Iran Pivots From Russia to China in Quest for New Weapons After Israel War

Newsweek

19-07-2025

Based on factual reporting, incorporates the expertise of the journalist and may offer interpretations and conclusions.
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With Iran's military battered from an intense 12-day war with Israel that also involved direct U.S. intervention, China is emerging as top candidate to provide advanced weaponry that could help Tehran reestablish deterrence as tensions continue to simmer across the Middle East.
The trend marks a departure from Iran's long-standing efforts to acquire arms from another strategic partner, Russia, whose ability to deliver on deals remains limited by its ongoing war in Ukraine and other geopolitical constraints.
Beijing, on the other hand, has remained relatively insulated from two of the world's deadliest ongoing wars ravaging Eastern Europe and the Middle East, even if it has continued to cultivate cooperation with Moscow and Tehran.
With Iran's airspace now more vulnerable than ever, Hongda Fan, a professor at Shanghai International Studies University's Middle East Studies Institute, told Newsweek that "strengthening air defense capabilities is clearly an urgent priority for Iran at the moment" and that "China has indeed made remarkable progress in areas such as fighter jet development, attracting global attention."
Such progress was put on rare display in May when one of China's leading partners, Pakistan, employed Chinese Chengdu J-10C multi-purpose combat jets during another brief but intense battle with India, reportedly downing several Indian aircraft, including French Dassault Rafale warplanes.
Given the growing level of unrest that has rocked the international order in recent months, Fan felt the conditions could be ripe for greater military cooperation between the People's Republic and the Islamic Republic, particularly as "both China and Iran are victims of certain policies pursued by Western powers."
But if Tehran was to upgrade its cooperation with Beijing to something that more closely resembled the "all-weather," "iron-clad" pact between China and Pakistan, he said Iran would likely need to reevaluate its foreign policy outlook.
"It is important to note that, unlike Islamabad, some decision-makers in Tehran often see themselves Iran as one of the centers of the world," Fan said. "A great-power mindset is not uncommon in contemporary Iran, which to some extent affects the development of its foreign relations."
"Personally, I believe that if Tehran shows sufficient willingness and trust toward China," he added, "Beijing would not reject cooperation with Iran in military fields such as weapons."
Newsweek has reached out to the Chinese Embassy to the United States and the Iranian Mission to the United Nations for comment.
Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is seen alongside a Chinese flag and a Yemeni protester holding a mock missile in support of Iran and Gaza in this Newsweek illustration.
Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is seen alongside a Chinese flag and a Yemeni protester holding a mock missile in support of Iran and Gaza in this Newsweek illustration.
Photo-illustration by Newsweek/The Office of the Iranian
Eastward But Uneven
Iran officially embarked on its "Look East" trajectory under late Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, a staunch principlist who was elected in 2021, succeeding the more moderate President Hassan Rouhani. Rouhani's push for better ties with the West were dashed when President Donald Trump withdrew from a 2015 nuclear deal during his first administration in 2018.
But Iran's broader drift from West to East dates much further, beginning with the 1979 Islamic Revolution that toppled a monarchy with close ties to the U.S. and Europe.
Yet Tehran is also accustomed to isolation, with much of the world, including Cold War rivals the U.S. and the Soviet Union, largely backing Iraq during its 1980 invasion of post-revolutionary Iran. China, while also providing some equipment to Iraq throughout the eight-year conflict, would emerge as one of Iran's most reliable international partners.
Since then, however, China's interests in the Middle East have been governed primarily by economic interests, along with an abundance of caution. Though heavily reliant on Iranian oil and willing to expand cooperation in a number of fields, emphasized by a 2021 comprehensive strategic partnership treaty, military cooperation has been largely limited so far to joint exercises.
Most of these drills have been conducted alongside Russia, with which Iran has had an even more complex relationship.
Vladimir Sazhin, senior researcher at the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Oriental Studies, noted how relations between Russia and Iran date back some 500 years, during which "there have been wars and peaceful days between the countries," but "never" a true alliance.
The two powers did find a new alignment in the Middle East when civil war broke out in Syria in 2011, with Tehran and Moscow aiding longtime Syrian President Bashar al-Assad against rebels and jihadis. At the same time, Tehran stepped up efforts to acquire equipment such as Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets and S-400 surface-to-air missile systems to prepare for the very kind of scenario that erupted during last month's conflict.
Tehran would go on to provide some of its own military prowess to Moscow, sharing a license to produce Shahed-style loitering munitions, or suicide drones, that have become a regular tool in Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine.
Despite these developments, however, dissonance has remained prevalent in their relationship as the Kremlin's attention increasingly turned to Europe's deadliest conflict since World War II. Assad's government ultimately collapsed and most Iranian requests for arm sales have gone unfulfilled.
"The scale of military-technical cooperation between the two countries is limited," Sazhin said. "Over the past decades, they have been characterized by ups and downs. Often, Iranian demands on Russia were too high, and Moscow either could not or did not want to fulfill them."
"The reasons are: Russia's growing needs for weapons and military equipment in connection with the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, as well as Russia's ability to independently produce weapons, for example, drones, which Iran previously supplied."
Now, he said, "there is an increasingly obvious trend in Iran's policy towards reorientation towards military-technical cooperation with China."
Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi at the Kremlin in Moscow on June 23, 2025.
Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi at the Kremlin in Moscow on June 23, 2025.
SERGEI KARPUKHIN/Pool/AFP/Getty Images
Signs of Recalibration
Reports have already surfaced of new Iranian requests for Chinese equipment, though their veracity and status could not be independently confirmed by Newsweek.
Earlier this month, the Chinese Embassy in Israel denied a report by Middle East Eye citing unnamed sources saying that Tehran had already received surface-to-air missiles systems from Beijing, with the Embassy saying that "China never exports weapons to countries engaged in warfare and maintains strict controls on the export of dual-use items."
In response to separate reports from several media outlets on alleged high-level discussions regarding an Iranian desire to seek J-10C jets, the Chinese National Defense Ministry would neither confirm nor deny the development, saying that "China has always taken a prudent, responsible approach to military exports and is willing to share the achievements of its equipment development with friendly countries," according to a spokesperson's statement.
The statement was also shared with Newsweek by Chinese Embassy to the U.S. spokesperson to Liu Pengyu, who also spoke about Beijing's commitment to maintaining a balanced, peaceful approach to the Middle East, without engaging in regional competition.
"The situation in the Middle East remains complex and sensitive," Liu said. "China has been committed to promoting peace talks and easing the situation, and this position has always been clear. China has never sought any selfish interests in the Middle East. It neither seeks spheres of influence nor engages in geopolitical rivalry."
"China will continue to contribute Chinese wisdom, put forward Chinese initiatives and play the role of a responsible major country to achieving peace and tranquility in the Middle East," he added.
Beijing and Tehran have already cultivated close cooperation on other fronts. While the roughly half-million barrels per month of oil China buys from Iran lags behind other sources, such as Russia and Saudi Arabia, the amount constitutes the vast majority of Iran's exports as a result of U.S.-led sanctions, providing Iran with sorely needed revenue.
Iran, like virtually every nation in the Middle East except for Israel, is also a member of Chinese President Xi Jinping's landmark Belt and Road Initiative, an intercontinental network of infrastructure projects. The Islamic Republic's central location also makes it a potentially crucial corridor for East-West trade networks.
The two nations also work together, alongside Russia, through two emerging international blocs of which Iran is among the newest members—BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
Yet neither of these organizations constitute a military alliance, nor does the 2021 China-Iran comprehensive strategic partnership treaty or a similar deal signed with Russia in January contain a mutual defense clause.
The latter agreement simply stipulates that, in the event of a conflict, each party "must not provide any military or other assistance to the aggressor, contributing to the continuation of aggression."
The language differs notably from a separate comprehensive strategic partnership agreement signed between Russia and North Korea last June that does necessitate each side to come to the other's aid in the event of a hostile third-party attack. North Korean troops now openly operate on Russia's side of the war in Ukraine, though officially only to fend off Ukrainian incursions into Russian territory.
On the contrary, Russian President Vladimir Putin decided to limit his role in the 12-day war between Iran and Israel to expressions of condemnation, a position Sazhin characterized as "neutral."
Aleksei Zakharov, a fellow at the Observer Research Foundation's Strategic Studies Program, argued that "Moscow is still pursuing a careful balance between various players in the Middle East while Iran—having initially provided supplies to Russia—is reluctant to become embroiled in the Russia-Ukraine war."
While he told Newsweek that "the level of Russia-Iran defense cooperation may be deeper than it seems," he noted that the "publicly available information is controversial."
"It is unclear whether the contract on the supply of fighter jets has been fulfilled," Zakharov said, "or Iran has switched from the Russian to Chinese jets as reported."
A young boy holds a sign of Chinese fighter jet J-10C as Pakistani people participate in a public gathering of gratitude organized by Parks and Horticulture Authorities held at Liaquat Bagh in Rawalpindi, Pakistan on...
A young boy holds a sign of Chinese fighter jet J-10C as Pakistani people participate in a public gathering of gratitude organized by Parks and Horticulture Authorities held at Liaquat Bagh in Rawalpindi, Pakistan on May 12, 2025. More
Zubair Abbasi/Middle East Images/AFP/Getty Images
Balancing Friends and Foes
Even if Iran opts to make the switch, few expect China to take any drastic measures in terms of scrapping its own relationship with Israel, described uniquely by Beijing as an "innovative comprehensive partnership."
As with Russia, which Sazhin said "has maintained and maintains normal, businesslike relations with Israel," China has continued to invest in ties with U.S.' top Middle East ally, even if Israeli officials have criticized both nations' positions on the war that has consumed the region for the past 21 months.
Alireza Taghavinia, a Tehran-based security analyst, expressed skepticism about the degree to which China and Russia could align with Iran given the two powers' continued relationship with Israel as well as Western countries and rivals of Tehran.
"Iran should not expect much from these countries because they also have their own national interests and relations with the West and Israel," Taghavinia told Newsweek.
"For example, China has hundreds of billions of dollars in trade relations with the United States every year, and Russia also realizes that 30 percent of Israel's population is of Russian descent, and certainly in a conflict between Iran and Israel, Putin would not want Israel destroyed by Iran," he added.
Still, he argued that Tehran had little choice but to double down on its ties with Beijing and Moscow.
"In many issues, Iran reaches out to China and Russia not out of arbitrariness or interest, but out of necessity, because it has no other option," Taghavinia said.
Meanwhile, China and Russia also have important motivations for maintaining close ties with Iran, namely China "in challenging U.S. hegemony and preventing NATO expansion," he said, with Beijing in particular in need of "a sustainable source of energy that is self-sufficient for its industrial future."
Yet another constraint from the Iranian side, he argued, was that, while hard-liner Raisi was ardent supporter of boosting ties with China and Russia, his successor, reformist President Masoud Pezeshkian, continues to push for resetting ties with the U.S. and Europe, even amid the current tensions dominating Tehran's relationship with the West.
"I must say that Iran has many common interests with Russia and China, but in many cases, Iran's pro-Western governments have not shown much interest in them," Taghavinia said.
Moving forward, he argued that "Iran's cooperation with Russia and China should continue, but we should not expect a 100 percent strategic relationship with them, because Iran's regional rivals are also important to Russia and China."
Iranian Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh stands in the reception hall of the International Conference Centre in Qingdao during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting alongside counterparts from eight other nations, including China and Russia, on June...
Iranian Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh stands in the reception hall of the International Conference Centre in Qingdao during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting alongside counterparts from eight other nations, including China and Russia, on June 25, 2025. More
Johannes Neudecker/Picture-Alliance/DPA/AP
Iran at the Crossroads
While Iran and Israel declared victory after their deadly bout, having launched hundreds of attacks against one another in a mere dozen days, the Islamic Republic's losses were staggering. All key nuclear facilities were either destroyed or significantly damaged, air defenses and missile stockpile arsenals compromised, and key military officials and nuclear scientists killed.
Potentially even more significant, the Axis of Resistance coalition of allies developed by Iran over the course of decades and at great cost has been largely neutralized.
Moscow's absence in the latest conflict may mark the final straw in pushing Tehran toward a broader realignment in its strategy in a bid to turn setback into opportunity.
Ali Vaez, director of the Crisis Group's Iran Project and adjunct professor at Georgetown University, argued that Iran's deep disappointment in Russia's reaction to the war last month, along with indications that "their weapons have also proven to be no match for Western technology" have increasingly made China "a much more attractive option for Iran."
Echoing Fan, however, he said the ball may fall in Iran's court as to whether its strategic reconsiderations would also constitute a rethinking of behavior deemed undesirable by China, thus opening new doors for cooperation—and, potentially, state-of-the-art weapons.
"China's problem with Iran is that it's too much of a troublemaker," Vaez told Newsweek. "China has significant economic interests in the Gulf states and does not want Iran to pursue policies that could escalate tensions in that region."
"If Iran's behavior changes, reducing the risks for China," he added, "then Beijing is likely to become more amenable to deepening its military ties with Tehran."