Titan sub disaster preventable, US finds
The Titan vanished during a descent to the Titanic wreck on a tourist expedition, losing contact with its support ship.
After a tense four-day search, its shattered remains were discovered strewn across the seabed 1,600 feet (488 metres) from the bow of the legendary ocean liner that sank in 1912, claiming more than 1,500 lives.
OceanGate, the US-based company that managed the tourist submersible, suspended all operations after the incident.
A company spokesperson said on Tuesday the company again offered its deepest condolences to the families of those who died "and directed its resources fully towards cooperating with the Coast Guard's inquiry through its completion."
The chair of the US Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation, Jason Neubauer, said the accident was preventable.
"There is a need for stronger oversight and clear options for operators who are exploring new concepts outside of the existing regulatory framework," he said in a statement with the release of the 300-page report.
Chloe Nargeolet, whose father, French oceanographer Paul-Henri Nargeolet, died on the submersible, said she was satisfied with the investigation.
"The OceanGate boss didn't do his job properly and obviously my father didn't know any of that," she said. "It was not random or bad luck, it came from something. It could have been avoided."
The board determined that the primary contributing factors were OceanGate's "inadequate design, certification, maintenance and inspection process for the Titan."
It also cited "a toxic workplace culture at OceanGate," an inadequate regulatory framework for submersibles and other novel vessels, and an ineffective whistleblower process.
The report added "for several years preceding the incident, OceanGate leveraged intimidation tactics, allowances for scientific operations, and the company's favourable reputation to evade regulatory scrutiny."
The board found that OceanGate failed to investigate and address known hull anomalies following its 2022 Titanic expedition. It said data from Titan's realtime monitoring system should have been analysed and acted on during that expedition.
It also criticised OceanGate for failing to properly store the Titan before the 2023 Titanic expedition.
The report faulted the absence of a timely Occupational Safety and Health Administration investigation into a 2018 OceanGate whistleblower's complaint combined with a lack of government cooperation, calling them a missed opportunity and added "early intervention may have resulted in OceanGate pursuing regulatory compliance or abandoning their plans."
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The Star
18 hours ago
- The Star
Series of mistakes caused Titan sub disaster, US Coast Guard says
The Coast Guard's final report on the submersible that imploded during a dive to the Titanic concluded that the fatal disaster resulted from a series of safety and design failures. 'This marine casualty and the loss of five lives was preventable,' said Jason Neubauer, who led the two-year inquiry for the Marine Board of Investigation, which issued a more than 300-page report on Aug 5. The submersible, known as the Titan and operated by a company called OceanGate, disappeared in June 2023 on a trip to view the wreck of the Titanic ocean liner. It lost contact an hour and a half into the dive, and prompted a sprawling search effort in the dark depths of the Atlantic Ocean. The craft's remains were discovered on the fourth day by a remotely operated vehicle. The submersible's operator and four passengers were killed. Numerous investigations, hearings and news reports have documented failures in the submersible's construction and operation, which were echoed by the Coast Guard report. 'The board determined the primary contributing factors were OceanGate's inadequate design, certification, maintenance and inspection process for the Titan,' the investigative board said in a news release. The five people killed in the implosion were the operator, Stockton Rush, as well as explorers Hamish Harding and Paul-Henri Nargeolet and two members of a wealthy Pakistani family, Shahzada Dawood and Suleman Dawood. Here are takeaways from the report. The Titan's final moments seemed normal. The Titan's final voyage on June 18, 2023, proceeded largely without incident until the submersible nearly reached the ocean floor, the report found. At 10.47am, as the submersible was approaching the seabed, the report said it 'followed standard procedure by releasing ballast weights to slow its descent'. Seconds later, at a depth of 10,978 feet, the Titan transmitted its location for the final time. Within moments, the submersible's carbon fiber hull gave way, catastrophically imploding under the immense pressure, the report found. The board's report said the passengers 'were exposed to approximately 4,930 pounds per square inch of water pressure' when the vessel imploded, 'resulting in the instantaneous death of all five occupants.' The implosion was heard at the surface. Seconds after the submersible imploded, OceanGate employees aboard the submersible's support ship, the Polar Prince, heard a 'bang' from the ocean's surface, the board found. After hearing the noise, the leader of the submersible's communications and tracking team turned to another OceanGate employee and asked, 'What was that bang?' according to the report. Subsequent messages to the Titan's crew went unreturned. 'With the benefit of hindsight, I now believe I felt the Polar Prince shudder at around the time communications were reportedly lost, but at the time we thought nothing of it,' the master of the Polar Prince later wrote to the board. He added that the disturbance 'was slight'. OceanGate pilots lacked adequate training. The report found that OceanGate lacked adequate protocols to ensure its submersible pilots, including Rush, were sufficiently trained to lead undersea expeditions. OceanGate's former director of operations told the board that there was 'no official documentation' required for OceanGate's submersible pilots, and that the company didn't have a dedicated manual for pilots operating the Titan submersible, the report said. Additionally, the board found no evidence showing that Rush had completed any training programme specific to the submersible that would have met the company's standards for its highest pilot training certification. OceanGate gave false information to the Coast Guard. At the time of the Titan's final dive, Rush possessed a credential issued by the US Coast Guard that permitted him to operate vessels of a certain volume on inland waters. That credential was based on falsified information, the report said: In 2020, OceanGate exaggerated the volume of the Titan in a letter to the National Maritime Center so that it would appear as if Rush had the requisite time at sea needed to earn the credential. The Titan was damaged in previous dives. On multiple occasions, OceanGate failed to adequately investigate damage suffered by the Titan during previous dives, the report found, including one that resulted in the vessel becoming entangled with the wreckage of the Titanic. During a dive in July 2022, the Titan entered the Titanic's wreckage and became briefly caught in debris near the ship's main stairwell, a mission specialist told the board. During the submersible's ascent, crew members reported hearing a loud noise they feared indicated damage to the hull. A contractor told the board that Rush later brushed aside those concerns. It wasn't the first time an OceanGate submersible became entangled in a shipwreck, according to the report. In an interview with the board, the OceanGate director of operations described a dive in which an earlier OceanGate submersible, the Cyclops 1, became stuck beneath the bow of the Andrea Doria shipwreck near Nantucket, Massachusetts, with Rush at the controls. In response, Rush had a 'meltdown,' the director of operations said, adding that when he asked Rush to relinquish the controls Rush threw the controller at him. – ©2025 The New York Times Company This article originally appeared in The New York Times.
The Sun
a day ago
- The Sun
Titan sub disaster preventable due to safety failures, US report finds
WASHINGTON: The catastrophic implosion of the Titan submersible that killed five people in 2023 could have been prevented, a U.S. Coast Guard investigative board found on Tuesday, calling the vessel's safety culture and operational practices 'critically flawed.' The Titan vanished during a descent to the Titanic wreck on a tourist expedition, losing contact with its support ship. After a tense four-day search, its shattered remains were discovered strewn across the seabed 1,600 feet (488 meters) from the bow of the legendary ocean liner that sank in 1912, claiming more than 1,500 lives. OceanGate, the U.S.-based company that managed the tourist submersible, suspended all operations after the incident. A company spokesperson said on Tuesday the company again offered its deepest condolences to the families of those who died 'and directed its resources fully towards cooperating with the Coast Guard's inquiry through its completion.' The chair of the U.S. Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation, Jason Neubauer, said the accident was preventable. 'There is a need for stronger oversight and clear options for operators who are exploring new concepts outside of the existing regulatory framework,' he said in a statement with the release of the 300-page report. Chloe Nargeolet, whose father, French oceanographer Paul-Henri Nargeolet, died on the submersible, said she was satisfied with the investigation. 'The OceanGate boss didn't do his job properly and obviously my father didn't know any of that,' she said. 'It was not random or bad luck, it came from something. It could have been avoided.' The board determined that the primary contributing factors were OceanGate's 'inadequate design, certification, maintenance and inspection process for the Titan.' It also cited 'a toxic workplace culture at OceanGate,' an inadequate regulatory framework for submersibles and other novel vessels, and an ineffective whistleblower process. The report added 'for several years preceding the incident, OceanGate leveraged intimidation tactics, allowances for scientific operations, and the company's favorable reputation to evade regulatory scrutiny.' The board found that OceanGate failed to investigate and address known hull anomalies following its 2022 Titanic expedition. It said data from Titan's realtime monitoring system should have been analyzed and acted on during that expedition. It also criticized OceanGate for failing to properly store the Titan before the 2023 Titanic expedition. The report faulted the absence of a timely Occupational Safety and Health Administration investigation into a 2018 OceanGate whistleblower's complaint combined with a lack of government cooperation, calling them a missed opportunity and added 'early intervention may have resulted in OceanGate pursuing regulatory compliance or abandoning their plans.' - Reuters
New Straits Times
a day ago
- New Straits Times
Titan sub disaster preventable, US finds
WASHINGTON: The catastrophic implosion of the Titan submersible that killed five people in 2023 could have been prevented, a US Coast Guard investigative board found on Tuesday, calling the vessel's safety culture and operational practices "critically flawed." The Titan vanished during a descent to the Titanic wreck on a tourist expedition, losing contact with its support ship. After a tense four-day search, its shattered remains were discovered strewn across the seabed 1,600 feet (488 metres) from the bow of the legendary ocean liner that sank in 1912, claiming more than 1,500 lives. OceanGate, the US-based company that managed the tourist submersible, suspended all operations after the incident. A company spokesperson said on Tuesday the company again offered its deepest condolences to the families of those who died "and directed its resources fully towards cooperating with the Coast Guard's inquiry through its completion." The chair of the US Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation, Jason Neubauer, said the accident was preventable. "There is a need for stronger oversight and clear options for operators who are exploring new concepts outside of the existing regulatory framework," he said in a statement with the release of the 300-page report. Chloe Nargeolet, whose father, French oceanographer Paul-Henri Nargeolet, died on the submersible, said she was satisfied with the investigation. "The OceanGate boss didn't do his job properly and obviously my father didn't know any of that," she said. "It was not random or bad luck, it came from something. It could have been avoided." The board determined that the primary contributing factors were OceanGate's "inadequate design, certification, maintenance and inspection process for the Titan." It also cited "a toxic workplace culture at OceanGate," an inadequate regulatory framework for submersibles and other novel vessels, and an ineffective whistleblower process. The report added "for several years preceding the incident, OceanGate leveraged intimidation tactics, allowances for scientific operations, and the company's favourable reputation to evade regulatory scrutiny." The board found that OceanGate failed to investigate and address known hull anomalies following its 2022 Titanic expedition. It said data from Titan's realtime monitoring system should have been analysed and acted on during that expedition. It also criticised OceanGate for failing to properly store the Titan before the 2023 Titanic expedition. The report faulted the absence of a timely Occupational Safety and Health Administration investigation into a 2018 OceanGate whistleblower's complaint combined with a lack of government cooperation, calling them a missed opportunity and added "early intervention may have resulted in OceanGate pursuing regulatory compliance or abandoning their plans."
