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Washington Post
4 days ago
- Politics
- Washington Post
20 years after its landmark withdrawal from Gaza, Israel is mired there
TEL AVIV, Israel — Twenty years ago, Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip, dismantling 21 Jewish settlements and pulling out its forces. The Friday anniversary of the start of the landmark disengagement comes as Israel is mired in a nearly 2-year war with Hamas that has devastated the Palestinian territory and means it is likely to keep troops there long into the future. Israel's disengagement, which also included removing four settlements in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, was then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's controversial attempt to jump-start negotiations with the Palestinians. But it bitterly divided Israeli society and led to the empowerment of Hamas, with implications that continue to reverberate today . The emotional images of Jews being ripped from their homes by Israeli soldiers galvanized Israel's far-right and settler movements. The anger helped them organize and increase their political influence, accounting in part for the rise of hard-line politicians like National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich. On Thursday, Smotrich boasted of a settlement expansion plan east of Jerusalem that will 'bury' the idea of a future Palestinian state. For Palestinians, even if they welcomed the disengagement, it didn't end Israel's control over their lives. Soon after, Hamas won elections in 2006, then drove out the Palestinian Authority in a violent takeover. Israel and Egypt imposed a closure on the territory, controlling entry and exit of goods and people. Though its intensity varied over the years, the closure helped impoverish the population and entrenched a painful separation from Palestinians in the West Bank. Israel captured the West Bank, east Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip in the 1967 Mideast war. The Palestinians claim all three territories for a future independent state. Israel couldn't justify the military or economic cost of maintaining the heavily fortified settlements in Gaza, explained Kobi Michael, a senior researcher at the Misgav Institute and the Institute for National Security Studies think tanks. There were around 8,000 Israeli settlers and 1.5 million Palestinians in Gaza in 2005. 'There was no chance for these settlements to exist or flourish or become meaningful enough to be a strategic anchor,' he said. By contrast, there are more than 500,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank, most living in developed settlement blocs that have generally received more support from Israeli society, Michael said. Most of the world considers the settlements illegal under international law. Because Israel withdrew unilaterally, without any coordination with the Palestinian Authority, it enhanced Hamas' stature among Palestinians in Gaza. 'This contributed to Hamas' win in the elections in 2006, because they leveraged it and introduced it as a very significant achievement,' Michael said. 'They saw it as an achievement of the resistance and a justification for the continuation of the armed resistance.' Footage of the violence between Israeli settlers and Israeli soldiers also created an 'open wound' in Israeli society, Michael said. 'I don't think any government will be able to do something like that in the future,' he said. That limits any flexibility over settlements in the West Bank if negotiations over a two-state solution with the Palestinians ever resume. 'Disengagement will never happen again, this is a price we're paying as a society, and a price we're paying politically,' he said. Anita Tucker, now 79, was part of the first nine Jewish families that moved to the Gaza Strip in 1976. She and her husband and their three kids lived in an Israeli army outpost near what is today Deir al-Balah, while the settlement of Netzer Hazoni was constructed. Originally from Brooklyn, she started a farm growing vegetables in the harsh, tall sand dunes. At first relations were good with their Palestinian neighbors, she said, and they worked hard to build their home and a 'beautiful community.' She had two more children, and three chose to stay and raise their families in Netzer Hazoni. She can still recall the moment, 20 years ago, when 1,000 Israeli soldiers arrived at the gate to the settlement to remove the approximately 400 residents. Some of her neighbors lit their houses on fire in protest. 'Obviously it was a mistake to leave. The lives of the Arabs became much worse, and the lives of the Jews became much, much worse, with rockets and Oct. 7,' she said, referring to the decades of rockets fired from Gaza into Israel and the date in 2023 of the Hamas attack that launched the ongoing war. Despite the passage of time, her family still is 'yearning and longing for their home,' she said. Several of her 10 grandchildren, including some who spent their early childhood in the Gaza settlements, have served in the current war and were near her old house. 'It's hard to believe, because of all the terrible things that happened that we predicted, but we're willing to build there again,' said Tucker. After Israel's withdrawal 20 years ago, many Palestinians described Gaza as an 'open-air prison.' They had control on the inside – under a Hamas government that some supported but some saw as heavy-handed and brutal. But ultimately, Israel had a grip around the territory. Many Palestinians believe Sharon carried out the withdrawal so Israel could focus on cementing its control in the West Bank through settlement building. Now some believe more direct Israeli occupation is returning to Gaza. After 22 months of war, Israeli troops control more than 75% of Gaza, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks of maintaining security control long term after the war. Amjad Shawa, the director of the Palestinian NGO Network, said he doesn't believe Netanyahu will repeat Sharon's full withdrawal. Instead, he expects the military to continue controlling large swaths of Gaza through 'buffer zones.' The aim, he said, is to keep Gaza 'unlivable in order to change the demographics,' referring to Netanyahu's plans to encourage Palestinians to leave the territory. Israel is 'is reoccupying the Gaza Strip' to prevent a Palestinian state, said Mostafa Ibrahim, an author based in Gaza City whose home was destroyed in the current war. Israeli former Maj. Gen. Dan Harel, who was head of the country's Southern Command during the disengagement, remembers the toll of protecting a few thousand settlers. There were an average of 10 attacks per day against Israeli settlers and soldiers, including rockets, roadside bombs big enough to destroy a tank, tunnels to attack Israeli soldiers and military positions, and frequent gunfire. 'Bringing a school bus of kids from one place to another required a military escort,' said Harel. 'There wasn't a future. People paint it as how wonderful it was there, but it wasn't wonderful.' Harel says the decision to evacuate Israeli settlements from the Gaza Strip was the right one, but that Israel missed crucial opportunities. Most egregious, he said, was a unilateral withdrawal without obtaining any concessions from the Palestinians in Gaza or the Palestinian Authority. He also sharply criticized Israel's policy of containment toward Hamas after disengagement. There were short but destructive conflicts over the years between the two sides, but otherwise the policy gave Hamas 'an opportunity to do whatever they wanted.' 'We had such a blind spot with Hamas, we didn't see them morph from a terror organization into an organized military, with battalions and commanders and infrastructure,' he said. The Oct. 7 attack, Israel's largest military intelligence failure to date, was not a result of the disengagement, said Harel. 'The main issue is what we did in the 18 years in between.' __ Associated Press writer Fatma Khaled contributed from Cairo.
Associated Press
4 days ago
- Politics
- Associated Press
20 years after its landmark withdrawal from Gaza, Israel is mired there
TEL AVIV, Israel (AP) — Twenty years ago, Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip, dismantling 21 Jewish settlements and pulling out its forces. The Friday anniversary of the start of the landmark disengagement comes as Israel is mired in a nearly 2-year war with Hamas that has devastated the Palestinian territory and means it is likely to keep troops there long into the future. Israel's disengagement, which also included removing four settlements in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, was then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's controversial attempt to jump-start negotiations with the Palestinians. But it bitterly divided Israeli society and led to the empowerment of Hamas, with implications that continue to reverberate today. The emotional images of Jews being ripped from their homes by Israeli soldiers galvanized Israel's far-right and settler movements. The anger helped them organize and increase their political influence, accounting in part for the rise of hard-line politicians like National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich. On Thursday, Smotrich boasted of a settlement expansion plan east of Jerusalem that will 'bury' the idea of a future Palestinian state. For Palestinians, even if they welcomed the disengagement, it didn't end Israel's control over their lives. Soon after, Hamas won elections in 2006, then drove out the Palestinian Authority in a violent takeover. Israel and Egypt imposed a closure on the territory, controlling entry and exit of goods and people. Though its intensity varied over the years, the closure helped impoverish the population and entrenched a painful separation from Palestinians in the West Bank. Israel captured the West Bank, east Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip in the 1967 Mideast war. The Palestinians claim all three territories for a future independent state. A unilateral withdrawal enhanced Hamas' stature Israel couldn't justify the military or economic cost of maintaining the heavily fortified settlements in Gaza, explained Kobi Michael, a senior researcher at the Misgav Institute and the Institute for National Security Studies think tanks. There were around 8,000 Israeli settlers and 1.5 million Palestinians in Gaza in 2005. 'There was no chance for these settlements to exist or flourish or become meaningful enough to be a strategic anchor,' he said. By contrast, there are more than 500,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank, most living in developed settlement blocs that have generally received more support from Israeli society, Michael said. Most of the world considers the settlements illegal under international law. Because Israel withdrew unilaterally, without any coordination with the Palestinian Authority, it enhanced Hamas' stature among Palestinians in Gaza. 'This contributed to Hamas' win in the elections in 2006, because they leveraged it and introduced it as a very significant achievement,' Michael said. 'They saw it as an achievement of the resistance and a justification for the continuation of the armed resistance.' Footage of the violence between Israeli settlers and Israeli soldiers also created an 'open wound' in Israeli society, Michael said. 'I don't think any government will be able to do something like that in the future,' he said. That limits any flexibility over settlements in the West Bank if negotiations over a two-state solution with the Palestinians ever resume. 'Disengagement will never happen again, this is a price we're paying as a society, and a price we're paying politically,' he said. One of the first settlers longs to return Anita Tucker, now 79, was part of the first nine Jewish families that moved to the Gaza Strip in 1976. She and her husband and their three kids lived in an Israeli army outpost near what is today Deir al-Balah, while the settlement of Netzer Hazoni was constructed. Originally from Brooklyn, she started a farm growing vegetables in the harsh, tall sand dunes. At first relations were good with their Palestinian neighbors, she said, and they worked hard to build their home and a 'beautiful community.' She had two more children, and three chose to stay and raise their families in Netzer Hazoni. She can still recall the moment, 20 years ago, when 1,000 Israeli soldiers arrived at the gate to the settlement to remove the approximately 400 residents. Some of her neighbors lit their houses on fire in protest. 'Obviously it was a mistake to leave. The lives of the Arabs became much worse, and the lives of the Jews became much, much worse, with rockets and Oct. 7,' she said, referring to the decades of rockets fired from Gaza into Israel and the date in 2023 of the Hamas attack that launched the ongoing war. Despite the passage of time, her family still is 'yearning and longing for their home,' she said. Several of her 10 grandchildren, including some who spent their early childhood in the Gaza settlements, have served in the current war and were near her old house. 'It's hard to believe, because of all the terrible things that happened that we predicted, but we're willing to build there again,' said Tucker. Palestinians doubt Israel will ever fully withdraw from Gaza again After Israel's withdrawal 20 years ago, many Palestinians described Gaza as an 'open-air prison.' They had control on the inside – under a Hamas government that some supported but some saw as heavy-handed and brutal. But ultimately, Israel had a grip around the territory. Many Palestinians believe Sharon carried out the withdrawal so Israel could focus on cementing its control in the West Bank through settlement building. Now some believe more direct Israeli occupation is returning to Gaza. After 22 months of war, Israeli troops control more than 75% of Gaza, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks of maintaining security control long term after the war. Amjad Shawa, the director of the Palestinian NGO Network, said he doesn't believe Netanyahu will repeat Sharon's full withdrawal. Instead, he expects the military to continue controlling large swaths of Gaza through 'buffer zones.' The aim, he said, is to keep Gaza 'unlivable in order to change the demographics,' referring to Netanyahu's plans to encourage Palestinians to leave the territory. Israel is 'is reoccupying the Gaza Strip' to prevent a Palestinian state, said Mostafa Ibrahim, an author based in Gaza City whose home was destroyed in the current war. Missed opportunities Israeli former Maj. Gen. Dan Harel, who was head of the country's Southern Command during the disengagement, remembers the toll of protecting a few thousand settlers. There were an average of 10 attacks per day against Israeli settlers and soldiers, including rockets, roadside bombs big enough to destroy a tank, tunnels to attack Israeli soldiers and military positions, and frequent gunfire. 'Bringing a school bus of kids from one place to another required a military escort,' said Harel. 'There wasn't a future. People paint it as how wonderful it was there, but it wasn't wonderful.' Harel says the decision to evacuate Israeli settlements from the Gaza Strip was the right one, but that Israel missed crucial opportunities. Most egregious, he said, was a unilateral withdrawal without obtaining any concessions from the Palestinians in Gaza or the Palestinian Authority. He also sharply criticized Israel's policy of containment toward Hamas after disengagement. There were short but destructive conflicts over the years between the two sides, but otherwise the policy gave Hamas 'an opportunity to do whatever they wanted.' 'We had such a blind spot with Hamas, we didn't see them morph from a terror organization into an organized military, with battalions and commanders and infrastructure,' he said. The Oct. 7 attack, Israel's largest military intelligence failure to date, was not a result of the disengagement, said Harel. 'The main issue is what we did in the 18 years in between.' __ Associated Press writer Fatma Khaled contributed from Cairo.
Asharq Al-Awsat
18-06-2025
- Politics
- Asharq Al-Awsat
A Brand Bargain or a Major Conflict
For at least a year now, Iran and Israel have been fighting a direct conflict, after having waged a shadow war for decades. This is more than a regional power struggle; what we are witnessing is an existential war between two regimes as traditional pillars of deterrence erode, creating trajectories that are difficult to foresee. 1. Controlled Escalation The confrontation has yet to escalate into a full-scale war. Israel continues to target nuclear and military facilities, as well as supply chains. For its part, Tehran has retaliated with strikes intended to hurt Israeli society to the greatest extent possible, as it assumes that the Israelis cannot endure protracted conflict. Iran is betting that Israel cannot withstand attrition, while Israel is betting that Iran's limited missile stockpile (estimates put the number between 2,000 and 5,000 missiles) means that it will face a problem of diminishing returns as time goes on. 2. Total War Total war would be the most damaging scenario: strikes on oil facilities, infrastructure, and cities- a conflict between two rivals, separated by thousands of miles, that both have a vast arsenal. This level of escalation would almost certainly draw US intervention, igniting a regional war with catastrophic consequences for oil markets and the global economy. While there are no concrete indications that either side is seeking such a war, "fatal miscalculation" remains a serious and ever-present risk. 3. Diplomatic De-escalation This scenario remains on the table, but it requires political will and prudent use of leverage. However, recent developments have made this outcome less likely. Indeed, the prerequisites for de-escalation have been undermined, and no potential settlement can be limited to Iran's nuclear program any longer; its missile program and regional proxy network would now also have to be addressed. Pursuing this path would require a triangular consensus, at a minimum, between Washington, Tehran, and Tel Aviv, with a regional mediator facilitating the process. The goal, here, would be to lower tensions and lay the groundwork for a comprehensive political settlement. Nonetheless, this outcome remains far-fetched. The total lack of trust among the parties and stakeholders, the collapse of previous nuclear negotiations, and each side's determination to exploit what it perceives as its rival's domestic vulnerabilities have left them all locked into a high-stakes game of brinkmanship. The most likely outcome is continued clashes, interrupted by temporary pauses, that do not lead to a full-scale war. Israel understands that taking its offensive on Iran's oil facilities too far would provoke unprecedented retaliation and the ire of its allies- particularly the United States- because of the global economic repercussions of such action. Israeli military officials acknowledge the limits of their country's munitions, and they have admitted that they cannot destroy Iran's nuclear program on their own. As for inciting regime change instead of destroying Iran's nuclear program, that remains a step Israel cannot take unilaterally, at least for now. It is worth noting that US President Donald Trump refused to greenlight the assassination of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei- a decision that underscores Trump's preference to turn escalation into leverage that pulls Iran back to the negotiating table. Israel, meanwhile, has a broad array of tools with which it can gradually dismantle Iran's nuclear program: from targeted assassinations to cyberattacks and precision airstrikes. This sort of warfare is believed to be effective in achieving its strategic objectives while also allowing Israel to avoid a conventional war. Iran, for its part, cannot afford total war under the current circumstances: its economy is in decline, it has lost much of its senior military and security leadership, its missile stockpile has been depleted, and its proxy network has been degraded. Iran is likely to focus on maximizing the social, political, and economic toll of this war on Israel. It may seek to pace its attacks and avoid depleting its missile stockpile, or it could use capabilities that have yet to be revealed. Given the complexity of the situation, thinking outside of the box is crucial. The conflict between Iran and Israel is not a conventional war between two states. This conflict is a struggle rooted in revolutionary ideology. Deterrence is achieved through fear, and the two sides have fought several proxy wars. Accordingly, shifting the framework of the conflict should be the priority. The sides' existential enmity should be turned into a political rivalry, and the dynamics between them should be shaped by interests rather than ideology. The region needs a grand bargain that redefines Iran's position in the international order. Such a deal would entail Iran ending its role in the Palestine conflict, as well as abandoning its pursuit of exporting the revolution, in exchange for regional and international integration. Iran would be offered gradual sanctions relief and recognition of its regional power status in return for ending its military support to Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and the Iraqi militias, as well as freezing its sensitive nuclear enrichment. Regional powers would guarantee the implementation of this agreement. The time has come for Iran to remove the notion of "resistance" from its political imaginary, endorsing the logic of statehood within a global system instead. Iran is unlikely to mirror post–World War II Japan any time soon. But it could become a regional China if it stops anchoring its domestic and foreign policy in ideological hostility, embracing strategic realism in its place. This would mean integrating Iran into the regional architecture and encouraging the technocratic wing of the regime to pursue a strategy that prioritizes survival through adaptation rather than escalation. This is an opportune moment to build a coalition that blends power and pragmatism. This coalition could include regional powers, India, the Trump administration, and pragmatic and patriotic factions within Iran's political system. The latter are becoming increasingly aware that the revolution is no longer a vehicle for survival, and that it has become an existential threat to the state.
New York Times
08-05-2025
- Politics
- New York Times
Israel Has a Terrible Choice to Make
The war in Gaza has reached a predictable and deadly impasse. In response to the Hamas terrorist attack on Oct. 7, 2023, the Israeli government has publicly pursued two primary war aims. First, Israel wanted to secure the return of every hostage Hamas seized. Second, Israel wanted to destroy Hamas. At the same time, however, Israel also indicated that it did not want to reoccupy Gaza. There are good reasons for this. The international community is opposed to occupation, Israeli society is deeply divided by the idea, and the previous occupation ended poorly — with Hamas coming to power after Israel withdrew from the strip in 2005. But the brutal military fact is that rejecting occupation not only rendered Israel's vow to destroy Hamas incalculably more difficult, it made the war far more inhumane and deadly. I want to emphasize that this newsletter primarily offers a military analysis. It is not focused on politics. That's not because the politics of the situation are unimportant, but rather because we often pay too little attention to military realities, and the success or failure of military operations can completely transform the politics of an international crisis. As a military matter, if you do not seize and control territory, then your war is likely to devolve into an endless exercise in killing terrorists. And if terrorists illegally embed themselves in the civilian population (as Hamas has always done), then killing terrorists also means that civilians will be caught in the crossfire. Yes, the military can do enormous damage to terrorist forces and temporarily diminish their ability to carry out attacks, but if you do not replace terrorist control with a competing force, then jihadists have the time and space to eventually recover their strength. Want all of The Times? Subscribe.
