Latest news with #ForceDesign
Yahoo
09-05-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
USAF Wants Collaborative Aircraft Fleet To Stress Parts Commonality For Forward Operations
The U.S. Air Force will have to prioritize the sustainability of its new Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) drones if it's to ensure they are an effective 'additive' to the force. This is the conclusion of Maj. Gen. Joseph Kunkel, Director of Force Design, Integration, and Wargaming, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air Force Futures, who also called for a significant degree of shared components between the first increment of CCA drones, which comprises the General Atomics YFQ-42A and the Anduril YFQ-44A. The topic of maintenance, logistics, and sustainment of CCAs, including a heavier focus on commercial-off-the-shelf components, is something we have addressed in the past. Maj. Gen. Kunkel was speaking as a guest at the rollout of the Mitchell Institute's latest research study, authored by Air Force Col. Mark A. Gunzinger (ret.), Director of Future Concepts and Capability Assessments. Based on a series of wargames, the study looks at the logistics requirements for Air Force CCAs in combat scenarios. Ultimately, Kunkel said, the CCAs will only be of real value as combat mass as long as they can be kept flying at high rates, either alongside crewed fighters or flying missions alone. In this way, the adversary will be forced to respond to their presence, generating sorties and expending weapons in their effort to counter them. While that is one of the main reasons behind developing the CCAs in the first place, it does impose a significant logistics burden, Kunkel observed. Even without the demands of making its CCAs suitable for distributed operations, these drones will come with a significant logistics burden, simply due to their number. The service expects to buy between 100 and 150 Increment 1 CCAs, but has said in the past that it could ultimately acquire at least a thousand of the drones across all of the program's increments. The goal, according to Kunkel, is to have CCAs that are able to operate for hundreds of hours without needing significant maintenance work. This becomes especially important when operating from forward locations, as is the expectation of future conflicts, notably in the Pacific theater. The drones are being designed from the outset to make them suitable for concepts of distributed and disaggregated operations, something also referred to as Agile Combat Employment (ACE). Kunkel highlighted the relevance of this concept to the new drones: '[With] an ability to position CCAs and posture them in different places in a theater, you can increase the complexity of the picture that our adversary sees dramatically … increasing dilemmas for the adversary, increasing the complexity of the picture that they're going to see, increasing the complexity of what it takes for them to counter us.' In the past, Kunkel has described the Air Force CCAs as 'the first aircraft that we have developed specifically for ACE.' Reflecting these concerns, Kunkel said he has already had talks with General Atomics and Anduril, with a view to reducing the number of different components in the company's CCA designs. This would also seem to indicate that the Air Force currently plans to buy a mix of YF-42As and YF-44As, under Increment 1, although that could still change. Kunkel noted that he has encouraged those firms to explore 'motors that are the same, controls that are the same, actuators, tires … those types of things that we need,' to make it easier to sustain CCAs once deployed. 'They don't necessarily have to be the same aircraft, but certainly many of the components need to be the same,' Kunkel added. Meanwhile, the increased use of 'condition-based maintenance' should help reduce the maintenance demands involved in CCA operations by alerting ground crews early to any looming issues. Already, we have explored the Air Force's ambition for its CCAs to make greater use of commercial-off-the-shelf components than the service's existing crewed and uncrewed platforms. On the other hand, Gunzinger proposed a somewhat different approach to dealing with maintenance issues, namely by fielding more expendable CCAs, with the idea of less-exquisite and cheaper drones in future increments gaining some traction recently. 'CCAs do not need to be anywhere near as reliable or have as large a mean time between failure as crewed aircraft,' Gunzinger contended. 'If it's a recoverable CCA that might fly 10, 15, or 20 sorties, there are still lower costs.' Gunzinger raised the scenario of some kind of mechanical failure keeping a CCA on the ground in the middle of the fight. 'We can push it off the side of the runway … because we don't have time, we don't have resources to get around and repair that CCA on the ground, increasing the time our airmen are on the ground, and possibly vulnerable.' For Kunkel, another important reason for ensuring as much subsystem commonality as possible is the sheer number of different CCA drone variants that are currently planned. According to Col. Gunzinger, the wargames involved 16 different variants, reflecting the wide spectrum of missions the CCAs are expected to undertake. While the Increment 1 CCAs are expected to work closely together with crewed combat jets primarily in the air-to-air combat role, at least initially, they will also be used as electronic warfare platforms and sensor nodes, further augmenting crewed platforms. There is also significant potential for the drones to fulfill roles additional to these: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions have also been discussed. Another mission that was included in the recent wargames was logistic support, in which the CCAs would move ammunition and supplies around different forward operating locations. This reflects Air Force experiments involving MQ-9 Reaper drones, deployed in small packages to forward locations under the Rapid Reaper concept. For the MQ-9, General Atomics helped develop a 'kit' to assist with deploying and sustaining those drones within the ACE construct. Future CCAs, like the Reapers, could be adapted to carry small cargoes in travel pods under their wings, or in internal payload bays. With so many different versions of the CCA likely to be fielded, the Air Force will need to avoid having different sets of logistics trains to support them. In particular, weapons, refueling equipment, other ground equipment, and loading equipment should be common for CCAs, as far as is possible, Gunzinger said. Even with existing crewed aircraft, the demands of specialized maintenance and logistics, as well as the need for more bespoke equipment on the ground to support flight operations, have been significant challenges for the Air Force when it comes to implementing the ACE concepts. When it comes to optimizing the CCAs for combat operations from forward locations, Kunkel pointed to the utility of drones that can operate free from the constraints of traditional airbases, including being fully independent of runways. 'We know that the adversary is going to try and target our bases,' Kunkel added, in an obvious reference to China. 'For the last 30 years, they've developed a rocket force. They've developed cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, and all these things are meant to counter our bases, meant to keep us from reliably generating combat power from bases.' Putting CCAs at forward locations is 'one of the ways to thin out the adversary's mass … and the logistics pipeline of CCA is less complex' than for crewed aircraft. Compared with a traditional combat aircraft that likely requires complex logistical pipelines, long runways, and extensive infrastructure, all of which are vulnerable, CCAs are 'being specifically built so you can put them in a lot of different places. And if you can put them in a lot of different places, you can create a tremendous ground picture that an adversary has to attack if they're going to be successful. Increasing the number of ground targets for an adversary, I think, is just as important as increasing the number of air targets.' Kunkel noted that for certain roles, CCAs would need a conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) capability, but that short or vertical takeoff 'is something that we need to look at' in future CCA increments. 'As you look at how we generate combat power, and the number of sites we can use … there's something to a shorter takeoff length,' Kunkel said. 'We've got to figure out what that takes because, generally, when you do a vertical takeoff aircraft, you decrease the payload, you decrease the range. There's a balance that we need to strike here.' In addition to potential STOL and VTOL capabilities for future CCA increments, Kunkel also suggested that some of these drones could potentially be launched from other aircraft. Clearly, the Air Force is very much still in the process of working out how best to utilize its CCAs and what kinds of missions they should be used for. It's also notable that the promise of these drones to augment crewed combat aircraft, making them more lethal and flexible in the process, is also tempered by the potentially challenging logistics requirements that will come with them. These challenges will become greater the more different mission sets are taken on and as the different increments and versions of the drone diversify. It will therefore be critical to strike a balance between fielding CCAs with a range of capabilities and meeting the requirements of operating from forward locations with limited support. Contact the author: thomas@
Yahoo
24-04-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
Air Force's Next Batch Of Collaborative Combat Drones Could Be Less ‘Exquisite,' Cheaper
We now have more clarity on the U.S. Air Force's plans for its second tranche of Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) drones, known as Increment 2. This includes the likelihood that each CCA Increment 2 drone will cost less than was previously expected, as well as the increasing likelihood of its integration with assets in addition to fighters, including the B-21 stealth bomber and E-7 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft. The information was provided by Maj. Gen. Joseph D. Kunkel, Director of Force Design, Integration, and Wargaming, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air Force Futures. Kunkel was speaking today at the Warfighters in Action virtual Q&A organized by the Air and Space Forces Association. Kunkel confirmed that the Air Force is currently looking more deeply at the requirements for CCA Increment 2, noting that this contrasts with its approach to Increment 1, which focused on rapidly bringing a capability into service. The Air Force expects to buy between 100 and 150 Increment 1 CCAs, but has said in the past that it could ultimately acquire at least a thousand of CCA drones across all of the program's increments. The service's stated initial focus is on acquiring CCAs that can act as weapons 'trucks,' electronic warfare platforms, and sensor nodes, to augment crewed tactical combat jets, but there is also significant potential for drones that can fulfill roles additional to these. 'What we wanted to do with CCA Increment 1 was speed the field,' Kunkel said. 'How quickly can we field this? And so we've got a capability that's going to field very quickly. We're flying the first things this summer, which is absolutely incredible from a timeline perspective, as we continue to do analysis.' The Air Force has chosen to build two different drones for CCA Increment 1, which are being developed by General Atomics and Anduril as the YFQ-42A and YFQ-44A, respectively. These are the U.S. military's first-ever 'fighter drone' designations. The Increment 1 CCAs are expected to work closely together with crewed combat jets, primarily in the air-to-air combat role, at least initially. Kunkel added that some of the analysis that's now helping frame CCA Increment 2 requirements emerged from the Air Force's studies for its Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) 'fighter' initiative. The centerpiece of the NGAD effort is a new crewed sixth-generation stealth combat jet, the Boeing F-47, which the Air Force hopes to begin fielding in the next decade. Based on these findings, 'We're looking at a range of CCAs,' Kunkel continued. 'I know that as Secretary Kendall left, he said, 'Hey, it's going to be more expensive and it's going to be more exquisite.' Well, it might be, but we're also seeing that there's going to be room for other capabilities that aren't as exquisite.' Kunkel was referencing the words of former Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall, who suggested that the Increment 2 drones could be between 20 to 30 percent more expensive per airframe than those in the first batch. Kendall had previously said that the goal was for the price point for Increment 1 CCAs to be between one-quarter and one-third of that of an F-35. This would put the price tag of a single one of those drones at between $20.5 and $27.5 million, based on publicly available cost data. An increase of 20-30 percent in those figures would put the price range for Increment 2 CCAs at between approximately $24.6/$26.65 and $33/35.75 million. At the same time, Kendall did say he doesn't believe the Increment 2 CCAs should evolve into high-end exquisite platforms. This came amid serious questions about the Air Force's ability to afford its next round of CCAs, as well as other future advanced aircraft, including new sixth-generation crewed combat jets and stealthy tankers. 'I think, personally, something that has some increase in cost over Increment 1 would not be outrageous,' Kendall told Air & Space Forces Magazine earlier this year, '20 or 30 percent, something like that.' Kunkel went further on that theme, noting that the Increment 2 drones — or at least some of them — will very likely be cheaper, to 'provide mass.' 'This whole CCA thing started a long time ago,' Kunkel reflected. 'You had a bunch of baby F-22 drivers sitting around the bar at Elmendorf going, 'Man, I ran out of missiles five minutes into the fight. If only I had this loyal wingman that wouldn't talk back to me but would also be able to just shoot some missiles,' and we dreamed about this loyal wingman. We didn't call it CCA back then, but we're now getting to the point where we're realizing it.' As to what Increment 2 might look like, Kunkel said he expects to see 'a range of options from low-end to potentially more exquisite. I tend to think that it's probably going to be closer to this low-end thing.' We already know the Air Force is working to acquire what could ultimately be a fleet of multiple different types of CCA drones through iterative development cycles. Already, dozens of contractors are also working on other aspects of the program, including advanced autonomous technologies. When the Air Force starts to look at further CCA increments, Kunkel stated that the service will have to examine how it can best generate combat power. Although 'generation of combat power from bases is important, there might be other ways to generate this combat power that don't rely on bases,' Kunkel said. 'So that might be something that we might be looking at as we start looking at future increments of CCA. That is a big portion of it. We're not just looking at how it fights in the air. We're looking at how we generate combat power as well.' Kunkel's words suggest that the Air Force will be looking at options to launch and recover CCA drones of future increments that don't rely on traditional, vulnerable runways and expensive related infrastructure. On the one hand, this could involve drones launched from a rail or catapult, but it might also include scope for drones that can be launched from other aircraft. In the past, TWZ has highlighted in the past the value of CCAs able to operate from shorter and/or less improved runways, and the benefits would only increase if they were to be made entirely runway independent, which would also allow them to be more flexibly positioned in forward areas. Kunkel also provided some insight into how the CCAs (Increments 1, 2, and potentially beyond) will be operated in conjunction with crewed Air Force assets, confirming that the service is looking at integrating the drones with a range of platforms.'The F-47 is going to be one of those platforms,' Kunkel said. 'What CCA does in the fight is twofold. One, it provides affordable mass. But the other thing it does is complicate the picture for an adversary. And you know, as an air-to-air guy, we all know that the easiest picture is this single-axis, single-azimuth picture of the fight. Everyone's coming right at you, and it's like, 'Okay, hey, diddle diddle, up the middle, we can take this on.' What's more complex and harder to fight is this multi-axis dense-threat environment, and with CCA, we have the opportunity to do that. So CCA integration with F-47 makes the F-47 better.' As well as a loyal wingman to the F-47, CCA drones will be integrated with the F-35 and F-22 stealth fighters, Kunkel said. Furthermore, 'I would suggest potentially in the future, B-21 and E-7, and maybe just CCA on its own.' All of these different options 'complicate the adversary picture [and] put us in a better position where it makes the fight better for all of us. So yeah, CCA integration with a number of platforms is something that we're looking at.' Back in 2023, Lt. Gen. James Slife, the Air Force's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, had also raised the idea of CCAs operating alongside B-21s, as well as aerial refueling tankers and cargo aircraft. Meanwhile, the potential of CCAs to assist the E-7 is something that has been discussed for some time, with General Atomics, in particular, having pitched CCA-like drones in an asset-protection role for AEW&C platforms, tankers, and other critical and more vulnerable aircraft. At this stage, there are still many unknowns surrounding CCA Increment 2, although it's clear that requirements are taking shape. With the potential for CCAs to complement crewed platforms beyond fighters, and with what looks likely to be an emphasis on low cost and combat mass, it's also likely that the Air Force's future CCA fleet could grow significantly larger and include multiple different designs. That is, if all goes to plan. For all its undoubted potential, the CCA effort still has plenty to prove, and this is a concept very much in its infancy. Whether the Air Force's CCA ambitions will pan out as Kunkel or other officials envisage them remains to be seen. Contact the author: thomas@
Yahoo
08-04-2025
- Yahoo
Top Marine Says Service Has Finally Settled on 13-Grunt Rifle Squads
After years of experimentation, the Marine Corps has finally settled on a 13-person rifle squad, including a grunt trained in long-range precision weapons as the service looks to increase the distance from which its most fundamental ground unit can destroy the enemy. The Corps' top officer, Commandant Gen. Eric Smith, made the announcement Monday at the Navy League's Sea-Air-Space 2025 conference in National Harbor, Maryland, where military and defense industry leaders are gathering this week to discuss national security aims and challenges. The service had used a 13-Marine rifle squad for decades. But in 2018, as the Corps embarked on its most ambitious organizational shift since before World War II -- known as Force Design -- and it began to tinker with the number of infantrymen in the unit, ranging from 12 people to 15 over the last several years. Read Next: House Republicans and Democrats Say the US Must Maintain Its Troop Totals in Europe "This includes a school-trained squad leader sergeant and three fire teams," Smith said at the conference. "While this structure sounds familiar, it now includes an organic precision fires specialist." Those specialists will use drones carrying loitering munitions, a move that comes as the service is looking to insert unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, not only into its most elemental infantry units, but also into the broader culture of the service, previously reported. Smith also said that the service will be standing up dedicated fire units within its infantry battalions, taking weapon systems like the 81mm mortar out of its headquarters companies, and creating a single unit within the battalion to better "integrate intelligence, precision fires and reconnaissance at greater ranges." The commandant said that the changes were informed by bottom-up feedback from Marines in the fleet, "empowered by our campaign of learning to refine and adapt" -- a core aim of Force Design as the service looks to challenge China in the Indo-Pacific. "So as we experiment, we have our young battalion commanders telling us how to do things, and we're complying with them," Smith said. "We're executing what they direct from the bottom up." The revamped infantry squads will apply to all traditional infantry battalions, as well as littoral combat teams, which are part of the service's latest Indo-Pacific-oriented formations known as Marine Littoral Regiments, Cathy Close, a spokesperson for the Marine Corps' Combat Development and Integration Division, told in an emailed statement Tuesday. The service dabbled with rifle squads with 14- and even 15-Marine units, which would have included a corpsman, she said. Now, the squads will include three teams of four Marines, with a sergeant squad leader, corporal assistant squad leader and corporals as team leaders. After experimenting for years, the service settled on 13, Close said, noting that any less than that "indicated risk regarding resilience within the formation" related to its ability to take casualties. The current revamp, she said, gives squads and platoons more flexibility with three fire teams, as opposed to just two. "The Marine Corps has looked to current conflicts, including the war in Ukraine, to help determine the capabilities the infantry battalions, including their rifle squads, need to be effective on the battlefield," Close said when asked whether the service took lessons from modern combat to codify its rifle squad structure. "The impacts of multi-domain operations, to include the importance of drone, counter-drone and loitering munitions, have been considered as an integral requirement for modern warfare." The changes -- which the commandant said were made last week -- have not come without their challenges. Smith said that "unpredictable funding" due to Congress' inability to pass a long-term budget has slowed the modernization efforts, requiring the Corps to "make tough decisions." reported recently that Marines were at risk of losing out on bonuses, and the service was unable to move thousands of troops for routine military moves because the funding wasn't there. Congress has relied on continuing resolutions -- stop-gap measures that require the services to rely on the previous year's funding levels -- to manage the budget. "I'll stay out of politics, but I will say that we need predictable, on-time funding that only Congress can provide, meaning that continuing resolutions aren't continuing anything," Smith said. "They stop our progress." Related: Every Marine a Drone Operator? New Team Aims to Compete, Set Standards for Unmanned Aircraft Warfare.
Yahoo
07-04-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Coast Guard Secretary? The Trump Administration Is Planning a Big Redesign of the Service.
The Coast Guard is planning a radical redesign that includes more personnel, improved technology and acquisition systems, and changes to its organization that include a service secretary. Exact details of the service's transformation, known as "Force Design 2028," have not been released, but plans call for changes in personnel policy, including modernization of the Coast Guard Reserve and civilian management; restructuring at the headquarters level; and improvements to acquisitions processes and information technology systems, according to an April 3 news release. "We are executing transformational change to renew the Coast Guard," Acting Commandant Adm. Kevin Lunday said in a statement to on Friday. "Force Design 2028 will ensure the Coast Guard remains Semper Paratus, Always Ready, to serve the American people." Read Next: Book Purge at Service Academy a 'Blatant Attack' on Free Speech, Democratic Lawmakers Say According to the Coast Guard, Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem directed the restructure. Sean Plankey, billed as "senior adviser to the secretary for the Coast Guard," is leading the effort. Plankey, a Coast Guard Academy alumnus who deployed in 2013 to Afghanistan, is the Trump administration's nominee to head the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. He previously served as the National Security Council's director of cyber policy and the Navy's chief information officer. Unlike its fellow services in the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard does not have a service secretary. Its military leader, the commandant, reports directly to the Homeland Security secretary. Force Design 2028 calls for creating a secretariat along with several other headquarters positions, including a director of staff, a Force Design implementation team, and an assistant commandant position for operational integration and response policy. The operational integration and response policy assistant commandant would be responsible for increasing "decision-making speed and resource allocation to operational commanders" and working with the Joint Staff and across the national security federal infrastructure, according to the Coast Guard. Republican Sens. Rick Scott of Florida and Shelley Moore Capito of West Virginia introduced a bill last week that would create the Coast Guard secretary position. According to the proposed legislation, the secretary would report directly to the Department of Homeland Security secretary and, in cases when the Coast Guard serves as a service within the Navy, would advise the Navy secretary on Coast Guard-related matters. According to the bill, the commandant would report to the civilian Coast Guard secretary and, in cases where the Coast Guard operates under the Navy, report to the Navy secretary. "The establishment of a secretary of the Coast Guard is an important step in ensuring our nation's maritime security is led with the strength and efficiency it deserves to ensure it can fulfill its mission and adapt to any challenges," Scott said in a news release April 1. Rep. Mike Ezell, R-Miss., introduced similar legislation in the House the same day. According to the Coast Guard, efforts have already begun on the force restructuring, beginning with a review of physical standards to align with the Defense Department's standards "to the maximum extent possible." In March, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth ordered a review of military standards "pertaining to physical fitness, body composition and grooming, which includes but is not limited to beards." The Coast Guard has physical fitness requirements for recruits, cadets and officer candidates and fitness tests for certain operational units but does not have a standardized physical fitness evaluation program for all members. It does, however, conduct body composition screenings. In 2021, the service instituted an option that members could select abdominal circumference as a measurement rather than the traditional tape test of different parts of the body that negatively affected some women and extremely muscular service members whose measurements didn't meet the standards set for their height. Force Design 2028 also will "restore maximum discretion" to commanders and officers-in-charge on the use of nonjudicial punishment. In 2023, President Joe Biden signed an executive order that standardized the burden of proof for the services to issue nonjudicial punishments, requiring that commanders need only a "preponderance of evidence" to mete out punishment. Previously, some of the services required proof beyond a reasonable doubt for a commander to punish a member. "This change is consistent with the ultimate responsibility entrusted to commanders to maintain good order and discipline at their units," according to the Coast Guard. Among the planned organizational changes under the redesign is an effort to delegate operational responsibility to the "appropriate levels of command" -- for example, giving coxswains and commanding officers of cutters pursuing noncompliant vessels use-of-force decision authority -- and restructuring the offices of the deputies for personnel readiness and material readiness. According to the service, the changes are needed to provide better support to service members and their families and oversee management of ships, aircraft and shore infrastructure. Regarding acquisitions and contracts, the service plans to simplify procedures and authorize direct purchases on some goods and services to speed up delivery, and work with the Defense Innovation Unit to improve contracting speed and procurement, as well as transparency. And the redesign calls for the service to adopt cutting-edge technology systems to improve data sharing and situational and operational awareness. According to the service, a "Rapid Response Rapid Prototype Team" will oversee technology solutions for all aspects of Coast Guard performance, including operations, engineering, acquisitions, finance, information technology, logistics, data science and change management. Lunday has served as acting commandant since Jan. 21, when the Trump administration fired Commandant Adm. Linda Fagan for loss of confidence in her command based on recruiting concerns, border security and the service's focus on diversity. The service has not announced a nominee for the permanent position of commandant. Lunday has a strong operational background, having led the Coast Guard's 14th District and Atlantic Area, but also experience in cyber operations, leading the service's Cyber Command and working as director of exercises and training at U.S. Cyber Command. In a statement to Lunday said Force Design 2028 will make the service more "agile, capable and responsive." "FD 2028 is the way forward for our service and will ensure our ability to ensure U.S. national security and economic prosperity for decades to come," Lunday said. Related: $7 Billion Coast Guard Maintenance Backlog Looms as Lawmakers Decry 'Unacceptable' Conditions
Yahoo
10-03-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
There is free-riding among the US military services, too
Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has vowed to serve as the Pentagon's 'change agent,' reforming the acquisition process and placing emerging capabilities in the hands of warfighters faster. This is a tall task. Truly disrupting the Pentagon will require starting at the top, specifically adopting a comprehensive joint force design, in which capabilities are developed and integrated cohesively across all military services, domains and functions. This approach is especially critical for identifying capabilities vital to the joint force, but which no single service has a major interest in funding, because they are 'common pool' assets. By the Joint Staff's own admission, joint force design is 'necessary to produce a unifying vision for the future of the Joint Force.' Yet the U.S. military lacks such a future-oriented framework for guiding joint modernization priorities and timelines. While the Joint Warfighting Concept outlines a broad approach for how the Joint Force should fight in a future conflict, it lacks specificity about which services are expected to provide what future capabilities and on what timelines. As the Marine Corps commandant lamented in 2023, the services lack 'a common aimpoint … that says this is where the Joint Force needs to be 5, 6, or 7 years into the future.' Instead, each branch independently develops its own separate force design, laying out operational capabilities required at varying future dates. The Marine Corps' Force Design 2030, which is now known as 'Force Design,' emphasizes a lighter and more mobile force armed with long-range sensors and precision-strike weapons. The Navy's Force Design 2045 proposes a hybrid fleet, in which surface and subsurface uncrewed vessels augment traditional naval assets, while the Air Force's One Force Design envisions a mix of stand-off, stand-in and asymmetric capabilities designed to attack an adversary's kill chains. The Army is expected to unveil its new force design later this month. The problem with this approach is that too often, the driving force behind service choices are budgetary considerations rather than a joint strategic vision. The competition for a larger share of total obligation authority promotes spending on service-centric warfighting capabilities while simultaneously reducing investment in the service-provided capabilities needed to generate and sustain U.S. military power. This puts the entire joint force at risk. In economic terms, capabilities like intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, data connectivity, and logistics are 'common pool resources' — when they are procured by one service, they can be used by all under a joint command. Because these assets are non-excludable, each service has incentives to free-ride on the investments of others. Here's the rub: The validity of each service's force design depends on the other services' investments in common pool resources, but there is no forcing function to enforce their provision across the joint force. Take the Marines' Force Design as an example: it assumes robust Navy support, including logistics, intelligence, and mobility. The Navy's Navigation Plan 2024, however, make no mention of the Navy's important role in supporting and sustaining Marine stand-in Forces. Why? Because no joint mechanism exists to ensure service force designs either fulfill these dependencies or envision forces which are not dependent on common pool resources. This is particularly troubling because U.S. military advantage increasingly requires cross-domain, and therefore cross-service, solutions. A common understanding in force design is that each service should strive to dominate its own domain. Each domain — land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace — offers unique advantages that, when combined, generate more robust and flexible national military capabilities. Each domain also has specific vulnerabilities best mitigated from other domains, and possibly by other services. For example, ground forces have limited visibility from the ground, but, with access to the air, space, and even cyber domains, have the potential to see further. While domain expertise is essential, an overemphasis on domain-centric superiority can undermine the fighting effectiveness of the joint force, particularly when it leads to missed opportunities to develop new capabilities that operate across multiple domains. To achieve an effective joint force, the Department of Defense should start with a joint force design, deliberately integrating domain-specific expertise into a unified force design. Such a design would prioritize the creation of options over the creation of platforms, ensuring military capabilities align with overarching national security objectives, not just individual service preferences. This joint force design should also identify those common pool resources which are chronically underfunded in service budgets, acknowledge their critical importance to the entire joint force, and drive resources to them. To make that happen, the Pentagon ought to move some acquisition authorities away from the services, structuring the budget around the joint force design rather than just service-specific priorities. The current Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System often fails to align funding with the true needs of the joint force, resulting in inefficiencies and capability gaps. Reforming Pentagon budgeting is therefore essential to ensure US defense dollars are used efficiently and effectively and not misallocated because of unproductive bureaucratic competition among the services. Rethinking and redesigning the current force structure is not merely an option — it is a necessity for maintaining military advantage in an increasingly complex global security environment. Col. Maximilian K. Bremer, US Air Force, is the director of the Advanced Programs Division at Air Mobility Command. Kelly A. Grieco is a senior fellow with the Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center and an adjunct professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University. This commentary does not necessarily reflect the views of the US Defense Department, or the US Air Force.
