Ian Storey on Russia's Turn to Southeast Asia

The Diplomat

15-07-2025

Over the past decade, under President Vladimir Putin, Russia has taken steps to expand its economic, political, and security relations with Southeast Asia. This has involved efforts both to build upon the historical influence of the Soviet Union in the region, particularly in Indochina, and to forge new partnerships with rising middle powers such as Malaysia and Indonesia.
In a new book, 'Putin's Russia and Southeast Asia: The Kremlin's Pivot to Asia and the Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War,' Ian Storey charts the course of this policy toward Southeast Asia and ASEAN since Putin was elected president in 2000, and especially since the beginning of his third presidential term in 2012. The first major study of Russia-Southeast Asia relations since the end of the Cold War, Storey's book examines both the causes and outcomes of Russia's increasing engagement with Southeast Asia, and the impact that the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has had on this trajectory.
Storey, a senior fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore and the co-editor of its journal 'Contemporary Southeast Asia,' spoke with The Diplomat's Southeast Asian Editor Sebastian Strangio about how the Kremlin's policy has shifted during Putin's long tenure, and the sources and limits of Russian influence in Southeast Asia.
In the Introduction to your book, you write that Russia has 'the smallest economic footprint in Southeast Asia, the least geopolitical influence, and the lowest strategic significance,' which accounts for the dearth of academic writing on Russia's relations with the region since the end of the Cold War. What made you decide to study this topic in depth?
As I argue in the Introduction, while Russia is not a major player in the region, it is a player nevertheless and has some undeniable strengths that make it worthy of scholarly attention. While Russia cannot be considered a great power in Southeast Asia, most of the ASEAN member states recognize that at the global level, it does have certain great power attributes, including its size, population, nuclear arsenal and vast natural resources. Moreover, from a geopolitical perspective, Russia is a member of the U.N. Security Council and is an influential player in many regions of the world, including the post-Soviet space (especially Central Asia), Europe, the Arctic, the Middle East and Africa. Moscow also has an increasingly consequential strategic partnership with China, retains some influence on the Korean Peninsula and, since 2022, has reinvigorated its alliance with North Korea. Until the mid-2010s, Russian defense companies sold billions of dollars of equipment to regional states, including Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and Myanmar. Russia has important energy interests in Southeast Asia, including in the South China Sea, and is a major exporter of food and fertilizers to the region. Russia is also a dialogue partner of ASEAN, albeit a problematic one at times (it has tried to block Western countries from becoming observers to the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus observer groups).
In sharp contrast with the West, Russia has a relatively benign image in Southeast Asia, isn't perceived as a threat by any country, and people have a generally positive impression of President Putin. In some parts of Southeast Asia, Putin's image is that of a strongman standing up to the West, and this resonates well. Interestingly, despite its brutal war in Chechnya, Russia is perceived by the Muslim-majority countries in Southeast Asia as being Islamic-friendly, largely due to its long-standing support for Palestinian statehood. Yet despite these factors, not one single-authored book on Russia and Southeast Asia had been published since the end of the Cold War. In 2021, I decided to close that important gap in the academic literature. In February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine and that event, and how Southeast Asian countries responded to it, made the task all the more timely and important.
How did Russia's influence in, and approach toward, Southeast Asia evolve between President Vladimir Putin rise to power in 2000 and his invasion of Ukraine in February 2022? Where, and in which countries, do you think Russia made the most significant inroads?
When Putin became president in 2000, he felt that his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, had neglected Southeast Asia, especially Russia's Cold War allies Vietnam and Laos. He put bilateral relations with both of those countries back on track, and encouraged Russian defense companies to sell more arms to regional states. Under Putin, Russia also sought a closer relationship with ASEAN even though it was not seen as a very important multilateral forum. But the real change came in 2012, when Putin began his third term as president and introduced his 'Turn to the East,' or Asia Pivot. Although China remained at the center of the Kremlin's Asia policy, Russia did make some important gains in Southeast Asia over the next decade: two-way trade with the ASEAN-10 began to grow, Russia started to attend the East Asia Summit and ASEAN-Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus, persuaded Vietnam and Singapore to sign free trade agreements with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and appeared on the verge of winning some major defense contracts, including with U.S. allies, the Philippines and Thailand. After the military coup in Myanmar in 2021, Russia forged close ties with the junta. But as I argue in the book, from the mid-2010s, it began to lose ground: two-way trade with the ASEAN-10 peaked, its arms sales dropped off a cliff due to Western sanctions and its vaccine diplomacy during the COVID-19 pandemic was a flop. Then came the war.
You began working on this book prior to the Ukraine invasion, an event that you write 'would complicate my endeavor, but make it much more interesting, timely, and relevant.' How has the war changed Putin's view of Southeast Asia and his policy towards it?
Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Southeast Asia's importance to Russia has increased significantly. In terms of regional responses to the invasion, I think the Kremlin can be fairly satisfied with the region's responses. While only Myanmar endorsed the invasion, Singapore was the only country that condemned Russia by name and imposed financial sanctions. All of the other ASEAN states took an essentially neutral position. Russia's closest friends in the region, Vietnam and Laos, abstained on votes at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) which condemned the attack on Ukraine, while the other ASEAN states (and Timor-Leste) more or less voted consistently in support of the resolutions but went no further.
Western attempts to portray Russia as an international pariah have clearly failed in Southeast Asia, as since February 2022, six regional leaders have met with Putin in person, and in June 2024, the Russian leader paid a state visit to Vietnam. In addition, the Russia-Ukraine War has barely impacted Moscow's dialogue partnership with ASEAN, even though the invasion violated all of ASEAN's core principles, which are enshrined in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and which Russia endorsed in 2004. Putin must also have been pleased that Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam all became BRICS partners in 2024 during Russia's chairmanship. The biggest hit Russia has taken in Southeast Asia has been to its arms sales, which in some ways was its most lucrative interest in the region. As Western countries tightened sanctions against Russia, Southeast Asian countries began to question Moscow's reliability as an arms seller. Consequently, sales have fallen from a peak of $1.4 billion in 2014 to less than $100 million last year. It's highly doubtful if Russia's defense sector can recover in Southeast Asia, as regional states can buy from traditional suppliers in the U.S. and Europe, and newcomers such as South Korea and Turkey.
Given Moscow's pariah status in the West since 2022 (and to some extent since 2014), what do you think explains the decision of so many Southeast Asian governments to maintain, even to deepen (in the case of Malaysia, Indonesia, and others) their relations with Russia since 2022? What does this say about Southeast Asian strategic inclinations, and their views of how the United States and other Western countries have sought to frame the Ukraine war?
As I mentioned earlier, most Southeast Asian countries have adopted a neutral position towards the Russia-Ukraine War for several reasons. They don't want to get embroiled in the disputes of the major powers, especially over an issue in which they do not believe their own interests are directly at stake. There is also a degree of empathy towards the Russian narrative that it was provoked into attacking Ukraine due to NATO's eastward expansion, and that Ukraine is simply a proxy of the U.S. More importantly, perhaps, a number of Southeast Asian countries, and especially the Muslim-majority states Indonesia and Malaysia, have accused the West of hypocrisy, pointing out that the U.S. invaded Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000s. These accusations of double standards have been greatly amplified since Israel invaded Gaza in October 2024. Political leaders in Indonesia and Malaysia have asked why it is that the West was so quick to condemn Russian atrocities in Ukraine, but less keen to do so when it comes to Israel's actions.
Most Southeast Asian countries voted in support of the UNGA resolutions, which condemned Russia, but that is the limit of their actions against Russia. The majority of ASEAN member states want to move on and engage Russia on issues that they consider important, especially trade, despite Moscow's shallow economic footprint in the region. Indonesia and Malaysia, in particular, seem keen to strengthen their countries' professed non-aligned stance by pursuing a more balanced foreign policy, and especially closer ties with both Moscow and Beijing. That may include arms purchases from Russia and China. Indonesia is looking to Russia to help improve its food security, including stepping up imports of Russian wheat, cooking oil and fertilizers. Several Southeast Asian countries, such as Myanmar, Vietnam, and Indonesia, are considering partnering with Russia to establish civilian nuclear power programs.
In a nutshell, what is Putin's 'pitch' to the region?
Putin's pitch to the region is sixfold. First, Russia is a great power and no problem in any part of the world can be resolved without it. Second, in the escalating strategic rivalry between the U.S. and China, Moscow represents a 'third pole' of equal rank to Washington and Beijing. Third, Russia is a valuable source of advanced technology (especially nuclear power, weapons, and space). Fourth, Russia's Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) can provide a beneficial framework of cooperation among the EAEU, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and ASEAN. Fifth, Russia can help promote the voices of the Global South through platforms such as BRICS. And sixth, among the great powers, only Russia and China truly respect ASEAN centrality.
But in many respects, Russia's pitch is hard to sell to Southeast Asian leaders. Few ASEAN member states perceive Russia to be a great power in the region because trade links are insubstantial and Moscow cannot provide significant investment or developmental assistance. Nor is it a major security provider. As such, no Southeast Asian leader places Russia on a par with the US and China. ASEAN as an organization has been lukewarm towards the idea of a free trade agreement with the EAEU as well as the GEP because, unlike China's BRI, there's no money supporting the initiative. When it comes to arms, nuclear power and space cooperation, Southeast Asian states have many other countries they can choose to partner with, and Russia is seldom their first choice (except for Myanmar, which basically has to choose between either Russia or China). And while four Southeast Asian countries have joined BRICS, and three others have expressed an interest in joining, the main motivation is China's economic heft, not Russia's.