Mainland China calls for legal improvements to fight Taiwan independence, foreign forces
Anti-Secession Law
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Zhao Leji, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC), said on Friday that China should 'resolutely crack down on Taiwanese secession and intervention of foreign forces'.
China has doubled down on 'improving the legal system to penalise independence forces' and the 'large-scale anti-secession, anti-intervention struggle' under the leadership of Chinese President Xi Jinping, Zhao said at the event.
The last time such a meeting was held was in 2020, which marked the 15th anniversary of the law.
Zhao Leji (top, centre), chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, addresses a symposium in Beijing on Friday marking the 20th anniversary of the Anti-Secession Law. Photo: Xinhua
Zhao added that the country would continue to step up its confidence and determination to achieve reunification with Taiwan, which Beijing sees as part of its territory.
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