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Asia Times
20-05-2025
- Business
- Asia Times
Beijing's blurred red lines and the strategy of ambiguity
Originally published by Pacific Forum, this article is republished with permission. When Lithuania let Taiwan open a diplomatic office in Vilnius in 2021, China froze trade overnight. Goods were blocked, supply chains snarled and European firms with Lithuanian ties faced pressure. The message was clear: a red line had been crossed. But what line, exactly? Beijing never said. That is the logic of strategic ambiguity. China has dellineated four red lines that anchor its foreign polilcy: Taiwan, democracy and human rights, its political system and the right to development. But those lines are rarely clear. They shift, vanish and reappear without warning. This is not a flaw; it's a feature. And it's a strategy that demands closer attention in the Indo-Pacific. Ambiguity means keeping thresholds vague, language flexible and reactions unpredictable. It lets China adjust its stance without appearing inconsistent. More importantly, it deters others. Foreign actors must weigh the risk of crossing a line they cannot see. This is not new. The US also uses ambiguity on Taiwan. But Beijing applies the tactic more broadly. Its red lines cover sovereignty, values and development. And they come with consequences. For Beijing, ambiguity offers both offensive and defensive advantages. It allows China to recalibrate its posture in real time, applying pressure where needed while walking back without losing face. It also helps maintain internal cohesion by signaling strength to domestic audiences without committing to risky action. What makes China's ambiguity work is enforcement. It uses legal, economic, military and diplomatic tools selectively and powerfully. Legally, it relies on vague laws like the Anti-Secession Law and the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law. Terms like 'acts of secession' or 'interference' can stretch to fit many cases. That is the point. Newer statutes, like the Foreign Relations Law, expand the toolbox. These laws often lack precise definitions. They give Beijing maximum interpretive space to act when it wants and to refrain when it does not. Economically, it uses trade bans, customs delays and unofficial boycotts. When South Korea hosted a US missile defense system, Chinese tourists vanished and Korean businesses were hit. Australia faced barley and wine sanctions for calling for a Covid inquiry. China rarely announces these moves. The silence keeps the threat alive. Military actions follow the same pattern. The PLA conducts drills near Taiwan, enters disputed waters and flies into contested airspace. Sometimes it escalates. Other times, it retreats. The choreography is meant to keep adversaries guessing. A joint naval patrol near Japan may be paired with conciliatory diplomatic visits elsewhere. The ambiguity lets Beijing strike multiple tones at once. Diplomatically, Beijing summons ambassadors, fires off sharp rhetoric and lets loose the state media. 'Wolf warrior' diplomacy raises tensions without drawing clear lines. The ambiguity tests resolve and gauges reactions. This system creates the appearance of control without committing to fixed outcomes. It is designed to shape the behavior of other states by increasing the cost of uncertainty. Ambiguity is not just a deterrent. It is a method of control. By making others guess, China limits their strategic choices. By reacting selectively, it maintains deniability. This is not random. It is integrated statecraft. While other countries also shift their red lines like Russia in Ukraine, China's scope is wider. It blends politics, economics and security into one strategic system. And the lines are ideological as well as geopolitical. Western criticisms of Chinese human rights practices, support for Hong Kong protests or bans on Chinese tech firms are often framed in Beijing as red-line violations. But there is no unified threshold for what triggers a reaction. That uncertainty compels self-censorship. It discourages bold policy choices. The result is a sophisticated ecosystem of influence. One that punishes selectively, forgives tactically and always retains the upper hand by never revealing the rules. But ambiguity cuts both ways. It raises the risk of miscalculation. When others cannot see the red lines, they might cross them unintentionally. That can escalate fast. It also hurts policymaking. Without knowing what triggers Beijing, governments become risk-averse. They avoid policies that might offend, even when national interests demand them. That erodes sovereignty. For businesses, the uncertainty is chilling. A symbolic gesture such as hosting a Taiwanese official, a tweet or a t-shirt can trigger major losses. In the Indo-Pacific, ambiguity deters some but fuels arms races, hedging and alliances. States prepare for the worst because they cannot tell where the line is. It can also lead to fragmentation of alliances. US allies may not agree on how to respond to Chinese provocations if they interpret the red lines differently. That divergence can weaken collective responses and embolden further testing by Beijing. There is also a cost to China. Overuse of ambiguity can create a credibility gap. If others begin to see China's red lines as performative rather than firm, the deterrent power declines. The constant calibration can look like indecision. That opens China to counter-pressure. Taiwan arms sales are a prime example. The US sells weapons to Taiwan regularly. Sometimes Beijing reacts with fury. Other times, it shrugs. That inconsistency is the point. Washington cannot predict the cost. Lithuania faced China's full wrath over a name: the 'Taiwanese Representative Office.' Beijing did not just target Lithuania; it blocked companies with any Lithuanian ties. A minor diplomatic move turned into a global lesson. In the South China Sea, China claims 'indisputable sovereignty' but will not say exactly what that means. It builds islands, harasses ships and denies wrongdoing. The line is enforced without ever being drawn. Another example is the 2023 sanctions on US defense firms. Ostensibly triggered by arms sales, they were announced months later, during a political moment when China needed to appear strong. The delay was deliberate. In each case, ambiguity allows China to set the tempo and scope of enforcement, giving it the strategic initiative. What can others do? First, stop demanding clarity. Ambiguity is the point. Instead, prepare for scenarios. Use war games and red-team exercises to explore responses. Build back channels to avoid escalation. Second, push for regional norms. Forums like ASEAN, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue ('Quad') and APEC can help set expectations. Even if China resists formal rules, informal ones shape behavior over time. Third, businesses need sharper political risk analysis. Watch laws, but also speeches, trends and public sentiment. Sometimes, a party slogan can predict more than a policy paper. Governments can also develop shared playbooks. When Beijing targets one state, coordinated support from others can raise the cost of coercion. A multilateral approach makes red lines harder to exploit. Above all, staying calm matters. Not every rhetorical flare-up signals imminent escalation. Sometimes it's performance. The key is to distinguish noise from intent. China's red lines are not lines at all. They're zones of ambiguity – sometimes visible, often not. But they are enforced with powerful tools. In the Indo-Pacific, where competition and mistrust run high, strategic ambiguity will keep shaping the landscape. The real challenge isn't just seeing the red lines. It's learning to operate smartly without ever knowing exactly where they are. Understanding the logic behind this ambiguity and crafting thoughtful, adaptive responses is essential for any nation hoping to stay stable, sovereign and strategically relevant in a world where the rules are written in pencil. Tang Meng Kit is a graduate of the MSc in International Relations program at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. His research interests encompass cross-Strait relations, Taiwanese politics and policy issues, as well as aerospace technology. He currently works as an aerospace engineer.
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First Post
28-04-2025
- Politics
- First Post
Is China's top general's disappearance a result of Xi's corruption purge?
One of China's senior-most generals, He Weidong, was conspicuously missing from a top political gathering last Friday. This is the second big event the 67-year-old has missed in recent times. This has led many to ponder if he is part of President Xi Jinping's anti-corruption drive read more Second-ranked Vice Chairman He Weidong at the opening session of the National People's Congress (NPC) at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China on March 5. His absence was apparent at the recent Politburo study session. File image/Reuters In China, top officials keep disappearing. The latest such instance is that of He Weidong, a top Chinese general, who missed yet another top gathering last Friday (April 25). Earlier, He had missed the tree-planting event in the outskirts of the capital Beijing – an annual springtime tradition for the country's military leadership spanning more than four decades. He's absence at the two important events is part of a growing pattern where Chinese military officials go missing. Many report that the disappearance of these personalities is part of President Xi Jinping's purge of the military's top ranks. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Let's take a closer look at who exactly is He and the growing number of military officials going 'missing' in China. He's absence felt Last Friday (April 25), He, who is the second-ranked vice-chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission (CMC) and one of the 24 members of the Communist Party's Politburo, was absent for a top political gathering — the Politburo study session presided over by Chinese President Xi Jinping. Earlier, He's absence was felt at a two-day, high-profile working conference on neighbourhood diplomacy on April 9. He was also missing from a voluntary tree-planting event in April that he attended last year. State media had also reported that He wasn't present at the symposium, which marked the 20th anniversary of the implementation of the Anti-Secession Law on March 14. He was last seen on March 11 at the closing ceremony of the National People's Congress, China's parliament. He Weidong (keft), second-ranked vice chairman of China's Central Military Commission (CMC) has been a senior official of the Chinese administration and has held roles in the Peoples Liberation Army for the past three decades. File image/AFP All about He Weidong For those who don't know, 67-year-old He is a senior official of the Chinese administration and has held roles in the Peoples Liberation Army for the past three decades. In 2013, he was appointed the commander of the Jiangsu Provincial Military District and a year later, became the commander of the Shanghai Garrison. In 2016, he was made deputy commander and army commander of the Western Theatre Command where he was deputy party secretary of the army committee. In October 2022, Xi appointed He as the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. Many had stated that it was an unusual move to appoint someone as vice chairman without going through the top 200 or so Central Committee members in the party hierarchy. However, He is considered close to President Xi and according to a report in Nikkei considered a member of the 'Fujian faction' of Xi's leadership. Chinese officials and their disappearing act The absence of He, according to experts and Chinese observers, is part of President Xi's anti-corruption drive. In recent times, the Chinese leader has removed a long line of officials for alleged corruption. But there's no confirmation on the same. However, Neil Thomas, an expert on elite Chinese politics at the Asia Society Policy Institute, told the Financial Times that He's purge would be the first of a serving uniformed vice-chair of the CMC since General He Long in 1967. Xi's purge of top officials dates back to over two years. Last year, Xi had sacked Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu, both defence ministers. Wei served in the role between 2018 and March 2023, and was succeeded by Li. Li disappeared from public view within months and was sacked in October 2023, becoming the country's shortest-serving defence minister. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Former Chinese Defence Minister Li Shangfu. Following weeks into his 'disappearance', China announced that he had been sacked. File image/Reuters Both men had 'gravely hurt the work of the party', the development of defence and the image of senior leaders, a report by the Central Military Commission (CMC), China's top military body, had said in the first official explanation for Li's sudden removal. Interestingly, Dong Jun, who took over from Li in December and was the first navy chief in the role, was also under investigation for corruption. Another high-profile disappearance followed by sacking was that of China's former foreign minister Qin Gang, who vanished from public view in June 2023 months after taking up the job. He was then removed as foreign minister a month later. Former Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang vanished from public view in June 2023 months after taking up the job. File image/Reuters Other officials have also carried out the disappearing act. For instance, Gen Wang Chunning, commander of the People's Armed Police Force. As per a Nikkei report, Chunning has disappeared from the centre stage a while back, missing many key meetings. Other similar examples are ground force commander Li Qiaoming and PLA naval commissar Yuan Huazhi, who reportedly went missing last December. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD In 2023, General Li Yuchao, commander of the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force, and his deputy, General Liu Guangbin had also gone missing with Xi ordering for their replacements in August. The Chinese president then appointed Wang Houbin, deputy commander of the PLA navy since 2020, as the head of the Rocket Force. Additionally, Xu Xisheng, an air force officer and party central committee member, was named as the Rocket Force's new political commissar. That's not all. In July 2022, Xiao Yaqing, who helmed the ministry of industry and information technology, disappeared from public view. Three weeks later, the state media said he was being investigated for corruption. With inputs from agencies
South China Morning Post
17-03-2025
- Politics
- South China Morning Post
‘Unprecedented danger' seen to loom over Taiwan Strait after Lai's ‘hostile force' remark
Observers have warned of 'unprecedented danger' to cross-strait relations following Taiwanese leader William Lai Ching-te's moves to reinstate military trials and his reference to mainland China as a 'hostile' force. Advertisement In comments following a high-level security meeting in Taipei on Thursday, Lai characterised mainland China as a 'foreign hostile force' as he underlined the need for stronger measures to tackle what he said were Beijing's infiltration and subversive efforts 'from within us'. It was the strongest such rhetoric yet from the leader of the ruling, independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) amid spiralling tensions across the Taiwan Strait. Lai also proposed a series of security measures, including reinstating military trials, setting up a 'disclosure mechanism' for officials who visit the mainland , and tightening the residency criteria for individuals from mainland China, Hong Kong and Macau. 02:01 'Every bit of strength': Taiwanese leader William Lai vows to boost island's defences 'Every bit of strength': Taiwanese leader William Lai vows to boost island's defences Lai's announcement, made on the eve of the 20th anniversary of the mainland's Anti-Secession Law , triggered swift condemnation from Beijing – with its Taiwan Affairs Office warning that he was pushing Taiwan towards 'the perilous brink of war' with his 'highly provocative' comments. Advertisement The mainland foreign ministry also rebuked the Group of 7 for 'interfering in China's internal affairs' after a joint statement from the bloc on Friday 'reiterated their opposition to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion'.
South China Morning Post
16-03-2025
- Politics
- South China Morning Post
Mainland China's PLA ‘ready to fight' for Taiwan at any time, commander warns
The Chinese military remains on high alert – 'ready to fight at all times and able to fight at any time' – to thwart any attempt at Taiwan independence, according to the commander of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) unit overseeing the Taiwan Strait. Advertisement The warning from Lin Xiangyang, who heads the PLA's Eastern Theatre Command, came at a symposium in Beijing on Friday to mark the 20th anniversary of the Anti-Secession Law Beijing sees Taiwan as part of China to be reunited by force if necessary, and this law serves as the legal basis for opposing Taiwan's independence and promoting reunification. It also provides a legal framework for the use of 'non-peaceful means' under certain conditions to achieve reunification. Lin Xiangyang at the event in Beijing on Friday, which marked the first time a frontline PLA commander had addressed such a meeting. Photo: Handout Friday's event marked the first time a frontline PLA commander had addressed such a meeting. His speech comes at a time of worsening cross-strait tensions, especially after William Lai Ching-te of the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party took office as leader of Taiwan last May. Beijing has repeatedly called Lai a 'dangerous separatist' who is likely to increase the risk of cross-strait war. According to excerpts from Lin's speech published on Saturday by the Communist Party mouthpiece People's Daily, the commander warned that 'if 'Taiwan independence' secessionists are stubborn or even take desperate measures, and if external forces are determined to create tension and turbulence in cross-strait relations', the Chinese military would 'take all necessary measures to strongly deter and punish them'. Advertisement He also vowed that the PLA would 'forge more reliable means and stronger capabilities to make sufficient and concrete military preparations to safeguard the complete reunification of our motherland'. Beijing blames Lai for destroying cross-strait peace with his repeated remarks that Taiwan and mainland China are not 'subordinate to one another'. Since Lai's inauguration last May, Beijing has tightened legal action related to anti-succession activities and intensified military drills around the island.
South China Morning Post
14-03-2025
- Politics
- South China Morning Post
Mainland China calls for legal improvements to fight Taiwan independence, foreign forces
Mainland China's No 3 official has called for 'further improving' the legal system against Taiwan independence during a symposium in Beijing marking the 20th anniversary of the country's Anti-Secession Law Advertisement Zhao Leji, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC), said on Friday that China should 'resolutely crack down on Taiwanese secession and intervention of foreign forces'. China has doubled down on 'improving the legal system to penalise independence forces' and the 'large-scale anti-secession, anti-intervention struggle' under the leadership of Chinese President Xi Jinping, Zhao said at the event. The last time such a meeting was held was in 2020, which marked the 15th anniversary of the law. Zhao Leji (top, centre), chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, addresses a symposium in Beijing on Friday marking the 20th anniversary of the Anti-Secession Law. Photo: Xinhua Zhao added that the country would continue to step up its confidence and determination to achieve reunification with Taiwan, which Beijing sees as part of its territory.
