As Europe aims to rearm, will India find it difficult to buy Rafale jets in future?

New Indian Express

08-07-2025

Europe is marching to a different beat these days.
My time in Brussels, which saw me meet European Union officials and ex-diplomats, scholars, underlined that the unquestioned dependence on American security there is coming to an end. Europe now knows—that the party is over.
This realisation came into the spotlight in early March 2025 when the European Union (EU) leaders convened in Brussels after the brutally honest message from Washington that Europe should take care of itself. Proposals to unlock hundreds of billions of euros of defence spending were supported by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa.
The post-1945 security architecture in the EU had long been pegged on the promise of the American security umbrella always being around. This was being overturned with the move. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has become the biggest geopolitical stress test in the continent in decades, had a huge role to play in the shift.
For years, the positive belief in American love, rather than any strategy, concealed the bitter fact: The European continent was not ready to defend itself. Major powers in Brussels now admit that European security hinges on ensuring a strong Ukraine and can no longer be delegated.
The EU's ReArm Europe strategy that was launched in response in March aims to mobilise up to €800 billion, including €150 billion in defence-related loans, and is a dramatic shift in military ambition. For a bloc long seen as a normative power, this represents not only a strategic recalibration but a philosophical departure from the post-war consensus on peace dividends and social spending. The EU was after all described as a peace project.
Learning from close quarters
It was my return to Brussels—19 years after my first visit there—in June this year that gave me an opportunity to understand how the EU forges consensus among diverse member states and builds complex regulatory structures.
There can be little doubt that the political and economic integration of the EU was a historic success. From the inception of the euro in 1999 to its expansion to more than 20 countries, the EU has bred peace, prosperity and institutional cooperation, which have never been witnessed before. A free movement of goods, services, capital, and citizens is now possible because of a single market of over 450 million citizens.
The EU has managed to adjust even during the times of financial crisis, Brexit, and the growth of populism. The integrationist model of the European Union cannot be compared to other regional blocs such as ASEAN with the latter yet to reach the same magnitude of depth and cohesiveness.
But beyond budgets and military hardware, the question of moral and strategic autonomy looms. Europe had long benefitted from the US security umbrella, often without the political costs that come with strategic independence. What has suddenly sprung up is the need for the transformation not just of capabilities, but of identity since the EU, as mentioned before, was essentially described as a peace project.
Emmanuel Macron, the French President, who had constantly been calling to increase European defence investments, on March 2, 2025, urged the EU member states to increase defence expenditure to between 3 to 3.5 percent of GDP, with 3.5 percent to be directed to the core defence which will include the personnel, arms and munitions.
President Macron came up with a proposal of a joint investment tool of 200 billion euros which can be financed by EU level borrowing or by the European Stability Mechanism. This signaled a sea change in European incrementalism and emphasised the recognition that Europe could no longer continue to under-invest in defence.
Blunt Prez insists on 'Trump'ing even as cracks open up in EU
Around the same time of my stay in the Netherlands, at the 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague, President Trump achieved what had long eluded past leaders: getting the allies to raise their spending from 2% of gross domestic product to 3.5% by 2035. Trump's message was blunt: either shoulder the burden or expect diminished American support. He condemned Spain for resisting the target.
While the US defence spending hovers at 3.5% of GDP, the European average remains around 1.9%. Even the revised NATO target 3.5% for traditional defence and 1.5% for cyber and infrastructure faces political headwinds. Many capitals remain wary. Spain flatly refused the 5% goal, citing social obligations and there are concerns about unsustainable fiscal deficits and European Union's fiscal rules in this regard.
However, expectedly, states like Poland and the Baltics, acutely aware of security threats to the east, have endorsed the higher targets. On June 27, António Costa has even suggested that increased European purchases of American weapons could be leveraged to rebalance transatlantic trade a subtle reminder of how defence and commerce intertwine.
But beneath these general trends are the internal cracks that have the potential to weaken the EU cohesion.
Led by Viktor Orbán, Hungary remains close to Moscow diplomatically and economically, regularly preventing or diluting EU-wide proposals regarding Russia in the statements of the EU and in sanctions. Such a position has left member states such as Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia visibly frustrated by the apparent fact that Hungary was completely out of sync with common securitization agendas in Europe.
This strategic incoherence has been stoked by the reconsiderations in the Council on the aid to Ukraine by Budapest that have led to delaying of critical decisions. In the meantime, in Slovakia, elections had swept to power a government that sounds less-than-enthusiastic about war-proofing, joining the choir of those opposed to the escalation of defence commitments.
Austria too still sticks to its policy of neutrality and Italy wavers between Atlanticism and the political attitudes at home. Such inconsistent national interests are not something new, but they are growing more consequential. As Europe faces an increasingly unstable security environment, such fragmentation could weaken the EU's emerging defence ambitions.
What India must prepare for
In this evolving landscape, countries from global south like India have to pay close attention as these changes will be consequential. The defence partnerships with Europe, particularly France, deserve closer scrutiny. I was told by an interlocutor that India is 'a victim of its own success.'
For instance, bilateral defence cooperation with France has flourished, from Rafale jets and Scorpène submarines to Safran engines and UAV collaboration. However, future engagements may require navigating EU-level frameworks such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).
Launched in 2017 under the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy, PESCO aims to harmonize European defence procurement and strategic planning. As of 2025, 26 member states participate. While PESCO does not automatically obstruct third-country partnerships, it introduces regulatory layers, particularly when EU funding is involved as with the Future Combat Air System (FCAS). For India, which values flexibility and sovereignty in defence deals, such frameworks could introduce delays or complications.
PESCO is based on political vision: to be less reliant on non-EU suppliers and a strong European defence-industrial base. This would progressively motivate key partners such as France and Germany towards focussing on intra-European projects rather than focusing on external projects. India must therefore prepare for a future where bilateral ties with European states are increasingly shaped by Brussels-based structures and standardizations.
Curiosity around China and Europe's future
In some circles, there is curiosity about the role of Chinese-supplied weaponry in the recent four-day crisis involving India and Pakistan. Their curiosity was not limited to South Asia. Rather, they viewed the episode as a microcosm of Beijing's growing ability to shape regional conflict dynamics through calibrated arms transfers and embedded military technologies. Drones, radar systems, and precision munitions, often provided to Pakistan on concessional terms, were seen as part of a broader Chinese strategy of building tactical leverage without direct confrontation.
In their eyes, it was also an opportunity to see how China could practice or perfect instruments that demonstrate its might internationally. The episode also reaffirmed to European policymakers that Chinese global presence is not only all over the economic and trade lanes of the world but indeed right in live conflict zones, and that a more comprehensive European response, premised on long-term strategic thinking, is required.
The existential issue in Europe, however, is whether it will be a geopolitically effective player or will it be bound to a failing transatlantic compact. The days of the postwar party are over perhaps, but this is just the start of the new era.
Europe is at a crossroads as the continent grapples with war on its doorstep, internal divisions and faltering transatlantic certainties. The way it establishes a new architecture of defence and diplomacy will determine its position in the international order and the connection it will have with the rest of the world, including Asia, in the decades to come.
(The author has worked for 25 years as a practitioner, researcher and an analyst on conflict areas and violent extremism issues. He has authored two books including Across the LoC: Inside Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir published by Columbia University Press.)