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Arab News
5 days ago
- Politics
- Arab News
Lebanese state and Hezbollah face their most difficult hour
Can Lebanon become a normal state again, one that makes decisions through state institutions and that respects its commitments in line with international laws? Can Hezbollah acknowledge that the 'Axis of Resistance' is no more, and that it has no choice but to return to Lebanon and close the chapter of the 'regional player?' Can the party agree to a lesser role for Lebanon if Iran agrees to a lesser role in the region in recognition of the new balance of power? It does not take a genius to recognize that the situation in Lebanon has not changed, even though the features of this new reality have yet to be fully formed. Joseph Aoun was sworn in as president with Arab and international backing and under the slogan of reclaiming the state with all of its institutions. Nawaf Salam was named prime minister with the same goals. However, it was evident that Lebanon would not enjoy regional and international support for its reconstruction unless the decisions that are carried out in the south are restored to the state alone. I recalled what an Arab politician once told me. He said the Axis of Resistance was based on three pillars: The first was Gen. Qassem Soleimani, with his unique position in the Iranian supreme leader's circle and role in exporting the revolution that is enshrined in the Iranian constitution. The second was Hassan Nasrallah, who was Soleimani's partner in building the axis in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon. The third was Syria, which acted as the supply route for arms, 'advisers,' and funds from Tehran to Beirut passing through Iraq. What is left of Hezbollah's regional role now that Soleimani and Nasrallah are dead, and the Syrian 'bridge' has been severed with the ousting of former leader Bashar Assad? The politician said Hezbollah is undoubtedly going through the most difficult phase since its establishment in the wake of the Israeli invasion of Beirut in 1982. Nasrallah and Soleimani are no more, and the Syrian Arab Republic President Ahmed Al-Sharaa has not forgotten what the pair did to keep Assad's regime alive. Tehran has suffered from Israeli jets breaching its skies. There is no doubt that Hezbollah fought fiercely, but there can be no denying Israel's superiority and how it succeeded in eliminating the pillars of the axis. This reality prompted Aoun to dare to declare the facts as they are after he realized that Lebanon was at risk of more Israeli violations and that it would not get out from under the rubble without paying a price — Hezbollah and its weapons. So, he openly declared what his predecessors had avoided saying explicitly: The possession of weapons should be restricted to the army and Hezbollah must disarm. Hezbollah is obviously having a hard time accepting this demand, which is effectively calling on it to abandon its regional exploits and become a local party that does not monopolize the decision of war and peace and has no military arsenal. In other words, it no longer has the right to name presidents and veto any Lebanese decisions that do not align with its regional vision. In early summer 2004, I held a meeting with Assad, with discussions focusing on the US invasion of Iraq and its impact on the region. I had to ask about Lebanon, where Syrian troops were deployed throughout its territories and where Syria held sway over its decisions. The country was then ruled by President Emile Lahoud. Assad said that his term would end in the fall. I asked him about the rumors that the term would be extended, to which he replied: 'Wasn't the extension of Elias Hrawi's term costly?' I agreed, and Assad added: 'Don't you think Lahoud's extension will be even more costly?' And I had to agree. Assad revealed that he had a list of possible presidential candidates, including Jean Obeid, whom he said was skilled at politics, but would be no match for Rafik Hariri. Asked who his preferred candidate was, he tried to imply that the Lebanese themselves would decide in the end. I told him that I was not some ignorant stranger and that I knew how things worked in Lebanon. At my insistence, Assad told me he favored Suleiman Frangieh, whom he praised. Will Hezbollah assume the responsibility for the isolation that will befall Lebanon if it insists on hanging on to its arsenal? Ghassan Charbel In the end, Lahoud's term was extended and Frangieh was ruled out as a candidate, perhaps because he was a family friend of the Assads. I returned to Syria that fall and asked Assad what prompted the extension, to which he replied that a 'friend' advised him that Frangieh needed to forge more foreign relations, especially in the region. Frangieh would later reveal to me that the 'friend' was none other than Nasrallah, who urged Assad to extend Lahoud's term, a decision that would be costly for Syria after Hariri's assassination. Hezbollah made presidents and governments in Lebanon. It kept the presidential palace vacant for two-and-half years so that it would be able to elect Michel Aoun as president, putting him at odds with Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri from day one of his term. Can a party that used to change Assad's decisions and that sent advisers to Yemen and Iraq return to the Lebanese map without its rockets? Will the party assume the responsibility for the isolation that will befall Lebanon if it insists on hanging on to its arsenal or if it sparks a new Israeli war on Lebanon? The party has lost its strong leader, its influence in Syria, and its ability to fight Israel, so what role does its arsenal have left to play? Can it take the decision to lay down its arms?
The National
6 days ago
- Politics
- The National
With Gaza in the global spotlight, expect Israel to turn the heat on Hezbollah
Israel finds itself in need of diverting global attention away from its atrocities in Gaza. Enter Hezbollah. The Israeli government appears to see renewed war with the Lebanese group as a chance to further its interests, pretexting the latter's refusal to surrender its weapons to the Lebanese state as it previously pledged. The timing is driven by several factors. The administration of US President Donald Trump has grown weary of waiting for Beirut to fulfil its promise of exclusive state control over arms, and it might be ready to endorse any Israeli decision, regardless of its severity. Another factor is Iran's unwillingness to enter a direct war with Israel on Hezbollah's behalf. Indeed, Tehran is both preoccupied with the fallout from the recent US and Israeli strikes and worried about another wave of attacks in the near future. Still, it refuses to abandon its strategy of using armed regional proxies as bargaining chips in potential negotiations with Washington. Tensions between the US and Iran are thus escalating – manifested through American sanctions, Iranian threats and Israeli war preparations. Iran's proxies in Lebanon and Yemen are on high alert, and the wider Iranian 'Axis of Resistance' is watching events closely, from Iraq to Gaza. Israel has zero tolerance regarding Hezbollah's arsenal. It has convinced the Trump administration that if the Lebanese government fails to implement its disarmament pledge, Israel has no choice but to press ahead with its war on the group. Meanwhile, the international conference on the two-state solution – co-chaired by Saudi Arabia and France at the UN – might have angered Iran. The Islamic Republic's ideology rejects the two-state solution, with its doctrine calling for Israel's destruction. Moreover, the conference's show of global support for the Palestinian Authority as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people was also a collective cry against Hamas, a key player in Iran's axis. Just as Israel is indifferent to the civilian toll in Gaza, Iran appears unbothered by Palestinian suffering, particularly as long as Hamas remains faithful to the axis. Mr Trump was recently forced to acknowledge the human-made famine in Gaza, having previously denied this reality. While he didn't initially act against Israel, which is enacting a policy of starvation in the enclave, he spoke about it after parts of his Maga political base pressed him to intervene to end the humanitarian catastrophe. This was accompanied by a different kind of global political pressure as Mr Trump was challenged by European and non-European allies who participated in the two-state solution conference and endorsed its final communique charting a path towards a Palestinian state alongside Israel. There are concerns over possible vindictive responses from Mr Trump, particularly if he feels isolated on the international stage. There is unease over his administration sanctioning the PA's leadership, which the latter says is a form of punishment for seeking the establishment of a Palestinian state. It shouldn't surprise anyone if Israel seeks to crush everything that emerged from the UN conference. It views the PA as an obstacle to its ambitions of annexing the West Bank. It opposes the near-unanimous international view that Hamas should be dismantled, only because its policy is to fracture Palestinian unity and undermine the PA. The dilemma facing the US President over the current Israeli government's extremist policies is his growing global isolation on the Palestine issue. He may still choose to ignore increasing international momentum in favour of a Palestinian state, but it could come at a cost. Indeed, it was no small development for Saudi Arabia to insist to the international community that it won't normalise relations with Israel unless a Palestinian state is established. Riyadh's support for Palestinian statehood gained greater significance when it co-chaired the conference with France. The event brought surprising developments, including the UK's readiness to recognise the state of Palestine at next month's UN General Assembly unless Israel changes course from its current approach in Gaza. Yet a Palestinian state cannot come into being without American backing and Israeli compliance. The UN Security Council has already enshrined the two-state solution in resolutions 1397 and 1515, both supported by Washington. But the roadmap they laid out for Palestinian statehood by 2005 was never implemented and the Trump administration walked back American commitments to those resolutions. The events in New York could push Mr Trump further into the arms of Israeli extremism and its rejection of the two-state solution. Or he might find himself cornered and unable to punish the broad coalition of states that have challenged him. If so, his policy could shift under pressure. This would require a deft diplomatic effort to present Mr Trump with ways to align with the emerging consensus without feeling provoked. Countries have bilateral interests and won't risk undermining relations with Washington solely for the sake of the two-state solution. Having been increasingly scrutinised by the international community, Israel appears intent on shifting global focus away from Gaza. This is precisely because it intends to continue its policies there. And as long as European states fail to impose tangible punitive measures on Israel, and as long as Mr Trump supports its project of 'voluntary displacement', Israel will continue with its agenda. Israel's posture towards Lebanon and Iran, however, is another matter. There is little international sympathy for Iran's insistence that Hezbollah retain its arms in defiance of Lebanese sovereignty. Nor is there sympathy for Tehran's reckless endangerment of the Lebanese people's safety, security and agency. There is, likewise, little global sympathy for the Islamic Republic's stubborn adherence to its triad of strategic doctrines – nuclear capability, ballistic missiles and proxy warfare – without modifications. Thus, should it once again face US or Israeli military strikes, it is unlikely to find many sympathisers. Tehran is now trapped by American sanctions and the threat of more air strikes. Hezbollah, too, will find no one rushing to its rescue if it falls prey to Israel's attempts to shift global attention away from Gaza. Both entities will have only themselves to blame.
Yahoo
11-07-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Gaza for Fordow: Did Netanyahu master the art of the strategic deal?
Like a masterful game of chess, Netanyahu sacrificed his "queen" of the complete dismantling of Hamas in order to achieve something greater: The destruction of Iran's nuclear sites. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's current trip to Washington will likely provide the answer to one of the most-asked questions since Operation Rising Lion: how will Israel's success in Iran impact the situation in Gaza? The very fact that there is now intensified discussion about a ceasefire in Gaza and bringing the hostages home already shows that one event has influenced the other. That momentum was not felt to the same degree before June 13 and Israel's attack on Iran. But, unlike what many may have assumed, the change in heart has not come from Hamas. It has come from Netanyahu. Until recently, Netanyahu was adamant about continuing the war, mainly due to an aversion to allowing Hamas any semblance of victory -- something they will claim by remaining in any capacity in Gaza after the war. Yet following Israel's stunning military success in Iran, the crippling of Hezbollah, and the destruction of much of Hamas's infrastructure, it is hard to argue, credibly, that Hamas 'won' the war it launched on October 7. Instead, that war triggered a chain of events that brought about the dismantling of the so-called 'axis of resistance,' an enterprise on which Iran mortgaged its future and spent an estimated half a trillion dollars over three decades building. The result? Iran is left with little energy, scarce water, a basket-case economy, a proxy network that has largely gone up in smoke, and a nuclear program that has now been set back years. This new lay of the land—not any newfound flexibility from Hamas—is what may now bring the war in Gaza to a close. And it may give Netanyahu the political space to show flexibility on terms he previously ruled out. For the first time in decades, Israel is not staring down an immediate existential threat. That changes the calculus. In this strategic realignment, it's hard not to recall a historical parallel drawn by Israeli thinker Micah Goodman, even before the war, in one of his podcasts with Efrat Shapira-Rosenberg as part of a series on Iran. One particular comparison between Netanyahu and Winston Churchill now seems more relevant than ever and merits revisiting. In the early stages of World War II, Churchill came to one overriding conclusion: that only an American entry into the war would save Britain and ensure Nazi defeat. His primary strategic objective was to draw the US into the conflict. The Atlantic Conference in August 1941, when he met Franklin D. Roosevelt in Newfoundland, made that clear: Churchill's goal was, quite simply, to get the Americans in. When that failed, he settled for expanded aid and a united Anglo-American vision for the postwar world, enshrined in the Atlantic Charter. The Charter itself was a monumental concession. Among its principles was the right of all peoples to choose their own government, a direct threat to British colonial rule. Churchill was concerned that this clause would legitimize decolonization movements, including those within Britain's own empire. And he was right. The Charter also demanded the dismantling of Imperial Preference, Britain's protective trade system, another blow to the British Empire. Yet Churchill, deeply attached to the empire, made those concessions. Why? Because the strategic prize, the American alliance, was worth the sacrifice. This is a textbook case of strategic prioritization. For Churchill, the supreme goal was to get the US into the war. And to achieve that goal, he was willing to sacrifice other ambitions. Goodman likened this to a game of chess, during which one sacrifices the queen, in this case, the British Empire, to save the king, Britain itself, and the free world. That logic—the willingness to trade a cherished but secondary asset for a decisive strategic gain, resonates today. Just as Churchill gave up the empire to preserve the nation, Netanyahu may now be weighing a similar trade: 'absolute victory' in Gaza for a decisive victory over Iran. For Netanyahu, Iran has always been the king on the board, and the neutralization of its nuclear program -- an existential threat to Israel -- has been his lifelong mission. But to get that achievement, he needed US involvement in the bombing of Iran's nuclear facilities at Fordo, Natanz, and Isfahan. Doing that, obviously, did not come without cost or calculation. Much has been written about the role of Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer in persuading the Trump administration to approve the strike despite the objections of the isolationist wing of the GOP. Some have called it Israel's most significant diplomatic achievement in decades. It is equally plausible, if not more so, that Gaza was a major piece in this puzzle. Following the US strikes, Trump made it clear that he wanted the war in Gaza to end. On Sunday, in the runup to Monday evening's meeting with Netanyahu in the White House, he also said that the US is 'working on a lot of things' with Israel, including 'probably a permanent deal with Iran.' The US and Iran are expected to restart talks in the coming days, and Trump has made clear that under any deal, Iran will not be able to enrich uranium -- a condition reinforced by the US strike. This may all be part of a broader strategic bargain: that if the US took out Iran's nuclear facilities, Netanyahu would agree to wind down the war in Gaza. It's the Churchill chessboard, modernized. Just as Churchill accepted American terms on decolonization to gain an ally against Hitler, Netanyahu may have already agreed to forgo 'absolute victory' in Gaza to secure the far greater strategic win of neutralizing Iran's nuclear capabilities. Which brings us back to the chess analogy. The 'queen,' in this case, is the continuation of the war in Gaza and the maximalist objective of toppling Hamas completely. The 'king' is neutralizing Iran. Just as Churchill gave up imperial glory to get the US into World War II, the coming days will show whether Netanyahu was willing to tamp down his conditions regarding a Gaza ceasefire in exchange for getting the US to act against Iran. Critics will say Netanyahu is cutting a deal with a transactional American president at the expense of letting Hamas survive. Others will argue that if this was part of the price for getting US action in Iran -- if it was a calculated sacrifice in the service of a more important end -- then it was well worth it. Through Churchillian eyes, the logic is cold and clear: sacrifice the queen, win the game.
The National
08-07-2025
- Politics
- The National
Tit-for-tat strikes expose Houthi defiance and Israel's limited options
The latest exchanges between Israel and the Houthis reflect how entrenched and emboldened the Yemeni group has become, undeterred by Israeli attempts to weaken its Iranian patron. The Israeli attack involved approximately 20 aircraft that launched a wave of strikes on Houthi-controlled ports, a power station and even a ship that the group captured in 2023. Israel dropped more than 50 munitions in the attack, according to its military. The operation came after the Iran -backed Houthis attacked the Liberia-flagged Magic Seas ship hours earlier, and then fired missiles and drones at targets in Israel. 'The attack on the Magic Seas is not a shift in the position of the Houthis. Before the ceasefire announced by the US President in May, and even after it, the position remained that targeting Israel and ships dealing with it will continue,' a Yemeni source in Sanaa told The National. Two months ago, President Donald Trump announced that the US would stop attacking the Houthis after the rebels agreed to halt attacks on US forces and commercial vessels in the Red Sea. The Magic Seas strike is the first Houthi attack since that truce, and it comes after the Houthis vowed to resume attacks in the region following the US strikes on Iran. 'Every Israeli aggression against the Palestinian and Yemeni people will be met with direct strikes on Israel by the Houthis. This is the decision now, no matter the consequences,' added the Yemeni source. The Houthis are part of the so-called Axis of Resistance, an Iran-led network that includes Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon and armed groups in Iraq, whose aim is to deter Israel from conducting military action and countering its influence in the region. Many of the groups have fought against Iran's enemies in their respective countries. Heavy price The groups launched attacks on Israel as part of a support campaign for Hamas and the Palestinian people after the Gaza war broke out on October 7, 2023. But months of fighting with Israel, which holds clear military dominance, have eroded the operational capacity of the axis considerably. Hezbollah was once seen as Iran's frontline deterrent against Israel, but a string of Israeli strikes last year wiped out much of its leadership and crippled its arsenal. Now, the Houthis have emerged as Tehran's preferred strategic proxy. After the recent Houthi attacks, the Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz said that 'the Houthis will continue to pay a heavy price for their actions' as his military announced it 'struck and destroyed terror infrastructure belonging to the Houthi terrorist regime'. 'Among the targets were the ports of Hodeida, Ras Isa, and As Salif,' it said. It was the Israeli army's first attack on Yemen in around a month. The Israeli strikes, which hit targets that have already been attacked several times, highlights the limits on what Israel alone can achieve against its distant enemy, which despite the weakening of Iran and the regional militant groups it backs, keeps up a steady pace of missile attacks against Israel. Dr Yoel Guzansky, a senior researcher at the Israeli think tank INSS, told The National that he thought there is 'no delusion in Israel that the Houthis are about to stop targeting Israel'. 'I think the aim of these attacks is to punish and deter not necessarily the Houthis, but the surrounding neighbourhood enemies and to show that even if the attacks don't stop, there's no attack on Israel that it will not carry on retaliation. Israel will not be silent.' Mr Katz directly warned Iran in his statement after the strikes, saying that 'what's true for Iran is true for Yemen'. 'Anyone who raises a hand against Israel will have it cut off,' he said. Mr Guzansky said that the infrastructure targets attacked by Israel have been attacked 'over and over … meaning that the Houthis rebuild their stuff very fast'. He added that the most 'meaningful attack on the Houthis was in June when Israel targeted the chief of staff of the Houthis [Muhammad Al Ghamari].' Mr Al Ghamari's fate is unknown, but Mr Guzansky said the attack showed that 'Israel is gaining intelligence on the Houthis, something we didn't have before'.
Al Arabiya
02-07-2025
- Politics
- Al Arabiya
A year of setbacks for Iran
The Iranian government declared 'victory' following a ceasefire with Israel that ended the devastating 12-day war. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei tried to project strength and control. But the reality is stark: the Islamic Republic has just endured what is arguably the worst year in its post-1979 history. For all the latest headlines follow our Google News channel online or via the app. Iran's claims of resilience and power may comfort the government, but the broader geopolitical picture reveals unprecedented blows – military, strategic, and psychological. In the past year and a half, Tehran has watched its foundational pillars of influence crumble: its military prestige has been shattered, its nuclear deterrent set back, its closest regional allies have been weakened or lost entirely, and its so-called 'Axis of Resistance' has been weakened. This isn't just a series of temporary setbacks; these are deep structural wounds that may take decades to heal – if they ever do. The 12-day war: Devastation behind the curtain of ceasefire The 12-day war that began on June 13, 2025, was not just a military confrontation – it was a strategic humiliation for Iran. What started with a surprise Israeli operation rapidly evolved into one of the most precise and crippling military campaigns the Islamic Republic has ever faced. Within a short time, Israeli fighter jets and drones eliminated more than 30 senior Iranian military figures, including the powerful IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Gen. Amir Ali Hajizadeh and Revolutionary Guard chief Gen. Hossein Salami. These were not mid-level operatives; they were the architects of Iran's asymmetric warfare strategy, its ballistic missile programs, and its regional proxy operations. Their loss has created a leadership vacuum that no amount of rhetoric can disguise. The strikes did not stop at personnel. Israel proceeded to bombard many high-value military targets deep inside Iranian territory. It targeted and killed at least nine nuclear scientists in Tabriz and Natanz. Meanwhile, US B-2 bombers and F-22s joined the offensive, delivering bunker-busting bombs to sites like Fordow and Parchin. The scale and speed of the joint Israeli-American campaign was unprecedented. Iran's ability to retaliate was feeble at best. It launched volleys of missiles into Israel, but most were intercepted or fell harmlessly. In the end, Tehran was forced into accepting a ceasefire under pressure – not from a position of strength, but desperation. Khamenei's declaration of victory appears to ring hollow to those who had seen the true extent of Iran's defeat. Iran's vulnerable skies: A myth shattered One of the most shocking revelations of the war was just how easily and thoroughly Israel was able to dominate Iran's airspace. For twelve days, Israeli F-35s and armed drones operated with impunity, striking targets from Tehran to Isfahan without any significant resistance. This wasn't just a tactical failure – it was a strategic disaster. Iran has spent decades cultivating the image of a self-reliant military power capable of defending its skies. From Russian-made S-300s to its indigenously produced 'Bavar-373' air defense system, Tehran projected the impression that it was prepared for any aerial threat. That illusion has now been obliterated. To the average Iranian – and to the government's regional allies – the message was unmistakable: a small country like Israel, with the backing of the US, can dismantle Iran's defenses in a matter of days. If Tehran cannot even secure its own skies, how can it defend its proxies, project regional dominance, or threaten its adversaries? The psychological impact of this defeat is enormous and will linger long after the physical damage has been repaired. Nuclear deterrent eroded: Infrastructure in rubble Iran has long viewed its nuclear program as the ultimate insurance policy against government change and foreign attack. Its ability to enrich uranium and the ambiguity surrounding its breakout capabilities gave it leverage in diplomatic negotiations and instilled fear in regional adversaries. That edge has now been dulled, if not completely shattered. The Israeli and US airstrikes targeted multiple nuclear sites, including the heavily fortified Fordow facility, deep within a mountain. Satellite images in the aftermath showed massive craters, collapsed infrastructure, and frantic recovery efforts. Bulldozers and cranes have been working day and night to salvage what they can, but the damage is undeniable. More devastating than the physical damage is the human toll. The assassination of key nuclear scientists has crippled Iran's technical brain trust. These were individuals who carried decades of specialized knowledge – not easily replaced by young engineers or imported know-how. This blow to Iran's nuclear program strips the government of one of its most powerful diplomatic tools. Its ability to use the threat of nuclear escalation to extract concessions from the West, to rally domestic unity, or to scare its neighbors, has now been seriously compromised. Losing al-Assad: A strategic corridor severed Syria, under Bashar al-Assad, was Iran's central gateway to the Levant. Through Damascus, Iran moved weapons to Hezbollah, trained Shia militias, and maintained a military presence on Israel's northern border. The fall of al-Assad's government upended that equation. Without Syria, Iran has effectively lost its land bridge to Hezbollah. Tehran can no longer count on free passage or safe havens in Syria. Al-Assad's fall was more than just a strategic loss – it's a symbolic one. For years, Iran boasted of rescuing the Syrian government from collapse during the civil war. That investment, both in blood and treasure, has now been erased. Billions of dollars spent, thousands of Quds Force operatives deployed, and hundreds of diplomatic man-hours – all for nothing. The collapse of the Syrian government not only weakens Iran's forward presence, but it also emboldens its adversaries who now see the Axis of Resistance as fragmented and vulnerable. Hezbollah: From fearsome proxy to fading force Hezbollah, once the crown jewel of Iran's proxy network, is now weakened. Following relentless Israeli airstrikes on southern Lebanon throughout 2024 and 2025, Hezbollah has lost much of its command infrastructure and weapons stockpile. Key commanders have been eliminated, and morale among fighters has reportedly dropped significantly. Most telling was Hezbollah's limited involvement in the Iran-Israel war. Despite calls from Tehran for solidarity, no support was extended by the group; There was no coordinated assault, no second front, no regional escalation. Hezbollah stood by, restrained and degraded. This is a devastating development for the Islamic Republic. For decades, Iran has relied on Hezbollah as both a deterrent and an extension of its military power. If Hezbollah can no longer be counted on to fight alongside Iran in a time of war, then the concept of 'proxy resistance' begins to unravel. The larger picture: A declining power facing the abyss Taken together, these developments paint a bleak picture for the Iranian government. Over the course of just 18 months, Tehran has lost key military leaders, had its air defenses exposed as inadequate, seen its nuclear infrastructure severely damaged, watched its key ally Assad fall from power, and witnessed the degradation of Hezbollah. The psychological toll on the government – and on the Iranian people – should not be underestimated. Confidence in the government's competence is eroding. Public anger is simmering over the government's foreign adventures while domestic economic and social needs go unaddressed. More importantly, Iran's enemies now see it as weakened and the era of Iran projecting power into the region without serious pushback may be over. Even if the government survives these blows – which it likely will in the short term – the road to recovering its strategic position will be long and uncertain. In fact, some of the damage may be irreversible. Iran may never again command the same level of influence it once did in Baghdad, Damascus, or Beirut. In conclusion, this past year has been a strategic catastrophe for the Islamic Republic of Iran. The 12-day war exposed its military vulnerabilities. Israeli dominance of its airspace shattered its aura of invincibility. Its nuclear program was set back. Al-Assad's fall broke the land corridor vital to Iran's regional presence. Hezbollah, its strongest proxy, is no longer a dependable partner. Despite the government declaration of victory, the facts speak for themselves. Iran has had a very bad year – perhaps its worst yet. And the repercussions will echo not just in 2025, but in the years and decades to come.
