India should join the Global Combat Air Program — but not just yet

Japan Times

12-06-2025

As the world learns to navigate an era of volatile American politics, global defense partnerships are being reshaped. Donald Trump's chaotic return to the White House has called into question America' reliability as a security guarantor and U.S. allies are seeking new forms of international cooperation.
An ambitious expression of this shift is the Global Combat Air Program, a joint effort between Japan, the United Kingdom and Italy to develop a next-generation fighter jet by 2035.
GCAP is more than just a weapons platform. It is a statement of strategic autonomy, industrial innovation and trilateral cooperation among democracies that are, each in their own way, redefining their role on the global stage. And now, as reports emerge that Japan and India have discussed possible Indian participation in GCAP, the project stands at a potential inflection point.
The idea of including India — one of the world's fastest-growing economies and an increasingly assertive geopolitical actor — makes strategic sense. But it also presents diplomatic and practical challenges that cannot be ignored. As with many promising international endeavors, timing is everything.
Opening for Japan-India ties
India's inclusion in GCAP could offer a breakthrough in Japan-India relations. Over the past two decades, the Asian nations have built a robust security partnership. From the 2008 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation to more recent agreements on defense-equipment acquisitions and the sharing of sensitive security information, Tokyo and New Delhi have grown comfortable with each other in the defense realm. Joint military exercises are now routine and there is a shared interest in counterbalancing China's growing influence in the Indo-Pacific.
Yet this bilateral relationship has stalled in recent years. Prime Minister Narendra Modi's failure to visit Japan in 2024 broke an established pattern, and with India now positioning itself as the de facto leader of the Global South, Japan may be losing relative importance in New Delhi's strategic calculus.
Including India in GCAP could re-energize this relationship by offering a high-stakes, high-visibility partnership that aligns with India's long-term security and technological ambitions.
For Japan, whose defense industry has long struggled under strict export controls, GCAP represents a rare opportunity to lead in a collaborative international project. Since Japan revised its arms transfer policy in 2014, and especially after its 2024 decision to allow exports of finished defense products under GCAP, it has cautiously moved toward becoming a more active player in global defense markets. Including India could bring financial investment, manufacturing capacity and political clout to the initiative.
Lessons of the past
However, the road to integrating India into such a high-technology, multinational defense program is strewn with potential pitfalls. Japan — and its British and Italian partners — must approach the issue with cautious optimism rather than uncritical enthusiasm.
India's track record in defense negotiations is complex, often fraught with delays, policy reversals and insistent demands for domestic production and technology transfer.
A previous fighter-jet purchase by New Delhi stands as a cautionary tale. After years of negotiations, India abandoned its Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft tender competition, which intended to supply its air force with 126 fighters. It ultimately settled for 36 jets under new terms with the winner, Dassault of France — hardly a model of streamlined procurement.
Japan has its own bitter experience. Talks over the amphibious U.S.-2 search and rescue aircraft, once hailed as a landmark opportunity for Japanese defense exports, fizzled after years of talks due to cost concerns. And in the economic sphere, skeptics can point to India's withdrawal from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in 2019 — despite Tokyo's encouragement — citing unresolved trade imbalances and geopolitical concerns.
These cases point to a broader reality: India negotiates hard, takes its time and rarely yields on its demands for strategic autonomy. This negotiating culture, while entirely within India's rights as a sovereign nation, may be fundamentally at odds with the pace and structure of GCAP, which is already a delicate balancing act among three countries with differing defense needs and industrial capacities.
A future invitation
The GCAP's schedule is ambitious. Japan aims to replace its aging F-2 fighters by 2035 and any delay in production or development could leave a gap in national defense readiness. Integrating a new partner like India at this stage — especially one likely to demand significant changes to project structure, technology-sharing agreements and production timelines — could threaten that schedule.
Moreover, the three current partners are still ironing out key elements, including industrial roles and manufacturing bases. The recently created GCAP International Government Organisation (GIGO), headquartered in the U.K. but headed by former Japanese Vice Defense Minister Masami Oka, is just beginning to establish the governance structure for this complex collaboration.
To bring India into the project now would almost certainly add complications. A protracted negotiation could not only jeopardize the project timeline but also fray relations among the current trio. Worse still, if talks were to collapse — as happened with RCEP or the U.S.-2 — the diplomatic fallout could damage the Japan-India relationship rather than enhance it.
That's why timing is key. While India should be considered a prospective partner, this should be done at a later, more stable stage in the GCAP's development. Once the project has passed the foundational design and industrial division phases — perhaps around 2027 or 2028 — it may be more feasible to expand the partnership. At that point, India's involvement could be structured in a modular way, perhaps focusing on production, systems integration or joint exports to third countries rather than full-scale co-development from the ground up.
The broader strategic picture
Inviting India to join GCAP — eventually — would send a powerful message about the resilience and adaptability of democratic defense partnerships. It would align with the growing convergence between India and the West, particularly as China's influence looms large and the United States vacillates between engagement and retrenchment.
That said, this must be done with the clarity that strategic alignment cannot come at the cost of operational failure. GCAP is too important and too delicate to risk being overwhelmed by difficult negotiations or mismatched expectations. The priority now must be maintaining GCAP's momentum and cohesion.
Tokyo, London and Rome should continue quiet consultations with New Delhi, keeping the option open and signaling a willingness to explore future cooperation. India, with its ambition, industrial potential and rising global stature is a natural candidate for eventual participation in a program like GCAP — but not just yet.
Tomoko Kiyota is an associate professor at Nagasaki University.