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India.com
5 days ago
- Business
- India.com
Is China's ‘economic slave' sending troops to Ukraine to support Russia? Not Pakistan or Sri Lanka, it is....
The close partnership between Russia and China is no longer a secret. Despite Western sanctions, China has been very supportive of Russia, which has helped bolster its economy and its military. Now, numerous media outlets are reporting that a nation that is deeply indebted to China may send troops to assist Russia. That nation is Laos, which owes China billions of dollars. A few years back, Laos' vital energy grid was taken over by China after it defaulted on its loans. Laos also has significant military and diplomatic ties to Russia, and there is concern that it may become directly involved in helping bolster Moscow's military efforts. Which country is being called China's 'economic slave' in this context? According to the South China Morning Post(SCMP), Laos state media reported this week that the government rejected recent reports in international media that it would send troops to support Russian military operations in Ukraine. The reports claimed that Moscow was trying to recruit Laotian soldiers and civilians with the promise of financial incentives and Russian citizenship. Reports also claimed that Russia identified Laotian military engineering units to offer support, i.e., mine-clearing support in the Kursk region at the outset. The reports, citing Ukraine's Main Directorate of Intelligence, stated that the Kremlin aims to involve allied states in the war under the 'under the pretext of carrying out humanitarian projects in Russian regions bordering Ukraine.' 'Laos is the latest country Russia is attempting to pull into the war,' the agency noted. Which major country provides economic and diplomatic support to Russia without condemning its actions? With the country's strong ties with Moscow and demining expertise, concerns about the Southeast Asian nation playing a role in the conflict seemed reasonable. Laos said the allegations were baseless and were intended to confuse and damage the country's international reputation. Laos stressed there was no evidence to support the allegations, characterising them as a 'deliberate distortion of the truth' to create confusion in the world community. The Thongloun Sisoulith government also announced that it has no policy or intention to dispatch military personnel or citizens to intervene in any other countries' internal conflicts, the report mentioned. According to Ian Storey, a senior fellow at the Singapore-based ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, these claims originated from Ukraine's military intelligence, which has 'a track record of false or exaggerated claims'. 'However, the story was somewhat plausible given the good relations between Laos and Russia,' Ian Storey, senior fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute based in Singapore, was quoted as saying by the South China Morning Post. The two nations' close historical ties began in the Cold War situation, with the Soviet Union supplying essential support to the Laotian Communist Party. Ian Storey, author of Putin's Russia and Southeast Asia: The Kremlin's Pivot to Asia and the Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War, notes that Vientiane is thankful to Moscow and has not condemned Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
The Diplomat
15-07-2025
- Politics
- The Diplomat
Ian Storey on Russia's Turn to Southeast Asia
Over the past decade, under President Vladimir Putin, Russia has taken steps to expand its economic, political, and security relations with Southeast Asia. This has involved efforts both to build upon the historical influence of the Soviet Union in the region, particularly in Indochina, and to forge new partnerships with rising middle powers such as Malaysia and Indonesia. In a new book, 'Putin's Russia and Southeast Asia: The Kremlin's Pivot to Asia and the Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War,' Ian Storey charts the course of this policy toward Southeast Asia and ASEAN since Putin was elected president in 2000, and especially since the beginning of his third presidential term in 2012. The first major study of Russia-Southeast Asia relations since the end of the Cold War, Storey's book examines both the causes and outcomes of Russia's increasing engagement with Southeast Asia, and the impact that the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has had on this trajectory. Storey, a senior fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore and the co-editor of its journal 'Contemporary Southeast Asia,' spoke with The Diplomat's Southeast Asian Editor Sebastian Strangio about how the Kremlin's policy has shifted during Putin's long tenure, and the sources and limits of Russian influence in Southeast Asia. In the Introduction to your book, you write that Russia has 'the smallest economic footprint in Southeast Asia, the least geopolitical influence, and the lowest strategic significance,' which accounts for the dearth of academic writing on Russia's relations with the region since the end of the Cold War. What made you decide to study this topic in depth? As I argue in the Introduction, while Russia is not a major player in the region, it is a player nevertheless and has some undeniable strengths that make it worthy of scholarly attention. While Russia cannot be considered a great power in Southeast Asia, most of the ASEAN member states recognize that at the global level, it does have certain great power attributes, including its size, population, nuclear arsenal and vast natural resources. Moreover, from a geopolitical perspective, Russia is a member of the U.N. Security Council and is an influential player in many regions of the world, including the post-Soviet space (especially Central Asia), Europe, the Arctic, the Middle East and Africa. Moscow also has an increasingly consequential strategic partnership with China, retains some influence on the Korean Peninsula and, since 2022, has reinvigorated its alliance with North Korea. Until the mid-2010s, Russian defense companies sold billions of dollars of equipment to regional states, including Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and Myanmar. Russia has important energy interests in Southeast Asia, including in the South China Sea, and is a major exporter of food and fertilizers to the region. Russia is also a dialogue partner of ASEAN, albeit a problematic one at times (it has tried to block Western countries from becoming observers to the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus observer groups). In sharp contrast with the West, Russia has a relatively benign image in Southeast Asia, isn't perceived as a threat by any country, and people have a generally positive impression of President Putin. In some parts of Southeast Asia, Putin's image is that of a strongman standing up to the West, and this resonates well. Interestingly, despite its brutal war in Chechnya, Russia is perceived by the Muslim-majority countries in Southeast Asia as being Islamic-friendly, largely due to its long-standing support for Palestinian statehood. Yet despite these factors, not one single-authored book on Russia and Southeast Asia had been published since the end of the Cold War. In 2021, I decided to close that important gap in the academic literature. In February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine and that event, and how Southeast Asian countries responded to it, made the task all the more timely and important. How did Russia's influence in, and approach toward, Southeast Asia evolve between President Vladimir Putin rise to power in 2000 and his invasion of Ukraine in February 2022? Where, and in which countries, do you think Russia made the most significant inroads? When Putin became president in 2000, he felt that his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, had neglected Southeast Asia, especially Russia's Cold War allies Vietnam and Laos. He put bilateral relations with both of those countries back on track, and encouraged Russian defense companies to sell more arms to regional states. Under Putin, Russia also sought a closer relationship with ASEAN even though it was not seen as a very important multilateral forum. But the real change came in 2012, when Putin began his third term as president and introduced his 'Turn to the East,' or Asia Pivot. Although China remained at the center of the Kremlin's Asia policy, Russia did make some important gains in Southeast Asia over the next decade: two-way trade with the ASEAN-10 began to grow, Russia started to attend the East Asia Summit and ASEAN-Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus, persuaded Vietnam and Singapore to sign free trade agreements with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and appeared on the verge of winning some major defense contracts, including with U.S. allies, the Philippines and Thailand. After the military coup in Myanmar in 2021, Russia forged close ties with the junta. But as I argue in the book, from the mid-2010s, it began to lose ground: two-way trade with the ASEAN-10 peaked, its arms sales dropped off a cliff due to Western sanctions and its vaccine diplomacy during the COVID-19 pandemic was a flop. Then came the war. You began working on this book prior to the Ukraine invasion, an event that you write 'would complicate my endeavor, but make it much more interesting, timely, and relevant.' How has the war changed Putin's view of Southeast Asia and his policy towards it? Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Southeast Asia's importance to Russia has increased significantly. In terms of regional responses to the invasion, I think the Kremlin can be fairly satisfied with the region's responses. While only Myanmar endorsed the invasion, Singapore was the only country that condemned Russia by name and imposed financial sanctions. All of the other ASEAN states took an essentially neutral position. Russia's closest friends in the region, Vietnam and Laos, abstained on votes at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) which condemned the attack on Ukraine, while the other ASEAN states (and Timor-Leste) more or less voted consistently in support of the resolutions but went no further. Western attempts to portray Russia as an international pariah have clearly failed in Southeast Asia, as since February 2022, six regional leaders have met with Putin in person, and in June 2024, the Russian leader paid a state visit to Vietnam. In addition, the Russia-Ukraine War has barely impacted Moscow's dialogue partnership with ASEAN, even though the invasion violated all of ASEAN's core principles, which are enshrined in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and which Russia endorsed in 2004. Putin must also have been pleased that Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam all became BRICS partners in 2024 during Russia's chairmanship. The biggest hit Russia has taken in Southeast Asia has been to its arms sales, which in some ways was its most lucrative interest in the region. As Western countries tightened sanctions against Russia, Southeast Asian countries began to question Moscow's reliability as an arms seller. Consequently, sales have fallen from a peak of $1.4 billion in 2014 to less than $100 million last year. It's highly doubtful if Russia's defense sector can recover in Southeast Asia, as regional states can buy from traditional suppliers in the U.S. and Europe, and newcomers such as South Korea and Turkey. Given Moscow's pariah status in the West since 2022 (and to some extent since 2014), what do you think explains the decision of so many Southeast Asian governments to maintain, even to deepen (in the case of Malaysia, Indonesia, and others) their relations with Russia since 2022? What does this say about Southeast Asian strategic inclinations, and their views of how the United States and other Western countries have sought to frame the Ukraine war? As I mentioned earlier, most Southeast Asian countries have adopted a neutral position towards the Russia-Ukraine War for several reasons. They don't want to get embroiled in the disputes of the major powers, especially over an issue in which they do not believe their own interests are directly at stake. There is also a degree of empathy towards the Russian narrative that it was provoked into attacking Ukraine due to NATO's eastward expansion, and that Ukraine is simply a proxy of the U.S. More importantly, perhaps, a number of Southeast Asian countries, and especially the Muslim-majority states Indonesia and Malaysia, have accused the West of hypocrisy, pointing out that the U.S. invaded Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000s. These accusations of double standards have been greatly amplified since Israel invaded Gaza in October 2024. Political leaders in Indonesia and Malaysia have asked why it is that the West was so quick to condemn Russian atrocities in Ukraine, but less keen to do so when it comes to Israel's actions. Most Southeast Asian countries voted in support of the UNGA resolutions, which condemned Russia, but that is the limit of their actions against Russia. The majority of ASEAN member states want to move on and engage Russia on issues that they consider important, especially trade, despite Moscow's shallow economic footprint in the region. Indonesia and Malaysia, in particular, seem keen to strengthen their countries' professed non-aligned stance by pursuing a more balanced foreign policy, and especially closer ties with both Moscow and Beijing. That may include arms purchases from Russia and China. Indonesia is looking to Russia to help improve its food security, including stepping up imports of Russian wheat, cooking oil and fertilizers. Several Southeast Asian countries, such as Myanmar, Vietnam, and Indonesia, are considering partnering with Russia to establish civilian nuclear power programs. In a nutshell, what is Putin's 'pitch' to the region? Putin's pitch to the region is sixfold. First, Russia is a great power and no problem in any part of the world can be resolved without it. Second, in the escalating strategic rivalry between the U.S. and China, Moscow represents a 'third pole' of equal rank to Washington and Beijing. Third, Russia is a valuable source of advanced technology (especially nuclear power, weapons, and space). Fourth, Russia's Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) can provide a beneficial framework of cooperation among the EAEU, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and ASEAN. Fifth, Russia can help promote the voices of the Global South through platforms such as BRICS. And sixth, among the great powers, only Russia and China truly respect ASEAN centrality. But in many respects, Russia's pitch is hard to sell to Southeast Asian leaders. Few ASEAN member states perceive Russia to be a great power in the region because trade links are insubstantial and Moscow cannot provide significant investment or developmental assistance. Nor is it a major security provider. As such, no Southeast Asian leader places Russia on a par with the US and China. ASEAN as an organization has been lukewarm towards the idea of a free trade agreement with the EAEU as well as the GEP because, unlike China's BRI, there's no money supporting the initiative. When it comes to arms, nuclear power and space cooperation, Southeast Asian states have many other countries they can choose to partner with, and Russia is seldom their first choice (except for Myanmar, which basically has to choose between either Russia or China). And while four Southeast Asian countries have joined BRICS, and three others have expressed an interest in joining, the main motivation is China's economic heft, not Russia's.
Mint
14-07-2025
- Business
- Mint
Your next lawn chair is coming from Vietnam, but it's still kind of Chinese
In May, hundreds of workers at a furniture factory here got a nice surprise. Their Chinese bosses were giving them a nearly 45% raise. Factory owner Ren Li said so many other Chinese factories were moving to Vietnam to avoid high U.S. tariffs that he needed to give his workers a big increase to keep them from getting poached. 'They just flood in," Li said of Chinese companies. 'And that will cause a tsunami." For factory owners, the economic logic is simple. Goods made in China generally face tariffs of 40% to 50% when imported into the U.S. Vietnam is a relative bargain after President Trump this month announced a new tariff rate of 20%, upholding expectations that Vietnam would get more-lenient treatment. Western buyers such as Lowe's and Hasbro have promised to cut their exposure to China. The rush to produce in Vietnam and other lower-tariff countries, far from wiping China off the map, keeps Chinese companies at the center of the export trade. Chinese businesspeople typically have the edge when it comes to building factories anywhere in the world—even in the U.S. 'They have all the technology, all the know-how," said Le Hong Hiep, a senior fellow at Singapore's ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute think tank. 'It will take them less time to set up factories in Vietnam than for local companies to develop their own capabilities." Outdoor furniture awaits shipment in Thai Nguyen. The factory's Chinese owner counts some of America's biggest retailers among its customers. The Hanoi airport on a recent visit was clogged with Chinese workers and managers coming to collect their visas. For Trump administration officials, that isn't exactly the desired outcome of a trade war. In trade talks, the U.S. has called on Southeast Asian nations to take a hard line on economic ties with China, including by stopping Chinese companies from setting up manufacturing and export operations in their countries. The goal is to reduce U.S. dependence on Chinese companies regardless of where they are located. But for the first half of this year, China—including Hong Kong—was responsible for more than 800 new investment projects in Vietnam, far more than any other country. Much of the investment was concentrated in manufacturing. Li is the founder of Letright Industrial, one of China's largest outdoor-furniture manufacturers with a customer list that includes Walmart and Lowe's. His factory in Thai Nguyen, near Hanoi, first opened in 2021 and today employs around 1,200 workers making lounge chairs, coffee tables and sofas. A set of six pieces can retail at American stores for around $700 to $2,000. Teams of U.S. buyers have visited recently to tour the factory and review their products. On the factory floor, laborers use laser-welding tools to construct sofa frames. Others hunch over waist-high tables, hand-weaving wicker chairs. With faux-natural materials popular in the U.S. this season, a team of workers uses brown spray paint to make metal chairs resemble wooden ones. Workers at the Vietnam facility have received training from their Chinese counterparts as production moves across the border. At the company's testing center, a machine slams a heavy weight into the seat of a finished chair more than 10,000 times, to prove its durability. Anticipating demand from U.S. clients, the company is building a second factory here a 10-minute drive away and is hiring hundreds more workers while trimming the workforce at its home base in Hangzhou, China. Teams of Chinese welders and weavers have been dispatched to train the Vietnamese. The company's ambitious goal: move 100% of U.S.-bound production to Vietnam this year, up from 30% last year. But getting work done in Vietnam is tougher than in China, and the first factory has yet to turn a profit. The intense heat and humidity of the region saps worker productivity, especially because furniture factories don't have high enough margins to use air conditioning in their high-ceilinged factories, says Li. 'The hot weather makes them very sleepy," said Li of his workers. He said they also don't have air conditioning at home, so they don't rest well during Vietnam's summers. The work culture in Vietnam is different from China. Chinese workers are known to show up at 7 a.m. in the hopes of getting started early and earning extra commissions. In Vietnam, workers tend to stick to standard hours. Employees at the Thai Nguyen complex have benefited from wage hikes as rival Chinese companies seek to ramp up hiring in the area. Luke Lu, who heads the company's North American sales, said the company's Vietnamese workers operate at a more deliberate pace when weaving wicker furniture. The company recently introduced extra pay for highly efficient workers, but Vietnamese workers remain about 30% less productive than Chinese workers, Lu said. In China, every raw material can be easily acquired. But in Vietnam, materials such as certain metal pipes used in chairs and fabrics for seat cushions need to be imported from China. When ports fill up, parts can be trucked over the Chinese border, five hours away. Trump has pledged a double tariff rate of 40% on foreign goods, including Chinese goods, transshipped through Vietnam, without specifying what counts as transshipment. Lu said some 70% of the materials that go into the company's Vietnam-made furniture are sourced locally, and it is working to find Vietnamese producers for the rest. Li said not all companies operating abroad should be considered transshippers. 'He has to separate the good people from the bad people," Li said of Trump. Overall Lu estimates that it is about 10% to 15% more expensive to produce outdoor furniture in Vietnam compared with China—which gives Vietnam the edge for U.S. exports, assuming Trump doesn't throw any more tariff curveballs. 'We already invested a lot here, and expanded production," said Lu. 'We just want things to be stable." Li said he was better off than some fellow Chinese manufacturers because he started planning the shift in Trump's first term. He recalled attending an Asia-Pacific leaders' summit in 2017 in Da Nang, Vietnam, where Trump took the stage and unleashed a fiery speech accusing China of cheating the U.S. on trade. 'Trust between the U.S. and China is getting less and less," Li said. Write to Jon Emont at
Time of India
04-07-2025
- Business
- Time of India
Why are Malaysia and Indonesia boosting ties with Russia?
AP Image Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto skipped a G7 summit last month to visit Russia, where he and his counterpart, Vladimir Putin , agreed that bilateral ties are "getting stronger again." "My meeting with President Putin today was intense, warm and productive. In all fields of economics, technical cooperation, trade, investment, and agriculture, they all have experienced significant improvements," Prabowo's office said in a statement after the visit. Officially part of the 75th anniversary of Indonesia–Russia diplomatic ties, Prabowo's three-day visit last month meant he missed a chance to meet US President Donald Trump for the first time at the G7 summit in Canada. Standing next to Putin, Prabowo said Indonesia would not follow the philosophies of "the biggest and most powerful power in the world" and described Russia and China as without "double standards" and as defenders of "the downtrodden and the oppressed." Prabowo's trip came a month after Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim's latest visit to Russia, his third in two years. Although Indonesia and Malaysia did initially condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, they have typically taken a neutral position on the ongoing war. Beginning early 2024, their public statements have also become noticeably more pro-Moscow. During his trip to Vladivostok in September last year, Anwar praised Putin for his "vision and leadership" and for his "determination…to survive," presumably referring to Western sanctions. He also championed Moscow for its "remarkable soft power" that has earned it "global respect and admiration, influencing the hearts and minds of people around the world." Indonesia and Malaysia balance interests Prabowo and Anwar "are keen to strengthen their countries' non-alignment by pursuing a more balanced foreign policy, including closer ties with both Russia and China," Ian Storey, senior fellow at Singapore's ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute and author of the newly-released book, 'Putin's Russia and Southeast Asia,' told DW. "A more balanced foreign policy includes strengthening economic engagement with Moscow, even though the opportunities for growing trade and investment ties with Russia are quite limited," he added. Despite the limitations, Russia's bilateral trade with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries grew to a record high of $22 billion in 2023, according to Russian data cited by the Lowy Institute, an Australian think tank. That represents more than 14% year-on-year growth. This growth trend is expected to continue. Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta are exploring possible ways to expand trade, including in arms imports. Energy is another important area of cooperation, especially for Indonesia, which still heavily relies on coal as a source of power. Several Southeast Asian states have an interest in exporting electrical goods and machinery to Russia, which has faced crippling Western sanctions since 2022. They are keen on utilizing Russian expertise to develop their civilian nuclear energy sectors. Last month, Vietnam and Moscow agreed to fast-track agreements that could see Russian firms help build Vietnam's first nuclear power plants. In February, ASEAN Secretary General Kao Kim Hourn opened an exhibition on ASEAN-Russia Cooperation in Civilian Nuclear Energy and Technologies at the regional bloc's headquarters in Jakarta. In St Petersburg last month, Indonesia's sovereign wealth fund, Danatara, and the Russian Direct Investment Fund signed an agreement to create an investment fund worth €2 billion. Alternative international forums While several Southeast Asian countries are looking to join multilateral organizations, such as Thailand's successful bid to join the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), many have looked to the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) grouping as an alternative arena for global politics. Indonesia is now a formal member of BRICS, while Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam are partner countries. Although Malaysia and Indonesia's governments began their overtures with Russia before Donald Trump's return to the White House in January, Washington turning away from international institutions since then has convinced many Asian leaders that they can no longer count on US support and that the future of the Western-backed international order might soon be over, analysts say. "The recent change in US administration and opportunities like BRICS membership have provided both governments with more space to engage Russia," Prashanth Parameswaran, founder of the weekly ASEAN Wonk newsletter, told DW. What do Malaysia and Indonesia want? However, it remains unclear to what extent Malaysia and Indonesia are merely engaging with Russia out of geopolitical necessity to diversify their bilateral relations and avoid entanglement in the US-China rivalry, or how much they have a deeper affinity with Moscow's vision for the world. When asked by reporters why he turned down a G7 invitation to instead visit Russia, Prabowo replied, "Don't read too much into it. We want to be friends with everybody." However, attending the G7 event in Canada would have given him his first opportunity to meet US President Donald Trump. However, the speech in St. Petersburg "did not come across as convincing that Indonesia would remain neutral in the ongoing big power rivalry, with veiled criticisms of the US on the one hand, and a lavishing of praise for China and Russia on the other," according to a Jakarta Post analysis piece published this week. Zachary Abuza, a professor at the National War College in Washington, said that Russia provides an "interesting model" for Indonesia and Malaysia. It is a country "that can act independently, poke America and the West in the eye, and try to establish a new international order," he told DW. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar's several visits to Russia over the past two years have motivated the party by a desire to gain a more prominent position on the world stage, Bridget Welsh, an honorary research associate at the University of Nottingham's Asia Research Institute Malaysia, told DW. But it is also because Russia is "popular at home due to anti-westernism, with many Malaysians believing that the US provoked the Ukraine War," she added. This year's State of Southeast Asia Survey, a poll of "elite" opinion in the region conducted by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, found that anti-Western feeling is riding high in Muslim-majority Indonesia and Malaysia, in large measure due to the West's support for Israel in its Middle Eastern wars.
DW
03-07-2025
- Politics
- DW
Why are Malaysia and Indonesia boosting ties with Russia? – DW – 07/03/2025
The leaders of Malaysia and Indonesia have warm words for President Putin, while seeking to expand trade and business with Russia. What's the backstory? Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto skipped a G7 summit last month to visit Russia, where he and his counterpart, Vladimir Putin, agreed that bilateral ties are "getting stronger again." "My meeting with President Putin today was intense, warm and productive. In all fields of economics, technical cooperation, trade, investment, and agriculture, they all have experienced significant improvements," Prabowo's office said in a statement after the visit. Officially part of the 75th anniversary of Indonesia–Russia diplomatic ties, Prabowo's three-day visit last month meant he missed a chance to meet US President Donald Trump for the first time at the G7 summit in Canada. Standing next to Putin, Prabowo said Indonesia would not follow the philosophies of "the biggest and most powerful power in the world" and described Russia and China as without "double standards" and as defenders of "the downtrodden and the oppressed." Prabowo's trip came a month after Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim's latest visit to Russia, his third in two years. Although Indonesia and Malaysia did initially condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, they have typically taken a neutral position on the ongoing war. Beginning early 2024, their public statements have also become noticeably more pro-Moscow. During his trip to Vladivostok in September last year, Anwar praised Putin for his "vision and leadership" and for his "determination…to survive," presumably referring to Western sanctions. He also championed Moscow for its "remarkable soft power" that has earned it "global respect and admiration, influencing the hearts and minds of people around the world." Prabowo and Anwar "are keen to strengthen their countries' non-alignment by pursuing a more balanced foreign policy, including closer ties with both Russia and China," Ian Storey, senior fellow at Singapore's ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute and author of the newly-released book, 'Putin's Russia and Southeast Asia,' told DW. "A more balanced foreign policy includes strengthening economic engagement with Moscow, even though the opportunities for growing trade and investment ties with Russia are quite limited," he added. Despite the limitations, Russia's bilateral trade with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries grew to a record high of $22 billion in 2023, according to Russian data cited by the Lowy Institute, an Australian think tank. That represents more than 14% year-on-year growth. This growth trend is expected to continue. Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta are exploring possible ways to expand trade, including in arms imports. Energy is another important area of cooperation, especially for Indonesia, which still heavily relies on coal as a source of power. Several Southeast Asian states have an interest in exporting electrical goods and machinery to Russia, which has faced crippling Western sanctions since 2022. They are keen on utilizing Russian expertise to develop their civilian nuclear energy sectors. Last month, Vietnam and Moscow agreed to fast-track agreements that could see Russian firms help build Vietnam's first nuclear power plants. In February, ASEAN Secretary General Kao Kim Hourn opened an exhibition on ASEAN-Russia Cooperation in Civilian Nuclear Energy and Technologies at the regional bloc's headquarters in Jakarta. In St. Petersburg last month, Indonesia's sovereign wealth fund, Danatara, and the Russian Direct Investment Fund signed an agreement to create an investment fund worth €2 billion. While several Southeast Asian countries are looking to join multilateral organizations, such as Thailand's successful bid to join the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), many have looked to the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) grouping as an alternative arena for global politics. Indonesia is now a formal member of BRICS, while Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam are partner countries. To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video Although Malaysia and Indonesia's governments began their overtures with Russia before Donald Trump's return to the White House in January, Washington turning away from international institutions since then has convinced many Asian leaders that they can no longer count on US support and that the future of the Western-backed international order might soon be over, analysts say. "The recent change in US administration and opportunities like BRICS membership have provided both governments with more space to engage Russia," Prashanth Parameswaran, founder of the weekly ASEAN Wonk newsletter, told DW. However, it remains unclear to what extent Malaysia and Indonesia are merely engaging with Russia out of geopolitical necessity to diversify their bilateral relations and avoid entanglement in the US-China rivalry, or how much they have a deeper affinity with Moscow's vision for the world. When asked by reporters why he turned down a G7 invitation to instead visit Russia, Prabowo replied, "Don't read too much into it …We want to be friends with everybody." However, attending the G7 event in Canada would have given him his first opportunity to meet US President Donald Trump. However, the speech in St. Petersburg "did not come across as convincing that Indonesia would remain neutral in the ongoing big power rivalry, with veiled criticisms of the US on the one hand, and a lavishing of praise for China and Russia on the other," according to a analysis piece published this week. Zachary Abuza, a professor at the National War College in Washington, said that Russia provides an "interesting model" for Indonesia and Malaysia. It is a country "that can act independently, poke America and the West in the eye, and try to establish a new international order," he told DW. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar's several visits to Russia over the past two years have motivated the party by a desire to gain a more prominent position on the world stage, Bridget Welsh, an honorary research associate at the University of Nottingham's Asia Research Institute Malaysia, told DW. But it is also because Russia is "popular at home due to anti-westernism, with many Malaysians believing that the US provoked the Ukraine War," she added. This year's State of Southeast Asia Survey, a poll of "elite" opinion in the region conducted by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, found that anti-Western feeling is riding high in Muslim-majority Indonesia and Malaysia, in large measure due to the West's support for Israel in its Middle Eastern wars. To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video
