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The Diplomat
a day ago
- Politics
- The Diplomat
Erasing Confucian Cosmology: How Harmony Lost Its Soul
The statue at Fan Zhongyan's tomb site in Yichuan County, Henan. In 1043, Fan's Ten-Point Memorial proposed civil, military, and educational reforms not simply as policy corrections, but as acts of cosmological repair. Confucian cosmology once bound rulers to an order they could not command, linking virtue, ritual, and the rhythms of Heaven. This second essay in the Simulated Sagehood series explores how that moral architecture has been emptied and re-coded in China. In place of resonance, Xi's regime installs synchronization; in place of harmony across difference, it imposes order through uniformity. What remains is not metaphysics, but choreography, an aesthetics of control masquerading as ethical order. Under Xi Jinping, the metaphysical heart of Confucianism – once pulsing with the idea of cosmic responsiveness (ganying, 感应) – remains in name but is empty in spirit. The words of the tradition still echo in speeches and textbooks, but their deeper logic – where human action was supposed to resonate with a morally ordered universe – has been stripped of its ethical charge and repurposed for political submission. In classical Chinese thought, cosmology wasn't abstract speculation. It was a moral architecture, a way of binding rulers to a higher standard. Tian (Heaven) wasn't a deity, but a moral horizon – a principle rulers had to align with. Ganying wasn't just intuition; it was a ritual circuit, a choreography of offerings, timing, and space that linked governance to cosmic rhythms. Power was judged not by loyalty or efficiency, but by how well it harmonized with this larger moral field. He (和), often translated as 'harmony,' didn't mean peace or consensus. It meant ethical balance – a live calibration between Heaven, ruler, minister, and people. In the Zhongyong (Doctrine of the Mean), zhong (中) refers to centrality or equilibrium – not as a fixed state, but as a form of ethical responsiveness. Virtue created legitimacy, but only if it answered to something outside itself. This notion of 'differentiated harmony' – captured by the phrase he er bu tong (和而不同), or 'harmony without uniformity' – stood in quiet opposition to the Legalist idea of yi (一), or enforced sameness. Where Confucians aimed for resonance across difference, Legalists imposed order by crushing it. That contrast would come roaring back under the Chinese Communist Party's modern appropriation of Confucian ideas. Imperial China took this moral cosmology seriously. Omens, droughts, and celestial events were read as signs of moral imbalance, demanding ritual correction. In 637, Emperor Taizong issued a limited ban on animal slaughter during the three annual changzhai (long fasts) – not a sweeping reform, but a gesture toward ethical recalibration, where Confucian ren (benevolence) met Buddhist compassion in an act of cosmic repair. A few centuries later, Song Dynasty Emperor Zhenzong responded to strange heavenly phenomena by unveiling a 'Heavenly Text' (tianshu) – a supposed divine revelation that was in fact fabricated by the Daoist priest Zhao Yu. What followed wasn't retreat, but theatrical escalation: grand new rites, altar constructions, and sacrifices, especially at Mount Tai. These weren't acts of superstition, but were scripted performances designed to restore Heaven–ruler resonance. Even the Western Zhou Dynasty, nearly 3,000 years ago, eclipses could trigger pauses in labor conscription or suspensions of punishment. The message was clear: power must remain morally permeable to the world beyond itself. There were moments – rare but real – when Confucian cosmology exerted genuine moral traction on political authority. The Western Han Emperors Wen and Jing, ruling in the aftermath of the Qin collapse, pursued a politics of restraint. Collective punishment was scaled back (though retained in treason cases), fiscal discipline enforced, and rituals simplified. Wen, in particular, refused to build new palaces and avoided lavish rites, not merely out of thrift but as a gesture of symbolic restraint that later Confucian historians would interpret as alignment with Heaven. While the dominant ideology of the court remained Huang-Lao – a syncretic blend of Daoist non-action and Legalist statecraft – advisers like Lu Jia began articulating a political ethic grounded in virtue and moral suasion rather than coercion. His Xinyu rejected Qin authoritarianism and emphasized humane governance, ritual propriety, and the ruler's ethical conduct as the foundation of lasting order. Although not yet grounded in the metaphysics of resonance, this early Han rhetoric laid conceptual foundations for later cosmological models of rulership, where austerity could function as a ritualized performance of moral clarity. Centuries later, under the Northern Song, Emperor Renzong presided over one of the clearest efforts to embed Confucian ethics into the structures of governance. Reformers like Fan Zhongyan and Ouyang Xiu interpreted institutional decay as a symptom of moral misalignment. In 1043, Fan's Ten-Point Memorial proposed civil, military, and educational reforms not simply as policy corrections, but as acts of cosmological repair. Renzong responded to droughts and disasters with a pattern of ritualized self-accountability – issuing scores of self-reproach edicts, palace diet reductions, and public requests for remonstrance. While the precise number is debated, it far exceeded that of any earlier Song monarch. These gestures were not mere formalities: they often accompanied dismissals, budget reallocations, and real administrative shifts. They did not transform the system. But they did mark moments when sovereignty acknowledged its limits and sought legitimacy by answering to a moral order beyond itself. Yet those flashes of traction were neither continuous nor permanent. Over time, ritual began to detach from moral substance and serve the consolidation of power. Confucian forms were retained, but their ethical force dulled. Ming Emperor Yongle built the sprawling Temple of Heaven between 1406 and 1420 – not just as a sacred site, but as a theatrical assertion of harmony. The architecture multiplied altars and axis lines in a performance of cosmic alignment, even as Yongle centralized power and suppressed dissent. Qing emperors performed elaborate rituals at the empire's frontiers even while expanding through conquest and destruction – most infamously during the Dzungar genocide and the incorporation of Tibet and Xinjiang. Harmony remained on the stage, but it no longer bound sovereignty to an ethical horizon. Ritual could now operate as a mirror or a mask. Under Xi, the entire cosmological structure hasn't been debated or disproved – it's simply been overwritten. In 2013, the directive On Cultivating and Practicing the Core Socialist Values recast he (harmony) as 'unity and cohesion under Party leadership.' That may sound cosmetic, but it marks a profound ontological shift. Where he once meant ethical balance between distinct entities – ruler and Heaven, humans and nature – it now means the elimination of difference. In this, Xi's reinterpretation hews closer to the Legalist ideal of yi – sameness as control – than to Confucian harmony. The 2021 Xi Jinping Thought Student Readers illustrate this clearly. Children learn about 'social harmony' through standardized dress, synchronized flag-raisings, and orderly public behavior. He is illustrated by clean streets, neat queues, and families watching the evening news in unison. What once expressed resonance across moral and cosmic domains is now reduced to aesthetic compliance. It's not a misreading of Confucianism – it's an inversion. The classical system nurtured harmony by balancing difference; Xi's model engineers harmony by erasing it. This logic extends beyond human society. In Mencius 1A7, a ruler's refusal to watch an ox suffer was more than kindness – it was an ethical sensitivity that reached beyond class, species, and utility. That single passage fueled debates on humane governance for centuries. Han thinker Dong Zhongshu warned that Heaven sent disasters when animals were slaughtered without ritual care. His Chunqiu Fanlu linked environmental order, moral virtue, and the ethics of sacrificial violence into a single system. The Book of Rites urged nobles to abstain from meat while mourning – not just for human grief, but in recognition of broader sentient suffering. That whole ethical universe is now dormant. Modern CCP documents and textbooks no longer mention tian-ren ganying – the resonance between Heaven and humanity. Environmental policy is framed not as stewardship but as technocratic optimization. The flagship initiative of 'ecological civilization,' introduced under Hu Jintao and expanded by Xi, turns environmental ethics into spreadsheets: carbon credits, eco-city blueprints, green GDP. The moral grammar remains, but it's been converted into metrics. Nowhere is this clearer than in Xiong'an, the showcase 'smart eco-city.' Citizens are encouraged to embrace 'green lifestyles,' rewarded with housing and benefits for actions like tree-planting or sorting trash. AI-based behavioral scoring is still uneven, but the logic is already in place: ethical performance as data. Even phrases like tian-ren he-yi (Heaven and humanity in unity) survive – but only as marketing for Chinese diplomacy or tech-savvy modernization. The cosmos is still cited. But it's no longer inhabited. This transformation didn't begin with Xi. Mao Zedong denounced Heaven as superstition and collapsed moral order into class struggle. Deng Xiaoping shifted legitimacy from cosmic alignment to GDP growth. Hu Jintao tried to soften that edge, introducing slogans like 'harmonious society' and 'ecological civilization.' Xi finishes the arc – not by discarding the old language, but by embalming it. Harmony becomes discipline. Virtue becomes loyalty. Heaven becomes a decorative backdrop. To many outside China, this might look like rational progress. After all, in a world run by data and governance metrics, who needs omens or rites? But Confucian cosmology was never about superstition. Its real power lay in de-centering authority – binding it to something it couldn't control. Floods and eclipses mattered not because they caused political change, but because they interpreted power. That external frame – where sovereignty had to respond to something beyond itself – acted as a brake on autocracy. Consider the late Ming. When the Wanli emperor stopped performing the Temple of Heaven rites for nearly 30 years, Confucian officials protested not out of rote ritualism, but because his silence symbolized a breakdown in the moral order. His absence from ritual space became a proxy for dynastic decay, long before the Manchu threat arrived. Other civilizations have had cosmological checks – mizan (moral balance) in Islamic thought, logos in Stoicism, ordo in medieval Christianity – but none formalized them quite like China. The Chinese model triangulated Heaven, ruler, and people through codified rites, bureaucratized resonance, and symbolic accountability. That precision makes its unraveling today even more striking. In Xi's China, that triangle is broken. Tian no longer functions as a moral constraint. The people cannot remonstrate in meaningful ways. Legitimacy no longer flows from above or below – it loops inward. The 20th Party Congress made this official: the CCP's centralized leadership is now the sole source of political truth. Omens are out. Metrics are in. And in 2022, a revised Party Constitution placed Xi Jinping Thought above even Deng Xiaoping Theory. Authority no longer seeks external justification. It declares itself valid. Recovering the spirit of Confucian cosmology doesn't mean reviving superstition. It means recovering the principle of external constraint. Replace eclipses with transparency. Replace sacrificial rites with civic audits. Replace Heaven–Earth resonance with climate interdependence rooted in responsibility. What matters isn't mysticism; it's the refusal to let power justify itself on its own terms. What remains today is a highly curated imitation. Harmony is measured in spatial order. Virtue becomes a checkbox. Heaven becomes a logo on a brochure. The symbolism persists, but the force is gone. Ritual no longer binds power to morality – it seals it within performance. The CCP reenacts legitimacy on a stage drained of resonance. The architecture still stands, but the breath is gone.
New Straits Times
3 days ago
- Entertainment
- New Straits Times
#SHOWBIZ: HK actor Louis Fan ate 7 durians during 3-day stay in Malaysia
HONG KONG: Actor Louis Fan recently popped over to Malaysia to cheer on his wife, Chinese artiste JJ Jia, at her concert in Genting Highlands on July 19. While in Malaysia, the 52-year-old took full advantage of durian season, indulging in plenty of the 'King of Fruits'. In a recent update on Xiaohongshu (Red Note), the martial arts star shared several photos of himself thoroughly enjoying durians. He also made sure to visit the iconic Petronas Twin Towers, where he snapped a photo to remember the trip. "Finally experienced the joy of durians. I scoffed four durians a day and managed seven in just three days. "Freshly picked Musang King from the tree is simply too delicious," he wrote in his post. While Fan's durian enthusiasm tickled many fans, some were quick to point out that in Malaysia, durians are typically left to fall naturally from the tree when ripe. This ensures they have the best flavour and texture. "In Malaysia, we usually let the durian fall naturally instead of picking them from the tree," one netizen commented. Fan is best known for his roles in the films Riki-Oh: The Story Of Ricky (1991) and Ip Man (2008), as well as its 2010 sequel.
News18
3 days ago
- Entertainment
- News18
Shalin Bhanot Recalls Meeting Shah Rukh Khan: 'He Was Shooting At That Time...'
Last Updated: Shalin Bhanot featured on Farah Khan's YouTube show, where the two discussed SRK, Bigg Boss and gorged on soya chaap. Actor and former 'Bigg Boss 16" contestant Shalin Bhanot recalled meeting Bollywood superstar Shah Rukh Khan, while having a conversation with Farah Khan. He also spoke about Salman Khan and tagged him as a 'caring person". Shalin featured on Farah Khan's YouTube show, where the two discussed about the stars, Bigg Boss and gorged on soya chaap. While giving a house tour to Farah, Shalin showed a picture posing with SRK and said: 'I take a lot of pride in this picture. It is with Shah Rukh sir… I just wanted to meet Shah Rukh sir… So, Morani bhai made me meet SRK sir in the JW Marriott." Shalin revealed at that time SRK was busy shooting for the 2016 film 'Fan", which featured the superstar in a dual role as Aryan Khanna, a film star, and his obsessive fan and lookalike, Gaurav Chandna. 'He was shooting at that time and he was crossing. He was shooting for Fan. He had a prosthetic at that time so this was the only day he didn't have any prosthetics," Shalin told Farah. Farah then spoke about seeing Shalin on 'Bigg Boss 16." She said: 'I thought that Shalin has grown up. But when I saw him in Bigg Boss. Two people can drive me crazy. One is Sajid. Because he is my brother since childhood. And in Bigg Boss, I thought of shaking up Shalin and asking him what he is doing." To which, Shalin replied: 'But ma'am, one thing happened in Bigg Boss. Sajid came into my life. He is my mentor. I call him BB." Farah said that Sajid Khan and Shalin 'had a lot of fights in Bigg Boss". 'And ma'am, you won't believe, since the day Bigg Boss ended I am telling you the truth. It doesn't happen once in a week or 10-15 days. That Sajid doesn't message me from the front. Sajid only says one thing 'You okay?' I say, yes, BB. BB is bade bhaiya," Shalin added. Shalin and Farah then laughed about the viral hand gestures the actor used to do in Bigg Boss at the time of Weekend Ka Vaar in confusion. The actor recalled how the show's host Salman Khan still does it when he sees Shalin. 'Salman sir was coming from a distance. And I was standing. And the moment he entered, he saw me and he was like (doing the hand gesture)…. I said, 'when do I do this?'" Farah said that Salman used to love doing that. Shalin replied: 'And he still does. He still loves doing that…. But Salman sir loves me a lot and he is such a caring person." First Published: July 22, 2025, 08:11 IST Disclaimer: Comments reflect users' views, not News18's. Please keep discussions respectful and constructive. Abusive, defamatory, or illegal comments will be removed. News18 may disable any comment at its discretion. By posting, you agree to our Terms of Use and Privacy Policy.
The Star
4 days ago
- Entertainment
- The Star
HK actor Louis Fan ate 7 durians during 3-day stay in Malaysia: 'Too delicious'
Hong Kong actor Louis Fan took advantage of the durian season to indulge in the King of Fruits during his time in Malaysia. Photos: Louis Fan/Xiaohongshu Hong Kong actor Louis Fan recently visited Malaysia to support his wife, Chinese artiste JJ Jia, during her concert in Genting Highlands on July 19. During his stay, Fan, 52, took advantage of the durian season to indulge in the King of Fruits. In a recent update on Xiaohongshu (Red Note), the martial arts star shared several photos of himself enjoying durians in Malaysia. He also made a stop at the iconic Petronas Twin Towers, snapping a photo to mark the visit. 'Finally experienced the joy of durian freedom. I ate four durians a day and had seven in just three days. Freshly picked Musang King from the tree is too delicious,' he wrote in his post. While Fan's durian enthusiasm delighted many fans, some pointed out that in Malaysia, durians are typically left to fall naturally from the tree when ripe to ensure the best flavour and texture. 'In Malaysia, we usually let the durian fall naturally instead of picking them from the tree,' said one netizen. Another joked: 'Why does he look so much like Louis Fan?' 'Welcome to Malaysia,' added a third. Fan is best known for his performances in the films Riki-Oh: The Story Of Ricky (1991) and Ip Man (2008), as well as its 2010 sequel. He has also starred in several TVB dramas including Demi-Gods And Semi-Devils (1997), In The Realm Of Fancy (2003) and more.
Newsweek
6 days ago
- Business
- Newsweek
Iran Pivots From Russia to China in Quest for New Weapons After Israel War
Based on factual reporting, incorporates the expertise of the journalist and may offer interpretations and conclusions. Newsweek AI is in beta. Translations may contain inaccuracies—please refer to the original content. With Iran's military battered from an intense 12-day war with Israel that also involved direct U.S. intervention, China is emerging as top candidate to provide advanced weaponry that could help Tehran reestablish deterrence as tensions continue to simmer across the Middle East. The trend marks a departure from Iran's long-standing efforts to acquire arms from another strategic partner, Russia, whose ability to deliver on deals remains limited by its ongoing war in Ukraine and other geopolitical constraints. Beijing, on the other hand, has remained relatively insulated from two of the world's deadliest ongoing wars ravaging Eastern Europe and the Middle East, even if it has continued to cultivate cooperation with Moscow and Tehran. With Iran's airspace now more vulnerable than ever, Hongda Fan, a professor at Shanghai International Studies University's Middle East Studies Institute, told Newsweek that "strengthening air defense capabilities is clearly an urgent priority for Iran at the moment" and that "China has indeed made remarkable progress in areas such as fighter jet development, attracting global attention." Such progress was put on rare display in May when one of China's leading partners, Pakistan, employed Chinese Chengdu J-10C multi-purpose combat jets during another brief but intense battle with India, reportedly downing several Indian aircraft, including French Dassault Rafale warplanes. Given the growing level of unrest that has rocked the international order in recent months, Fan felt the conditions could be ripe for greater military cooperation between the People's Republic and the Islamic Republic, particularly as "both China and Iran are victims of certain policies pursued by Western powers." But if Tehran was to upgrade its cooperation with Beijing to something that more closely resembled the "all-weather," "iron-clad" pact between China and Pakistan, he said Iran would likely need to reevaluate its foreign policy outlook. "It is important to note that, unlike Islamabad, some decision-makers in Tehran often see themselves Iran as one of the centers of the world," Fan said. "A great-power mindset is not uncommon in contemporary Iran, which to some extent affects the development of its foreign relations." "Personally, I believe that if Tehran shows sufficient willingness and trust toward China," he added, "Beijing would not reject cooperation with Iran in military fields such as weapons." Newsweek has reached out to the Chinese Embassy to the United States and the Iranian Mission to the United Nations for comment. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is seen alongside a Chinese flag and a Yemeni protester holding a mock missile in support of Iran and Gaza in this Newsweek illustration. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is seen alongside a Chinese flag and a Yemeni protester holding a mock missile in support of Iran and Gaza in this Newsweek illustration. Photo-illustration by Newsweek/The Office of the Iranian Eastward But Uneven Iran officially embarked on its "Look East" trajectory under late Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, a staunch principlist who was elected in 2021, succeeding the more moderate President Hassan Rouhani. Rouhani's push for better ties with the West were dashed when President Donald Trump withdrew from a 2015 nuclear deal during his first administration in 2018. But Iran's broader drift from West to East dates much further, beginning with the 1979 Islamic Revolution that toppled a monarchy with close ties to the U.S. and Europe. Yet Tehran is also accustomed to isolation, with much of the world, including Cold War rivals the U.S. and the Soviet Union, largely backing Iraq during its 1980 invasion of post-revolutionary Iran. China, while also providing some equipment to Iraq throughout the eight-year conflict, would emerge as one of Iran's most reliable international partners. Since then, however, China's interests in the Middle East have been governed primarily by economic interests, along with an abundance of caution. Though heavily reliant on Iranian oil and willing to expand cooperation in a number of fields, emphasized by a 2021 comprehensive strategic partnership treaty, military cooperation has been largely limited so far to joint exercises. Most of these drills have been conducted alongside Russia, with which Iran has had an even more complex relationship. Vladimir Sazhin, senior researcher at the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Oriental Studies, noted how relations between Russia and Iran date back some 500 years, during which "there have been wars and peaceful days between the countries," but "never" a true alliance. The two powers did find a new alignment in the Middle East when civil war broke out in Syria in 2011, with Tehran and Moscow aiding longtime Syrian President Bashar al-Assad against rebels and jihadis. At the same time, Tehran stepped up efforts to acquire equipment such as Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets and S-400 surface-to-air missile systems to prepare for the very kind of scenario that erupted during last month's conflict. Tehran would go on to provide some of its own military prowess to Moscow, sharing a license to produce Shahed-style loitering munitions, or suicide drones, that have become a regular tool in Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine. Despite these developments, however, dissonance has remained prevalent in their relationship as the Kremlin's attention increasingly turned to Europe's deadliest conflict since World War II. Assad's government ultimately collapsed and most Iranian requests for arm sales have gone unfulfilled. "The scale of military-technical cooperation between the two countries is limited," Sazhin said. "Over the past decades, they have been characterized by ups and downs. Often, Iranian demands on Russia were too high, and Moscow either could not or did not want to fulfill them." "The reasons are: Russia's growing needs for weapons and military equipment in connection with the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, as well as Russia's ability to independently produce weapons, for example, drones, which Iran previously supplied." Now, he said, "there is an increasingly obvious trend in Iran's policy towards reorientation towards military-technical cooperation with China." Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi at the Kremlin in Moscow on June 23, 2025. Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi at the Kremlin in Moscow on June 23, 2025. SERGEI KARPUKHIN/Pool/AFP/Getty Images Signs of Recalibration Reports have already surfaced of new Iranian requests for Chinese equipment, though their veracity and status could not be independently confirmed by Newsweek. Earlier this month, the Chinese Embassy in Israel denied a report by Middle East Eye citing unnamed sources saying that Tehran had already received surface-to-air missiles systems from Beijing, with the Embassy saying that "China never exports weapons to countries engaged in warfare and maintains strict controls on the export of dual-use items." In response to separate reports from several media outlets on alleged high-level discussions regarding an Iranian desire to seek J-10C jets, the Chinese National Defense Ministry would neither confirm nor deny the development, saying that "China has always taken a prudent, responsible approach to military exports and is willing to share the achievements of its equipment development with friendly countries," according to a spokesperson's statement. The statement was also shared with Newsweek by Chinese Embassy to the U.S. spokesperson to Liu Pengyu, who also spoke about Beijing's commitment to maintaining a balanced, peaceful approach to the Middle East, without engaging in regional competition. "The situation in the Middle East remains complex and sensitive," Liu said. "China has been committed to promoting peace talks and easing the situation, and this position has always been clear. China has never sought any selfish interests in the Middle East. It neither seeks spheres of influence nor engages in geopolitical rivalry." "China will continue to contribute Chinese wisdom, put forward Chinese initiatives and play the role of a responsible major country to achieving peace and tranquility in the Middle East," he added. Beijing and Tehran have already cultivated close cooperation on other fronts. While the roughly half-million barrels per month of oil China buys from Iran lags behind other sources, such as Russia and Saudi Arabia, the amount constitutes the vast majority of Iran's exports as a result of U.S.-led sanctions, providing Iran with sorely needed revenue. Iran, like virtually every nation in the Middle East except for Israel, is also a member of Chinese President Xi Jinping's landmark Belt and Road Initiative, an intercontinental network of infrastructure projects. The Islamic Republic's central location also makes it a potentially crucial corridor for East-West trade networks. The two nations also work together, alongside Russia, through two emerging international blocs of which Iran is among the newest members—BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Yet neither of these organizations constitute a military alliance, nor does the 2021 China-Iran comprehensive strategic partnership treaty or a similar deal signed with Russia in January contain a mutual defense clause. The latter agreement simply stipulates that, in the event of a conflict, each party "must not provide any military or other assistance to the aggressor, contributing to the continuation of aggression." The language differs notably from a separate comprehensive strategic partnership agreement signed between Russia and North Korea last June that does necessitate each side to come to the other's aid in the event of a hostile third-party attack. North Korean troops now openly operate on Russia's side of the war in Ukraine, though officially only to fend off Ukrainian incursions into Russian territory. On the contrary, Russian President Vladimir Putin decided to limit his role in the 12-day war between Iran and Israel to expressions of condemnation, a position Sazhin characterized as "neutral." Aleksei Zakharov, a fellow at the Observer Research Foundation's Strategic Studies Program, argued that "Moscow is still pursuing a careful balance between various players in the Middle East while Iran—having initially provided supplies to Russia—is reluctant to become embroiled in the Russia-Ukraine war." While he told Newsweek that "the level of Russia-Iran defense cooperation may be deeper than it seems," he noted that the "publicly available information is controversial." "It is unclear whether the contract on the supply of fighter jets has been fulfilled," Zakharov said, "or Iran has switched from the Russian to Chinese jets as reported." A young boy holds a sign of Chinese fighter jet J-10C as Pakistani people participate in a public gathering of gratitude organized by Parks and Horticulture Authorities held at Liaquat Bagh in Rawalpindi, Pakistan on... A young boy holds a sign of Chinese fighter jet J-10C as Pakistani people participate in a public gathering of gratitude organized by Parks and Horticulture Authorities held at Liaquat Bagh in Rawalpindi, Pakistan on May 12, 2025. More Zubair Abbasi/Middle East Images/AFP/Getty Images Balancing Friends and Foes Even if Iran opts to make the switch, few expect China to take any drastic measures in terms of scrapping its own relationship with Israel, described uniquely by Beijing as an "innovative comprehensive partnership." As with Russia, which Sazhin said "has maintained and maintains normal, businesslike relations with Israel," China has continued to invest in ties with U.S.' top Middle East ally, even if Israeli officials have criticized both nations' positions on the war that has consumed the region for the past 21 months. Alireza Taghavinia, a Tehran-based security analyst, expressed skepticism about the degree to which China and Russia could align with Iran given the two powers' continued relationship with Israel as well as Western countries and rivals of Tehran. "Iran should not expect much from these countries because they also have their own national interests and relations with the West and Israel," Taghavinia told Newsweek. "For example, China has hundreds of billions of dollars in trade relations with the United States every year, and Russia also realizes that 30 percent of Israel's population is of Russian descent, and certainly in a conflict between Iran and Israel, Putin would not want Israel destroyed by Iran," he added. Still, he argued that Tehran had little choice but to double down on its ties with Beijing and Moscow. "In many issues, Iran reaches out to China and Russia not out of arbitrariness or interest, but out of necessity, because it has no other option," Taghavinia said. Meanwhile, China and Russia also have important motivations for maintaining close ties with Iran, namely China "in challenging U.S. hegemony and preventing NATO expansion," he said, with Beijing in particular in need of "a sustainable source of energy that is self-sufficient for its industrial future." Yet another constraint from the Iranian side, he argued, was that, while hard-liner Raisi was ardent supporter of boosting ties with China and Russia, his successor, reformist President Masoud Pezeshkian, continues to push for resetting ties with the U.S. and Europe, even amid the current tensions dominating Tehran's relationship with the West. "I must say that Iran has many common interests with Russia and China, but in many cases, Iran's pro-Western governments have not shown much interest in them," Taghavinia said. Moving forward, he argued that "Iran's cooperation with Russia and China should continue, but we should not expect a 100 percent strategic relationship with them, because Iran's regional rivals are also important to Russia and China." Iranian Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh stands in the reception hall of the International Conference Centre in Qingdao during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting alongside counterparts from eight other nations, including China and Russia, on June... Iranian Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh stands in the reception hall of the International Conference Centre in Qingdao during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting alongside counterparts from eight other nations, including China and Russia, on June 25, 2025. More Johannes Neudecker/Picture-Alliance/DPA/AP Iran at the Crossroads While Iran and Israel declared victory after their deadly bout, having launched hundreds of attacks against one another in a mere dozen days, the Islamic Republic's losses were staggering. All key nuclear facilities were either destroyed or significantly damaged, air defenses and missile stockpile arsenals compromised, and key military officials and nuclear scientists killed. Potentially even more significant, the Axis of Resistance coalition of allies developed by Iran over the course of decades and at great cost has been largely neutralized. Moscow's absence in the latest conflict may mark the final straw in pushing Tehran toward a broader realignment in its strategy in a bid to turn setback into opportunity. Ali Vaez, director of the Crisis Group's Iran Project and adjunct professor at Georgetown University, argued that Iran's deep disappointment in Russia's reaction to the war last month, along with indications that "their weapons have also proven to be no match for Western technology" have increasingly made China "a much more attractive option for Iran." Echoing Fan, however, he said the ball may fall in Iran's court as to whether its strategic reconsiderations would also constitute a rethinking of behavior deemed undesirable by China, thus opening new doors for cooperation—and, potentially, state-of-the-art weapons. "China's problem with Iran is that it's too much of a troublemaker," Vaez told Newsweek. "China has significant economic interests in the Gulf states and does not want Iran to pursue policies that could escalate tensions in that region." "If Iran's behavior changes, reducing the risks for China," he added, "then Beijing is likely to become more amenable to deepening its military ties with Tehran."
