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Malaysiakini
12-08-2025
- Politics
- Malaysiakini
Malaysia's pusillanimous foreign policy
COMMENT | Successive prime ministers have, since Merdeka, played a major role in the making of the nation's foreign policy and raising its international profile. Tunku Abdul Rahman, Malaya and Malaysia's first prime minister, was instrumental in shaping the direction of our international relations, carving an independent path for the newly independent, sovereign nation. Tunku refused to join SEATO (the Alliance created by the US to confront Cold War paranoia and Communism) and the Non-Aligned Movement. He supported India in the Sino-Indian conflict in 1962. He bravely led the newly born Malaysia in its fight against the Indonesian Confrontation from 1963 to 1966. Finally, Tunku, unlike many of our neighbours, refused to support the US in the Vietnam War. Tunku steered the ship of state in dangerous, uncharted waters with confidence. Our national interest was always defended with all our might.
New Indian Express
04-08-2025
- Business
- New Indian Express
Cold War camaraderie: Why US refuses to take Pak to task
It was in 1991 that India-US relations began to acquire a strategic shape. With the Cold War concluded and the Soviet Union reduced to a diminished Russia, the US found itself in an unfamiliar role—as a lone superpower with global responsibilities. It recognised the dangers of complacency in victory and quickly began pivoting from its Atlantic preoccupations to the Asia Pacific, anticipating a new set of challengers. The growing rise of China, while facilitated in earlier decades by the US itself, had begun to look less like an opportunity and more like a coming storm. India, geographically positioned next to China, democratically stable and increasingly open to global markets, became a natural component of this new architecture—a potential US partner. Yet, for much of its early strategic phase, the India-US relationship remained cautiously transactional. Military-to-military ties grew at a measured pace, beginning with the Malabar exercises in 1992. Somehow, the trust deficit remained a Cold War legacy. The 1998 Pokhran nuclear tests were a shock to Washington and created an immediate rift. But this proved temporary. President George W Bush's outreach, culminating in the landmark civil nuclear deal, and external affairs minister Pranab Mukherjee's 2005 speech at RAND Corporation marked a turning point. India, at that point, became a more serious US partner. The devil in the relationship remained Pakistan. The US equivocation on Pakistan's role in cross-border terrorism has been one of the most vexing elements of this evolving relationship. Despite overwhelming evidence of Pakistan's nurturing of terror networks, Washington has not held Islamabad to account. It has always had the leverage—economic, diplomatic and military—but rarely used it. The oft-cited reason is strategic: an overstated fear of pushing Pakistan further into China's embrace. In reality, it is also an emotional and historical inertia rooted in the Cold War, SEATO, CENTO and years of military camaraderie.
Express Tribune
03-07-2025
- Politics
- Express Tribune
Big powers need to reassess postures towards Pakistan, India
The writer is an academic and researcher. He is also the author of Development, Poverty, and Power in Pakistan, available from Routledge Listen to article The recent Indo-Pak crisis has been temporarily defused by a still fragile ceasefire. Yet, this crisis has major policy implications not only for the subcontinent, but for the world's two major global superpowers, the US and China, which are locked in increasingly intensive great power competition. The impact of the unfolding great power competition has become particularly acute within South Asia. Much has been said about Pakistan's historical alliances with the US, and its growing strategic embrace with China, and America's simultaneous bet to help prop up India to counter China. However, these strategic policy postures cannot remain static but must instead be subjected to constant revision. The post-Pahalgam conflict was a defining moment which should provide strategic thinkers and policymakers ample reasons to reassess their postures, especially if they want to prevent another steep and slippery escalatory crisis between the neighbouring nuclearised rivals. Pakistan did not take long to side with the US during the Cold War, joining regional alliances such as SEATO and CENTO, way back in the 1950s. As India decided to remain non-aligned, the US had to walk a regional tightrope to prevent the Indians from joining the Soviet camp. While Pakistan was disappointed that the US did not come rushing to Pakistan's aid during its 1965 and 1971 wars with India, a lot of US aid poured into Pakistan to entice Presidents Zia and Musharraf to subsequently cooperate with the US in neighbouring Afghanistan. Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and before the post-9/11 US-led invasion of Afghanistan, Washington also became convinced of the need to simultaneously bolster its relations with New Delhi. Bill Clinton onwards, all US administrations have been wooing "the largest democracy in the world", considering it a natural ally to counterbalance the steady rise of Communist China. China, on the other hand, had extended the hand of friendship to Pakistan, viewing it is the ideal strategic ally to exert pressure on India, soon after the Sino-Indian war in 1962. China's relationship with Pakistan remained modest during the Cold War years, but when the US started bolstering its relationship with India, China also became convinced of the need to integrate Pakistan into its ambitious BRI vision. Alongside its economic relationship with Pakistan, the Chinese military also began forging closer ties with Pakistan, quickly supplanting Pakistan's reliance on American military hardware. However, the burning question now is, how China and the US will reposition their stances towards India and Pakistan following the post-Pahalgam confrontation? The US, alongside other regional mediators, did manage to secure de-escalation this time around. President Trump was quick to claim credit for defusing this crisis. Yet, his stated willingness to even resolve the 'fifteen-hundred-year-old' Kashmir dispute seems more a self-aggrandising assertion rather than a signal indicating a shift in America's longstanding stance of not meddling in this thorny dispute, especially without India's consent. While Pakistan has decided to nominate Trump for a Nobel Peace Prize, perhaps in the bid to pander to his ego, not many serious Pakistani analysts expect him to help resolve the Kashmir dispute. Conversely, many strategic advisors within the US still want it to continue bolstering India's capabilities. China may also have to pay the price of increased stress in its already strained relations with India for choosing to side openly with Pakistan during the recent military confrontation. India's decision to hold IWT in abeyance does not bode well for enabling regional stabilisation, especially if India chooses to disregard the recent decision by the International Court of Arbitration. Instead of using the Indo-Pak rivalry as another arena for proxy confrontation, a saner geostrategic recalibration necessitates placing greater emphasis on restraint, and the systematic mitigation of tensions between India, Pakistan and China. More cooperative approaches to water sharing and softening existing borders do exist, but they are unfortunately not being given the attention they need within our increasingly unstable and transactional world.
Mint
22-06-2025
- Politics
- Mint
There we go again: Will America ever rid itself of its Pakistan delusions?
Harsh V. Pant , Vinay Kaura US President Trump may have flattered Pakistan's General Asim Munir into tactical utility as it joins Israel's conflict with Iran. While India must stay alert to any Rawalpindi misadventure, these developments don't alter New Delhi's long-term strategic calculus. Trump's decision to engage directly and publicly with Pakistan's army chief through lunch diplomacy at the White House is hardly surprising. Gift this article In the arena of global diplomacy, where visible gestures are often decoys and true intentions remain hidden, last week's overture of US President Donald Trump towards Pakistan's army chief, General Asim Munir, needs to be understood not as a standalone event, but in the context of America's weekend strikes against three Iranian nuclear facilities: i.e., as part of a calculated manoeuvre rooted in both expediency and ignorance. In the arena of global diplomacy, where visible gestures are often decoys and true intentions remain hidden, last week's overture of US President Donald Trump towards Pakistan's army chief, General Asim Munir, needs to be understood not as a standalone event, but in the context of America's weekend strikes against three Iranian nuclear facilities: i.e., as part of a calculated manoeuvre rooted in both expediency and ignorance. That Trump 'was honoured" to meet Munir and publicly claimed Pakistanis 'knew Iran better than most" was not casual talk. It was a premeditated message that underscored America's need of Pakistan on its side both diplomatically and potentially as a military partner. Courting the Pakistani general, however, is also a misjudgement—a glimpse of America's enduring delusions. India can easily see through the US-Pakistan theatre. And it need not react with anxiety or noise. Instead, it should observe, evaluate, and, when needed, act with precision. Trump's decision to engage directly with Pakistan's army chief through lunch diplomacy at the White House is hardly surprising. It is a throwback to the antiquated logic of bipolar era diplomacy where the American state, impatient with the democratic disorder in a military-dominated milieu, finds solace in military men—generals who make lofty promises of order, control and silence. As a veteran of anti-communist Cold War alliances SEATO and CENTO and a front-line US ally during the Soviet-Afghan war, Pakistan is well-versed with the nuances of American strategy making. From Dwight D. Eisenhower's fondness of General Ayub Khan to Ronald Reagan's strategic embrace of General Zia-ul-Haq, the American presidency has followed a consistent pattern. However, as history has demonstrated, courting generals may yield a tactical advantage but invite strategic disaster. What differs this time is the subtext. Trump's praise of Pakistan's knowledge of Iran is more than rhetorical flattery. It is a signal to the Pentagon and the Israeli right alike: the US, with Iran's nuclear programme in its crosshairs, views the Pakistani military machine as a potential lever in the broader Middle Eastern calculus. That Pakistani people, by and large, are sympathetic towards Iran and view Israeli aggression dimly is irrelevant in this cynical calculation. Powerful quarters in Washington see the Pakistani army as a lever of consequence. Also Read: Pakistan's economy must escape the clutches of its armed forces Against this backdrop, the much-hyped lunch with Munir was not a diplomatic courtesy; it was psychological inflation, a deliberate stroking of the ego of a man who views himself in imperial terms as a field marshal presiding over a captive polity. Even as Trump was boasting of his role in 'averting war" between India and Pakistan—a false claim that New Delhi had rejected firmly and early—he was probably aware of the war plans unfolding in Tel Aviv. Israel's airstrikes of 13 June against Iran had not yet taken place, but their outlines were already drawn. The choreography of the flattery of Munir within days of Tel Aviv's action was not about equations in South Asia, but a likely prelude to another play for power in West Asia. In joining Israel with US firepower—although he could've confined the American role to supporting Tel Aviv with diplomacy and intelligence—Trump has apparently opted to sacrifice strategic flexibility and risk losing diplomatic leverage. The Pakistani military may be willing to take extraordinary risks in acting against Iranian interests, provided it is assured by Washington of anything resembling a tactical advantage vis-a-vis India. Pakistan's official condemnation of Israeli strikes on Iran was rendered immaterial by the image of its field marshal seated at Trump's lunch table. Also Read: Nitin Pai: How to dissuade Pakistan from deploying terrorism This raises vital strategic implications for India. First, it affirms the reality that Pakistan's military is its only coherent institution, with an unequalled grip over its foreign policy, nuclear doctrine and internal security. Second, it underscores that the West, particularly the US ruling elite, continues to see Pakistan through a transactional lens. This isn't new but increasingly out of touch with current geopolitical realities. The message from Prime Minister Narendra Modi's recent rejection of Trump's gratuitous claim regarding the India-Pakistan ceasefire is clear: India would not be dragged into a charade of equivalence. This is not the Cold War era or a unipolar moment. India does not share a hyphen with Pakistan; what it shares is a geography, and increasingly, very little else. In the Trump-Munir exchange, New Delhi sees a populist president who treats foreign policy as theatre, a militarized state desperate for global validation and a global order that is once again flirting dangerously with instability. Yet, this spectacle calls for vigilance. The symbolic coronation of Munir within Pakistan could animate the military establishment to engage in brinkmanship. New Delhi cannot afford to become complacent. It is premature to judge whether this reset in the US-Pakistan relationship is a thaw or an upswing; yet, in flattering Munir, Trump has opened the door to a broader psychological campaign detrimental to India's stance: one that seeks to position the Pakistani military as a stabilizing force, even as it acts as the principal agent of regional instability. Also Read: Pakistan's IMF bailout: Good money after bad again? India should keep deepening its strategic relationships—not just with the US, whose political trajectory remains clouded, but with the EU, France, Japan, Gulf countries and Australia. The West must also be reminded: if it seeks a counterweight to Chinese power, it will not find it in the client military of a garrison state. It will find it in a vibrant democracy that's a bulwark against authoritarianism. India is not merely a 'market' or a 'partner'; it is the backbone of any reliable Indo-Pacific institutional architecture. The great blunder of US diplomacy has long been its impatience. It seeks short-term gains over long-term understanding. Its gestures often appear dramatic, but its memory is woefully short. India has no need to highlight its importance; it must only act in accordance with it. Last week's spectacle was farcical but calls for reflection. As the Trump-led White House seeks to remake old alliances on discredited assumptions, the smile on Munir's face as he sat across from Trump was not the smile of victory. It was the smile of a man flattered into tactical utility. India, having seen many Pakistani generals flattered before their fall, has no need for such illusions. The authors are, respectively, professor of international relations, King's College London, and assistant professor, international affairs and security studies, Sardar Patel University of Police, Security & Criminal Justice. Topics You May Be Interested In
Indian Express
20-06-2025
- Business
- Indian Express
Why India doesn't need to worry about the Trump-Munir lunch
US President Donald Trump's recent lunch meeting with Pakistan's Army Chief, General Asim Munir, has raised more than a few eyebrows, particularly in India. Munir is not a well-known figure in Washington's strategic circles and yet, he found himself seated across from the most powerful man in the world. For many, it seemed like a bizarre political detour. But if one strips away sentiment and looks through the lens of history and statecraft, the picture becomes clearer. As the old adage goes, nations have no permanent friends or enemies — only permanent interests. What we are witnessing is not a departure from norms but a reaffirmation of how American foreign policy has long worked, particularly when it comes to Pakistan. Pakistan occupies one of the most strategically sensitive pieces of real estate in the world. It borders five civilisational and geopolitical spheres: Indian, Chinese, Central Asian, Persian and Arab. No other space in the world offers such a dense intersection of influence. That alone ensures that Pakistan, regardless of its economic health or internal chaos, will continue to feature in the calculus of global powers. This is not a new phenomenon. From the 1950s onwards, Pakistan was a member of both SEATO and CENTO — Cold War alliances aimed at containing communism. In 1960, CIA pilot Gary Powers flew a U-2 spy plane from Peshawar over Soviet territory, which was later shot down, sparking an international crisis. In the 1970s, Pakistan served as the covert conduit through which President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger opened diplomatic relations with China. Crucially, after 9/11, Pakistan's territory became indispensable for US operations in Afghanistan. Whether it was providing a logistics corridor for NATO supplies, intelligence coordination (however uneven), or access to airbases, Pakistan allowed America to wage a two-decade war in its backyard without the financial and operational burden of establishing new infrastructure in Central Asia. Without Pakistan, the Afghan war would have cost three times as much and been logistically far more challenging. Many Indians are rightly puzzled by Washington's recurring tilt toward Pakistan, especially when it is common knowledge that Pakistan has harboured and supported anti-India terror networks. However, the US Department of Defence has maintained a deep institutional relationship with the Pakistan army that survives changes in political mood. America may mistrust Pakistan's civilian governments or even its double-dealing on terrorism, but it views the Pakistan military as a rational, hierarchical force that can 'get things done'. I attended training courses and programmes in the US. I can state that in a lineup of Indian and Pakistani officers from the armed forces, an American general will always shake hands first with the Pakistanis. That calculus has not changed. Trump's meeting with Munir signals a tactical re-engagement rather than a fundamental strategic pivot. The US may be planning for renewed contingency operations in Afghanistan, hedging against China's Belt and Road Initiative via CPEC, or managing risks in Iran and Central Asia. Pakistan is relevant in all these theatres. At the same time, India must recognise that its own strategic partnership with the US remains strong and is grounded in very different fundamentals. Since 1991, when India opened up its economy and began integrating with the global order, relations with Washington have steadily deepened. The nuclear deal of 2008, defence cooperation under LEMOA and COMCASA, technology partnerships and the rise of the Quad reflect this. However, this relationship is not immune to friction. India's insistence on strategic autonomy occasionally confounds American expectations. Nowhere was this more visible than during the Ukraine war. While the West imposed sweeping sanctions on Russia, India chose a path of calibrated engagement — buying oil at discounted rates, abstaining at the UN, and maintaining robust dialogue with both sides. This decision wasn't about fence-sitting; it was about placing Indian national interest above alliance politics. Washington noticed — and, to its credit, ultimately respected — India's position. But the episode was a timely reminder; even close partners will diverge when their interests do. Seen in this light, Trump's outreach to Pakistan should not be read as a betrayal or a shift away from India. It is better understood as tactical engagement driven by geography, legacy relationships, and evolving regional threats. Pakistan will always offer America access, whether for leverage in Kabul, observation posts against Iran, or to counter Chinese expansion. But such engagement is opportunistic, not strategic. India's strength lies elsewhere. We are not a country that offers itself as an operational base or intermediary. We offer long-term strategic value; a stable democracy, a massive consumer market, a growing technological base, a competent military, and a rules-based approach to global governance. We are not transactional in our diplomacy; we are a civilisational state with depth. Pakistan's ruling elite — particularly its military — has always sought visibility abroad to compensate for instability at home. Foreign engagements like the one with Trump are often used to burnish credentials domestically. But Pakistan's fundamentals remain fragile: An economy in freefall, a splintered polity, and an increasingly alienated populace. America knows this. While it may engage Islamabad's generals from time to time, it does not mistake tactical necessity for strategic trust. India, on the other hand, has remained firm and predictable through global flux. India remained steady whether it was Covid, the Afghanistan pull-out, or the energy crisis after Ukraine. That is the hallmark of a reliable partner, not one that flits in and out of favour but one that shows up and stays the course. Let us not be distracted by luncheon invites. Let us remain focused on India's trajectory. We are not a fly-by-night friend of the US — we are a strategic power in our own right. We are neither insecure about Pakistan's moment in the sun nor anxious for validation. We should be confident that the more uncertain the world becomes, the more valuable India's stability will appear. The US knows this, even if it occasionally wanders in search of old allies for new problems. Real partnership is tested over time — and India has passed that test repeatedly. The US may dip back into its Pakistan playbook occasionally, but its real bet is on a rising India. That bet may not always be loud, but it will be lasting. The writer is a former corps commander of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps and a member of the National Disaster Management Authority. Views are personal
