interests and security," the article noted. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (in the center) with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov and Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi in Beijing, China, March 14, 2025, during the talks on the Iranian nuclear issue. (Source: the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs).[2] Below is article:[3] "This Informal But Vital Partnership Is Based On Shared Goals" "The strategic cooperation between Russia, China, and Iran, often referred to by Western powers as the 'axis of instability,' has become an important counterweight to Western influence, especially to the United States. This informal but vital partnership is based on shared goals: countering American unipolarity, protecting national sovereignty, and expanding influence in strategic regions. "Thanks to the country's strategic location and vast energy resources, Iran comes forward as a key element in this axis, serving as a vital ally for Russia and an important energy and transit hub for China. Both Russia and China promote Iran's integration into [international] structures such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS, perceiving it as a bulwark against Western sanctions. Therefore, provided Iran is drawn into a military conflict or faces increased external threats, especially from the West or as a result of regional conflicts, this could significantly upset the global and regional balance of power, which would have serious consequences for both Russia and China." "Iran Is A 'Key Gateway' For China's Belt And Road Initiative" "A military crisis or growing external threats to Iran could pose significant risks to China's economic and strategic interests. Despite its close economic ties with the West and Israel, China prefers diplomatic and political support for Iran to direct military intervention. Iran plays a key role in ensuring China's energy security, supplying about 90 percent of its exported crude oil to the PRC. In 2025, average supplies [volume] will range from 1.4 to 1.7 million barrels per day (bpd), reaching a peak of 1.8 million bpd in June 2025. "These supplies with a discount, made possible by Western sanctions, are extremely important for China, the world's largest oil importer. A crisis in Iran will disrupt this vital supply chain, prompting China to seek more expensive or less reliable alternatives, which could potentially slow its economic growth. In addition, non-oil trade between Iran and China, which amounted to $32.3 billion in 2024, will face serious restrictions. "Iran is a 'key gateway' for China's Belt and Road Initiative (B&R), facilitating a connection to markets in Europe and West Asia. A military crisis or external threats disrupting Iran's transport and energy corridors would jeopardize China's major infrastructure projects and vital logistics routes to the West. "Events such as Israel's strike on Iranian military and nuclear facilities in June of 2025 could further undermine strategic projects such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The 'Middle Corridor' (Trans-Caspian International Transport Route), which comes as an alternative to routes running through Iran or Russia, has a number of infrastructure limitations, including limited capacity, making it an unsuitable replacement for Iran within China's Belt and Road Initiative. "Geopolitics-wise, the crisis in Iran would undermine China's diplomatic authority, especially after its successful mediation in Iran and Saudi Arabia rapprochement in March of 2023. It will also jeopardize China's strategic autonomy in securing energy and logistics routes, increasing its vulnerability to external pressure, especially in such narrow points as the Strait of Malacca, which remains under notable US influence. This would weaken China's stance in the region and globally, giving the West an opportunity to strengthen its position and possibly to shift its focus towards a direct confrontation with China." "A Crisis In Iran Will Weaken Russia's Ability To Maintain Its Influence In The Region" "For Russia, a military crisis or external threats targeting Iran would have far-reaching consequences, affecting its geopolitical influence, economic stability, and security interests. A crisis in Iran will weaken Russia's ability to maintain its influence in the region, which could create a power vacuum that rivals such as Turkey or Saudi Arabia could make use of. In the worst-case scenario, under a serious escalation of the conflict, growing instability, inter-ethnic tensions, or a refugee crisis, the situation could spread to Central Asia and the Caucasus, which in turn increases the risks of terrorism, migration, and anti-Russian sentiment in these critically important regions. "Economy-wise, while Russia, being a major oil exporter, may temporarily benefit from an increase in global oil prices due to supply disruptions from Iran, long-term market volatility will undermine OPEC+ cooperation on oil production and price stabilization. Iran is also perceived as a market for Russian arms, and the crisis will likely reduce demand for Russian military exports, which will affect the country's defense industry. In addition, Iran provides Russia with access to Asian markets, in particular India, through [its] transportation corridors. "The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which connects Russia, Iran, and India, is a cornerstone of Russia's strategy to diversify trade routes and reduce dependence on routes controlled by the West. The crisis in Iran would threaten feasibility of the INSTC by disrupting Russia's access to markets of the South Asia and exacerbating problems associated with the sanctions over the conflict in Ukraine. A direct conflict involving Iran could further reduce the security of these routes and block Russian exports. "In terms of politics, Iran serves as a geopolitical buffer protecting against Western pressure, especially in the context of the Ukrainian conflict. The crisis in Iran will encourage the West, which could increase Russia's isolation and weaken its rhetoric against Western imperialism." The "Geopolitical Leverages Over The West" "In conclusion, let's note that a military crisis or increased external threats against Iran would have profound and many-sided consequences for both China and Russia. The loss of a key strategic partner would weaken their regional influence and geopolitical leverages over the West. Key energy and transit routes would be disrupted, instability would grow in neighboring regions, and both countries would face significant threats to their economic interests and security. "The 'axis' would be seriously weakened, which will create opportunities for the West to expand its influence. Provided the U.S. manages to deal with the challenge posed by Iran, it will be able to divert resources to a more direct confrontation with China and Russia, wherein Russia will face an additional threat in the form of increased NATO pressure, especially in the context of resumed support for Ukraine on part of the West. This scenario will prompt both countries to rethink their geopolitical and economic strategies and face significant obstacles to maintaining strategic balance and global influence."
Rudaw Net
12 hours ago
- Rudaw Net
Baghdad nearing oil deal with Erbil, negotiating new export agreement with Ankara
Also in Iraq Iraq's water crisis spurs calls to block Turkish companies Eighth batch of Yazidi remains from ISIS genocide laid to rest in Shingal Dozens of Arbaeen pilgrims killed, injured in southern Iraq accident Iraq's electricity back online after nationwide outage A+ A- ERBIL, Kurdistan Region - Iraq's oil ministry is 'very close' to reaching a final agreement with the Kurdistan Region to resume oil exports, a senior ministry official told Rudaw on Wednesday, adding that talks are also ongoing with Ankara to negotiate a new oil export agreement through the Turkish port of Ceyhan. Speaking to Rudaw on condition of anonymity, the official confirmed, 'We are very close to a final agreement' with Erbil, adding that once exports resume, 'the Kurdistan Region's oil will be sold exclusively through [the State Organization for Marketing of Oil] SOMO,' Iraq's national oil marketer. For his part, Ali Nizar Faiq, general director of SOMO, confirmed to Rudaw on Wednesday that the company is prepared to 'receive and sell' oil from the Kurdistan Region, but noted that 'the Kurdistan Region has not handed over the oil yet.' Efforts to finalize the deal follow a mid-July agreement in which Erbil and Baghdad agreed on the daily transfer of 230,000 barrels of oil from the Kurdistan Region to SOMO for export through the Ceyhan pipeline. Exports along that route have been suspended since March 2023, following a ruling by a Paris-based arbitration court in favor of Baghdad. The court found that Ankara had breached a 1973 pipeline agreement by allowing the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to independently export oil since 2014. Importantly, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced in mid-July that Turkey will not renew the 1973 Iraq-Turkey pipeline agreement, which is set to expire in 2026. However, the senior Iraqi oil ministry source told Rudaw that Baghdad is currently reviewing new proposals from Ankara. 'We are reviewing proposals from the Turkish government to finalize a new agreement, and we expect to reach a deal before the deadline expires.'
