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Asharq Al-Awsat
10 hours ago
- Politics
- Asharq Al-Awsat
A Brand Bargain or a Major Conflict
For at least a year now, Iran and Israel have been fighting a direct conflict, after having waged a shadow war for decades. This is more than a regional power struggle; what we are witnessing is an existential war between two regimes as traditional pillars of deterrence erode, creating trajectories that are difficult to foresee. 1. Controlled Escalation The confrontation has yet to escalate into a full-scale war. Israel continues to target nuclear and military facilities, as well as supply chains. For its part, Tehran has retaliated with strikes intended to hurt Israeli society to the greatest extent possible, as it assumes that the Israelis cannot endure protracted conflict. Iran is betting that Israel cannot withstand attrition, while Israel is betting that Iran's limited missile stockpile (estimates put the number between 2,000 and 5,000 missiles) means that it will face a problem of diminishing returns as time goes on. 2. Total War Total war would be the most damaging scenario: strikes on oil facilities, infrastructure, and cities- a conflict between two rivals, separated by thousands of miles, that both have a vast arsenal. This level of escalation would almost certainly draw US intervention, igniting a regional war with catastrophic consequences for oil markets and the global economy. While there are no concrete indications that either side is seeking such a war, "fatal miscalculation" remains a serious and ever-present risk. 3. Diplomatic De-escalation This scenario remains on the table, but it requires political will and prudent use of leverage. However, recent developments have made this outcome less likely. Indeed, the prerequisites for de-escalation have been undermined, and no potential settlement can be limited to Iran's nuclear program any longer; its missile program and regional proxy network would now also have to be addressed. Pursuing this path would require a triangular consensus, at a minimum, between Washington, Tehran, and Tel Aviv, with a regional mediator facilitating the process. The goal, here, would be to lower tensions and lay the groundwork for a comprehensive political settlement. Nonetheless, this outcome remains far-fetched. The total lack of trust among the parties and stakeholders, the collapse of previous nuclear negotiations, and each side's determination to exploit what it perceives as its rival's domestic vulnerabilities have left them all locked into a high-stakes game of brinkmanship. The most likely outcome is continued clashes, interrupted by temporary pauses, that do not lead to a full-scale war. Israel understands that taking its offensive on Iran's oil facilities too far would provoke unprecedented retaliation and the ire of its allies- particularly the United States- because of the global economic repercussions of such action. Israeli military officials acknowledge the limits of their country's munitions, and they have admitted that they cannot destroy Iran's nuclear program on their own. As for inciting regime change instead of destroying Iran's nuclear program, that remains a step Israel cannot take unilaterally, at least for now. It is worth noting that US President Donald Trump refused to greenlight the assassination of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei- a decision that underscores Trump's preference to turn escalation into leverage that pulls Iran back to the negotiating table. Israel, meanwhile, has a broad array of tools with which it can gradually dismantle Iran's nuclear program: from targeted assassinations to cyberattacks and precision airstrikes. This sort of warfare is believed to be effective in achieving its strategic objectives while also allowing Israel to avoid a conventional war. Iran, for its part, cannot afford total war under the current circumstances: its economy is in decline, it has lost much of its senior military and security leadership, its missile stockpile has been depleted, and its proxy network has been degraded. Iran is likely to focus on maximizing the social, political, and economic toll of this war on Israel. It may seek to pace its attacks and avoid depleting its missile stockpile, or it could use capabilities that have yet to be revealed. Given the complexity of the situation, thinking outside of the box is crucial. The conflict between Iran and Israel is not a conventional war between two states. This conflict is a struggle rooted in revolutionary ideology. Deterrence is achieved through fear, and the two sides have fought several proxy wars. Accordingly, shifting the framework of the conflict should be the priority. The sides' existential enmity should be turned into a political rivalry, and the dynamics between them should be shaped by interests rather than ideology. The region needs a grand bargain that redefines Iran's position in the international order. Such a deal would entail Iran ending its role in the Palestine conflict, as well as abandoning its pursuit of exporting the revolution, in exchange for regional and international integration. Iran would be offered gradual sanctions relief and recognition of its regional power status in return for ending its military support to Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and the Iraqi militias, as well as freezing its sensitive nuclear enrichment. Regional powers would guarantee the implementation of this agreement. The time has come for Iran to remove the notion of "resistance" from its political imaginary, endorsing the logic of statehood within a global system instead. Iran is unlikely to mirror post–World War II Japan any time soon. But it could become a regional China if it stops anchoring its domestic and foreign policy in ideological hostility, embracing strategic realism in its place. This would mean integrating Iran into the regional architecture and encouraging the technocratic wing of the regime to pursue a strategy that prioritizes survival through adaptation rather than escalation. This is an opportune moment to build a coalition that blends power and pragmatism. This coalition could include regional powers, India, the Trump administration, and pragmatic and patriotic factions within Iran's political system. The latter are becoming increasingly aware that the revolution is no longer a vehicle for survival, and that it has become an existential threat to the state.
New York Times
08-05-2025
- Politics
- New York Times
Israel Has a Terrible Choice to Make
The war in Gaza has reached a predictable and deadly impasse. In response to the Hamas terrorist attack on Oct. 7, 2023, the Israeli government has publicly pursued two primary war aims. First, Israel wanted to secure the return of every hostage Hamas seized. Second, Israel wanted to destroy Hamas. At the same time, however, Israel also indicated that it did not want to reoccupy Gaza. There are good reasons for this. The international community is opposed to occupation, Israeli society is deeply divided by the idea, and the previous occupation ended poorly — with Hamas coming to power after Israel withdrew from the strip in 2005. But the brutal military fact is that rejecting occupation not only rendered Israel's vow to destroy Hamas incalculably more difficult, it made the war far more inhumane and deadly. I want to emphasize that this newsletter primarily offers a military analysis. It is not focused on politics. That's not because the politics of the situation are unimportant, but rather because we often pay too little attention to military realities, and the success or failure of military operations can completely transform the politics of an international crisis. As a military matter, if you do not seize and control territory, then your war is likely to devolve into an endless exercise in killing terrorists. And if terrorists illegally embed themselves in the civilian population (as Hamas has always done), then killing terrorists also means that civilians will be caught in the crossfire. Yes, the military can do enormous damage to terrorist forces and temporarily diminish their ability to carry out attacks, but if you do not replace terrorist control with a competing force, then jihadists have the time and space to eventually recover their strength. Want all of The Times? Subscribe.
