The Evolution of India's Strategic Forces Command
Since its inception, the SFC has made significant progress. It has evolved from a nascent organization with fewer resources to a larger force. However, the command's 22-year journey has remained shrouded in secrecy. The article is therefore an attempt to document the SFC's journey, including newly inducted systems and storage sites, and how its operationalization has enhanced India's nuclear deterrent capabilities.
The SFC became fully operational with the induction of a nuclear delivery system – the Prithvi-II missile in 2003. Following this, the SFC inducted the Agni-I in 2007, and since then, various other land-based missile systems have become part of the Command, including the Agni-I, Agni-II, Agni-III, and Agni-IV. Agni-Prime, which the SFC has already tested on many occasions as part of user trials, will also become operational, along with the Agni-V variant capable of carrying only a single warhead. These missiles are part of regular army missile units, which indicates that the SFC is a joint custodian of land-based nuclear delivery systems.
In the case of aerial assets, the Indian Air Force had hesitated to hand over its jets solely to the SFC, citing a lack of adequate combat fighters. Instead, it offered 'dual-tasked fighters' as an alternative. The agreement was based on the proposal that the Air Force would maintain operational control over a specific number of dual-role aircraft, such as Jaguars, Mirage-2000s, and Su-30 MKIs, under normal circumstances. However, during nuclear strike missions, the SFC would take full control of these dual-use systems.
An important question remains: whether these aircraft will conduct routine air-to-air and air-to-ground missions during a crisis, or be reserved solely for nuclear launches, with some performing conventional roles. Depending on the air base, those aircraft that have been assigned a nuclear role will be stored in protected or underground shelters to ensure survivability.
According to public sources, the SFC has at least 40 modified Su-30MKIs to launch dual-capable BrahMos missiles for nuclear missions. The aircraft can be assigned to a nuclear role because the IAF already operates over 270 Su-30MKIs. Integrating a nuclear warhead is possible with BrahMos because, as per sources, India has developed a fission device of 12-15 kilotons, which weighs under 200 kg. An air-launched version of the BrahMos system can carry a 300 kg warhead.
The SFC's role in operating India's nuclear-capable ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), which are responsible for carrying and launching the country's sea-based nuclear weapons, remains unclear. India currently has three SSBNs: two – INS Arihant and INS Arighat – are operational, while INS Aridhaman is expected to join the fleet soon. At present, only submerged platforms can deliver nuclear weapons payloads. Scholars have claimed that India's SSBNs will remain solely under the operational command of the SFC. The SSBNs will only have nuclear warheads mated with onboard submarine-launched ballistic missiles in times of crisis, which the SFC defines not as a situation of live conflict, but when defense officials believe there is a high possibility of military escalation with either Pakistan or China.
With the arrival of 26 Rafale-M aircraft from France, India's indigenous naval aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, which will house them, is likely to carry nuclear warheads onboard. This is possible because the Rafale can be modified for nuclear missions. According to sources, France has still not provided source codes to the Indian military, which would allow India to deploy indigenous weapons systems on the aircraft. However, the strategic partnership between France and India suggests that, in the future, changing geopolitical circumstances might lead Paris to permit New Delhi to integrate nuclear weapons with Rafales. In that scenario, it is a possibility that the SFC will also share joint command of the aircraft carrier with the Indian Navy, but what protocols will be in place are unclear, as there is no information available in the public domain.
Over time, the SFC has built independent facilities for storing nuclear warheads and missiles, along with joint facilities with conventional forces. These include bases at Ambala and Gorakhpur, and potential land-based missile storage at Jodhpur and Jalandhar ammunition depots. One such facility is located at Morki in the state of Rajasthan, which is suspected to not only house India's nuclear-capable missiles but also a potential warhead storage site. Morki is approximately 300 km from the India-Pakistan border, thus suggesting a potential storage site for Agni-1 and Agni-II ballistic missiles. According to the latest open-source satellite imagery, this site appears operational.
Besides this, another missile base and storage facility were constructed near Guwahati, Assam. Full-scale construction commenced around 2014. The base is now an operational facility similar to one at Morki. It has one significant concrete ground, which can be used as a launchpad for launchers to fire their payload. In addition, the SFC will also have its operational storage site near India's new SSBN naval base, INS Varsha, which is under construction at Rambilli. INS Varsha has an underground tunnel, a perfect place to store missiles and warheads. These warheads and missiles will be employed for sea deterrent missions.
The SFC has improved its operational readiness. Senior Indian civilian security officials and former commanders consistently indicate that some portion of New Delhi's nuclear arsenal – especially those meant for use against Pakistan – is now kept at a high alert level, capable of being activated and launched within seconds or minutes during a crisis, rather than hours as previously believed.
The SFC has played a pivotal role in managing the Indian nuclear forces by systematically constructing and fortifying India's nuclear storage facilities – all while working under extreme secrecy. Its evolution implies that the organization has managed to guard and enhance the Indian deterrence force's capabilities over the past two decades. It has come a long way from the induction of Prithvi-II missiles propelled by liquid fuel, which required significant time to launch, to the commissioning of solid fuel missiles stored in canisters, ready for launch within seconds.
While greater readiness allows India to prepare for any crisis's eventualities, it also exacerbates the risks associated with their inadvertent or accidental launch. The world has already witnessed a BrahMos missile's accidental launch in 2022. This highlights the chances of an unauthorized or accidental launch of a delivery system, which requires strict checks and balances from India's Nuclear Command Authority.
It is unclear what measures have been adopted so that nuclear readiness doesn't come at the cost of diluting India's centralized command and control system. In a region where crises are frequent and misperceptions aplenty, higher readiness levels can prompt early introduction of nuclear weapons despite India's stated policy of No First Use.
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The SSBNs will only have nuclear warheads mated with onboard submarine-launched ballistic missiles in times of crisis, which the SFC defines not as a situation of live conflict, but when defense officials believe there is a high possibility of military escalation with either Pakistan or China. With the arrival of 26 Rafale-M aircraft from France, India's indigenous naval aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, which will house them, is likely to carry nuclear warheads onboard. This is possible because the Rafale can be modified for nuclear missions. According to sources, France has still not provided source codes to the Indian military, which would allow India to deploy indigenous weapons systems on the aircraft. However, the strategic partnership between France and India suggests that, in the future, changing geopolitical circumstances might lead Paris to permit New Delhi to integrate nuclear weapons with Rafales. 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Besides this, another missile base and storage facility were constructed near Guwahati, Assam. Full-scale construction commenced around 2014. The base is now an operational facility similar to one at Morki. It has one significant concrete ground, which can be used as a launchpad for launchers to fire their payload. In addition, the SFC will also have its operational storage site near India's new SSBN naval base, INS Varsha, which is under construction at Rambilli. INS Varsha has an underground tunnel, a perfect place to store missiles and warheads. These warheads and missiles will be employed for sea deterrent missions. The SFC has improved its operational readiness. 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