25-04-2025
Opinion Bengaluru's new local governance Act goes against the spirit of decentralisation
The Greater Bengaluru Governance Act, 2024 (GBG Act), meant to replace the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike Act, 2020 (BBMP Act, 2020), received the Karnataka Governor's assent on April 24. This comes in the aftermath of protest, controversy and walkouts staged against the Act, while it was passed in both the legislative assembly and the legislative council in Karnataka. The GBG Act provides for the creation of the Greater Bengaluru Authority for coordinating and supervising the development of the Greater Bengaluru area. Despite its claims to be 'futuristic', it does little to address Bengaluru's existing problems, which are rooted in lack of coordination among multiple agencies, ineffective decentralisation, and the lack of effective devolution of functions.
While the mayors of the municipal corporations within the Greater Bengaluru Area are designated as ex-officio members of the Greater Bengaluru Authority, the fact that the Chief Minister is the ex-officio chairperson is a cause for concern. As the GBG Act aims to improve the quality of life of all citizens of Bengaluru, the mayor — considered the city's first citizen — must be empowered to preside over the meetings of the Authority to ensure coordination, execution and administration of plans, schemes and major projects. These problems are compounded by the fact that the mayor's term is limited to 30 months — too short to provide stability in governance and to secure a long-term vision for the city.
The Constitution (Seventy-fourth Amendment) Act, 1992, (74th CAA) provides for the establishment of urban local bodies(ULBs) as institutions of local self-government. The objective of the 74th CAA was to devolve key civic functions to ULBs, but in reality, functions such as planning, land use regulation, water supply and others continue to be provided by parastatals in Karnataka/Bengaluru. It is already problematic that these parastatals work directly under the state government and are not accountable to the ULBs. The 1st State Finance Commission, constituted in 1994 had, in fact, recommended that parastatal agencies such as the Bengaluru Development Authority should be brought under the purview of the ULBs. A reading of the composition of the GBA and its functions takes us back to an era that existed before the enactment of the 74th CAA. The Authority essentially brings the operation of the corporations under the control and jurisdiction of the state government, in direct contravention of the intent and purpose of the 74th CAA. The Act perpetuates continued encroachment on the functions and revenues of local governments by the apparently 'specialised agencies' of the state government, thereby weakening the autonomy of local governments and hindering their performance. The fact that the city does not have an elected council only exacerbates the problem, as a ULB without a council cannot be held accountable and responsible by the citizens.
The 74th CAA provides for the creation of ward committees, envisioning them as a bridge between the municipal government and citizens. The GBG Act aims to 'empower Ward Committees to become basic units of urban governance and facilitate community participation'. However, it is important to note that the Act falls short on two fronts when it comes to ward committees. First, although the Act states that decisions of the ward committee shall be made on the basis of a simple majority, by giving a veto power to the chairperson of the ward committee, it renders the idea of voting meaningless, as the chairperson still retains the ultimate decision-making power. Second, Section 103 of the Act clearly states that the recommendations of the ward committee are advisory in nature, thereby rendering the committee toothless. The Act has also done away with Area Sabhas, a body that actually institutionalised community participation and has been instrumental in empowering the residents to suggest development priorities for their areas.
Decentralisation is essential for effective governance, but it cannot be mere lip service. While the Act aims to restructure the BBMP into 'more manageable' corporations, the split will only create coordination problems between the smaller corporations. Some questions remain: What happens to the Bengaluru Metropolitan Land Transport Authority, which has a similar structure to the GBA? Will Bengaluru have to wait for many more years for a mayor and corporators? How long will it be before the GBG Act is struck down by the courts for being contrary to the 74th CAA? When will the city have a new master plan? While states continue to fight over the lack of effective decentralisation and federalism, perhaps it is also time for them to look inwards to address these very concerns to ensure that decision-making power in our democracy effectively trickles down and reaches the cities, towns and villages, as envisioned by our Constitution.
