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AllAfrica
5 days ago
- Business
- AllAfrica
Ishiba's Trump trade pact fuels ‘unequal treaty' firestorm
Two weeks after he posted 'mission accomplished' on X, Japanese trade negotiator Akazawa Ryosei is back in Washington DC for another round of talks with his US counterparts. The issue is that the Trump administration has given no indication of when – or whether – it will implement the concession that appeared to be Akazawa and Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru's greatest achievement: a reduction in the US tariff on Japan's automobile exports from 27.5% to 15%. This concession was not mentioned in the White House's fact sheet about the US-Japan agreement or the executive order setting 'reciprocal' tariffs to 15%. With the Ishiba government's insistence that the lack of a written agreement was not only acceptable but even beneficial for Japan, the Ishiba government has nothing to go on other than the word of Akazawa and Ishiba that the US did, in fact, agree to concede on an issue upon which the Trump administration had been highly reluctant to compromise. As Akazawa returns to Washington, the agreement that was initially greeted with acclaim has become a liability for Ishiba, just one more threat to his tenure in office. Ishiba and his cabinet just faced two days of questioning in the Diet over the agreement in which Ishiba conceded that it is difficult to make any agreement with Donald Trump stick; betrayed a certain reluctance to speak directly with Trump; faced questions about the wisdom of concluding an unwritten executive agreement not subject to any legislative approval; and Tamaki Yuichiro, leader of the opposition Democratic Party for the People (DPFP), suggested that if auto tariffs are not reduced to 15%, it would be grounds for a no-confidence motion. However, the questions about the US-Japan trade deal are not just a threat to Ishiba's survival. They increasingly show the damage that the Trump administration's approach to Japan has done to confidence in Tokyo among Japanese elites, echoing the loss of trust in the United States recorded by public opinion polls. One phrase in particular captures the degree to which the mood in Tokyo has shifted since the beginning of the year: unequal treaty. While it is perhaps premature to call its use ubiquitous, in recent days Sanseito leader Kamiya Sohei suggested in parliamentary debate that 'many citizens feel that they have been forced to accept an unequal treaty.' Tamaki said that if the agreement is not renegotiated, it could be called the 'unequal treaty of the Reiwa era.' Meanwhile, in a column at TBS's website on August 1, economist Kumano Hideo wondered whether the deal appeared to be an 'unequal treaty.' Nakanishi Fumiyuki asked a similar question in his column in Nikkan Gendai on August 1. The phrase also appears in a July 31 article in Nikkei Business, referring to popular anger at the 'unequal treaty of the Reiwa era.' This phrase, of course, carries tremendous weight in East Asian history, referring to the treaties imposed by the Western powers on China, Japan and Korea from the First Opium War onward – either following the use of force or, in the case of Japan, under the threat of force – that gave the Western powers extraterritorial privileges, territorial concessions and the opening of treaty ports, and control over tariffs and customs enforcement. Meiji Japan, having inherited 'unequal treaties' signed by the Tokugawa shogunate, was determined to abolish these privileges and succeeded not only in effectively doing so by the mid-1890s but also imposed its own unequal treaties on both Korea and China as it joined the ranks of the imperial powers. China, meanwhile, continued to be subject to its unequal treaties until 1941 (or later, if Hong Kong's status is considered as part of the unequal treaties), serving as an important part of the Chinese Communist Party's narrative about a 'century of humiliation.'1 The phrase remained part of Japan's political rhetoric after 1945, often on the left when discussing postwar treaties with the United States.2 The ease with which the phrase has reappeared voiced by conservative politicians and economists – shortly after Ishiba took an aggressive stance on the campaign trail, warning that Japan 'would not be taken advantage of' in talks with the United States – points to the anger that is roiling barely below the surface of Japanese politics.3 Of course, the use of the phrase 'unequal treaty' suggests that the anger many in Japan are feeling stems from a sense of powerlessness. The negotiations with the Trump administration as a whole have revealed the degree to which the trade talks have seemed more like tributary diplomacy – as discussed here – than reciprocal talks between equals, a point conceded by the reality that Japan is haggling over the size of the additional tariffs its exporters will face, not whether it will face those tariffs at all. It is easier for Tamaki to threaten Ishiba with a no-confidence motion than to fulminate against the US directly.4 As the Tokugawa shogunate discovered, it is the Japanese government that signs the unequal treaties that pays the price, not the powers that impose them. In the near term, the fact that Akazawa has already returned to Washington to verify the agreement that he and Ishiba touted in July is a portentous omen for Ishiba's survival. Even before the upper house elections, Ishiba's right-wing rivals within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) were outraged over his handling of relations with the United States. In their eagerness to declare that a deal had been reached, Ishiba and Akazawa played right into their hands, notwithstanding Ishiba's efforts to argue that uncertainty around the agreement means that he has to stay in office. Over the longer term, it is unclear how the anger signified by the phrase 'unequal treaty' influences Japan's approach to the relationship with the United States in practical terms. Ishiba spoke of Japan's pursuing a more independent foreign policy on the campaign trail but was vague on the details. Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) leader Noda Yoshihiko hammered Ishiba for not doing more to coordinate with the European Union and other like-minded partners, but those efforts have been anemic (and not just because of Ishiba). The far left, of course, has never been satisfied with the security relationship with the United States in the first place. The wild card in this debate is Sanseito. On the one hand, even as Kamiya criticized the deal with Trump as an 'unequal treaty,' he suggested that Ishiba should assuage Trump by following his lead in opposing climate policies, diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) policies and the UN's sustainable development goals, hardly an assertion of Japan's independence. At the same time, however, Kamiya has hinted at an openness to considering an independent nuclear deterrent, while Saya, his party's most prominent candidate in July, paid no political price when it surfaced that she had called for acquiring nuclear weapons, calling them 'economical.' Sanseito's rise could signify the mainstreaming of not only its anti-immigrant rhetoric but also its embrace of a conservative, often anti-American nationalism that has been pushed to the margins of the LDP and into the pages of conservative journals but has largely not influenced Japan's foreign policymaking, which, particularly since 2012, has gone to extraordinary lengths to keep the United States committed to Japanese and regional security. While the right wing still talks of the need for an alliance with the United States – an essay by Fujii Satoshi in the current issue of Seiron, a right-wing monthly, calls for a 'new autonomy not dependent on the United States' but also for an equal partnership with the United States – it is a less deferential way of thinking about the relationship, less hesitant to embrace military power and remove postwar limits, and, to say the least, less apologetic for Japan's wartime past. The Trump administration, eager to see US allies take more responsibility for their own defense and the regional balance of power, would probably not object to a shift in this direction. Indeed, the Trump administration would likely celebrate it as a victory for its approach to the world. But a Japan that shifted in this direction could prove profoundly destabilizing, through its impact on the regional military balance and threat perceptions, its ability to work diplomatically with like-minded partners and the respect Japan has accumulated through its postwar rejection of the use of force to settle international disputes. To be sure, Sanseito's emergence does not guarantee that Japan will in fact take this path; the public may, among other things, balk at the price tag. Ishiba, meanwhile, may not be alone in seeking a more independent Japan that still seeks to uphold international rules and institutions and pursue constructive relations with China, South Korea, and other Asian countries. Whatever results from Akazawa's ninth round of talks with the Trump administration, the mainstreaming of references to 'unequal treaties' suggests that while the form of US-Japan cooperation remains unchanged – references to the importance of bilateral security cooperation and Japan's investments in the United States – Japanese elites are no longer taking the relationship for granted. As I argued earlier this year, the Trump administration's approach to Japan has laid bare that Japan faces a choice about what kind of foreign policy it should pursue when it can no longer rely on the United States as it once did. The nature of that choice is becoming ever clearer. NOTES: 1 As Pär Kristoffer Cassel writes in Grounds of Judgment, a history of extraterritorial privileges in Japan and China, 'China's 'hundred years of humiliation' forms an integral part of the prevailing nationalist narrative, and the struggle against the semicolonial status of China under the 'unequal treaties' has been enshrined in every constitution since 1954.' 2 To be fair, John Foster Dulles, who negotiated the original US-Japan security treaty that ostensibly restored Japan's sovereignty, said that Japan had accepted 'a voluntary continuation of the Occupation.' 3 Nikkei, incidentally, wrote an article last month discussing the trickiness of translating Ishiba's rhetoric. 4 Indeed, when Ishiba used harsh language about the negotiations during the campaign, Tamaki criticized the prime minister for using language that could undermine Japan's negotiating position in the talks with the US. This article first appeared on the Observing Japan Substack and is republished with permission. Read the original here and become a paid subscriber here.
Deccan Herald
29-07-2025
- Politics
- Deccan Herald
Japan battles a leadership void
On July 20, Japan's Upper House election culminated with the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) coalition losing its majority. This marks the first time since the LDP's foundation year in 1955 that it does not have a majority in either of the houses. The party failed to reach its goal of securing 50 seats out of 125 up for re-election. However, simultaneously, the opposition, particularly the Democratic Party For the People (DPFP), and Sanseito performed well, winning 17 and 14 seats, respectively. The election results show the decreasing popularity of the LDP-Komeito coalition and the public's anger against the political status quo. Furthermore, it signals that politics in Japan is, again, entering a flux, where there are no clear winners or LDP's loss in the elections adds to a long list of events marking its declining popularity among the masses. Since Shinzo Abe's step-down, the LDP has struggled with finding a popular face that could lead the party and, at the same time, enjoy strong support from the public. Other issues, such as rising inflation, the recent shortage of rice, and the shadow of political scandals, have added to its waning appeal. This fall in support has enhanced the chances of other parties, including DPFP and Sanseito, a recent entrant in the scene. The fragmentation of conservative voters into anti-democratic, pro-Abe, and anti-Ishiba factions has also helped the opposition parties, particularly Sanseito, to increase their seats to 14, from just PM Ishiba vows to stay in office to deal with US tariff the election results have thrown some surprises with a new Japanese political configuration, they also pose direct implications for the future of the LDP leadership and the stability of Shigeru Ishiba's Prime Ministership. Before the election, many LDP factions aimed to bring down Ishiba. The recent setback has allowed them to try to mobilise opinion within the party. The current leading contenders within the party are Shinjiro Koizumi, Ishiba's Minister of Agriculture, and Sanae Takaichi, former economic minister and Abe faction leader, who ran against Ishiba during last year's elections in October. After the election debacle, Ishiba expressed his intention to continue serving the country. However, if push comes to shove, we will see a political contest between Koizumi and Takaichi to secure the LDP leadership of the Far of the ruling LDP is expected to have serious socio-political consequences besides its economic fallouts. The rise of DPFP, a centre-right party that was established in 2018, is significant. It did extremely well in the election, quadrupling its number of seats. This shows an increasing interest among conservative voters in the party's vision. Its call for raising the income tax threshold has gained considerable traction among the conservative and working classes. However, the party's lack of seriousness in presenting a comprehensive economic plan will increasingly limit its goal of achieving political DPFP, the increasing popularity of Sanseito is expected to inflame more xenophobic sentiment in the country. The rise of Sanseito has highlighted the success of mainstreaming political myths that are rooted in conspiracy theories and anti-facts, and the prominence of cult figures. This rise of the Far Right is in line with a global phenomenon that has resonated with countries such as South Korea, where politics is also inspired by the success of Donald Trump's Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement. The success of Sanseito's 'Japanese First' campaign has prodded mainstream and other parties, including LDP, to adopt populist positions on critical issues such as support for anti-immigration LDP's loss in the October election, the upper house election results have again spelled the common people's frustration with Japanese politics, particularly a resentment among the youth against gerontocracy. These results highlight an increasing dissatisfaction with the traditional parties, including the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), one of the country's leading opposition current political environment lacks authentic leadership. It is impacted by a weakening ruling coalition and an emerging opposition with inherent rifts. In the coming months, when the parliament is in session and the supplementary budget is tabled, the ruling coalition will see a new political reality unfold – it will have to manage the opposition parties while seeking their support for passing bills in both houses. The path for LDP and the Ishiba administration will not be easy. Whether the opposition can force him to resign will depend on its ability to function as a united force against the incumbent..(The writer is a junior fellow, Indo-Pacific, Strategic Studies Programme, at Observer Research Foundation)
Yomiuri Shimbun
23-07-2025
- Politics
- Yomiuri Shimbun
Support Rate for Japan's Ruling Liberal Democratic Party Plunges to Record Low 19% in Wake of Historic Election Defeat
The beleaguered ruling Liberal Democratic Party was dealt another setback when the latest Yomiuri Shimbun survey showed its support ratings had dropped to a record low 19%. The dismal result of the urgent nationwide public opinion poll surpassed the 23% attained by the LDP in June, which had been the party's lowest-ever number in the years since regaining power in 2012. Support for Sanseito, which marked a sharp increase in Diet seats in Sunday's House of Councillors election, stood at 12%, up from 5% in the previous survey, while the Democratic Party for the People jumped from 5% to 11%. The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan marked a slight increase from 6% to 8%, as did Komeito from 3% to 4%. The percentage of respondents who do not support any specific party fell from 43% to 29%. Though a simple comparison cannot be made due to differing survey methods, the LDP's dismal polling marks its low point since The Yomiuri Shimbun began taking monthly surveys in March 1978. The party's previous low was 21%, recorded in a face-to-face survey in July 1998 during the administration of then Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto. Asked how they evaluate the results of the upper house election, 38% of the respondents said it would have been better if the opposition parties had gained more seats, while 34% said the proportion was right and 20% favored more seats for the ruling coalition. On the makeup of the next administration, 47% prefer a shift to an opposition-led government, exceeding the 35% who replied that they want the LDP-led administration to continue. That marks a notable change from the October 2024 survey just after a House of Representatives election, when 43% wanted the status quo and 40% favored a change. Should the LDP coalition fall from power, the DPFP and CDPJ both drew 23% of support to become the central party in the government, while 11% chose Sanseito and 9% favored the Japan Innovation Party. Regarding the scenario in which the LDP-Komeito coalition keeps the reins of government and an opposition joins the coalition, the majority of respondents opposed the idea. In the case of the CDPJ, 24% expressed support and 61% opposed it; for the JIP, the numbers were 25% and 56%, respectively, and for the DPFP, 25% and 59%, respectively.
The Mainichi
21-07-2025
- Politics
- The Mainichi
Editorial: New parties' upper house election surge deals major setback to Japan's ruling LDP
The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has once again been dealt a resounding "no" from voters in Japan. This result reflects a surge of public frustration with a political system unable to offer solutions to the nation's growing anxieties about the future. In the July 20 House of Councillors election, both the Democratic Party for the People (DPFP) and Sanseito made significant gains, while the LDP lost a substantial number of seats. The LDP's coalition partner, Komeito, also struggled. Following last year's House of Representatives election, this marks a second consecutive national election defeat for the administration of Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba. Even after about 10 months in office, his Cabinet has failed to regain public trust. The prime minister bears a heavy responsibility. Although the LDP remains the largest party in the upper house, calls for Ishiba's resignation from within the party are now inevitable, despite his stated intention to stay on. Ishiba cannot escape responsibility This defeat has exposed the LDP's political structure as suffering from institutional fatigue. For years, the party maintained its majority by reflecting the interests of industry groups in policy in exchange for votes and funding. But as these support centers have weakened, the LDP has become less able to take in the public's will. Komeito, which has participated in the ruling coalition for a quarter-century and helped bolster the government's organizational strength, is also clearly in decline. Long-term economic stagnation has widened inequality, and poverty has become a serious problem. With the population aging and shrinking, the sustainability of the social security system is in doubt. Despite widespread public dissatisfaction, the LDP-Komeito coalition has failed to chart a path toward resolving these issues. On the issue of "money in politics," the LDP has remained reluctant to pursue fundamental reforms such as banning corporate and organizational donations. This has only deepened public distrust in politics. The main opposition Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan failed to make a strong impression or become a true receptacle for protest votes. While it performed steadily in single-seat districts where opposition parties unified behind single candidates, it struggled to gain traction in the proportional representation vote. It was the new parties that made the biggest gains by channeling public dissatisfaction with the political status quo. The DPFP maintained the momentum it gained by quadrupling its seats in the previous lower house election. Its campaign focused on "a summer of higher take-home pay," calling for raising the income tax threshold to 1.78 million yen (about $12,000) and cutting the consumption tax. Sanseito, running on a "Japanese First" slogan, pledged to restrict the acceptance of foreign nationals. Since the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election in June, it has rapidly expanded its support base among young people and unaffiliated voters. Globally, populist political forces are gaining ground among those left behind by globalization. U.S. President Donald Trump, who has rallied support by promising to revive manufacturing through high tariffs, is emblematic of this trend. In Europe, parties calling for tougher immigration controls are also on the rise. In Japan's upper house election, too, many parties sought to win support by promising large tax cuts and stricter immigration policies. These moves were amplified online, with parties competing over tax cuts and cash handouts. A path to stability However, policies aimed solely at short-term popularity are fraught with risk. Measures to counter rising prices are necessary. But if the consumption tax is cut without securing alternative funding, social security finances could be jeopardized, raising questions about fiscal sustainability. When opposition parties appeared to be gaining during the campaign, concerns about fiscal deterioration led to a sell-off of government bonds, pushing long-term interest rates to their highest level in 17 years. With the population shrinking, Japan will increasingly need to rely on foreign workers. If xenophobic sentiment grows, it will undermine efforts to build a society that respects diversity. What is truly required of politics is wisdom to stabilize people's lives with a long-term perspective. It is not about chasing short-term gains or inciting dissatisfaction against the vulnerable and minorities. This upper house election has further fragmented Japan's political landscape, and the public's preferred framework for government has yet to emerge. The LDP remains a minority in the lower house, and further political instability is likely. With domestic and international challenges mounting, political paralysis must be prevented. Parties must avoid self-serving maneuvering and instead pursue constructive debate to find a new path forward. Japanese politics stands at a major crossroads. Each party must sincerely strive to dispel the public's pent-up frustration and anxiety and restore trust by pursuing politics of a new form.
The Mainichi
20-07-2025
- Politics
- The Mainichi
Ex-NHK announcer Ushida projected to win in Japan upper house race
TOKYO -- Mayu Ushida, a former NHK announcer and political newcomer, is projected to win a seat in the Tokyo constituency in the July 20 House of Councillors election. The Democratic Party for the People (DPFP) fielded two candidates in the Tokyo electoral district, where six seats were contested and one vacancy was to be filled. DPFP leader Yuichiro Tamaki and other party executives campaigned vigorously to win the party's first seat in this constituency. Ushida was officially endorsed by the DPFP in April. She admitted at the time, "There were so many things I didn't know about the Public Offices Election Act, and I was at a loss over whom to ask." Despite being an obviously inexperienced candidate, she capitalized on the momentum from the DPFP's success in the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election in June, where the party's seats increased from zero to nine. (Japanese original by Minhyang Hong, Tokyo Bureau, and Makoto Kakizaki, Tokyo City News Department)
