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Mint
6 days ago
- Business
- Mint
US, Gulf Pressure to Fully Disarm Hezbollah Puts Lebanon on Edge
(Bloomberg) -- Lebanon had been hoping this summer would see the return of tens of thousands of expats and tourists to the crisis-hit Mediterranean nation, spending money in resorts and restaurants and attending festivals such as a famed one in an ancient Roman city. But halfway through the season, the country is again teetering on the brink of conflict — one that could see a return to violence and instability after months of nascent recovery. New President Joseph Aoun is under pressure from the US and Gulf nations to completely disarm Hezbollah, and the Iran-supported militant group has made clear it won't back down without a fight. Hezbollah, previously Tehran's most powerful proxy militia, sustained heavy losses in a fierce battle with Israel last year and US President Donald Trump's administration has presented Lebanese leaders with ideas for completing the group's dismantlement, according to Tom Barrack, the US envoy to the country. The US has told Aoun it's willing to serve as an intermediary if he moves forward with disbanding Hezbollah as an armed group, Barrack said. That includes continuing to help enforce an Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire part-brokered by the US in November. At the same time, Gulf nations like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait have told Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam — both in their first years in office — that funds for reconstruction and investment Lebanon needs to help recover from that conflict and a previous financial crisis are contingent upon a timetable-bound plan to fully disarm Hezbollah, according to people with direct knowledge of the matter. The Gulf countries — who have eased travel restrictions after years of bans — want Lebanon to restructure its banking sector and crackdown on corruption as well — with the aim of controlling the country's vast cash-based informal economy, the people said. But the end of Hezbollah as an armed non-state actor, giving the Lebanese government a monopoly on the use of force, are key, Barrack said. 'Gulf countries have said 'if you do these things, we will come to the south of Lebanon, and we will fund an industrial zone, renovation and jobs,'' he said, referring to the region of Lebanon worst impacted by last year's war. 'Not talk, but actually do it.' The governments of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE didn't immediately respond to requests for comment. Aoun and Salam appear eager to meet the demands, and the PM said Tuesday the government has told the military to present a plan by the end of this month to dismantle all non-state armed groups by the end of 2025. Aoun, the country's former army chief, mentioned Hezbollah specifically when he made a similar pledge during a ceremony last week marking Army Day. But Hezbollah, a fixture of Lebanese politics and civil life for decades, remains defiant. It issued a statement on Wednesday saying it would treat the government's decision on disarmament as 'nonexistent' and accused Salam of committing a 'grave sin' by pursuing a 'surrender strategy' in the face of 'ongoing Israeli aggression and occupation.' Naim Qassem, the group's new leader after the Israeli assassination of long-time chief Hassan Nasrallah last year, said Tuesday that Hezbollah 'won't engage on disarmament just because the U.S. or a certain Arab country is seeking and applying all the pressure it can muster' — a veiled reference to Saudi Arabia. He threatened to resume missile attacks against Israel — which Hezbollah began shortly after the October 2023 Hamas attacks that triggered the war on Gaza — if it continues to 'widen its aggression' against Lebanon. Israel, which still occupies five positions inside Lebanon, struck a vehicle in eastern Lebanon near the Syrian border on Thursday, killing five people, after bombing 10 southern sites the day before, according to Lebanon's official news agency. Hezbollah, which has a political wing that's represented both in parliament and Salam's government, has sought to use Israel's actions to rally its Shiite Muslim base. Qassem warned them that relinquishing the group's weapons would leave them exposed to threats from both Israel and Sunni Muslim extremists in neighboring Syria. 'Despite Hezbollah's huge military losses it can still be a spoiler in Lebanon,' said Lina Khatib, an associate fellow at Chatham House's Middle East and North Africa Program. 'It does not need many resources to intimidate and threaten its opponents.' Barrack told reporters the Lebanese government's fears about causing conflict by trying to force Hezbollah to disarm were understandable, suggesting that perhaps one solution would be to incorporate elements of Hezbollah into the Lebanese army. But he made clear this is a problem for Beirut, saying that if the Lebanese government doesn't disarm Hezbollah 'America is not going to come in and put Marines on the ground to do that for you.' The US has designated Hezbollah a terrorist organization since 1997. The situation is further complicated by Hezbollah being now 'managed a lot more closely by the Iranians' and a major decision like disarmament 'can't be taken autonomously from Iran,' according to Michael Young, a commentator and senior editor at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut. The issue should be on the table in any further talks between Iran and the US about Tehran's nuclear capabilities. A similar standoff over Hezbollah's arms culminated in the 2005 assassination of former Lebanon Prime Minister Rafic Al-Hariri, who led the rebuilding of the country with Gulf and Western support after the end of a civil war in 1990. Gulf states collectively gave Lebanon at least $9 billion between 1963 and 2022, according to a 2023 study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. But this figure excludes loans, investments and humanitarian and development aid which have been substantive over the years. For example, the Kuwait-based Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development said in its 2024 report that Gulf states underwrote about $1.8 billion worth of loans to Lebanon between 1974 and 2024. 'The kingdom does not want to invest in a black hole,' said Ali Shihabi, a Saudi author and commentator close to the royal court referring to the present situation in Lebanon. --With assistance from Dana Khraiche and Fiona MacDonald. More stories like this are available on
Spectator
22-06-2025
- Politics
- Spectator
Iran is isolated against the US and Israel
America's entry into the war against Iran is the latest step up an escalation spiral that began in October 2023. What started with an attack by a Palestinian Islamist organisation on a poorly defended Israeli border, and then became a fight between Israel and a series of Iran-supported Islamist paramilitary groups by the end of 2023, and then extended to limited exchanges between Israel and Iran itself in April 2024, and then turned into war between Iran and Israel, has now become a confrontation pitting the US and Israel against their longest standing and most powerful adversary in the Islamic world. Now at war with both Israel and the US, it has no major power interested in fighting alongside it. So what are the implications of this latest turn, and what may happen next? While prediction remains unwise regarding the current US president, the notion that the Trump administration will be dominated by isolationism can be laid to rest. In Washington a few weeks ago, I found that much of the talk behind the scenes was worried assessments concerning the rise of isolationism and of individuals professing such views at the top reaches of the administration. People with past associations with hawkish or pro-Israel circles were having trouble getting confirmed for posts. Vice President J.D. Vance and Donald Trump Jr, I heard, were the most senior and influential members of the rising camp. An old friend of mine who has interviewed the President on a number of occasions cautioned against despair. His advice: don't take too much notice of the people around Trump. Pay attention to Trump himself, and to what his track record suggests regarding his views on Israel. Possessing no special insights of my own, I hoped he was right. It appears he was. Over the last two years, much ink has been spilled regarding a supposedly emergent axis of anti-western states. This axis, as usually depicted, is headed by China, with Russia, Iran and North Korea as members. Cooperation between these countries has indeed measurably increased over the last half decade. Chinese purchase of Iranian oil to foil Trump's strategy of 'maximum pressure' on Tehran during his first term is one example of this growing operational closeness. Yearly joint naval exercises between the Chinese, Russian and Iranian navies, the role of Iranian Shahed 136 drones and North Korean ground troops in the Ukraine war, the provision of advanced air defence systems by Moscow to Tehran all support this view. But while the eventual emergence of such an axis may be likely, it is also the case that no such crystallised alliance currently exists. Russia is bogged down in its own forever war in Ukraine. There are no indications that Moscow supports Tehran's ambition for a nuclear weapon, and still less that Russia would jeopardise its own interests, security or relations with other states in support of this goal. Moscow is a rival but not an enemy to US-aligned Israel, and clearly prefers to maintain this ambiguous status, which brings some benefits. As for China, while rumours have abounded regarding mysterious Chinese cargo planes reaching Iran in recent days, Beijing's interest in the region and its growing influence depends on stability and relations with all sides. The mood music from China has shifted over the last two years, with increasingly harsh criticism of Israel. Beijing has strongly condemned Jerusalem's pre-emptive action against Iran. But China has also sought to build diplomatic leverage on the basis of strong commercial ties with all major regional powers. It has no interest in involving itself in conflicts. What all this means is that Iran currently finds itself isolated. Now at war with both Israel and the US, it has no major power interested in fighting alongside it. This is no doubt a matter for concern and consternation on the part of the mullahs. It's a blessing for the rest of us. So, isolated and faced with attacks by powers enjoying massive technical advantage, what are the options now available to Tehran? Tehran could, of course, agree to a new nuclear deal which sees the final abandonment of uranium enrichment on Iranian soil. This would represent a historic victory for the US and for Israel. As of now, Tehran may not yet feel that the regime faces existential danger. Short of this, surrender appears unlikely. If it wants to opt for defiance, Iran has a number of means of possible pressure. It will need to consider carefully, of course, if it wishes to use them, and thus invite further US retribution. Tehran still has its proxies, even in depleted form. The Houthis are likely to recommence attacks on US flagged vessels on the Gulf of Aden-Red Sea route now. The Iraqi Shia militias are relatively unscathed from the last 20 months of regional war. The US has bases in Iraq, at Erbil and ain al-Asad. Iran itself or its client militias might attempt missile or drone attacks on these facilities, or on the remaining US presence in northeast Syria. Theoretically, Tehran could order its once powerful Lebanese Hizballah proxy back into the fray. But to do so would be to risk the final decimation of an organisation that has already been battered by Israel. US bases throughout the region could potentially be targeted by Iranian missiles. Iran might also seek to hit at US allies in the Gulf, and their oil producing capacity as it did in 2019. But Israeli attacks on launch sites and supply chains throughout Iran in recent days have significantly reduced Iranian capacities in this regard. Iran could block the Strait of Hormuz, through which one fifth of global petroleum exports are shipped. This is a potent threat, which would cause oil prices to rise. But this would also almost certainly precipitate a full US entry into the war. Finally, of course, Tehran could accelerate efforts toward the testing of a nuclear weapon. All these potential courses of action bring with them the likelihood of increased global isolation, and increased US counter measures. These, in turn, would lead to deteriorating internal conditions in the country, which could hit at the regime's legitimacy and stability. Then again, acceptance of defeat, and surrender might have a similar effect. Supreme Leader Khamenei and his isolated regime have few good options at present. Whichever one they take, they are likely to be privately cursing the memory of their brother and comrade Yahya Sinwar, deceased former Hamas leader, whose decision to launch the massacres in October 2023 has led directly to Tehran's current predicament.
UPI
19-06-2025
- Health
- UPI
Study: Wars with Hamas and Iran pose health risks for all Israelis
1 of 7 | Israelis gather in a public bomb shelter in Jerusalem after air raid sirens warned of Iranian ballistic missiles that struck seven cities and a hospital compound early Thursday morning. Photo by Debbie Hill/UPI | License Photo June 19 (UPI) -- Israelis lack sleep and experience high anxiety amid the wars with Hamas and Iran as the two Middle East nations exchange deadly aerial blows. Rocket fire, missile strikes and sirens sounding every night have caused a "severe decline in sleep quality" since the Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israeli civilians by Iran-supported Hamas, according to a new study published in the International Journal of Clinical and Health Psychology. The study by researchers at the Hebrew University and Hadassah Medical Center doesn't include the recent weeklong war between Israel and Iran. Researchers say the study is the first of its kind to document the effects of warfare on civilian sleep patterns, which could have "serious consequences." "Worldwide, much research focuses on the war's impact on soldiers," lead researcher Shoham Choshen-Hillel of Hebrew University's Business School said. "Until now, no systematic study examined sleep quality for civilians on the home front under daily threat," Choshen-Hillel said. "Israel's situation is unique, demanding a different perspective." Data analyzed from 9,000 participants The study collected and analyzed data from about 9,000 participants who participated in three researcher-led surveys from January 2023 to January 2024. Analysis shows the number of Israeli citizens sleeping less than six hours nightly rose from 13% before Oct. 7, 2023, to 31% during the survey period. Poor sleep health reports likewise increased from 15% to 38%, and clinical insomnia cases increased from 4% to 20%. Nearly half of those surveyed - 48% -- reported sleep problems after the war with Hamas began, which is up from 18% prior to the conflict. "The shocking picture for us is that sleep hasn't improved for a year and a half," Choshen-Hillel said. "Symptoms lasting over six months are significant," she added. "This isn't temporary. It's a long period health-wise with major implications." Among those most affected are women and those who have had friends or relatives killed, injured or abducted by on and after Oct. 7, 2023. Iran war makes matters much worse Choshen-Hillel said the war with Iran and its potential escalation are making the problem worse. "It's clear the situation regarding sleep and other aspects is the worst since the war began," she said. "People now wake for shelters multiple times a night and anxiety has understandably intensified," Choshen-Hillel explained. "I have no doubt that the situation is worse than we previously documented," she added. "We find even those not in direct danger experience deep, lasting psychological impacts from the war, manifesting in sleepless nights." The study was published at the same time that Iranian strikes killed eight Israeli civilians during the overnight hours from Sunday into Monday. The strikes raised the civilian death toll in Israel to 24 and likely 25 due to one person missing but expected to be declared dead, The Jerusalem Post reported on Monday. The Iranian Health Ministry says at least 639 Iranians have died in the Israeli strikes there. Iranian strike on Israeli hospital compound An Iranian missile hit a hospital compound in Beer Sheva in southern Israel, where 400 patients were receiving medical treatment on Thursday. Dozens suffered injuries, but none were killed at the Soroka Medical Center, which still has about 300 patients. "Approximately 80 people were injured in the incident, about half are hospital staff," a hospital spokesperson said in a prepared statement. "All injuries were classified as mild or stress-related," the statement said, adding that the strike was the "most severe incident of its kind in the history of Israel's healthcare system." Iranian officials said they targeted a military installation located near the hospital, but Israeli officials said there is no such installation. "We are hitting with precision the targets of the nuclear and missile programs, and they're hitting the children's ward of a hospital," Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in a prepared statement on Thursday. "That's the whole difference between a democracy taking lawful action to save itself from these murderers and these murderers whose aim is to destroy every one of us," Netanyahu added.
Spectator
16-06-2025
- Politics
- Spectator
Iran is too weak to wage a ground war against Israel
As Israel advances its surgical reduction of Iran's nuclear facilities and senior command, and Iran continues to launch missiles randomly at Israeli population centres in response, it is interesting to note what is not happening. Notably absent is any ground element to the war, which is currently being fought entirely between air and missile forces. Israel has effectively reversed two decades of Iranian advance across the Middle East This brings home just how much the picture has changed in Israel's favour over the last 20 months. It also reveals the deeper logic of this war. On 6 October, the Iran-led regional alliance stood as the most powerful strategic axis in the Middle East, pursuing clear goals via proven modes of action. As a result of an ill-fated decision by one of its most minor members (Hamas) to launch a war it could not win, the regional components of this alliance were neutralised. Israel is now seeking to complete the job by pulverising Iran itself. An optimal result would be the fall of the regime. But a battered, isolated Tehran, stripped of its nuclear programme, missile array and allies, would also suffice. I have been tracing the form and nature of Iran's ambitions in the Middle East for the best part of the last twenty years. For most of those years, what I and other observers saw was the slow, incremental and seemingly inexorable advance of Iran's power and influence across the region. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps' (IRGC) capacities for irregular warfare and political organisation, coupled with the collapse and fragmentation of governance across a broad swathe of the Middle East, allowed Tehran to table achievement after achievement. In Gaza, Israel's decision – in retrospect flawed – for unilateral withdrawal allowed the Iran-supported, Islamist Hamas movement to sweep aside their enfeebled opponents and assume sole control of the Strip in 2007. In Lebanon, the IRGC proxy Hizballah militia induced a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000. The organisation then emerged as the unchallenged dominant political force in the country in 2008, after fighting a second, inconclusive war against Israel in 2006. In Iraq, the US removal of Saddam Hussein and the subsequent rise of Sunni jihadi insurgency in the form of Isis enabled Iran to mobilise Hezbollah-style Shia militias. They went on to become the most powerful political-military force in the country. In Yemen, the removal of the dictatorship of Ali Abdullah Saleh enabled the Iran-supported Houthis to rise up, take the capital and a large part of the coast. They established an area of control comprising much of the country and most of its population. In Syria, the apparent victory of the Assad regime over the Sunni Islamist insurgency against it meant that this area was maintained as a vital territorial link between Iraq and Lebanon. This raised the possibility for Iran of moving ground forces from Iran in the direction of potential fronts against Israel in Lebanon and Syria, in the event of war. This array meant that on 6 October 2023, on the eve of war, Tehran, thanks to the skills and methods of the IRGC and the blunders of its opponents, had successfully implanted a series of powerful semi-regular militias in neighbouring states, primed and ready for war with Israel. Behind this alliance stood Iran's own capacities, embodied in its missile and nuclear programs. That was how things looked 20 months ago. The direct confrontation between Israel and Iran has now come. What remains of this hard-built array? What ground options does Iran now have in a war with Israel? In Gaza, Hamas has lost territorial control of most of the Strip, and no longer has the ability to fire rockets and missiles at Israel. It remains as a disconnected, fragmented insurgency. It is able to inflict periodic damage on Israeli forces using guerrilla methods. That's where it ends. It has been rendered useless as an instrument able to strike at Israeli population centres. It is also no longer serviceable as a semi-regular military force of the type that carried out the massacres of 7 October 2023. In Lebanon, as a result of the direct combat against Israel in the autumn of 2023, Hezbollah is a broken shadow of the powerful, semi-regular military painstakingly built up between 2000 and 2024. Its historic leadership has been targeted and killed by Israel. Its mid-level cadres devastated by successful Israeli clandestine warfare and subsequent targeting. Its long-range missile array targeted from the air and largely destroyed, its south Lebanon positions systematically reduced by Israeli ground forces. The result: Hezbollah can no longer be employed as an asset by Iran. Its token statement of support for Iran this week contained no concrete pledge of support or action. The fall of Assad in Syria means that the way through to potential fighting fronts is now closed to Iranian or Iraqi allied forces. The Iraqi Shia militias, in any case, appear to evince little enthusiasm for sharing the fate of their Lebanese counterparts. The Houthis, meanwhile, are on their feet and still firing their projectiles (usually intercepted). But, distant geographically, they are irrelevant in terms of availability for ground action. What all this means is that, little noticed by western commentators who were busy with their myopic focus on Gaza, Israel has, over the last 18 months, effectively reversed two decades of Iranian advance across the Middle East. The result is that Iran now finds that its intended envelopment of Israel with proxy militias has been dismantled. Tools for Iran to exert pressure from the ground no longer exist. This means that the current confrontation looks set to focus on air, missile and drone warfare. As to how things proceed, much will depend on the continued capacities of Israel's air defences, its ability to keep its current air corridor to Iran open and to continue reaping a toll on Iranian regime assets and personnel. The goal must be the crippling or drastic weakening of both the regime's nuclear programme and its ability to govern. The result: either the permanent weakening of the Islamic Republic to a point where it can no longer busy itself with seeking to project power and aggression against its neighbours, or, preferably, the reduction of the regime's capacities to a point where the Iranian people are able to free themselves from the mullah's yoke. The latter outcome would be an appropriate end both to Tehran's two-decade project of aggression in the Middle East, and to its ally Hamas's decision to launch war in October 2023.
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First Post
13-06-2025
- Business
- First Post
Israel attacks Iran: Oil shares tank, prices soar
Oil prices have jumped by nearly 11% in the wake of the Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear and military sites. read more Crude oil tankers lie at anchor in Nakhodka Bay near the port city of Nakhodka, Russia. File image/ Reuters Crude oil prices have jumped by nearly 11 per cent after Israel attacked Iran in the early hours of Friday. The Brent crude's futures jumped by 12.86 per cent to $78.31 and WTI crude's futures were up 10.95 per cent to $75.49 at the time of writing the story. Israel struck several sites in Iran associated with the military and the country's nuclear programme. It also appeared to have attacked homes of senior commanders and other officials in what apparent targeted assassinations. The strikes have sparked fears of a full-scale war in West Asia. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Any conflict in West Asia is bound to upset the world's energy supply and global trade. West Asia supplies as much as 40 per cent of world's oil and around a third of all cargo of the world passes through the region. As was seen in the aftermath of the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war, Iran-supported groups in the region, such as Yemen's Houthis, could disrupt the maritime trade and lead to further increase in prices. This is a developing story. It will be updated as details emerge.
