The ticking time bomb that the Middle East can turn out to be for US and world economy

New Indian Express

4 days ago

Conflict is reshaping the Middle East and energy markets, which are inextricably intertwined, in an unpredictable manner.
The 12-day Israel-Iran war
Complacent financial markets and policymakers are playing out a theatre of the absurd based on little detail and propaganda. As the old trope states, truth is the first casualty of war.
After the commencement of Israeli bombing but before the US strikes on Iran, the market price for oil for future delivery was trading around the mid-sixties per barrel well below the spot price which had spiked up to the mid-seventies. This is below the average inflation adjusted price for two decades.
It moved marginally higher after news of the American attacks on Iranian nuclear sites. Prices then fell sharply following an almost apologetic, symbolic response from Tehran, similar to that in 2020. This was seen as signalling de-escalation to avoid a full-blown conflict despite the continuation of the air war between Israel and Iran.
On June 24, markets did a victory lap after US President Donald Trump announced Iran and Israel had agreed a ceasefire that would end their conflict within 24 hours. Brent crude immediately fell 4.1 percent to $67.61 a barrel, around the price before Israel's initial attack on Iran on 13 June. Oil market reactions were surprising given that there appeared to be no substantive agreement or details. As of early July, the ceasefire appeared to be holding despite violations but remained fragile.
Peace in our times?
Caution is warranted. There is confusion whether Iran's nuclear capabilities have been destroyed or significantly degraded. The fate of Iran's highly enriched Uranium is unknown. Iran, which has extensive nuclear expertise despite the targeted killings of its scientists, has not indicated abandonment of its programs.
Given the continuing threats it faces and the knowledge that the US and Israel would not have dared attack if it possessed nuclear armaments, it might now be tempted to weaponise. This is precisely what Saddam Hussein did after Israel bombed his nascent nuclear programme in 1981 eventually leading to the Gulf Wars.
In effect, Iran is being forced to choose between becoming Libya (where Colonel Gaddafi gave up his nuclear ambitions and was removed then murdered) or North Korea.
Iran has the option of moving its program underground by withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty or preventing inspections. Iran has stopped cooperation with the IAEA, the UN nuclear oversight body. Many countries, including Israel itself, developed nuclear weapons covertly.
Given that Tel-Aviv has shown little regard for ceasefires in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria, it is fanciful to think that there is a sustained halt in hostilities. Remember Israel has used the Iranian nuclear threat as an excuse for its aggression arguing repeatedly that the Islamic nation is within weeks or days of building a bomb since 1992!
The ever changeable US President suggested that there may be no need for a nuclear agreement with Iran as it was unnecessary with the "obliteration" of the nuclear sites but later Trump indicated he would resume bombing if Iran continued any nuclear enrichment program or even did not allow inspections. The Israelis have never ruled out continuation of their military campaign.
Israel's operations against the abandoned Palestinians and attacks on Lebanon and Syria have not ceased. Israel's Iranian action was, in part, to distract the world's attention from its continuing aggression in these theatres. These will come back into focus.
Qatar and the Gulf states have indicated that they want the US to actively press for a comprehensive ceasefire in Gaza. The UN and West, if it has any moral courage remaining, may impose meaningful sanctions on Israel. Prime Minister Netanyahu needs a state of permanent war, to ensure support of his Zionist coalition partners, to stay in power to forestall legal actions against him and his family.
Without meaningful sanctions relief and security guarantees, a permanent cessation in hostilities is unlikely. There is too much bitterness, mistrust and history.
Iranians, especially the Republic Guards whose leaders were assassinated, are unlikely to forget and forgive. For Iran, recent events have confirmed, it that was needed, that Israel, the US and its allies are its enemies. It has made it difficult for more moderate forces to seek a diplomatic solution.
Despite its undoubted military capabilities, the Islamic Republic will have noted that the Jewish state is not invulnerable to its missiles and needed extensive US support and intervention in the "12-day war". Tehran has tested its weaponry under battlefield condition and can now refine its arsenal. Israeli sleeper cells and intelligence penetration will be less effective in future conflicts. Tel-Aviv cannot, as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu admitted, sustain a war of attrition. Iran will patiently rebuild its capabilities and proxies. 9/11 occurred years after the US-led intervention in Iraq.
The 'truce' may earn President Trump 'points' towards the Nobel Peace Prize that he covets. It is unlikely to bring lasting peace to the Middle East.
The US, Israel and its allies would do well to remember Thucydides' Melian Dialogue which records Athens' conquest of Melos. The Melians unsuccessfully resisted suffering horrific losses. Athens believed that "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must". They believed that they could act with impunity because their power was complete. Less than three years later Athens suffered a military disaster in Sicily from which they never recovered.
Oil Matters
Western focus on the Middle East is because of Israel, to expiate its own Holocaust guilt, and energy.
While renewables especially solar and wind power have grown as part of the mix, oil and gas, alongside coal, remain the major sources of energy fuelling economies. Currently the world consumes around 100 million barrels of oil daily (around 50 percent for transport and 20 percent for petrochemicals). While energy intensity (usually measured as the tonnes of oil needed to create $1,000 of GDP) has declined from 0.12 in 1975 to 0.05 in 2022, no significant decline in demand is forecast due to limited alternatives for heavy transportation and as a chemical feedstock. Natural gas is around 23 percent of the world's total energy consumption and provides a quarter of global electricity.
The Gulf region is the world's most important energy-producer, containing around 50 percent of proven reserves. It produces around 33 percent of the world's oil and around 17 percent of natural gas. Any serious disruption would affect availability and price flowing through to economies.
The current lethargy comes from a perception of ample supplies. In the lead up to the current crisis, OPEC, driven by Saudi pressure, increased output which combined with slowing demand from decelerating economic activity particularly in China caused sharp declines in price. In a repeat of 2015, Saudi Arabia sought to punish producers who were producing above quotas agreed between member states.
The actions may have been to placate President Trump who has consistently sought lower oil prices. Saudi Arabia's objectives remain unchanged: generate revenue at necessary levels, maintain its market share as low prices make US shale oil and gas uncompetitive and accelerate use of a potentially stranded resource.
Even before the Israel-Iran war, rising tensions and spreading conflict had altered the equation. There was increased stockpiling and consumption; military aircraft are not designed for fuel efficiency! But the serious long-term threat comes from collateral damage to energy facilities or the weaponization of oil and gas supplies.
There is no guarantee that Israel, whose declared objectives is eliminating the Iran's nuclear capabilities and unseating its leaders, will not at some time target oil and gas facilities to increase pressure on the regime. Iran exports up to 2 million barrels of oil and refined petroleum products daily (around 2 percent of total oil supply). This loss may not be able to be covered by other producers whose capacities are already strained due to lack of infrastructure, in part because of under-investment in the shift away from fossil fuels. Only Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Russia, whose capacity is hobbled by sanctions, may have actual additional available capacity.
Direct US military involvement has shifted the dynamics, making long-term resolution or containment more difficult. The key is how Iran and the Arab world reacts.
Narrow waters
One familiar option is for Iran to seek a total or selective blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, the chokepoint of global energy supplies where a fifth of world oil supply passes. An old rule in the Persian Gulf states if Iran is under threat, then they will seek to prevent regional competitors selling their oil. Reports suggest that in the wake of the US bombing Iran had plans to close the strait. The resources needed are not demanding. The Strait was briefly closed in the early 1980s using a few mines. Alternatives include GPS spoofing to misdirect ships onto collision courses.
Any threat of closure or resumption of hostilities will make shipping companies reluctant to transit the narrow waterway due to insurance concerns. After the Israeli attack on Iran, the charter costs of large crude carriers (capable of carrying 2 million barrels of oil) from the Gulf to China more than doubled (from around $20,000 to just under $48,000 per day). Cost of some refined products like diesel and jet fuel also rose sharply, especially in Europe.
Another option is attacks on other Gulf nation's oil facilities, which has occurred previously. Already in-place Iranian-backed domestic militias are well-placed to undertake these providing Iran with 'plausible deniability'. Iraq, which supplies over 4 million barrels of oil a day, is vulnerable due to the location of infrastructure in Basra close to Iran and the history between the two nations. A variant would be action against American military bases in these countries.
Iran would have been reluctant to attack Gulf neighbours with whom they have carefully re-established relations and a modus vivendi over recent years. However, on June 23, Iran launched a well-telegraphed strike of on Al Udeid base in Qatar. Suggestions are that there was limited damage and no casualties because the bases had evacuated. In one more bizarre tweet of his surreal rule. President Trump thanked the Iranians for advance notice of the "very weak response" and signalled that peace was imminent … [as the Iranians had] "gotten it all out of their 'system' …. there will, hopefully, be no further HATE".
Another option, rarely mentioned now, is a co-ordinated oil embargo restricting energy supplies to the US, Europe and supporters of Israel. While Arab unity is elusive and never guaranteed, there is a historical precedent - the 1973 oil embargo by Arab members of OPEC in response to the Yom Kippur War and the US support for Israel.
Of course, attacks on energy infrastructure and an embargo may trigger an escalation of the conflict.
What do the Kings, Sultans and Emirs think?
The crucial actors are West-leaning Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar. Despite competition with Iran for regional influence and the Sunni and Shia schism, there are reasons why an embargo remains a powerful alternative. While Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE predictably criticised Iranian actions against the US base, events have exposed deep underlying concerns which may prompt an united Arab approach.
First, they fear regional instability if the present Iranian regime is toppled. Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria highlight the West's lack of appetite for casualties and the cost of prolonged military engagement. In addition, the West is struggling to manage its commitments to support Ukraine. The prospect of refugees from Iran seeking safety in other Middle East countries, as in previous conflicts, is unwelcome.
Second, the US and Israeli actions despite the lack of evidence of any weapons development program let alone bombs (confirmed by the IAEA and US defence establishment) should be alarming. There is the precedent of Iraq's non-existent WMD. There is suspicion of the possible complicity of the IAEA in the sequence of events with suggestions that Western intelligence agencies have infiltrated the UN body. The Board's 'Non-Compliance' Resolution on 12 June 2025 preceded Israel's strike on Iran the very next day. After the announcement of the cessation of hostility, the IAEA have repeatedly suggested that the Iranian nuclear enrichment program could be restarted within a short time provided an excuse for further attacks on Iran.
Western denial of Iran's right to even peaceful nuclear capabilities will concern Saudi Arabia and the UAE which have ambitions in this area. This leaves the region subservient to Israel as its only nuclear capable actor.
The Saudis are already angry about US refusal to sell its F-35 fighters based on Washington's policy of maintaining Israel's qualitative military advantage in the region. Given expansive Israeli territorial visions based on religious texts and statements by extreme Jewish elements that Turkey, Qatar and UAE are "next", the Gulf regimes must recognise their rising vulnerability to a now emboldened US supported Israel. Announcing agreement to the ceasefire, Prime Minister Netanyahu Israel, intoxicated with battlefield success, trumpeted that Israel had joined the ranks of great global powers.
The US appears to have been coerced into intervening on behalf of the Jewish state. For many, MAGA has morphed into MIGA – Make Israel Great Again. One X denizen tweeted that "America is so deindustrialized we don't even manufacture our own consent".
For Arab states, Europeans do not offer a counterweight to the US, being prepared to "dance like monkeys" for President Trump to ensure continued American involvement in NATO to counter the bogey of a Russian threat. The craven, toe-curling supplications of Europe were illustrated by the head of NATO Mark Rutte, a former Prime Minster of the Netherland calling Trump "daddy" during a bilateral meeting after sending a flattering missive praising the US President's attack on Iraq as "truly extraordinary" and "something that no one else would do".
Rutte's version of Eartha Kitt's classic My Heart Belongs to Daddy? was cringeworthy. European diplomacy is now grounded in Mae West's seductive proposition: "flattery will get you… everywhere".
The Middle East conflict also presages deeper problems with non-proliferation arrangements. More countries both in the region and globally will seek nuclear weapons to protect their sovereignty.
Third, Israel and its supporters' will continue to seek regime change in Iran and potential replacement by the scions of the Shah. In a post to the Truth Social platform, President Trump, unaware of the loathing of Iranians for the Shah and especially SAVAK, his murderous secret police, promoted the idea of regime change in Iran to 'MAKE IRAN GREAT AGAIN'.
This will frighten Gulf monarchies whose kingdoms now only exist at the behest of foreign powers. The ruling dynasties can be displaced at the whim of the West. Given the volatile foreign policies of the US and its allies including their short-lived and disastrous backing of the ill-fated Arab Spring, this possibility is non-trivial. As Hosni Mubarak discovered, US support for its 'allies' exists until it doesn't. Subsequently, the Muslim Brotherhood found that Western belief in democracy was highly selective.
Fourth, America's confiscation of Russian assets, tariffs and recent economic policies have created unease in the Petrostates about the security of their Western investments. The Gulf states have already begun to favour domestic projects over foreign investments.
Fifth, there are economic consequences. Flight of foreign workers and firms from Gulf states will disrupt activity. Even temporary suspension or re-routing of flights, given the expansive business plans of Middle East airlines, are damaging.
Higher oil prices, under an embargo, would financially benefit producers struggling to balance budgets. Saudi Arabia needs prices around $80 to $100 per barrel depending on production levels and spending.
Sixth, the Gulf population, excepting the rulers and their acolytes, is predominantly pro-Palestinian and anti-American. A poll by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy in the first months of the Gaza war revealed 96 percent of people in Saudi Arabia oppose normalisation with Israel. Many Muslims globally see it as both a religious duty and a divine obligation to confront Israel and its Western allies. Islamic clerics and scholars have frequently urged a coordinated Muslim response to hold these powers accountable and to protect sovereignty.
Siding with Israel and the West, such as normalising relationship with Israel without a true Palestinian state and halts to Israeli military adventurism, is existentially dangerous for the internally fractious ruling families notwithstanding their highly repressive domestic security infrastructure. Internal instability is complicated by increasing financial constraints which reduce the scope for maintaining rule through generous handouts to citizens. Oman has become the first Gulf state to introduce income taxes as subsidies for locals and tax-free salaries have left the region fiscally exposed.
Finally, the Gulf states may see an opportunity to capitalise on events. Israel's vulnerability is palpable. Its reliance on US stands exposed. Iran's weaknesses, especially its weak air defences, were revealed. The Israeli population's difficulty in coping with two weeks of missile strikes contrasted sharply with a more stoic Iranian ability to withstand attacks.
This understanding may inform the Gulf states' dealings with the warring parties and the US. It gives them greater leverage when allied to their economic power. The UAE, Qatar and Saudi Arabia signed deals for hundreds of billions of dollars with US firms during President Trump's May visit to the region. The improved relationships with Iran also makes them valuable interlocutors. During the conflict, they publicly condemned Israel's attack on Iran and lobbied the US via back-channels to stop the war.
The Gulf states' focus is on diversifying their economy and reducing their dependence on oil revenues. This requires regional stability, which necessitates irreversible steps towards a Palestinian state, reigning in Western backed-Israeli expansion and interference in the region. In the absence of progress on these matters, these states may well consider a co-ordinated embargo as a way of pressing for a resolution.
'Ask'em when they are running out'
An embargo that maintained their energy supplies would be supported by non-aligned nations, who oppose the wars in Gaza and Iran and Western meddling.
China which is a major importer of Iranian and Gulf oil (around 1.5-1.7 million barrels a day), in particular, would benefit from diversion of supplies to meet its requirements. The Middle Kingdom also wants to protect its investments in the New Silk Road connectivity corridor as well as its influence in the region. In a curious twist which was unwelcome in Israel, following the announcement of the ceasefire, President Trump announced that China would be allowed to buy oil from Iran, reversing a policy of sanctioning Chinese refineries for these purchases.
The effect of an embargo should not be underestimated. In cases of extreme uncertainty or turmoil in the region, oil prices have historically risen by approximately 70 percent and average a 30 percent higher over time. Given the weaknesses in major economies and financial markets, any large rise in energy costs would trigger higher inflation, a major slowdown and financial instability which Western states are ill-positioned to deal with.
In the film Three Days of the Condor, an older cynical CIA operative (Cliff Robertson) tells a younger researcher (Robert Redford) why Americans, or citizens in advanced economies, will support anything for oil: 'Ask'em when they are running out. Ask'em when there's no heat in their homes and they're cold. Ask'em when their engines stop. Ask'em when people who have never known hunger start going hungry. You wanna know something? They won't want us to ask'em. They'll just want us to get it for 'em.'
Higher oil prices and restrictions on availability may force political action. If combined with financial measures, such as limiting purchase of Western goods, withdrawing capital and shifting away from US dollars as a payment mechanism for oil, the pressures may force an agreement that curbs Israeli expansion, ensures a just settlement for the Palestinians and removes Western interference in the region. The 1973 oil embargo forced the United States and its allies to reconsider their support for Israel, engineering a shift in the global balance of power and empowering oil-producing nations.
But persistent Arab division, skilfully exploited by the US and Israel, will probably lead to no decisive co-ordinated strategy. While they may not acknowledge the reality, failure to act strategically now will undermine the ruling dynasties of the Gulf states and Jordan. They will be seen by their citizens as rich puppets who serve their American, Israeli and allied masters and whose policies are chosen for them. With their standing and wealth dependent on a dwindling finite resource with an uncertain future, inaction may doom the royal families.
Certain uncertainty
Unless a binding and wide-ranging diplomatic agreement can be negotiated, the underlying forces point to resumption of a kinetic war, curtailment of supplies from the region as a result of attacks on energy infrastructure, closure of transit routes, an embargo, or a 'Gulf Spring' with domestic upheavals in many regional producers.
The precise trajectory is unclear. But it is not the end. The central issues – Israeli territorial ambitions, Palestine, the tribal and religious differences between Arabs, the battle for Gulf pre-eminence, energy security, great power involvement - remain unresolved. In the Middle East victories or defeats are rarely clear-cut.
Irrespective of the paths chosen, continued regional instability and volatile energy markets are probable. Conflict, most worthwhile military strategists agree, is like opening a door into a dark room where no one knows what is hidden in the darkness. The only certainty is that a new chapter in the history of the region is under way which will have profound effects on energy markets and the global economy.
This piece draws on material first published at The New Indian Express and nakedcapitalism.com.
Satyajit Das is a former banker. He is the author of numerous works on derivatives and several general title: Traders, Guns & Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives (2006 and 2010), Extreme Money: The Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk (2011), A Banquet of Consequences RELOADED, and Fortune's Fool: Australia's Choices (2022)