Is Pakistan's Second Chance in the Tribal Areas Slipping Away?

The Diplomat

3 days ago

In 2018, Pakistan overhauled the status and governance of FATAs. Yet the area remains socio-economically disadvantaged and violence is surging.
The president of Pakistan enacted the 25th Amendment to the constitution on May 31, 2018, signalling a watershed moment in the country's constitutional landscape with expansive socio-political corollaries for the frontline populations of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA). Eight clauses of Pakistan's 1973 Constitution were modified by the 25th Amendment to reflect this legal change. FATAs' pre-existing 'discriminatory status' as a constitutionally suspended zone was abolished (Art. 1), leading to its territorial merger with the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), while PATAs were incorporated into the provincial governments of Balochistan and KP (Art. 246).
Over seven decades after Pakistan's independence, the 25th Amendment finally upgraded the status of FATA community members from 'subjects' to that of 'real citizens,' noted Muhammad Zubair. To counteract the longstanding dominance of oppressive colonialism under the tutelage of the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), this legislation promised historically disadvantaged indigenous groups newly acquired constitutional rights and meaningful democratic influence in both the provincial legislature of KP and the National Assembly.
Yet, the observable reality has fallen far short of the spirit of the changes. What we see in the merged districts (MDs) is a shallow governance architecture without grounding. Despite its redesignation and the semblance of a unified structure and leadership, there are limited substantive reforms, a lack of state accountability and inadequate strategic thinking – all of which hinder prospects for sustainable performance.
A Lack of Functional Governance
The federal government had committed to investing 100 billion Pakistani rupees annually for 10 years – equivalent to 3 percent of the Federal Divisible Pool – thereby supporting the development of the merged areas. This pledge remains unfulfilled. Development initiatives remain obstructed by the failings of the provinces of Balochistan, Sindh, and Punjab to deliver on their contributions. The merger had ambitious goals for rehabilitated social services and infrastructural development, but the ASPIRE KP Symposium Report (2024) laid bare that inappropriate fund allocation – and failures to allocate funds at all – have caused development processes to reach a standstill. Socio-economic progress and the standard of living in the MDs continue to be adversely affected by the insufficient provision of medical services, educational institutions, and transportation.
With Pakistan's economic impediments, the World Bank's resident mission had warned in 2023 that anticipated reforms and service delivery enhancements would be tricky. Any failures would disproportionately impact the vulnerable within the tribal jurisdictions, predominantly women and children.
There is therefore an increasing disconnect between official rhetoric on the MDs and the actual lived experiences there. Former legislator and National Democratic Movement (NDM) chief Mohsin Dawar ascribed the lagging advancement of the ex-FATA merger to a lack of prioritization by those in power, holding both federal and provincial governments liable. The provincial government, he asserts, has not made appropriate use of the funds allocated for the MDs' socioeconomic advancement, and the federal government is withholding the agreed-upon proportion for KP province's MDs.
Administrative integration remains a distant prospect, despite FATA's political integration with KP having granted locals a voice in the provincial assembly. Stagnation persists in local government, legislative overhauls, and law enforcement mechanisms, where untenable imbalances in institutional and legal architectures cannot be readily disregarded.
Under the terms of the merger, the district commissioner of neighboring municipalities/districts superseded the political agent. These federal government bureaucrats still perceive locals as subordinates rather than citizens qualified for public services. Also, certain regions saw violent clashes due to the protracted protocols for regulating land ownership, which endangered the government's mandate to enact the merger through holistic reforms.
Progress in the MDs' legal system also stalled. After the abrogation of the FCR, the KP chief minister appointed session courts, together with the installation of judicial posts in seven districts across five divisions: Peshawar, Malakand, Kohat, Bannu, and D.I. Khan. All told, the MDs have seven district session judges, 14 additional district session judges, seven senior civil judges, and 24 civil judges, yet the judicial system remains in an unsustainable condition of dereliction.
Naveed Ahmad Shinwari, an experienced regional development professional, observed that in certain districts, judicial complexes are either nonexistent or commissioned in neighboring jurisdictions, forcing people to travel to these areas for justice and legal services, which introduces additional barriers to access. The lack of a functioning judicial system nurtures an overwhelming sense of insecurity, hence diminishing trust among tribal communities in the legal process.
Moreover, police reforms linger as a patchy and partial effort. More than 26,000 ex-Khasadar and Levies personnel were absorbed into the KP police, but they are largely uneducated and inadequately prepared. Quite alarmingly, they regularly have to procure their own weaponry and purchase uniforms independently. Simply put, the police force in the MDs remains mired in an operational limbo, with no defined roadmap to oversee the complexities of post-merger governance.
As Manzar Zaidi aptly put it, 'renaming an apple an orange' would not change its nature; likewise, simply recalibrating the nomenclature of the MDs' bureaucratic framework is unlikely to improve its performance without a deep institutional reckoning, capital infusion, and persistent organizational resolve toward overhauling the police force. Any reforms would have to reconcile tribal traditions with socioeconomic growth, securing baseline service delivery for the historically disadvantaged tribal community while also factoring in the region's competing jurisdictions and layered authority structures.
Under the leadership of Malik Shah Mahmood and Malik Bismillah Khan Afridi, a delegation of tribal elders recently convened with KP Governor Faisal Karim Khan Kundi to relay serious reservations about the worsening security threats and lackluster development in the MDs. Far from improving residents' living standards, the tribal leaders asserted that the merger has resulted in additional constraints for locals. More seriously, escalating feelings of aggravation among the community and an alarming breakdown in law and order are pushing the area back toward structural marginality.
The tribal leaders accused the government of pursuing the coercive implementation of externally driven policies devoid of local participation or consensus, and for failing to adhere to the promises made throughout the merger process. The elders called for reinstating the jirga institution to operationalize accessible and equitable justice delivery, reflective of culturally grounded mechanisms.
This is already happening, albeit without any official approval. HUM News noted that 'the justice system remains inaccessible and ineffective,' and in its place, 'informal jirgas continue to operate without legal oversight.' Customary adjudication methods have resurged, reclaiming a foothold with little intervention from state legislators and amid weak legislative scrutiny. Without resilient legal and political frameworks, traditional power hegemonies will resurface, leveraging the structural vacuum induced by governmental inertia.
The Rise (Again) of Violence
Governance in the tribal territories before the 25th Amendment was predominantly security-oriented, which contributed to a state of ostracism and poor governance. The security-first mindset also impaired both administrative efficacy and sociopolitical vitality. Nevertheless, instead of pivoting toward viable civilian administration in the MDs, the system is still heavily securitized, with security governance and counterterrorism as the main focus.
This is what the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) protests and activists have repeatedly pointed to. To this day, militarized mechanisms are engulfing meaningful political discourse and the establishment of resilient democratic institutions. When military intervention takes precedence, it inevitably blocks long-term sustainability and the well-being of the affected people. While the former FATAs have transitioned through constitutional integration, the state demonstrates rigid adherence to a traditional security-focused trajectory.
It is well-established that Pashtun tribes have seen their way of life violently upended over the past 20-plus years. They have repeatedly been targets for both militant groups and the security apparatus. However, even after the merger, this dynamic remains constant.
The predominant concern right now is the recurrence of militant violence that has rendered the affected regions exceedingly vulnerable. Lately, there has been an unsettling spike in lawlessness and violence. Despite calibrated military interventions, the adverse effects on people's daily lives and safety persist. Even women and children have lost their lives in the ongoing conflict. Anti-militant marches and gatherings by tribal members show grassroots attempts to reject the violence.
The Taliban's return to power in neighboring Afghanistan has further intensified this recurring pattern of militancy and the state's counteroffensives. The resiliency of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has yet again positioned the hinterland as a critical battlefield. The TTP seized the opportunity afforded by improved operational flexibility and connectivity to secure locations across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, further empowering the group to conduct attacks.
While tribal communities are determinedly anti-militant, they simultaneously make serious allegations against intrusive state operations, such as the reinstatement of checkpoints, military surveillance via drones, raids, search operations, and arbitrary detentions. Many locals have voiced grievances about the repeated episodes of being systematically scrutinized and stereotyped 'as militants, based on their tribe, dress, appearance, or ancestral district of origin.' These punitive policing strategies targeting tribal members have proven to be largely ineffective and, yet they remain in place, feeding into a pervasive climate of anxiety and disillusionment.
Meanwhile, the security campaign has not even had its intended effect of stopping militancy. TTP offensives continue without interruption, with terrorist attacks especially common in the southern districts of KP near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
The Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) Annual Security Report 2024 recorded a clear pattern of decline in yearly casualties from 2015 through 2020, with a 33 percent drop. But recent years have been marked by a disturbing upward trend: terrorism in the country has intensified since the Taliban returned to power. Attacks surged by 38 percent in 2021, then a more modest 15 percent rise in 2022. The most recent years have been horrifying, with attacks up 56 percent in 2023 and 66 percent in 2024. The MDs contiguous with Afghanistan, particularly Kurram, North Waziristan, and Khyber, witnessed the most disturbing increase in casualties from 'violence and counter-violence.'
Against this unsettling backdrop, there is focused scrutiny of the military's operations against the Pakistan Taliban. An ex-lawmaker declared: 'The military's seeming stance against the Taliban is merely cosmetic. The TTP is practically running a shadow government.' As the TTP consolidates its grip, its parallel governance system grows into an increasingly formidable entity, thereby exerting greater influence over local affairs and operations in the tribal region.
The TTP's maturing shadow government points to a multilayered and deteriorating security situation affecting the entirety of KP and disturbingly even Balochistan, which foregrounds the urgent need for the federal government to urgently adopt a cohesive strategy for combating militants not only on the battlefield but also in the provision of governance.
The Link Between Governance and Security
Pakistan's counterterrorism approach remains fractured and ineffective. With this in mind, the relevance of local ownership and enfranchisement in decision-making cannot be overstated, argued Aarish Khan.
Unless the state effectively integrates its institutions into the MDs, not merely in theory but in practice, power will continue to revert to clientelist structures – including certain armed non-state collaborators and proxies of militant factions. Tribes do not cling to indigenous juridical institutions and shadow governance structures out of rebellion, nor do they, as sometimes alleged, intrinsically reject state legitimacy or its bodies. This crisis has developed purely because the state lacked a meaningful presence in the MDs and the FATAs before them. Security and justice continue to be frustratingly elusive, whereas social services are either scarce or dysfunctional.
These assertions are not new; even the KP governor has publicly expressed his dismay about abandoned promises made to the residents of the MDs, and also the complete indifference to infrastructure improvements. For any governance construct and counterterrorism plan to work and succeed, the government needs to seriously and actively involve local communities, appreciating their principal part as major constituents in ensuring peace and security.
After reflecting on the past seven years, it quickly becomes clear that the former FATA region has not experienced tangible empowerment. Instead, it is still grappling with corrosive disenchantment and mounting socio-economic grievances as the government appears to revert to a familiar tradition of withdrawal.
There is no doubt that the merger may have offered a fleeting illusion of optimism to many in the MDs. But local people's circumstances will remain unstable until the state takes actions to remedy long periods of stagnation and exclusion. Another botched attempt at governance could stall this critical opportunity for reform.
Not only must the state recognize the transformative potential of integration, but it must also ensure that it delivers on its pledges and empowers the tribal communities to realize their aspirations and shape their collective identity. Pakistan's tribal peoples are not asking for preferential treatment or charity, nor are they seeking weapons. They are only asserting their constitutional rights: representation, economic resilience, security, equality, and inclusion in the formulation of relevant policymaking that directly impacts their daily realities and will determine their prospects. Simply put, tribal populations are asking for state ownership to which every Pakistani citizen is entitled.
But suppose Pakistan persists with its strategic drift in national security policies – marginalizing the periphery, neutralizing dissent, and imposing centralized control. In that case, it risks distancing the tribal community further and renewing the latent vulnerabilities that mainstreaming FATA was expected to redress. Decisive action is needed now, before it is too late and this second chance becomes forever lost.